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Preface 
This book was written in an effort to present a comprehensive overview of the findings and 
proposed solutions elaborated after 2004 by a Karlsruhe group of retired scientists of the 
former Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Technology of the former Karlsruhe 
Nuclear Research Center about the problem of “Plutonium Proliferation of Nuclear Power”. 
These findings were published in two scientific journals between 2007 and 2010 as solutions 
to subproblems of plutonium proliferation. 
From the beginnings of the civil use of nuclear power there have been fears that such use 
could produce fissile nuclear material (highly enriched uranium with up to 93% U-235 or 
more than 12% U-233, or weapon-grade plutonium or neptunium), which could be passed on 
or used directly to build nuclear weapons. 
All official nuclear weapon states (NWS) so far (USA, Russia, UK, France, China, India, 
Pakistan), however, conducted the development and construction of their nuclear weapons in 
special military programs and started the civil use of nuclear power at a later date. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in Vienna in 1956, and the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was presented for signature in 1968, to solve the 
proliferation problem. By 2003, the NPT had been signed and ratified by 186 nations of the 
world. 
From around 1970 onward, the IAEA published a series of statements in INFCIRC reports 
and scientific and technical publications. According to these rules, IAEA inspectors may 
monitor the inventories of fissile materials in the facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle 
(enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, nuclear power plants, reprocessing plants, waste 
disposal) of the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) running civil nuclear power programs. 
Scientific equipment and analytical methods for measuring fissile material inventories are 
now available. 
However, three events in 1975-1980 caused further international discussions and restrictions, 
especially in the United States of America: 
– The Indian initiation of a nuclear explosive in 1974. 
– The finding that the spent fuel elements of civil nuclear reactors had accumulated more 
plutonium than had existed in the nuclear weapon arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. 
– The realization in the FORD-MITRE study (1977), that reactor-grade plutonium was good 
for nuclear weapons which, though unreliable and only able to generate relatively low 
explosion energies, could still be dangerous nuclear explosives. 
The United States then gave up reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel elements and the 
technology of recycling plutonium in nuclear reactors approximately in 1978-80. Also the 
development of breeder reactors based on the uranium/plutonium fuel cycle was abandoned. 
“Direct disposal” of spent fuel elements was proposed instead. Only a few states with 
programs to utilize nuclear power followed this proposal after some delay. 
Roughly around 1995, the USA and Russia, as part of their obligations under the NPT, 
decided to transfer to the civil nuclear fuel cycle and use a total of approx. 50 t of their 
weapon-grade plutonium and several 100 tons of their highly U-235-enriched weapon-grade 
uranium. The UK is the only other nuclear weapon state to follow that example. In addition, 
    
the nuclear weapon arsenals of the USA and Russia were reduced by other disarmament 
agreements. 
At the same time scientific organizations in the USA (US-Department of Energy, American 
Physical Society, and American Nuclear Society) reiterated the assertion that it was possible 
to use reactor-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons. Since 1972 the IAEA provisions 
continue to be upheld (INFCIRC/173) that all plutonium of the civil nuclear fuel cycle was to 
be treated like weapon-grade plutonium (with the exception of plutonium containing more 
than 80% of the Pu-238 isotope). 
As a consequence of this situation, large reprocessing plants for spent nuclear fuel have been 
built and commissioned so far only in NWS (France, UK, Russia). Japan is an exception with 
its 800 t/a plant of Rokkasho-mura. The reasons are the very restrictive conditions imposed 
by the IAEA and the limited accuracy in measuring the plutonium inventories of large 
reprocessing plants. 
However, the civil use of nuclear power has progressed further since 1990. Around 2010, 
approx. 430 GW(e) of civil nuclear power plants were operated in the world, and another 35-
40 GW(e) were being planned or under construction. The quantity of plutonium, neptunium, 
and americium in spent fuel elements has accumulated to approx. 2300 tonnes of reactor-
grade plutonium, some 90 tonnes of neptunium, and 150 tonnes of americium. Only some 
30% of these fuel elements were reprocessed in NWSs and recycled as uranium/plutonium 
mixed oxide fuel especially in Europe and Japan. 
It has become clear in the meantime that all plutonium and neptunium (except for small 
residues of approx. 0.1% in the chemical steps of reprocessing plants and in refabrication) 
can be destroyed by nuclear fission. Direct disposal as planned in the United States (Yucca 
Mountain repository) has suffered a setback. The licensing applications filed for that 
repository were withdrawn by the U.S. Department of Energy. 
In this general situation, the “Karlsruhe Group” queried the statement, in scientific and 
technical terms, that reactor-grade plutonium of any composition could be used to make 
nuclear explosives. Limits were worked out above which the share of Pu-238 isotopes in 
plutonium renders the use in nuclear explosives technically impossible (proliferation-proof). 
Moreover, options are indicated for the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle which allow plutonium 
with a sufficiently high content of Pu-238 to be produced. This Pu-238-isotope content can 
be maintained even after repeated recycling. Nuclear weapon-grade neptunium can be 
avoided in these nuclear fuel cycle options. The use of americium allows also the plutonium 
generated in breeder blankets to be kept always above the proposed limit of the Pu-238 
isotope content. In this way, also the construction of nuclear explosives with blanket 
plutonium of fast breeders becomes impossible. 
In this scenario, future breeder technology also would permit complete use of U-238 for 
nuclear fission and employ only so-called proliferation-proof plutonium. In this way, the 
exploitation of the uranium resource could be increased by a factor of 100. 
The present status of the civil use of nuclear power with the U/Pu nuclear fuel cycle and the 
associated IAEA safeguards is described briefly in Sections 1-8. This was deemed to be 
necessary to explain the background to the previous debates about safeguards and the 
proliferation problem. 
    
The analysis of assertions that reactor-grade plutonium could be used for nuclear explosives, 
and the very restrictive regulations by the IAEA, are described in Sections 9-11. New 
scientific solutions with denatured or proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium to run 
future LWRs and FBRs are covered in Sections 12-14. These new technical and scientific 
approaches at the same time allow plutonium, neptunium, and americium to be incinerated 
through nuclear fission. 
The author had the good fortune to work on the solution of these problems with outstanding 
members, now retired, of the former Institute of Neutron Physics and Reactor Technology of 
the former Karlsruhe Research Center. These are 
Prof. Dr. W. Seifritz Dr. B. Goel Dipl.Math. W. Höbel 
Dr. C.H.M. Broeders Dr. D. Wilhelm Dr. A. Rineiski 
He wishes to dedicate Chapters 9-14 to these excellent scientists. 
The scientific findings described in Sections 9-14 were discussed at international workshops 
and covered in seven publications in “Nuclear Science and Engineering” and “Nuclear 
Engineering and Design.” 
Prof. Dr. Y. Fuji-ie (Emeritus Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission) first 
suggested that, roughly about the year 2005, both actinide incineration and the solution to the 
nuclear proliferation problem might be linked. The international workshops were organized 
by 
Prof. Dr. Saito, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan, 
Dr. Ch. Ganguly, International Atomic Energy Agency, Austria: 
– International Seminar on "Advanced Nuclear Energy System Toward Zero Release of 
Radioactive Wastes," Susono, Japan, November 6-9, 2000, 
– IAEA Consultancy Meeting on "Protected Plutonium Production," IAEA, Vienna, 
Austria, June 19-20, 2003, 
– International Science and Technology Forum on "Protected Plutonium Utilization for 
Peace and Sustainable Prosperity," Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, 
March 1-3, 2004, 
– IAEA Consultancy Meeting on "Protected Plutonium Production," IAEA, Vienna, 
Austria, June 15-16, 2006, 
– COE Satellite Technical Meeting on Non-proliferation and Protected Plutonium 
Production, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, December 1, 2006, 
– International Science and Technology Forum on "Protected Plutonium Utilization for 
Peace and Sustainable Prosperity," Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, 
September 16-19, 2008. 
Prof. Dr. V. Artisyuk, Obninsk State University and SCICET (Rosatom) in Obninsk, Russia, 
directed these workshops: 
– Special Session on "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Materials" at the 10th International 
Conference on Nuclear Power Safety and Nuclear Education, October 1-7, 2007, 
Obninsk, Russia, 
    
– International Workshop on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Materials, September 29 to 
October 3, 2008, Obninsk, Russia, 
– International Workshop on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Materials, September 29 to 
October 3, 2009, Obninsk, Russia. 
The author would like to thank the following scientists for assisting him with critical 
discussions and suggestions in the analysis of the proliferation problem: 
– Dr. E. Kiefhaber (retired scientist of the same Institute as the author). His help and his 
critical comments were of inestimable value in writing and publishing this book. 
– Prof. W. Häfele, former Director of the Research Centers of Jülich and Dresden, Germany, 
für his interest and critical suggestions. 
– Prof. H.H. Hennies, one of the former Directors of the Karlsruhe Research Center, for his 
support and advice. 
– Prof. Dr. jur. Burckhardt Jähnke, Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court, Karlsruhe, 
Germany, for his advice on German publication law. 
– Dr. G. Schumacher for his continued interest. 
– A number of former staff members for their suggestions in numerical mathematics and 
information technology. 
The author hopes that this book will make a helpful contribution to the advancement of the 
difficult future scientific and political discussion of the nuclear proliferation problem. 
 
 
 
G. Kessler 
Karlsruhe, December 15, 2010 
    
Summary 
A brief outline of the historical development of the proliferation problem is followed by a 
description of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle with uranium enrichment, fuel 
fabrication, the light-water reactors mainly in operation, and the breeder reactors still under 
development. The next item discussed is reprocessing of spent fuel with plutonium recycling 
and the future possibility to incinerate plutonium and the minor actinides: neptunium, 
americium, and curium. Much attention is devoted to the technical and scientific treatment of 
the IAEA surveillance concept of the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle. In this context, 
especially the physically possible accuracy of measuring U/Pu flow in the fuel cycle, and the 
criticism expressed of the accuracy in measuring the plutonium balance in large reprocessing 
plants of non-nuclear weapon states are analyzed. 
The second part of the book initially examines the assertion that reactor-grade plutonium 
could be used to build nuclear weapons whose explosive yield cannot be predicted 
accurately, but whose minimum explosive yield is still far above that of chemical explosive 
charges. Methods employed in reactor physics are used to show that such hypothetical 
nuclear explosive devices (HNEDs) would attain too high temperatures in the required 
implosion lenses as a result of the heat generated by the Pu-238 isotope always present in 
reactor plutonium of current light-water reactors. These lenses would either melt or tend to 
undergo chemical auto-explosion. Limits to the content of the Pu-238 isotope are determined 
above which such hypothetical nuclear weapons are not feasible on technical grounds. This 
situation is analyzed for various possibilities of the technical state of the art of making 
implosion lenses and various ways of cooling up to the use of liquid helium. The outcome is 
that, depending on the existing state of the art, reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel 
elements of light-water reactors with a burnup of 35 to 58 GWd/t cannot be used for making 
nuclear weapons. This statement does not apply to reactor-grade plutonium from fuel 
elements of lower burnup of less than 30 GWd/t (heavy-water reactors, older gas-graphite 
reactors or researach reactors), as their plutonium contains too little of the Pu-238 isotope. 
Today’s light-water reactors, however, attain fuel burnups in excess of 50 GWd/t. In the 
future, fuel burnups of more than 60 GWd/t are aimed at. 
In the next part of the book, nuclear fuel cycle options are examined which allow larger 
shares of the Pu-238 plutonium isotope (up to more than 10%) in reactor-grade plutonium to 
be achieved. This is easily possible by using re-enriched reprocessed uranium (RRU) arising 
in reprocessing spent fuel, whose low contents of U-235 and U-236 can be enriched. 
Moreover, the minor actinides, neptunium and americium, can be added to the fresh fuel. 
It is shown that reactor-grade americium produced in spent fuel cannot be used to build 
nuclear weapons for similar reasons as reactor-grade plutonium. The Am-241 isotope always 
present in reactor-grade americium generates so much heat as a result of alpha decay that any 
use in making hypothetical nuclear weapons becomes technically unfeasible. The nuclear 
physics properties of the neptunium minor actinide, however, are such that it can be used 
directly as a metal to build nuclear weapons. This leaves the only possibility to prevent 
neptunium in future nuclear fuel cycles. Such fuel cycle options are analyzed in the last but 
one chapter of the book. 
The last chapter of the book contains a proposal of a transition phase leading to a future 
proliferation-proof civil use of nuclear power. This employs the IAEA proposal henceforth to 
use multilateral fuel cycle centers which are multinational. As today’s large enrichment 
plants and reprocessing facilities are operated almost exclusively in nuclear weapon states, 
    
and as plutonium recycling is most advanced there as well, these are also the places where 
existing light-water reactors could produce plutonium with a higher Pu-238 content using 
neptunium and re-enriched reprocessed uranium. This is done by chemical co-separation of 
plutonium and neptunium in reprocessing. This plutonium, which has a higher content of Pu-
238, is proliferation-proof, i.e. cannot be abused to make nuclear weapons. It can be used and 
burnt in non-nuclear weapon states under surveillance by the IAEA. 
To hold this plutonium always at the required (proliferation-proof) content of Pu-238, several 
percent of (proliferation-proof) americium must be added to the fresh fuel. In this way, it is 
possible in a future proliferation-proof uranium-plutonium fuel cycle incorporating light-
water reactors and breeders with a fast neutron spectrum to use U-238 and so produce energy 
over very long periods of time (thousands of years) and incinerate all the existing plutonium 
and minor actinides. This can be achieved by a sophisticated change in the uranium-
plutonium fuel cycle and by the production of reactor-grade proliferation-proof plutonium 
with higher contents of Pu-238. 
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 1
1. Nuclear Proliferation and IAEA-Safeguards 
1.1 Historical Development 
Unfortunately, the first application of nuclear energy occurred for military use in 1945. The 
plutonium for this military application had been produced in special graphite moderated gas 
cooled reactors. Some years later pressurized water reactors were first used for nuclear 
submarine propulsion. Civil application of nuclear energy with electricity generating nuclear 
power reactors did not start until 1955-1958. 
Therefore, nuclear technology is considered to be a dual use technology which allows both 
peaceful and military applications. From the peaceful use of nuclear energy technologies, 
nuclear materials and nuclear facilities have been disseminated all over the world. 
Nuclear weapons were developed and manufactured before and independently of  the 
peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. This has been borne out by historical developments 
so far in nuclear weapon countries, e.g. the USA (1945), USSR (1949), UK (1953), France 
(1960), China (1964) as well as in the de facto nuclear weapon states: India (1974), Pakistan 
(1998), Israel and North Korea (2008). All these Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) produced 
their fissile nuclear materials: highly enriched uranium (93% U-235) or weapon-grade 
plutonium by military programs and not through the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Accordingly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot simply be prevented by restrictions 
on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The inherent proliferation risk in the use of nuclear energy was recognized at the very 
beginning of the development of nuclear power, and a number of proposals have been made 
and measures taken in the course of time to prevent proliferation. The period up until 1953 
can be regarded as a phase of complete classification of any kind of utilization of nuclear 
power. As early as 1945/46, the idea originated in the USA to make the peaceful utilization 
of nuclear power accessible to other states while, at the same time, preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The proposal contained in the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal 
report provided for the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," 
which was to manage or possess all nuc1ear activities, i.e., an international body to 
monopolize the field of nuclear power utilization. In 1946, the USA submitted a proposal to 
the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. That proposal, which became known 
as the "Baruch Plan," failed because it called for a far-reaching surrender of national 
sovereignty; and therefore classification was maintained [1]. 
The worldwide utilization of nuclear power began with the "Atoms for Peace" program 
announced by US President Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in December 1953, under which a promotion of nuclear power utilization was planned in 
conjunction with control measures. This initiative also lead to the 1954 Geneva United 
Nations Conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One major constituent of the plan 
was the establishment of an "International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," which was to 
promote and, at the same time, monitor all international cooperation in the field of nuclear 
technology. After a series of negotiations, the IAEA Statute was submitted for signature in 
October 1956. Article II of that Statute reads, inter alia: "The Agency ensures, so far as it is 
able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose” (IAEA Statute) [2]. 
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Controls were defined in agreements between the IAEA and the countries it supports. The 
guideline used was the INFCIRC/66 document, "The Agency's Safeguards System" [3]. It 
provided for controls of plants and materials. A system of records, reports and inspections 
was created. The IAEA’s only verifying compliance were agreements by the signatory states, 
i.e., to not abuse nuclear power for military purposes. 
In 1957, the European Community established in the frame of the Euratom Treaty a 
nuclear material control system.  Euratom safeguards were designed to ensure that nuclear 
materials were not diverted from their intended use and to guarantee that the Community 
complies with its international obligations concerning the supply and use of nuclear 
materials. Supply agreements with  Euratom employed  Euratom safeguards in recognition of 
the multinational character of its safeguards system. After the full development of IAEA 
safeguards, special arrangements and cooperative mechanisms between  Euratom and IAEA 
inspections were worked out and continue to evolve. 
The safeguards system at that time had been designed for the surveillance of small reactor 
plants below 100 MW(e) power output. It was soon found to be inadequate for a quickly 
expanding commercial nuclear power reactor technology. In 1963 the first civil nuclear 
power reactors were ordered in the USA, Russia, Canada, the UK, France and other European 
countries. All countries built their own commercial nuclear power reactors with several 100 
MW(e) output. 
It remained at the discretion of these countries to build and operate nuclear facilities 
without IAEA controls. As a consequence, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (UN Treaty Series No. 
9068) [4] was concluded in 1967 for the Latin American countries, and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) was negotiated and signed in 1968. It entered into force in May 1970 
(INFCIRC/140) [5]. This is a summary of its contents: 
Each non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that becomes party to the NPT binds itself not 
to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives (Article II). It also binds itself to 
conclude an agreement with IAEA for the application of safeguards to all its peaceful 
nuclear activities with a view to verifying the fulfilment of its obligations under the 
treaty (Article III). 
In return, the treaty recognizes the right of all parties to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information 
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; in other words, all parties are guaranteed full 
access to peaceful nuclear technology (Article IV). 
The parties also undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear 
disarmament (Article VI) and reaffirm their determination to achieve the 
discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons (Preamble); these latter commitments 
apply principally to the nuc1ear weapon states (NWSs) themselves. 
The safeguards required under the NPT shall be applied to all sources and special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
The structure and the contents of a verification agreement are contained in a 
recommendation by IAEA, which was to constitute the basis of negotiations, but in fact 
represents the contents of all agreements. This was documented in INFCIRC/153 Corrected 
(1972) [6]. This document became the basis for all Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
between NPT member states and the IAEA. These agreements have a number of important 
features. One is the requirement to place under safeguards all nuclear materials in peaceful 
uses in the state, which would later prove to have significance in determining the Agency's 
authority to search for undeclared nuclear materials and activities. A second feature is the 
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requirement for states to establish so-called State's System of Accounting and Control 
(SSACs) to track domestic inventories of nuclear materials and provide reports to the IAEA. 
In many countries, these SSACs are also the national authorities regulating nuclear activities 
including domestic safeguards and security. A third feature is that the agreement obligates the 
IAEA to apply safeguards with all states that have such agreements. Part II of INFCIRC/153 
Corrected outlines detailed procedures for the application of IAEA safeguards under the 
agreement. 
India's nuclear test explosion in 1974 shocked the nuclear non-proliferation community. It 
initiated greater interest in controlling the nuclear trade (nuclear fuel and technology) and 
lead to the association of states exporting nuclear technology called Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
This group agreed to enforced rules requiring special commitments to non-proliferation 
criteria from recipient states. 
In 1975 M. Willrich and Th. Taylor [7] warned of possible theft of nuclear materials and 
stated that reactor-grade plutonium could be misused for crude and inefficient nuclear 
explosive devices. The steadily increasing amounts of spent fuel from the growing nuclear 
industry and the plans for reprocessing and plutonium recycling in reactors lead to even more 
serious concerns. As a consequence the results of the FORD/MITRE [8] report published in 
1977 became the basis for the declaration by US-president J. Carter that the USA would 
refrain from civil reprocessing of spent fuel, plutonium recycling and breeder technology. 
The US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 (NAPA) strengthened international control 
and security measures to avoid further proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge. 
The burnup of spent fuel in gas cooled reactors and heavy water reactors – using natural 
uranium as fresh fuel – was about 7 GWd/t at that time and for light water reactors the 
burnup of the spent fuel was increased up to about 30 GWd/t. Table 1.1 shows the plutonium 
isotopic compositions of such reactor-grade plutonium and compares them with weapon-
grade plutonium (the sum for isotopic compositions of weapon-grade plutonium does not add 
up fully to unity). 
 
Plutonium isotopic composition Reactor type Burnup 
GWd/t Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
MAGNOX 5 0 0.685 0.25 0.053 0.012 
CANDU 7.5 0 0.668 0.265 0.055 0.012 
PWR 30 0.016 0.565 0.238 0.128 0.053 
Weapon-grade plutonium 
(US-DOE, US-NRC) 
very low 0.00012 0.938 0.058 0.0035 0.00022 
Table 1.1. Isotopic composition (weight fraction) of plutonium separated from gas cooled 
reactors (MAGNOX), Heavy Water Reactors (CANDUs) and Pressurized Water 
Reactors (PWRs) around 1975 in comparison with weapon-grade plutonium as 
defined by US-DOE and US-NRC [14]. 
 
Table 1.1 explains that there were already considerable differences for reactor-grade 
plutonium and weapon-grade plutonium around 1975. These differences increased 
considerably until 2010. The burnup of LWR spent fuel of LWRs was increased for 
economical reasons up to 55 GWd/t in 2010 (Section 9). 
The following international debate on civil reprocessing and reactor-grade plutonium 
recycling lead to a two-year International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) [9] under the 
guidance of the IAEA in Vienna. The result of these studies was that under the considered 
burnup conditions of the spent fuel there are no fuel cycle options which could guarantee 
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absolute proliferation resistance. Therefore, it was recommended that safeguard concepts 
should be further developed and more institutional concepts, such as collocation of fuel 
reprocessing and re-fabrication plants or international spent fuel storage facilities and other 
technical measures, e.g. co-processing, should be developed. 
Denaturing, i.e., dilution of fissile isotopes by non-fissile isotopes to such an extent that 
the fissile material can not directly be used for nuclear weapons, was proposed as a technical 
measure. 
For uranium fuel it was proposed keeping U-235/U-238 mixtures below 20% of U-235 
and U-233/U-238 mixtures below 12% of U-233 (Section 8.1.1). 
Denaturing of reactor-grade plutonium by the isotope Pu-238 to contents higher than 
about 5% in plutonium in order to increase the proliferation-resistance of reactor-grade 
plutonium, was proposed in the scientific literature by Campbell and Gift (1978) [10], 
Heising-Goodman (1980) [11], as well as Massey and Schneider (1982) [12]. Unfortunately 
these scientific proposals were not pursued further. 
The US administration decided the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 which defines a 
nuclear waste policy allowing only direct spent fuel disposal in deep geological repositories. 
France, the UK, Russia and Japan did not follow this once-through fuel cycle strategy. They 
built civil reprocessing facilities (LaHague, in France, Windscale known also as Sellafield in 
the UK and Rokkasho-mura in Japan) to chemically reprocess their own as well as foreign 
spent fuel. Sweden and Finland decided to follow the once-through fuel cycle concept that 
provides permanent spent fuel storage in deep geological repositories. Germany and 
Switzerland allowed both lines (reprocessing with plutonium recycling or direct spent fuel 
disposal). But Germany refrained from the reprocessing strategy in 2005. 
The international safeguards system was extended and improved considerably during the 
time period 1980 - 2006. Among the research and development efforts were the destructive 
and nondestructive assay methods used for independent measurements by IAEA inspectors. 
The concepts of material balance areas (MBAs) with key measurement points (KMPs), as 
well as near real time accountancy (NRTA) and the containment and surveillance (C/S) 
concepts were developed and demonstrated for nuclear reactors, reprocessing and fuel 
refabrication plants. Continuous monitoring of nuclear facilities (unattended monitoring 
systems) allows more cost effective safeguards surveillance for the future (Section 8.1.7 and 
8.1.8). The concept of physical protection for nuclear materials (INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4) [13] 
was revised in 1999. The so-called Additional Protocol to the NPT (INFCIRC/540) [15] was 
introduced in 1997. This allows IAEA inspectors access to information and locations in a 
state (not only those with declared nuclear materials) to follow up on evidence of safeguard 
violations. 
1.2     Safeguards Implementation 
By the end of 2003, 189 states including five nuclear weapon states (USA, UK, USSR, 
France and China) had signed the NPT. Four de facto nuclear weapon states are not parties to 
the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Out of these Israel is widely believed to 
possess nuclear weapons, but did not openly declare it. India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and 
North Korea (2006/2009) have first openly tested and then declared that they possess nuclear 
weapons. North Korea had acceded to the NPT, violated it, and withdrew from it in 2003. 
By 2009, there were safeguard agreements in force in more than 145 countries. Only Iran 
was found in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement in 2005. 
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Almost the entire known nuclear industry outside the NWSs is thus under the safeguards 
control of IAEA. By late 2009, some 229 power reactors, 153 research reactors and critical 
assemblies, 18 uranium conversion plants, 46 fuel fabrication plants, 13 reprocessing plants, 
17 enrichment plants, 118 separate storage facilities, and 76 others (mostly research and 
development facilities) were under safeguards [26]. 
1.3     Arms reduction initiatives 
As a result of arms reduction initiatives, the USA and Russia agreed in 1991 and 2010 to 
reduce their nuclear armaments. A considerable amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
was provided for its use in civilian power reactors. HEU can be downblended with natural 
uranium to form low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for nuclear power reactors. 
In 1993, Russia agreed to downblend 500 t of HEU into low enriched uranium and sell 
part of it to the USA for commercial use in nuclear reactors. In 1994, the USA declared, 174 t 
of its HEU stocks to be excess of military purposes and designated 85% of it to be 
downblended and converted into low enriched fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. In 2005, 
the USA announced it would remove another 200 t of HEU from its weapons stockpile [1]. 
In 1995, both the USA and Russia (former USSR) declared 50 t of their weapon-grade 
plutonium as surplus to their national security needs. Both the USA and Russia agreed to 
dispose 34 t of these weapon-grade in 2000 [27]. The UK declared 3 t of its weapon-grade 
plutonium as surplus to its security needs. Studies by the National Academy of Sciences and 
other organisations in the USA led to the decision to transform this metallic weapon-grade 
plutonium into mixed oxide uranium plutonium (MOX) fuel for irradiation or burnup in 
Light Water Reactors (LWRs). After a burnup period of about 5 years the weapon-grade 
plutonium will become reactor-grade plutonium. After removal from LWR cores, this spent 
MOX fuel can be assigned the lowest level “E” for attractiveness in weapons use (US-DOE 
Safeguards Categories). It will not be useable for weapons purposes (NAS, 1995) [14]. 
 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) t of HEU* t of weapon-grade Pu** 
USA*** 
Russia*** 
UK*** 
France 
China 
654 
985300 
23.4 
36.5 
20 
92 
14525 
7.6 
5 
4 
De facto Nuclear Weapon States   
India 
Israel 
Pakistan 
North Korea 
0.2 
not known 
1.3 
not known 
0.52 
0.45 
0.064 
0.035 
Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) 10 ----- 
*HEU (93% enriched in U-235) 
**Weapon-grade plutonium 94% Pu-239 
***This takes into account the already implemented reductions of HEU by downblending into low enriched 
uranium for civil nuclear reactors until 2007. 
 
Table 1.2. Estimates of stocks of HEU and weapon grade plutonium [16]. 
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The remaining amounts of HEU and weapon-grade plutonium in the NWS and in NNWSs 
are shown in Table 1.2. The respective data collected by the Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS) [25] differ only slightly from those of Table 1.2. 
1.4     Amounts of reactor-grade plutonium in the world 
The amount of reactor-grade plutonium in spent fuel elements of civil nuclear reactors in the 
world will be about 2300 t by the year 2010 [18]. Fig. 1.1 shows the data and projection until 
2030 for reactor-grade plutonium in the world. Almost one third of this spent fuel was 
reprocessed and used for the refabrication of MOX fuel which is recycled in MOX fueled 
LWRs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Nuclear power installed as well as plutonium stored in spent fuel elements, 
plutonium separated and plutonium in MOX fuel until 2030 [18]. 
 
1.5     Amounts of reactor-grade americium and neptunium in the world 
There is growing interest in countries with large nuclear energy programs to separate and 
incinerate neptunium and americium in order to minimize the radioactive inventories of these 
long-lived nuclides in deep geological waste repositories. However, separated neptunium and 
americium have long been of concern in proliferation discussions. The IAEA has, therefore, 
began to consider a program to monitor also neptunium and americium. 
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1.5.1     Neptunium and americium 
Neptunium is considered useable in nuclear explosive devices. It has a bare critical mass of 
574 kg [21]. A reflector, e.g., beryllium can reduce the critical mass to approximately 45 kg. 
Neptunium produces no alpha heat and has a low spontaneous fission neutron rate of 0.11 
n/kgs, which is lower than that of U-235 (0.29 n/kg.s) [22]. 
Americium generated in nuclear reactors is a mixture of Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243. 
Am-241 without admixture of other americium isotopes can originate from the decay of 
Pu-241. The critical mass of Am-241 was calculated to be approximately 34-45 kg, that of 
Am-243 between 111 and 193 kg, where both calculations used steel as reflector [23]. 
The critical mass of Am-242m is as low as 3.7-5.6 kg when reflected by steel [23]. 
However, Am-242m amounts to less than 1% in the americium of spent LWR fuel, and 
approximately 4% in americium of spent fuel of fast reactors (FRs). Spontaneous fission 
neutron emission of Am-241, Am-242m and Am-243 is relatively high. Am-241 has a high 
alpha particle heat output of 110 W/kg. 
The amount of neptunium and reactor-grade americium in spent fuel elements will be, 
respectively, about 90 t and about 150 t by 2010. Figs. 1.2 and 1.3 display the data and 
projection until 2030 for reactor neptunium and americium [18]. 
Fig. 1.2. World wide neptunium stored in spent fuel elements or high active waste until 
2030 [18]. 
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Fig. 1.3. World wide americium stored in spent fuel elements or in high active waste until 
2030 [18]. 
1.6     Nuclear fuel cycle concepts 
The two fuel cycle concepts that are being pursued are as follows: 
 The once-through fuel cycle followed by direct spent fuel disposal in deep repositories 
(USA, Sweden, Finland), and 
 the closed fuel cycle with reprocessing of the spent fuel followed by recycling and 
incineration of the plutonium (France, Japan etc.). 
Technical difficulties were discussed between 2008 and 2010 regarding the US national 
repository Yucca Mountain after certain temperature limits were set by the US regulatory 
agencies for the local areas surrounding the waste packages. 
In 2010 the US-DOE withdraw the license application for the Yucca Mountain high level 
waste repository [24]. 
A new international initiative on the proliferation resistance of future generation nuclear 
reactors and fuel cycles was initiated around 2005 (INFCIRC/640) [20]. 
In February 2006 the US government announced the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP), which envisions a close coupling of nonproliferation measures with new 
developments in nuclear energy technology. Among the nonproliferation measures are the 
possibilities of a small number of states which possess fuel cycle facilities employing 
advanced technologies. These states could ensure fuel cycle services, e.g. fresh fuel supply 
and spent fuel back services to other states which have forgone sensitive fuel cycle 
technologies, but still operate nuclear reactors. 
In June 2007 Russia announced an initiative which offers enrichment services to other 
states and proposes to create a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure [17]. 
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1.7    New scientific results and further developments 
New results from scientific analysis within the international community became apparent 
after about 2005: 
– The burnup of spent fuel in LWRs was about 55 GWd/t around 2010 and will increase to 
about 70 GWd/t in the future; 
– The reactor-grade plutonium in spent fuel of civil reactors after reprocessing and re-
fabrication as MOX fuel can be multi-recycled and be incinerated in LWRs, fast neutron 
reactors (FRs), or accelerator driven systems (ADSs); 
– The minor actinides (MAs) can be chemically partitioned by different aqueus chemical 
processes. They can be used in the future for refabrication of fuel elements and be 
incinerated by multi-recycling in LWRs, FRs, and ADSs. Another approach is applying 
pyroprocessing keeping the actinides together and multi-recycle them in FRs; 
– Incineration of reactor-grade plutonium and the main important minor actinides 
(neptunium, americium) will drastically lower the long term radiotoxicity caused by for 
the waste disposal in deep geological repositories; 
– The isotopic content of the isotope Pu-238 in the reactor-grade plutonium can be 
increased to above 5% by different fuel cycle options (re-enriched reprocessed uranium 
(RRU) or MOX fuel with small addition of minor actinides). This denatured reactor-
grade plutonium can be considered proliferation-proof as it will make so-called 
Hypothetical Nuclear Explosive Devices (HNEDs) technically unfeasible; 
– The denatured and proliferation-resistant reactor-grade plutonium can be fully incinerated 
by multi-recycling in LWRs, FRs or ADSs; 
– During multi-recycling steps, denatured plutonium can remain denatured by small 
additions of reactor-grade americium (not useable for nuclear weapons). At the same time 
the production of neptunium (useable for nuclear weapons) can be avoided. 
After earlier suggestions [19], in 2005 the IAEA proposed the so called multilateral fuel 
cycle centers, which should be built and operated by multinational industrial companies 
(INFCIRC/640) [20]. This opens the innovative possibility of combining the above scientific 
findings with the new IAEA proposal of 2005: 
During a transition period of several decades, the fuel reprocessing and refabrication for 
the production of denatured proliferation-resistant reactor grade plutonium could be done in 
existing reprocessing and refabrication centers in the NWSs (LaHague in France and 
Sellafield in the UK). They would provide denatured, proliferation-proof reactor-grade MOX 
fuel for LWRs and FRs in the NNWSs (Sections 12 - 14). 
In addition, two NWSs (USA and Russia) refabricate their weapon-grade plutonium for 
irradiation in MOX-LWRs (USA) or MOX-FRs (Russia). 
In a second phase, the NNWSs could irradiate the denatured proliferation-proof plutonium 
in own LWRs or FRs, and reprocess, refabricate and recycle the proliferation-proof 
plutonium in Multilateral Fuel Cycle Centers (with IAEA safeguards) of NNWSs. Neptunium 
would virtually be avoided. In this second phase only denatured proliferation-proof reactor-
grade plutonium would exist and be maintained in NNWSs. Neptunium would be avoided. 
All existing and future originating proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium would be 
incinerated in the future (Sections 13 and 14). 
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The present safeguards and surveillance concept of the IAEA would still be needed in its 
present form, e.g. to prevent concealed misuse of nuclear facilities. However, many presently 
discussed problems of IAEA safeguards survey would no longer exist. This will be discussed 
in Sections 8 to 14. 
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2.   Technical applications of nuclear power reactors 
The majority of nuclear power reactors built and operated today is used for electricity 
generation. Such nuclear power reactors are built in unit sizes up to 1300 and 1600 MW(e) 
and operated in the so called base load regime. Other potential applications are process heat 
generation for the substitution of oil and natural gas as primary sources of energy. 
Smaller size nuclear power reactors are used for ship propulsion, mainly submarines, 
air craft carries etc. Early attempts for application of nuclear power for commercial 
ship propulsion, e.g. the ships Savannah (USA), Otto Hahn (Germany), Mutsu 
(Japan), were given up for economical reasons and because of difficulties to obtain 
permits to stay in international ports. Only Russian icebreakers, e.g. N.S. Lenin, are 
still operating. They serve to keep the Russian Arctic route open for ship traffic. 
More than 80% of the electricity producing nuclear power reactors are light water 
moderated and cooled reactors (LWRs). Their heat produced by the fission process in 
the uranium fuel elements is used to achieve steam conditions of about 290 °C and 70 
to 78 bars to drive the steam turbine and generator. This leads to a thermal efficiency 
of about 33 to 36% for electricity generation. 
High temperature graphite moderated and helium gas cooled nuclear reactors or 
advanced gas cooled reactors (AGRs or HTRs) attain gas temperatures of 700-900 °C. 
In that range of temperature a number of technical processes requiring process heat 
are possible. If the gas temperatures are used for steam generation and electricity 
production a thermal efficiency of 42% can be attained. 
A different class of nuclear power reactors are liquid metal cooled reactors (LMFBRs) 
with a fast neutron spectrum. Contrary to light water in LWRs or graphite in AGRs 
and HTRs the liquid metal does not thermalize the fission neutrons. As a consequence 
these nuclear power reactors can use the abundant non fissile U-238 by converting it 
to the fissile plutonium (breeding process) which is then utilized as fissile material. 
Also thorium can be converted to the fissile U-233 by this breeding process. 
Other reactor types, e.g. heavy water moderated reactors (HWRs) will be described in 
Section 5. 
2.1     Nuclear reactors operating in the world in 2008 
In 2008, there were 439 nuclear reactors with a total electric capacity of 372 GW(e) operating 
in the world. They supplied about 16% of the world’s electricity. The countries providing the 
largest nuclear reactor electricity generating capacities are presented in Table 2.1 [1,2]. 
Smaller countries operating only several GW(e) of nuclear powere are listed in [7]. Nuclear 
power is generated (Tab. 2.2) chiefly in 
– light water reactors (LWRs) of which there are two types: the Pressurized Water Reactors 
(PWRs) and the Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 
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– the Heavy Water Reactors (HWRs or CANDUs) 
– the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGRs) and 
– the Light Water Cooled Graphite Moderated Reactors (LWGRs) 
– the Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors (LMFBRs). 
 
Country Number of 
operating reactors 
Generating capacity 
(GW(e)net) 
United States  104  100,582 
France  59  63,260 
Japan  55  47,587 
Russian Federation  31  21,743 
Germany  17  20,470 
Korea  20  17,451 
Ukraine  15  13,107 
Canada  18  12,589 
United Kingdom  19  10,222 
Sweden  10  9,014 
China  11  8,572 
Spain  8  7,450 
Rest of the world  72  40,155 
Total  439  372,202 
Table 2.1. Worldwide nuclear generating capacity in June 2008 [1,2]. 
 
Type number percentage % 
PWR 265 60.36 
BWR 94 21.41 
CANDU (HWR) 44 10.02 
AGR 18 4.10 
LWGR 16 3.64 
LMFBR 2 0.45 
Tab. 2.2.   Fractions of different types of nuclear reactors [1,2]. 
Fig. 2.1 shows the projections for nuclear power capacity of IAEA 2006 and of 
OECD/NEA worldwide until 2040. 
More than 40 additional nuclear power reactors were under construction by 2009. About 
80% of these were again LWRs. In addition many countries including China, India, Japan, 
Korea and Russia announced ambitious plans to expand their nuclear power capacities. 
The future market share of nuclear power in the world electricity market will depend on its 
competitiveness against other established sources of primary energy, e.g. hard coal, lignite, 
oil and natural gas or hydropower and renewable energies (wind, photovoltaics etc.). In 
addition other factors like public acceptance and the solution of the proliferation problem will 
play a dominant role. 
Nuclear power reactors are operating with yearly energy availability factors of 85 to 90%. 
Their operating life time is increasing from 35 years at present to 60 years in the future. 
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Fig. 2.1.   Existing and projected nuclear power reactor capacity [1,2]. 
2.2.    The nuclear fuel cycle 
Uranium ores contain 0.72% U-235 and 99.28% U-238 (disregarding the tiny amount of 
0.0054% U-234). Only the isotope U-235 can be fissioned by thermalized neutrons in nuclear 
power reactors. After mining of uranium ores these are milled and chemically processed for 
conversion into the uranium oxides UO2, UO3 and U3O8 (Fig. 2.2) [3,4,5]. These are then 
chemically treated and converted into the only gaseous uranium compound UF6. In 
enrichment plants which presently apply either the gas diffusion or gas centrifuge technique 
the natural isotopic mixture of the UF6 gas is enriched to about 5% U-235 and 95% U-238. 
This low enriched UF6 is chemically re-converted to low enriched UO2 fuel powder. The 
UO2 fuel powder is pressed into cylindrical pellets which are sintered at more than 1600 °C. 
The pellets are filled into Zircaloy tubes which are assembled to fuel elements also called 
fuel assemblies 
Fuel elements with metallic fuel are used for LMFBRs (Section 6). 
The fuel elements of LWRs produce about 50 to 60 GWd/t over an operation time of 
about 5 years. Partial loading, reloading and shuffling schemes after time periods of about 12 
to 24 months guarantee an optimal economic operation of the nuclear power reactor. The 
unloaded spent fuel is stored for several years in on site spent fuel storage water pools or dry 
containers cooled by air. Afterwards the spent fuel is either sent to spent fuel conditioning for 
later direct fuel disposal in deep geological repositories (open fuel cycle, Fig. 2.2a) or sent to 
a spent fuel reprocessing plant for chemical separation of the uranium, of the generated 
plutonium and of the minor actinides. The separated fission products become high active 
waste. Separated plutonium and separated minor actinides can be further recycled as fissile 
0
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1980 1990 2000 2020 2030 2040 2050
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PLUTONIUM
fuel. The fission products are vitrified and – after further cooling over about 40-50 years – 
deposited in deep geological repositories (closed fuel cycle) (Fig. 2.2b). 
 
            a) Once-through fuel cycle                                       b)   Closed fuel cycle 
 
Fig. 2.2.  The nuclear fuel cycle (once through and closed fuel cycle) (NUREG). 
 
 
The infrastructure needed for nuclear power reactors are uranium mining and milling, 
uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, uranium fuel fabrication and spent fuel 
reprocessing facilities. 
Table 2.3 presents the number of commercial operating facilities of the uranium fuel cycle 
in the world. 
Process Number of facilities 
in commercial operation 
Uranium mining and milling 37 
Conversion 22 
Enrichment 13 
Uranium fuel fabrication 40 
Spent fuel reprocessing 5 
 
 
Table 2.3.   Number of fuel cycle facilities operating in 2008 [1,2,3]. 
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The largest uranium conversion plants are located in Canada, France, Russia and the USA. 
The largest uranium enrichment plants operate in the USA, Russia, France, the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Only France, the UK, Russia and Japan operated large scale commercial 
reprocessing plants in 2008. 
2.3     Natural uranium ores 
Natural uranium is found in uranium ores in concentrations ranging from around fractions of 
a percent to several percent. It contains the fissile isotope U-235 found in nature in an 
isotopic concentration of 0.7204%. The remaining isotopes are 99.2742% of U-238 and 
0.0054% U-234. Uranium ores are obtained from open pit or underground mining. In 
addition it can be produced by in situ leaching or it is found as a co-product or by-product 
during mining of other materials, e.g. phosphate rock, mineral sands etc. 
2.3.1 Uranium resources 
Uranium resources are classified on the basis of geological certainty and foreseeable costs of 
mining. Reasonably assured resources (RAR) are based on high confidence estimates which 
are compatible with decision-making standards for mining. Inferred resources are defined on 
a similar basis, but additional measurements are required before making decisions for mining. 
Undiscovered resources (prognosticated and speculative) are expected to exist, based on 
geology or previously discovered resources. Both prognosticated and speculative resources 
still require significant efforts for exploration. The OECD nuclear energy agency (NEA) and 
the IAEA collect the resource data of the different countries in the world on a yearly basis. 
These data are categorized on a fictive US dollar recovery cost base. 
Table 2.4 shows the world uranium resources (reasonable assured and inferred) for three 
cost categories as published by OECD/NEA and IAEA in 2007 (other data given in the 
literature may vary slightly from these IAEA and OCD/NEA data). 
 
 Cost ranges 
 <US dollar 40/kg U <US dollar 80/kg U <US dollar 130/kg U 
Reasonably assured 
resources (RAR) 1,766,400 2,598,000 3,338,300 
Inferred resources 1,203,600 1,858,400 2,130,600 
 
Table 2.4. Reasonably assured and inferred natural uranium resources (tonnes) in the world 
as reported by 2007 [1,2]. 
 
Table 2.5 shows the distributions of the shares for natural uranium resources and natural 
uranium production in 2007 in the main uranium producing countries [2]. The total annual 
world production of uranium was about 39,000 t. 
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Country % of resources % of production 
Australia  23.0  21 
Canada  7.7  23 
United States  6.2  4 
Namibia  5.0  7 
Niger  5.0  8 
South Africa  8.0  1 
Kazakhstan  14.9  16 
Russian Federation  10.0  8 
Uzbekistan  2.0  6 
Ukraine  3.6  2 
 
Table 2.5. Shares of uranium resources and production in some countries in 2007. 
 
Undiscovered (prognosticated and speculative) resources were estimated to another 
7.771.100 tonnes worldwide [1,2]. In addition, so called unconventional natural uranium 
resources in black shales, e.g. at Chattanooga (USA), with a total of 4.2 million tonnes of 
uranium resources as well as additional uranium resources associated with monazite, coastal 
sands and phosphorite deposits are mentioned by OECD/NEA and IAEA. The total global 
amounts are estimated to 22 million tonnes of natural uranium resources. 
Seawater may also be regarded as a possible resource with very low concentration of 
uranium and high extraction costs. 
2.3.2 Thorium resources 
Thorium can also be used in combination with enriched uranium as a fertile nuclear fuel. It is 
found essentially as 100% Th-232 and is considered to be three times more abundant in the 
earths crust than uranium [8]. 
It is mainly recovered from monazite sand as a by-product and from deposits of titanium-, 
zirconium- or tin-bearing minerals. Worldwide reasonably assured and inferred thorium 
resources were estimated in 2007 to a total of 6.08 million tonnes of thorium [2]. 
2.4 Concentration of uranium 
Uranium ores must be separated from byproducts. They are concentrated by physical 
concentration methods, e.g. crushing, and gravity, magnetic or flotation types of separation. 
Roasting is applied to improve the solubility of the uranium. Leaching is performed by 
different agents depending on the type of uranium-bearing minerals. Agents can be either 
sulfuric, nitric and hydrochloric acids or sodium hydroxide and alkaline carbonates. Solvent 
extraction methods are preferred, if acid solutions are employed. In the solvent extraction 
process the active agent is an inorganic amine salt diluted in kerosene that can selectively 
extract the uranium ions. The uranium is finally precipitated as uranium diuranate and dried 
afterwards. The result is called yellow cake [3,4,5]. 
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2.5 Purification of uranium 
For purification the uranium concentrates are dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting uranyl-
nitrate is then extracted by tributyl phosphate in kerosene. By this purification step some 
elements like boron, beryllium, cadmium, rare earths and other elements are removed down 
to a concentration of a few ppm. The end product after purification is one of the uranium 
oxides UO2, UO3 or U3O8. 
2.6 Uranium conversion 
The uranium oxides are chemically converted into uranium hexafluoride, UF6. This is the 
only volatile or gaseous compound of uranium. It has a sublimation point of 56.5 °C at 1 bar. 
This gaseous compound UF6 is necessary for the enrichment process in gaseous enrichment 
plants. 
2.7 Natural uranium consumption and needs by the nuclear power industry 
2.7.1 Natural uranium consumption by different reactor types 
As already explained in Section 2.2 the natural uranium must be enriched, e.g. 3.5 to 5% U-
235 for the low enriched fuel (LEU) of LWRs. For HWRs or CANDUs it can be either the 
natural enrichment or LEU with enrichment of about 1.5% U-235. For AGRs or HTRs the 
enrichment of the LEU fuel must be about 8% U-235 due to the higher burnup foreseen for 
their fuel. 
The yearly need of natural uranium for the different reactor types operating about 85% of 
the year at full power is given for several examples in Table 2.6. Only for the LWR-LEU a 
second value for a load factor of 0.93 is given. This load factor is reached by many LWRs 
now. 
 
Reactor type Initial fuel enrichment 
[%] 
Natural uranium consumption
[t/GW(e)·y] 
LWR-LEU 
LWR-LEU 
HWR-Unat 
HWR-LEU 
HTR-LEU 
3.3 
3.3 
0.7 
1.5 
8 
171* 
156 
150 
107 
125 
LWR U/Pu recycle 
FBR U/Pu breeder 
4% 
20% 
110 
1.7** 
 *load factor 0.93                         **depleted uranium or natural uranium 
Table 2.6. Annual natural uranium consumption [tonne] for different reactor types per 
GW(e) and year operating 85% of the year at full power. 
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Due to their better neutron economy (heavy water and graphite absorb less neutrons than 
light water) HWRs and AGRs consume less natural uranium than LWRs. Plutonium 
recycling can reduce the natural uranium consumption by about 35%, but it requires 
reprocessing of the spent fuel and MOX fuel refabrication (closed fuel cycle). FRs with 
plutonium fuel can make use of the 99.27% U-238 of the natural uranium. They are 
continuously breeding new plutonium resulting from neutron capture in U-238. Consequently 
their natural uranium or depleted uranium or depleted uranium consumption is very low with 
about 14 te/GWe·a. FRs can also operate on thorium as a fertile fuel. 
2.7.2 Future need for natural uranium 
The future need for natural uranium can be illustrated by the following simple example: 
Assuming a constant installed nuclear reactor power capacity of 400 GWe over the next 60 to 
80 years (which corresponds roughly to the projection of IAEA low in Fig. 2.1) then the 
natural uranium consumption in future decades is shown by Fig. 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Natural uranium consumption (tonnes of natural uranium) for different reactor 
systems as a function of time. 
 
Fig. 2.3 shows that 400 GW(e) LWRs-LEU with a load factor of 0.93 operating during a 
lifetime of 60 years would consume about 4.1 million tonnes of natural uranium. HWRs-LEU 
or HTRs with a power capacity of 400 GW(e) would consume 2,57 and 3,0 million tonnes of 
natural uranium over 60 years, respectively. Uranium/plutonium recycling in LWRs would 
lead to similar savings of natural uranium. Comparing these numbers with the world uranium 
105
106
5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
Reactor operation time [years]
LWR-LEU*
HWR-LEU**
LWR-Recycle**
HTR-LEU**
Uranium consumption
400 GWe scenario (constant)
different reactor types
To
nn
es
of
 n
at
ur
al
ur
an
iu
m
*Load factor 0.93
**Load factor 0.85Uranium consumption 
400 GW(e) scenari  (constant)
different reactor types 
 21
resources of Section 3 one may conclude that LWRs would consume the uranium resources 
in the cost range of <130 $/kg U (reasonably assured and inferred, Table 2.4) either within 80 
(LWR-LEU) or up to about 140 (LWR U/Pu recycle) years. For other reactor types (HWRs, 
AGRs or HTRs) this time period would be similar. If prognosticated and speculative or even 
unconventional uranium resources would be considered, these time periods could be 
extended. Future increases in the installed nuclear power capacity above the simple example 
of constant 400 GW(e) (see, e.g. INFCE high, Fig. 2.1) would shorten these time periods 
accordingly. 
Reprocessing and recycling of uranium and plutonium or better neutron economy of the 
different reactors can help to curb the natural uranium consumption. A major cutback of 
natural uranium consumption, however, can only be achieved by the introduction of breeder 
reactors with a fast neutron spectrum. Fig. 2.4 shows the natural uranium consumption for 3 
cases in general form 
 LWR-LEU in once through fuel cycle (OT) (load factor 0.93) 
 HWR-Unat in once trough fuel cycle (OT) 
 LWR-U/Pu recycle in the closed fuel cycle 
 LWR + LMFBR in the closed fuel cycle 
 
 
Fig. 2.4. General projection of natural uranium consumption for different reactor types 
including fast neutron spectrum breeder reactors 
 
Fig. 2.4 is based on scenarios for nuclear power installations which where assumed during 
INFCE. Although these scenarios might not be fully consistent with future developments, the 
form of the curves for the consumption of natural uranium of the different reactor scenarios is 
generally valid. 
Fig. 2.4 shows that only the large scale introduction of fast neutron spectrum liquid metal 
cooled breeder reactors (LMFBRs with oxide, carbide, nitride or metallic Pu/U fuel) are able 
to curb the natural uranium consumption curves. A large scale introduction of LMFBRs 
around, e.g. 2050 could limit the total natural uranium consumption to about 6-7 mill. tonnes 
[6]. If the LMFBRs are introduced later into the energy market, then the total natural uranium 
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consumption would be higher correspondingly or the low cost rescources would be exhausted 
at an earlier time. 
The technical feasibility of LMFBRs was already proven between the years 1970-2010 
(Section 6). Prototype LMFBRs with electrical power of 250 to 800 MWe were operated 
safely over more than 30 years. The time and rate of introduction of LMFBRs depends 
mainly on the availability of reprocessing and refabrication plant capacities as well as 
political constraints (proliferation policy). 
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3. Uranium enrichment 
3.1 Introduction 
Naturally occuring uranium consists of three isotopes: U-234, U-235 and U-238 [1]. The 
amounts in weight percent of each isotope are shown in Table 1. 
 
U-234   0.0054% 
U-235   0.7204% 
U-238         99.2742% 
 
Table 3.1. Isotope concentration of natural uranium in weight percent [1]. 
 
Only the naturally occurring isotope U-235 is fissionable by thermal neutrons. Fission 
neutrons from spontaneous or neutron induced fission have an average kinetic energy of 
about 2 MeV. The probability of a neutron to fission U-235 is much higher for slow neutrons 
(thermal energies) compared to that for high energy fission neutrons. Therefore, the fission 
neutrons must be moderated by scattering processes from an average kinetic energy of about 
2 MeV down to an average thermal energy of 0.025 eV. This degradation of neutron energy 
is called slowing lower process. 
Good moderators are light and heavy water as well as beryllium and graphite. However, 
only heavy water or high purity graphite together with carbon dioxide or helium gas and low 
neutron absorbing structural materials can be used in nuclear reactor cores together with the 
naturally occurring uranium in appropriate material arrangements in the reactor core. Such 
nuclear reactors are the heavy water moderated reactors (HWRs or CANDUs) and the gas 
cooled graphite moderated reactors. Their fuel is exchanged continuously at full power for 
attaining good neutron economy. However, only a low burnup can be attained with natural 
uranium fuel. 
Light water as moderator and coolant requires enrichment of the natural uranium to about 
3-5% U-235. Even higher enrichment of about 8% or more U-235 is needed for high 
temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGRs) which can attain higher burnup of the fuel 
(Section 5). 
3.2     Enrichment technologies 
There are a number of enrichment technologies which were tested at the begin of nuclear 
energy development. However, for large scale commerical enrichment only two methods: 
gaseous diffusion (USA, France) and gas centrifugation (Russia, Europe) became 
predominant with more than 90% of installed enrichment capacity in the world. In addition 
one enrichment plant using LASER enrichment – the so called SILEX process – is being 
built in the USA from 2010 on [2,3,4]. 
Other enrichment methods like aerodynamic methods (separation nozzle (Germany) or 
advanced vortex tube (Helikon in South Africa) were only tested and operated on pilot plant 
scale. LASER enrichment methods based on the atomic vapor laser excitation were given up 
around 1994 in the USA. A variation of the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) 
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technology developed in Australia, is being applied on a large commercial scale as the 
SILEX (separation of isotopes by laser excitation) process for the first time in the USA 
[5,6,7]. 
Table 3.2 shows the world enrichment capacities by the year 2008 [4]. The enrichment 
capacity is given in kg or ton separative work units (SWU). The separative work unit is a 
measure of the amount of work necessary in the enrichment plant to produce a certain 
amount of enriched uranium. It has the dimension of mass in kg or ton SWU (Section 3.6). 
As an example, the annual reload of a 1 GW(e) PWR of 25 tons of 4.4% U-235 enriched UO2 
fuel requires about 175 t SWU. 
About 53 million kg (SWU) are installed in operating enrichment plants, mainly in Russia, 
the USA and Europe. The large scale gaseous diffusion plants in the USA and France still 
represent about 42% of the world enrichment capacity. Gaseous diffusion enrichment will 
slowly be phased out in the future and be replaced by the more economic gas centrifuge 
technology. About 23 million kg SWU in gas centrifuge technology were under construction 
or in the planning phase in 2008. Again most of this gas centrifuge capacity is located in 
Russia, Europe and in the USA. China, South Korea and Japan – having large nuclear power 
reactor programs – will certainly make up with own enrichment capacities. In addition, the 
laser isotope separation technology may become an additional economically promising 
enrichment technology. 
 
Enrichment method Enrichment capacity in million kg SWU/a 
 operating under 
construction
pre-licensing planned 
Gaseous diffusion 
 USA 
 France 
 China 
 
11.3 
10.8 
0.2 
 
 
 
 
Gas centrifuge 
 Russia 
 UK 
 Netherlands 
 Germany 
 USA 
 France 
 Japan 
 China 
 Brazil 
 Iran 
 India 
 Pakistan 
 
20 
3.7 
3.5 
1.8 
 
 
0.3 
1.0 
 
 
0.01 
0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
1.0 
2.7 
6.8 
7.5 
1.2 
0.5 
 
0.25 
 
 
Laser (SILEX) 
 USA 
   
3.5-6.0 
TOTAL 52.63 3.13 23.45 – 26.45 
 
Table 3.2. Enrichment capacities installed in gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge and LASER 
enrichment plants in the world [4]. 
 
Multinational enrichment companies like URENCO (UK, Netherlands, Germany, France) 
are favored by IAEA. Russia has offered his large industrial enrichment capacity for future 
multinational participation [4]. 
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3.3     Enrichment and cascade theory 
The smallest element of an enrichment plant is a separating unit (Fig. 3.1.). The feed, e.g. 
natural uranium (0.72% U-235, 99.27% U-238) with mass flow rate F and atom fraction xF in 
% is separated into a heads fraction (enriched in the desired isotope U-235) with mass flow 
rate P and atom fraction xP in % and a tails fraction (depleted in the desired isotope U-235) 
with a mass flow rate W and atomic fraction xW in %. The abundance ratio, , often used 
instead of the atom fraction, x in %, is defined as x
1 x
 	

 [2,8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1.  Separating unit and definitions 
 
 
The material balance on both isotopes is 
 F = P + W (3.1) 
 
 F·xF = P·xP + W·xW (3.2) 
 
The ratio of head to feed is called the cut, 
 
            P= 
F

  (3.3) 
The stage separation factor, , is defined as the abundance ratio of heads to tails 
                                                           WP
F P
( x )x'     
x ( x )

 	 	
 
1
1
                                      (3.4) 
and the heads separation factor, ß, is defined as the abundance ratio of heads to feed 
 P F
F P
x x'ß     
x x

	 	
 
1
1
 (3.5) 
P
W
xP
xW
xFF
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As the required enrichment cannot be achieved with one single separating unit, several or 
many separating units working in parallel are connected to a cascade. In a simple cascade the 
heads from the first row of parallel working of separating units – called a stage – become the 
feed of the next stage of separating units (Fig. 3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2.  Separating unit, stage and cascade [2]. 
 
A countercurrent recycle cascade is used, if the partially depleted tails of a stage have 
sufficient value to warrant reprocessing. This countercurrent cascade scheme is applied for 
uranium enrichment. Fig.3.3 shows the scheme of a countercurrent recycle cascade. 
The feed for each stage consists of the heads from the next lower stage and tails from the 
next higher stage. 
The number of stages between the feed point (natural uranium feed, xF = 0.72%) and the 
product (4% enriched uranium, xP = 4%) is called the enriching section. The portion between 
the feed point (natural uranium) and the waste (tails) (0.2% depleted uranium, xW = 0.2%) is 
called the stripping section. 
The aim of the enriching section is to produce enriched uranium. The purpose of the 
stripping section is to increase the recovery of the desired isotope U-235 from the feed and to 
reduce the amount of feed required. The stages in Fig. 3.3 are numbered from stage 1 at the 
waste end to stage n at the product end. The highest stage of the stripping section is 
numbered nw. 
As the flow in the enriching section becomes smaller the higher the product (enriched 
uranium) is enriched also the number of separating units per stages is lowered. This leads to 
so called tapered cascades. One type of tapered cascades which is approximated by all 
uranium enrichment plants is the so called ideal cascade. 
Cascade
Stage
Feed, F Product, P
Unit
x 1,W
x1,W
x 1,W
x 2,W
x 2,W
x 3,W
x 3,P
x 2,P
x 1,P
x 1,P
x 1,P
x 1,F
x 2,P
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Fig. 3.3. Countercurrent recycle cascade [8]. 
3.4     Ideal cascade 
The theory of ideal cascades was originally developed by Dirac and Peierls in the UK and 
Cohen and Kaplan in the USA [2,8,9]. Table 3.3 shows the characteristic shape of an ideal 
cascade for a gas centrifuge plant (Section 3.8). Gas centrifuges have a relatively high stage 
separation factor  per separation unit and therefore a relatively low number of stages. Table 
3.3 gives the number of stages (14 stages for a stage separation factor of  = 1.2) and the 
number of centrifuges per stage for enrichment of natural uranium to 3.02% U-235 and a tails 
assay of 0.29% U-235 in uranium [10]. 
Gaseous diffusion plants have only a separation factor of 1.0043 per separation unit. The 
number of stages is therefore about 1400 t attain a U-235 enrichment of about 4% [2]. 
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Table 3.3. Number of centrifuges required in an ideal cascade, assuming that each gas 
centrifuge has a separation factor 1.2 [10]. 
3.4.1 Number of stages for an ideal cascade [8] 
The total number n of stages for an ideal cascade is given by 
                     
P W
P W
x   ( x )ln   
( x )    xn         
ln  

 
	

1
12  (3.6) 
with 
xP atom fraction of final product 
xW atom fraction of tails depleted uranium 
 stage separation factor 
 
The number of stages in the stripping section is 
                                       
F W
F W
W
x   ( x )ln   
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 
	 
1
1 1 (3.7) 
 
xF atom fraction of feed 
ß heads separation factor 
For the ideal cascade the head separation factor is:  =  . 
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The number of stages in the enriching section 
                                
P F
P F
W
x ( x )ln
( x ) xn n       
ln  ß

 
 	
1
1  (3.8) 
 
Table 3.4 shows – as an example – the total number of stages required and the number of 
stages in the enrichment and stripping zone of an ideal cascade for an enrichment of natural 
uranium to xP = 4% LEU and a tails assay of xW = 0.2% 
- a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant with  = 1.0043 
- a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with  = 1.20 and  = 1.30. 
 
 Gaseous diffusion 
 = 1.0043 
Gas centrifuge 
 = 1.20                 = 1.30 
enrichment section 815 10  7 
stripping section 598   6  4 
total number of stages 1413 16 11 
 
Table 3.4.   Number of stages for gas diffusion and gas centrifuge enrichment. 
3.5     Inputs and Outputs of the enrichment process 
The mass input to the enrichment process is the uranium feed F of natural uranium (atom 
fraction xF = 0.72%) or reprocessed uranium (0.8% U-235 and 0.6% U-236 as well as 98.6% 
U-238) in the form of uranium hexafluoride. The mass output in the enriched uranium 
product P with atom fraction xP in % and the waste stream or tails W (atom fraction xW of, 
e.g. 0.2%). 
 
The ratio of the feed mass and the product mass is 
 P W
F W
x xF   
P x x

	

 (3.9) 
and the ratio of waste mass to product mass is 
 P F
F W
x xW   
P x x

	

 (3.10) 
3.6     Separative work of the enrichment process 
The separative work is a measure of the amount of work necessary in the enrichment plant to 
produce a certain amount of enriched uranium. It has the dimension of mass and is indicated 
in kg SWU or tonne SWU. 
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The separative work S in SWU/kg U can be expressed in terms of the different mass 
streams for feed, product and waste [8]. Applying the relations between these mass streams 
and their atom fractions, the relation for the separative work unit per product mass is given 
by 
W P WP P F F
P W F
P F W W F W F
x x -xx x -x xS  = (2x -1) ln  +  (2x -1) ln  -  (2x -1) ln 
P 1-x x -x 1-x x -x 1-x
         product term              waste term                         feed term
 (3.11) 
 
This relation is evaluated for P = 1 kg of product mass in Table 3.5 for different 
enrichment levels [7,8]. In the left column the different enrichment levels for low enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel are shown. The second column indicates how many kg of natural 
uranium are needed to produce 1 kg of low enriched uranium 
 
example: for P = 1 kg of 4% U-235 enriched uranium, a feed of F = 7.436 kg natural 
uranium must be provided. 
 
The third column gives the separative work needed to enrich the natural uranium as feed 
mass to a certain enrichment 
 
example: for 1 kg of 4% U-235 enriched uranium 6.544 kg separative work are 
needed starting from natural uranium. 
 
A 1.3 GW(e) PWR requires about 25 t of fresh UO2 fuel per year with 4% U-235 
enrichment. This quantity is produced from about 25x7.436 = 185.9 t of natural uranium. The 
separative work required would be 25x6.544 = 163.6 t SWU (Table 3.5) for a tails assay of 
0.2% wt% U-235 and 0.5% conversion losses. A 1 million kg SWU or 1000 t SWU 
enrichment plant would be able to enrich the fuel for about 6 PWRs of 1.3 GW(e). 
For enrichment levels higher than 10% U-235 in uranium or others than given in Table 3.5 
the above equation (3.11) must be applied. 
 31
 
 
 
Enrichment, 
kg of Natural U Feed kg of kg Separative 
Material to Enrichment U3O8 to be Workb 
Plant Purchaseda 
wt% 235U Per Kilogram of Enriched Uranium Product 
Nat. 0.72 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2.0 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.8 
3.9 
4.0 
5.0 
10.0 
1.000 2.613 0.000 
1.174 3.068 0.104 
1.370 3.580 0.236 
1.566 4.092 0.380 
1.957 5.114 0.698 
2.348 6.136 1.045 
2.740 7.160 1.413 
3.131 8.182 1.797 
3.523 9.206 2.194 
3.718 9.716 2.397 
3.914 10.228 2.602 
4.110 10.740 2.809 
4.305 11.250 3.018 
4.501 11.762 3.229 
4.697 12.274 3.441 
4.892 12.784 3.656 
5.088 13.296 3.871 
5.284 13.808 4.088 
5.479 14.318 4.306 
5.675 14.830 4.526 
5.871 15.342 4.746 
6.067 15.854 4.968 
6.262 16.364 5.191 
6.458 16.876 5.414 
6.654 17.398 5.638 
6.849 17.898 5.864 
7.045 18.410 6.090 
7.241 18.922 6.316 
7.436 19.432 6.544 
9.393 24.544 8.851 
19.178 50.112 20.863 
a0.5% U3O8 to UF6 conversion losses included. 
bTails assay at 0.2 wt. % U-235 
 
Table 3.5. Characteristic data: kg of natural uranium feed or U3O8 required for 1 kg of 
enriched uranium product and corresponding kg SWU needed [7]. 
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3.7     Gaseous Diffusion Technology 
Gaseous diffusion is based on molecular diffusion through micropores in a membrane. In 
thermal equilibrium U-235- and U-238-molecules have the same average kinetic energy. 
Hence the lighter molecules of the isotope U-235 have a faster velocity and impinge on the 
wall of the membrane more often. If the wall is porous the lighter molecules will pass 
through the membrane at a slightly higher rate than the heavier molecules of U-238. More 
235-UF6 molecules will pass through the membrane than 238-UF6 molecules. The theoretical 
separation factor per stage is equal to 1.0043. 
The diameter of the pores in the membrane must be very small. Membrane barriers with 
pores of 10-6 cm have been reported [7]. Sintering of fine alumina or nickel powder was 
applied. The barriers are about 50 m thick. They can be arranged in form of sintered nickel 
tubes assembled to tube bundles, housed in the diffuser or converter. The diffusion cell 
(diffuser) is divided into two compartments by the porous membrane. A compressor 
maintains the pressure at the inlet: A heat exchanger must remove the heat of compression 
from the UF6 gas. Because of the corrosiveness of the UF6 gas, the structural materials in the 
process vessels (converters) are nickel coated. Fig. 3.5 shows the converter units of a US 
gaseous diffusion plant with their motors for the compressors and connecting pipings and 
valves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5.     Basic stage equipment in a gaseous diffusion cascade [7]. 
 
Due to the low enrichment factor, gaseous diffusion plants typically need 1200-1400 
stages to produce low enriched uranium for LWR fuel of 3 to 4% U-235 enrichment. Most 
gaseous diffusion plants are designed to operate between 65 and 110 °C at low pressures of 
about 0.35 bars. After enrichment of the 235-UF6 product the gas is liquefied and put into 
storage cyclinders. The tails are also liquefied and put into containers. They are stored for 
further use e.g. in fast reactors (FRs). Large scale gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are 
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operating at Paducah, USA with an enrichment capacity of 11.3 million kg SWU/year and at 
Tricastin, France with an enrichment capacity of 10.8 million kg SWU/kg (Table 3.8). 
Gaseous diffusion enrichment plants have a high specific power consumption on the order 
of 2400 kWh/kg SWU. Therefore the power requirements of a large gaseous diffusion 
enrichment plant like at Tricastin is about 3000 MWe. 
3.8     Gas centrifuge 
The gas centrifuge was developed in Europe and Russia by Zippe, Kistemaker, Whitley, 
Kamenev and others. The gas centrifuge process is based on the separation effect of UF6 gas 
in a strong centrifugal field of a fast spinning rotating cyclinder. When the cylinder rotates at 
high speed, radial pressure differences cause the separation of the U-235 and U-238 
molecules. 
Table 3.6 gives the enrichment factors as a function of different peripheral speeds [2,10]. 
 
peripheral speed m/s 300 400 500 600 700 800 
enrichment factor 1.056 1.10 1.16 1.24 1.34 1.46 
 
Table 3.6. Peripheral speeds and enrichment factors of a gas centrifuge [2]. 
 
For rotor speeds of about 400 m/s at the outer radius of the centrifuge the local separation 
factor would be about 1.10. By creating a weak countercurrent flow inside the centrifuge the 
separative factor can be increased. The countercurrent flow can be achieved by traffles, 
molecular pumps or an axial temperature gradient. The result is that the U-238 diffuses to the 
bottom and the U-235 to the top of the centrifuge, where they are collected (see Fig. 3.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6.    Russian gas centrifuge design according to Kamenev [11]. 
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3.9    Gas centrifuge technology 
New materials have to be used to increase the peripheral speed of the centrifuges. Table 3.7 
shows the tensile strength, the density and the approximate maximum peripheral speed these 
materials can attain and endure in a gas centrifuge. 
 
Material Tensile strength 
 (kg/cm2) 
Density 
 (g/cm3) 
/ 
(cm) 
approx. max. 
peripheral speed 
(m/s) 
Al-alloy 5200 2.8 1900 425 
Titanium 9200 4.6 2000 440 
Maraging steel 22500 8.0 2800 525 
Glass fibre 7000 1.9 3700 600 
Carbon fibre 8500 1.7 5000 700 
Table 3.7.  Maximum peripheral speeds for thin-walled cylinders [10]. 
 
Gas centrifuges based on aluminum or steel can have a peripheral rotor speed in the range 
of 400 m/s. Composite materials allow peripheral velocities in the range of 600-700 m/s. For 
enrichment of natural uranium to 4% low enriched uranium for LWR fuel about 16 stages of 
gas centrifuges must operate in cascade if an enrichment factor of  = 1.2 and a tails assay of 
0.2% U-235 are assumed (Section 3.4). 
3.10     Russian centrifuge design 
The highest installed capacity in gas centrifuges is located in Russia (Section 3.2). A detailed 
review of Russian centrifuge technology is given by Bukharin [11]. Some characteristic 
design data of Russian centrifuges designed around 2000-2010 are given in Table 3.8. 
 
Generation Separative capacity 
[SWU/a] 
Peripheral speed 
6 2.5 580 m/s 
7 3.2 630 m/s 
8 4.2 690 m/s 
Table 3.8.  Russian centrifuge characteristic data [11]. 
 
Modern designs of the centrifuge rotor consist of an inner metal sheet around which 
aramid and graphite fibers are wrapped to achieve the required high strength. 
3.11    Rotor dynamics 
No matter how carefully rotors are balanced, this balancing can never be perfect. This leads 
to vibrations at certain speed which become violent at a certain critical resonance speed. 
These critical (resonance) speeds are determined by the rotor design (length/diameter ratio or 
L/D) and characteristics of its materials. 
 35
 
L/D Critical speeds [m/s] 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
7 400    
11.6 145 400   
16.3 74 204 400  
21 45 123 242 400 
25.5 30 83 162 269 
Table 3.9. Critical peripheral speeds as a function of length/diameter L/D for aluminum 
rotors [10]. 
 
A subcritical rotor with L/D = 7 would have no critical (resonance) speed as long as it runs 
of a peripheral speed of 350 m/s. A rotor with L/D = 11.6 would have to negotiate one critical 
speed at 145 m/s before it would experience another one at 400 m/s [Tab. 3.9]. 
A centrifuge operating below its first resonance is termed subcritical (short centrifuge). A 
centrifuge operating above the rotors vibrational resonances is termed supercritical (long 
rotor with damping measures). Modern design centrifuges with high stage separation factors 
and high separation capacity (Section 3.10) operate in the supercritical range. They have an 
energy consumption of about 100 kWh/SWU. 
3.12    Laser enrichment [4,7] 
Laser isotope enrichment is based on photo-excitation. The slight difference in electron 
energy levels of U-235 and U-238 is used for this enrichment technology. Laser light 
produced at the same wave length as these electron energy levels leads to resonances, 
enhanced ionization or molecular dissociations. Two main laser enrichment methods have 
developed: 
Atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) 
Molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) 
3.12.1 The AVLIS enrichment technology 
Two different ALVIS techniques were developed and tested at Livermore Laboratories in the 
USA. 
– An oven at 2600 K produces uranium vapor. A xenon laser operating in the ultraviolet 
range excites only the U-235 atoms. These atoms are then ionized by a krypton laser. The 
ionized U-235 atoms are collected on a plate in an electric field. 
– A sequence of three tunable dye lasers driven by a high-repetition copper laser excite the 
U-235 atoms. These laser photons produce auto-ionizing of the uranium atoms. The 
uranium ions can be collected from the vapor as described above. 
Both AVLIS technologies were given up in 1994 and did not enter the commercialization 
phase. 
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3.12.2 Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) 
The MLIS process developed at Los Alamos, USA is based on the vibrational modes 
(vibrational and rotational frequencies) of a UF6 molecule. The UF6 gas together with 
hydrogen is expanded through a hypersonic nozzle to cool it down to about 30 K. This brings 
the molecules into the lowest vibrational ground state. In a next step an infrared laser 
operating at 16 m wavelength selectively excites the 235-UF6 molecules. The laser radiation 
in the ultraviolet part of the spectrum at 0.308 m is used to dissociate the 235-UF6 
molecules into U-235-UF5 and F2. The U-235-UF5 precipitates as a fine powder. 
A variant of the MLIS process called SILEX originally developed in Australia is the basis 
of the first laser enrichment plant in USA (Section 3.2). 
3.13    Conversion of UF6 into UO2 powder 
The UF6 coming from the enrichment plant must be converted into UO2 powder in the UO2 
pellet fabrication plant. One of the chemical processes applied is the so-called AUC-process. 
The UF6 is vaporized and mixed with water to form uranyl fluoride UO2F2. This is mixed 
with ammonia NH3 and carbon dioxide CO2 which react to ammonium uranylcarbonate 
(NH4)4 UO2 (CO3)3 which precipitates from the suspension. Further heating leads to thermal 
decomposition and uranium trioxide UO3. This can be reduced by means of hydrogen to 
uranium dioxide UO2. 
After homogenization of the UO2 powder, binders and lubricants, are added. This mixture 
is pressed to cylindrical pellets of 10 mm diameter and height. In a furnace the pellets are 
sintered at temperatures of 1600 to 1750 °C in hydrogen. Densities of the UO2 pellets of 
about 10.4 g/cm3 are achieved. Afterwards the pellets are ground to the required dimensions. 
Finally the pellets are filled into the zircaloy tubes which are welded tight. These fuel rods 
are assembled to fuel assemblies (Section 5). 
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4     Neutron and reactor physics 
Only some basic nuclear processes and data are presented in this Section. This shall help to 
increase the understanding of the subsequent Sections. For a deeper understanding of nuclear 
reactor physics the literature given in the reference list is recommended [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. 
4.1    Fission process 
If a neutron of a certain velocity (kinetic energy) is absorbed by a fissile heavy nucleus, e.g. 
U-233, U-235 or Pu-239, the resulting compound nucleus can become unstable and split 
(fission) into two or even three fragments. The fission fragments are created essentially 
according to a double humped yield distribution function with mass numbers between about 
70 and 165. The mass yield distribution functions are similar for heavy nuclei fissioned by 
neutrons with kinetic energies up to about 2 MeV. They depend slightly upon the kinetic 
energy of the incident neutrons causing fission and on the type of heavy nuclei (U-233, U-
235, Pu-239). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1.  Fission of U-235 nucleus by a neutron. 
 
In addition to the fission products (fragments), 2-3 prompt neutrons are emitted during the 
fission process. These prompt fission neutrons appear within some 10-14 s. They are created 
with different kinetic energies following a certain distribution curve. In some heavy nuclei 
with even mass numbers, nuclear fission can only be initiated by incident neutrons with a 
certain, relatively high, threshold kinetic energy (Table 4.1). 
Neutron 
2200 m/s Uranium-235 
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Table 4.1. Threshold kinetic energy for incident neutrons causing substantial fission in 
different heavy nuclei [6]. 
The fission products can be solid, volatile or gaseous. Some of the fission products decay 
further emitting so-called delayed neutrons, -particles, -rays and anti-neutrinos. The 
delayed neutrons resulting from the decay of particular fission products – called precursors – 
represent less than 1% of all neutrons. The fraction of delayed neutrons originating from 
fissioning by thermal neutrons of U-235 is 0.67%, and 0.22% from fissioning of Pu-239. 
They appear with decay constants of 0.01 to 3 s-1 for U-235 and 0.01 to 2.6 s-1 for Pu-239. 
These delayed neutrons are of absolute necessity for the safe control of nuclear fission 
reactors [11,12,13]. 
The energy release per fission Qtot appears as kinetic energy of the fission products, Ef, of 
the prompt fission neutrons, En, as -radiation, E, as -radiation, E, or as neutrino radiation, 
E, (Table 4.2). The neutrino radiation does not produce heat in the reactor core. However, 
antineutrinos are relevant for safeguards and surveillance measures (Section 8.1.7). Table 4.2 
also shows the total energy, Qtot, and the thermal energy, Qth, released during fission of a 
nucleus. Some of -radiation and -radiation of the fission products is not released 
instantaneously but delayed according to the decay of the different fission products. 
 
Heavy 
Nucleus 
Incident 
neutron 
energy 
Ef En Eß E E Qtot Qth 
U-235 0.025 eV 
0.5 MeV 
169.75 
169.85 
4.79 
4.80 
6.41 
6.38 
13.19 
13.17 
8.62 
8.58 
202.76 
202.28 
194.14 
193.7 
U-238 3.10 MeV 170.29 5.51 8.21 14.29 11.04 206.24 195.82 
Pu-239 0.025 eV 
0.5 MeV 
176.07 
176.09 
5.9 
5.9 
5.27 
5.24 
12.91 
12.88 
7.09 
7.05 
207.24 
206.66 
200.15 
199.61 
Pu-240 2.39 MeV 175.98 6.18 5.74 12.09 7.72 206.68 198.94 
 
Table 4.2. Different components of energy release per fission of some heavy nuclei in 
MeV by incident neutrons of different kinetic energy (in eV or MeV) [10,11]. 
 
On the average, about 194 MeV or 3.11x10-11 J are released per fission of one U-235 
atom. Most of the fission energy is released instantaneously. However, a small fraction 
appears with some delay, the associated decay constants ranging between about 10-10 to 
1 per s. 
Since 1 g of U-235 metal contains 2.56x1021 atoms, the complete fission of 1 g of U-235 
results in: 
7.96x1010 J or 2.21x104 kW      or      0.92 MWd(th)  thermal energy 
For other fissile materials like U-233 or Pu-239 the energy release per fission is similar. 
Fission by neutrons with thermal energies (0.025 eV) or by energies of 0.5 MeV leads to 
almost equal energy releases. 
Heavy Nucleus Th-232 U-233 U-234 U-235 U-238 Pu-239 
Incident neutron kinetic 
energy [MeV] 
>1.3 0 >0.4 0 >1.1 0 
 41
Usually the thermal energy produced in the fuel of a fission reactor core is given in 
MWd(th) per tonne or GWd(th) per tonne of fuel which also corresponds roughly to the 
number of grams or kg, respectively, of U-235 fissioned in one tonne of fuel [2]. 
4.2    Neutron reactions 
Neutrons produced in nuclear fission have a certain speed or kinetic energy and direction of 
flight. In a fission reactor core they may be scattered elastically or inelastically or absorbed 
by different atomic nuclei. In some cases the absorption of neutrons may induce nuclear 
fissions in heavy nuclei (U-235 etc.) so that successive generations of fission neutrons are 
produced and a fission chain reaction is established. 
In addition to fission the scattering and absorption reactions also contribute to the energy 
release in a nuclear reactor. 
4.2.1 Reaction rates 
If n ( r ,v,) is the number of neutrons at point r , with speed v and the direction of flight , 
then these neutrons can react within a volume element dV with N·dV atomic nuclei (N being 
the number of atomic nuclei per cm3 of reactor volume). The number of reactions per second, 
e.g. scattering or absorption, is then proportional to 
v n(r, v, )    and  to  N dV    
The proportionality factor (v) is a measure for the probability of the nuclear reactions 
and is called microscopic cross section of the nucleus for a specific type of reaction. The 
microscopic cross section (v) is measured in 10-24 cm2  1 barn. It is a function of the speed 
or kinetic energy of the neutron and of the type of reaction and differs for every type of 
atomic nucleus. As for an absorption reaction the neutron can either remain captured or lead 
to fission of a heavy nucleus the relation 
a(v) = c(v) + f(v) 
is valid with 
a(v) microscopic absorption cross section 
c(v) microscopic capture cross section 
f(v) microscopic fission cross section 
 
The reaction rate can be written 
R( r ,v) = (v)·N( r )·v·n( r ,v) = ( r ,v)·( r ,v). 
The quantity ( r ,v) = N·(v) is called macroscopic cross section. 
 
The quantity: 
( r ,v) = v·n( r ,v) is called the neutron flux. 
Fig. 4.2 shows the microscopic fission cross section as a function of the neutron kinetic 
energy for the heavy nuclei U-235, U-238 and Pu-239. The fission cross sections for U-235 
and Pu-239 increase with lower kinetic energies. In the energy region of about 0.1 eV to 103 
eV this behavior is superposed by resonance cross sections. 
The capture cross section for U-238 are shown in Fig. 4.3. 
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Such microscopic cross sections are steadily compiled, supplemented and revised in 
nuclear data libraries, e.g. JEF [19] etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2.   Microscopic fission cross section for U-235, U-238 and Pu-239. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.   Microscopic capture cross section of U-238. 
 43
4.3     Spatial distribution of the neutron flux in the reactor core 
The spatial distribution of the neutrons with a certain speed or kinetic energy and flight 
direction can be described by the Boltzmann neutron transport equation or by Monte Carlo 
methods [2,14]. For both cases, numerical methods in one-, two- or three-dimensional 
geometry were developed. Computer program packages (deterministic codes for the solution 
of the Boltzmann transport equation and Monte Carlo codes) are available for applications 
[14,15,16,17,18]. 
For many practical applications it is sufficient to solve the neutron diffusion equation 
which is an approximation to the Boltzmann neutron transport equation. The continuous 
energy range can be approximated by a subdivision into a number of energy groups with 
specifically defined microscopic group cross sections, e.g. JEF [19], ENDF/B [20], or 
JENDL [21]. Group cross section sets for a given number of energy groups are, e.g. WIMS 
[22] and the ABBN set [23,25]. 
Fig. 4.4 shows the neutron energy spectra of a pressurized water reactor (PWR), of a 
sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) with metal, oxide and nitride fuel as well as of a very high 
temperature reactor (VHTR) as neutron flux (u) = E(E) per unit lethargy u. The lethargy u 
is defined as ln(Eo/E), where Eo is the upper limit of the energy scale. This logarithmic 
energy is suggested by the fact that the average logarithmic energy loss per elastic collision 
of a neutron with a nucleus is an energy independent constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4.   Neutron energy distribution (spectrum) in a PWR and an FR [36]. 
 
Fig. 4.5 displays the spatial distribution of the neutron flux in the range of thermal 
energies for a PWR [24]. The absorber or control rods are partially inserted in axial direction 
in the PWR core. The control rods absorb neutrons and are responsible for the spatial 
distortions of the thermal neutron flux. They influence the criticality level and the spatial 
power distribution. 
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Fig. 4.5. Spatial distribution of the thermal neutron flux, th (r)
 , in a PWR core with 
partially inserted control rods [24]. 
4.4     Criticality factor keff [1,2,3,4] 
The ratio between the number of newly generated neutrons by fission and the number of 
neutrons absorbed in the reactor core or escaping from the reactor is called the criticality 
factor or effective multiplication factor, keff. 
For a keff = 1 the reactor core is critical and can be operated in steady state. At keff <1 the 
reactor core is subcritical, e.g. with the control or absorber rods fully inserted in the core. 
Boron, cadmium or gadolinium etc. can be used as absorber materials, either as metallic 
alloys in control rods or as burnable poisons in ceramic form in fuel rods and special rods or 
as a fluid, e.g. boric acid in the coolant of a PWR. 
FUEL ELEMENT
WITH CONTROL ROD
FUEL ELEMENT 
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For keff >1 the reactor is supercritical. More neutrons are produced than are absorbed in 
the reactor core or do escape from the core. The neutron chain reaction is ascending (reaction 
rates and the number of neutrons increase as a function of time). 
The neutron flux in the reactor core can be controlled by moving or adding, e.g. absorber 
materials. This is done in a keff-range, where the delayed neutrons are dominating the 
transient behavior of the neutron flux. The delayed neutrons come into being in a time range 
of seconds. Therefore, the neutron flux in reactor cores can also be controlled safely by 
moving absorber materials in the time range of seconds. 
4.5     Design of a reactor core 
The choice of the type of fuel, e.g. natural or enriched uranium as well as plutonium or U-233 
and the choice of the moderator, coolant as well as the structural materials determine the type 
of nuclear reactor. In addition the type of fuel can be used as metallic, oxide, carbide or 
nitride fuel. Coated particles used, e.g. in VHTRs and pebble bed HTR module reactors, or 
molten salts (fluorides or chlorides) have also been employed in the past or are still 
investigated. However, these reactor types are outside the scope of this Section. Table 4.3 
shows the combination of fuel, moderator, coolant and structural materials for the most 
common types of reactors: high temperature reactors (HTR), heavy water reactors (HWR), 
light water reactors (LWR) and fast neutron reactors (FR) (Sections 5 and 6). 
 
Reactor type Fuel Moderator Coolant Structural 
material 
HTR Natural or slightly 
enriched uranium 
Graphite Gas: CO2, He Graphite, 
Mg-alloys 
HWR Natural or slightly 
enriched uranium 
Heavy water Light or heavy 
water 
Zircaloy 
LWR Enriched uranium 
4-5% U-235 
+ U-238 
Light water Light water Zircaloy 
Fast neutrons 
Reactor (FR) 
20-30% Plutonium 
     + U-238 
15-25% U-233 
     + Thorium 
No moderator He-Gas, sodium, 
Lead or Lead-
Bismuth 
Stainless steel 
Table 4.3. Combinations of fuel, moderator, coolant and structural material in different 
reactor types. 
 
The characteristic thermal properties of the coolant/moderator and of the structural 
material determine the power density in kW/l of the reactor core, e.g. 100 kW/l in a PWR and 
300 kW/l in an FR. Assuming a certain power output of the reactor core leads to the required 
volume of the reactor core (radius and height of the reactor core). The thermo-hydraulic and 
thermal properties of the coolant together with assumed coolant inlet and outlet temperatures 
result in the required coolant mass flow for cooling the reactor core. With these rough design 
parameters, the necessary enrichment in fissile isotopes in the fuel can be determined by 
solving, e.g. the Boltzmann neutron transport equation or the multigroup diffusion equation. 
This is done for the given geometry of the reactor core by solving the equations for keff. 
The fissile fuel enrichment is determined such that keff is slightly above 1 to allow 
(insertion of control material) for control of the reactor core over a full operation cycle i.e. 
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account for the effects of decreasing concentrations of fissionable material, e.g. U-235, and 
of the accumulation of fission products or temperature changes. 
For nuclear reactor cores with a thermal neutron spectrum the ratio of fuel volume to 
moderator volume is determined by the number of scattering collision required to slow down 
the fission neutrons to thermal energies. This leads to moderator/fuel volume ratios for the 
different reactor types as given in Tab. 4.4. 
The spatial distribution of the neutron flux in fuel rods and surrounding moderator is 
determined by subdividing the reactor into cells [2,3,4]. 
 
Reactor type (thermal) Moderator/Fuel volume ratio 
LWR 2-3 
HWR 20 
HTR 54 
Table 4.4.   Moderator/Fuel volume ratio for different reactor types. 
Fig. 4.6 shows such a cell arrangement for a square lattice as used for most Western 
LWRs. Triangular cells and hexagonal subassemblies are used, e.g. for Russian PWRs. These 
cells have a micro distribution of the neutron flux. This micro-distribution of the neutron flux 
is obtained by solving, e.g. the Boltzmann neutron transport equations in multigroup form for 
the geometry shown in Fig. 4.6 (fuel rod with cladding, surrounding moderator and the 
respective boundary conditions). 
Fig. 4.6 shows a two group representation of the neutron flux within a lattice cell for, e.g. 
LWRs. The fast neutrons are generated by fission in the fuel rod. They move relatively fast 
out of the fuel to the moderator region, where they are slowed down to thermal energies. This 
avoids to a large extent undesired captures in the resonance energy region (see Figs. 4.2 and 
4.3). 
The thermal neutrons in the moderator region diffuse back into the fuel rod where they are 
absorbed by the fuel nuclei and cause fissions. The fast neutron flux is highest in the fuel rod 
and lowest in the moderator region, whereas the thermal neutron flux is highest in the 
moderator region. Most of the thermal neutrons are already absorbed in the outer regions of 
the fuel rod (spatial self shielding effect). Therefore the radial fission power density 
generated is also somewhat higher in the outer region than in the center of the fuel rod. 
The radial fission power density distribution is given by 
 
G11 3
f ,g g
g 1
P(r)  3.11 10    (r)  (r) W/cm Sum
	
 	        
                   (4.1) 
with 
f,g (r)
  macroscopic fission cross section of energy group g 
f,g (r)
  neutron flux in energy group g 
In the above example the number of energy groups is G = 2. 
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Fig. 4.6. Square lattice cell with fuel rod, cladding, and moderator of a LWR-fuel element. 
 
With these multigroup neutron flux distributions in the cell spatially averaged multigroup 
cross sections can be determined. With these spatially averaged cross sections the Boltzmann 
multigroup neutron transport equations can be solved numerically for the whole reactor core 
with boundary conditions. The real neutron flux then results in a superposition of the micro-
distribution of the cell averaged over a subassembly, e.g. fuel rods with different fuel 
enrichment and burnable poison or water channels, and the macro-distribution over the entire 
core. 
4.6   Fuel burnup and transmutation during reactor operation 
During reactor operation over months and years the initially loaded U-235 in the low 
enriched uranium fuel will be consumed due to fission and neutron capture processes. As a 
consequence also the initial criticality factor keff decreases. Neutron capture in fertile 
isotopes, e.g. U-238 or Th-232 leads to buildup of new fissile isotopes, e.g. Pu-239 or U-233. 
This increases somewhat the criticality factor keff. Fission products originating from the 
fission of fissile isotopes decrease the criticality factor keff due to their absorption cross 
section. The combination of these three effects results in a time dependent change – usually a 
decrease – of the criticality factor keff during reactor operation. 
This burnup effect on keff is accounted for by special design of the reactor core. The 
enrichment of the initially loaded fuel is increased such that keff becomes slightly >1. As the 
keff shall be equal 1 during the whole operation cycle, this is balanced by absorber materials 
in the core (movable absorber rods or special rods with burnable absorber material or 
burnable absorber materials dissolved in the coolant or mixed with the fuel). The 
accumulating fission products and the decreasing keff are counteracted e.g. by moving 
absorber rods slowly out of the core during reactor operation. At the end of the operation 
cycle the absorber rods are almost withdrawn out of the core and spent fuel must be unloaded 
and replaced by new fuel elements. 
The calculation of the change in concentration of all fuel isotopes, actinides and fission 
products requires the knowledge of the microscopic cross section and decay constants of all 
isotopes as well as the yields of fission products during the fission process. Fig. 4.7 shows the 
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uranium-plutonium reaction chain with - and ¯-decays and their decay half-lives. Only the 
most important nuclear reactions and isotopes are shown. More details, e.g. about the Am-
isotopes will be discussed in Section 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7. Uranium-plutonium reaction chain with buildup of neptunium, americium and 
curium. 
 
The concentrations of the various isotopes in the reactor core can be described by a 
coupled set of ordinary differential equations which balance the production and destruction of 
the different isotopes [25,26]. This is explained in the following for only some fuel isotopes 
using the following indices (left side) and neglecting minor important contribution like the -
decay of the fairly stable uranium isotopes. 
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This set of coupled differential equations must be carried on for all fuel isotopes and 
fission products, structural material, absorber and coolant 
– N represents the number of isotopes per cm3, 
–  the neutron flux n/(cm2·s), 
–  the one group microscopic cross section in cm2, averaged over the neutron energy 
spectrum for capture (index c), absorption (index a), or n,2n reactions (index n,2n) 
–  the decay constant. 
The above coupled set of differential equations is solved numerically by computer 
programs for each point r  in the reactor core assuming the initial concentrations of the 
isotope as initial conditions and a specified level of neutron flux or power density. Often this 
burnup chain has to be truncated appropriately accounting only for the most important 
isotopes [27,28,29] 
One of the computer codes used internationally to predict the evolution of the fuel and 
fission product isotopes is ORIGEN-S developed at ORNL. Its modification, KORIGEN, 
[27] can treat 129 actinides, more than 1100 individual fission products and about 700 
isotopes associated with coolant, absorber and structural materials. 
The evolution chain in concentrations of all isotopes must be determined for each point of 
the reactor core with different spatial neutron flux. Therefore, the code ORIGEN is coupled 
with a code which solves the Boltzmann neutron transport equation. Such a code package is, 
e.g. SCALE developed by ORNL [30]. Another code package based on a MONTE CARLO 
code is MONTEBURNS [33]. 
Figs. 4.8a and 4.8b show the decrease of fissile U-235 nuclei (burnup), the buildup of U-
236 and of the different plutonium isotopes as well as the buildup of Np-237, Am-243, Sr-90 
and Cs-137 in one tonne of LWR fuel over a period of about five years of operation. It is seen 
that the isotopic distribution of plutonium (Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242) also changes as 
a function of burnup or time. While the enrichment of U-235 has dropped from 5% to 
roughly 0.77% or 7.7 kg in 1 tonne of fuel, i.e. similar but slightly higher than the U-235 
concentration in natural uranium by the end of the period of operation (burnup of 60.000 
MWd/t), the concentration of plutonium (sum of all plutonium isotopes) has risen to almost 
0.9% over the same period. The plutonium buildup is caused by neutron capture processes. In 
this way the fissile isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241, produced during operation make 
contributions to the heat production. From Fig. 4.8a it is understood that the sum of the 
concentrations of the two fissile plutonium isotopes exceed at a burnup of 60 GWd/t the 
concentrations of U-235. 
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Fig. 4.8a. Isotope concentrations for U-235, U-236, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241 and Cs-137 as 
a function of burnup [GWd/to] of LWR fuel. Initial fuel enrichment: 5% U-235 
[32]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8b. Isotope concentrations for Pu-242, Sr-90, Np-237, Pu-238, Am-243, Cm-244 as a 
function of burnup [GWd/ton] of LWR fuel. Initial fuel enrichment: 5% U-235 
[32]. 
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4.7   The conversion and breeding process 
4.7.1   Uranium-plutonium cycle 
Neutron capture in the fertile isotopes U-238 or Pu-240 creates the new fissile isotopes Pu-
239 and Pu-241 in the reactor fuel. This is depicted in Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8a and 4.8b. 
Neutron capture in U-238 creates U-239 being subject of ¯-decay to Np-239 (decay half 
life 23.5 min). Similarly, Np-239 decays to Pu-239 with a decay half life of 2.35 days. 
Neutron capture in Pu-239 results in Pu-240 and neutron capture in Pu-240 leads to Pu-241 
which follows ¯-decay to Am-241 with a half-life of 14.3 y. Finally neutron capture in Pu-
241 results in Pu-242. Further neutron capture in americium leads to the curium isotopes. 
Also the neutron capture in U-235 and U-236 as well as the buildup of Np-237 and Pu-238 
are shown there (Fig. 4.7). 
4.7.2   Thorium-uranium cycle 
Similarly, as depicted in Fig. 4.9, the thorium conversion chain leads to Th-233 after neutron 
capture in the Th-232. This Th-233 decays first to Pa-233 with a decay half life of 23.4 min 
and then to the fissile isotope U-233 with a rather long decay half-time of 27 days. 
Subsequent neutron capture in uranium isotopes leads to U-234, U-235 and U-236 (see 
equations in Section 4.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.9.   Thorium-uranium reaction chain. 
4.7.3     Conversion and breeding process 
The production of new fissile isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 in the U/Pu-cycle (Fig. 4.10) and 
U-233 in the Th/U-233 cycle is called conversion process. The conversion ratio CR is 
defined as the ratio of creation of new fissile isotopes to the rate of destruction of fissile 
isotopes. The conversion ratio CR depends on the fuel cycle and on the neutron energy 
spectrum in the reactor core. 
233Th232Th
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Fig. 4.10. Conversion process of U/Pu fuel cycle. 
 
It is determined by computer calculations in building the ratio of the sums of the total 
number of newly generated and destructed fissile isotopes in the reactor core between 
periodic refueling sequences. The conversion ratio for reactors with thermal neutron 
spectrum is CR <1. Only in the case of thermal breeders with U-233 it might slightly exceed 
unity. If the conversion ratio becomes >1 it is called breeding ratio BR. The conversion ratio 
CR can also be expressed by the relation 
CR =  - 1 - a -  + f    
where   is the neutron yield, i.e., the total number of fission neutrons generated per neutron 
absorbed, averaged over all fissile isotopes, the neutron energy spectrum and the whole 
reactor volume. The quantities a,   and f  are equivalent corresponding averages. a  
describes the absorption of neutrons in the coolant, structural and control materials.   is the 
leakage from the reactor core. f  describes the small contributions of fast neutron fissions in 
U-238, Pu-240 and Pu-242 or Th-232 (fast fission effect.). The largest contribution in the 
above relation for CR is the neutron yield  . It is shown for different fissile isotopes 
belonging to different fuel cycle options in Fig. 4.11: 
More refined calculation methods for the determination of CR or BR and other parameters 
like doubling time were described, e.g. in [9]. 
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Fig. 4.11. Neutron yield as a function of energy of incident neutron causing fission for  
U-233, U-235, Pu-239, Pu-241 [32]. 
 
In the range of thermal neutron energy spectra U-233 assumes the highest values of e.g.  
= 2.25 for U-233, whereas U-235 has the lowest -values. This is the reason for proposals of 
reactor designs with thermal neutron energy spectrum and U-233/Th-232 fuel. 
In the neutron energy range >100 keV the two plutonium isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 
assume the highest  values of   2.6-2.7. Therefore, in this neutron energy range a 
breeding ratio 
BR >1 
is possible. Liquid metal cooled (lead or sodium cooled) reactors have a neutron spectrum in 
this range and are able to operate as breeder reactors. They are called (fast) breeder reactors 
(FBRs) due to their fast energy neutron spectrum. If particularly high BR values shall be 
achieved, e.g. in a rapidly expanding nuclear energy economy the neutrons escaping from the 
core can be captured in thick blanket regions with natural or depleted uranium. 
Thermal energy spectrum reactors initially must start operation with the only available 
natural or enriched uranium. They can attain only a conversion ratio of 0.5 to 0.8 depending 
upon their absorption factor a  in the coolant (light water, heavy water, graphite) and in their 
structural or absorber materials. 
U-233 and Pu-239/Pu-241 are artificial man made fissile materials which must be 
produced first in thermal or fast neutron spectrum reactors. Only then U-233/Th-233 or Pu-
239/U-238 can be used in reactors which attain high conversion or breeding ratios. Table 4.5 
shows the conversion or breeding ratios for the main important different reactor systems 
operated in the near future. 
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Reactor type Initial fuel Fuel cycle Conversion/ 
breeding ratio 
PWR/BWR 3-5% U-235 U/Pu 0.55 
PWR/BWR - Pu recycl. 5% Pu U/Pu 0.7 
PWR -U-233/Th 4% U-233 U/Th 0.8 
FBR – Pu/U 15-25% Pu U/Pu 1.2-1.4 
FBR – U-233/Th 12-20% U-233 Th/U-233 1.03-1.15 
 
Table 4.5.    Conversion/breeding ratios for different reactors. 
 
4.8    Fuel utilization 
The fuel utilization is defined as the fraction of original nuclear fuel that can be ultimately 
converted into fission energy. This includes also the conversion of fertile isotopes like U-238, 
Pu-240 or Th-232 into fissile isotopes. Some of the converted fissile nuclei can be extracted 
after unloading of the spent fuel by chemical reprocessing. This collected fissile fuel can be 
used for refabrication of new fuel elements which can be loaded again (recycled) in nuclear 
reactors. 
This means that the determination of the fuel utilization must account for recycling of the 
fuel including possible losses of fuel during reprocessing and refabrication. 
For the once-through fuel cycle the fuel utilization will be lowest. For Pu/U recycling, e.g. 
in LWRs, the fuel can be recycled only several times (Section 12). For FBRs multi-recycling 
of the fuel is possible. FBRs attain the highest fuel utilization factor. The fuel utilization 
factor depends on the enrichment of the fuel, the tails assay after enrichment, the conversion 
factor (reactor design and fuel cycle) and in case of recycling on the burnup of the fuel per 
cycle and fuel losses during reprocessing and refabrication. 
The fuel utilization factor can be determined by detailed analysis following up the 
remaining fuel in a balance sheet for each operating cycle of the reactor core [31]. This leads 
to Fig. 4.12. 
Fig. 4.12 shows the fuel utilization as a function of the conversion or breeding ratio. 
Nuclear reactors operating not in the fuel recycling mode, e.g. LWRs in the once-through 
fuel cycle with a conversion ratio of 0.5 to 0.6 attain only a fuel utilization factor of about 
0.6%. Reactors operating in the recycling mode, e.g. LWRs with U/Pu recycling attain a 
conversion ratio of CR = 0.72 and a fuel utilization of almost 1%. This can be further 
improved somewhat by LWRs with tight lattice fuel elements and higher conversion ratios 
[34]. 
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Fig. 4.12. Fuel utilization [%] as a function of the conversion ratio for LWRs (PWRs or 
BWRs), plutonium recycling PWRs or BWRs and FBRs operating in the U/Pu-
cycle or the Th/U-cycle [31]. 
 
The fuel utilization factor shows a sharp increase above conversion factors of CR = 0.9 
and a step type increase for breeding ratios of about BR ≥ 1.03 (assumed fuel losses of 1.5% 
during reprocessing and 1.5% during refabrication). Above this limit the reactor system is 
able to make up for the fuel cycle losses by breeding sufficient fissile material. FBRs 
operating in the uranium/plutonium closed fuel cycle operate beyond this limit. The fuel 
utilization factor is then only dependent on the average fuel burnup (number of recycle steps 
or fuel loss during recycling). FBRs with a breeding ratio above, e.g. BR ≥ 1.03 can attain a 
fuel utilization factor of 60% which is about a factor of 100 higher than the fuel utilization 
factor of LWRs in the once-through cycle. Similar high fuel utilization factors can be attained 
by FBRs operating in the Th/U-233 cycle. 
In thermal spectrum reactors the concentration of the fission products, especially Xe-135 
and its precursor I-135 as well as Sm-149 must be accounted for because of their high 
absorption cross sections in the thermal neutron energy range. Their variation of 
concentration affects the criticality keff considerably after shut down of the reactor may 
prevent restart of the reactor for a certain period of time. Due to the decay half-life of I-135 
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of 6.61 h the decay of this precursor may induce so-called Xenon oscillations in large power 
reactors during operation. 
4.9     Radioactive Inventories in spent fuel 
The amount of fission products and actinides as well as the radioactivity inventory in 
structural material is a function of the operating time or of the burnup in MWd/tHM of the 
spent fuel. With the methods described in Section 4.5 and computer programs, e.g. 
KORIGEN [27] it is possible to calculate the amount of different substances in the spent fuel 
and their radioactivity. Table 6.4 lists the radioactivity of the most important fission products 
and actinides in 1 tHM of spent fuel after a burnup of 60,000 MWd/tHM. The radioactivity is 
measured in Curie [Ci] or Becquerel [Bq]. 
1 Curie Ѻ 3.7 x 1010 Bq 
1 Bq corresponds to one disintegration per second in a –,  or  decay of a nucleus. 
 
Fission products       Specific radioactivity   (Ci/tHM)  
Isotope  half life  discharge   1 year    3 years   5 years    7 years 
H   3    12.349 y   9.714E+02  9.184E+02 8.209E+02 7.337E+02  6.558E+02 
KR 85    10.720 y   1.701E+04  1.595E+04 1.402E+04 1.232E+04  1.082E+04 
SR 90    29.121 y   1.166E+05  1.139E+05 1.086E+05 1.035E+05  9.871E+04 
Y  90    2.6667 d   1.171E+05  1.139E+05 1.086E+05 1.035E+05  9.873E+04 
ZR 95    63.981 d   1.752E+06  3.354E+04 1.229E+01 4.501E-03  1.649E-06 
NB 95    35.150 d   1.765E+06  7.548E+04 2.728E+01 9.992E-03  3.660E-06 
RU106    1.0080 y   9.339E+05  4.696E+05 1.187E+05 3.002E+04  7.591E+03 
RH106    29.900 s   1.040E+06  4.696E+05 1.187E+05 3.002E+04  7.591E+03 
CS134    2.0619 y   4.163E+05  2.975E+05 1.519E+05 7.755E+04  3.960E+04 
CS137    29.999 y   1.847E+05  1.805E+05 1.723E+05 1.645E+05  1.571E+05 
BA137M   2.5517 m   1.752E+05  1.707E+05 1.630E+05 1.556E+05  1.486E+05 
CE144    284.26 d   1.409E+06  5.784E+05 9.745E+04 1.642E+04  2.767E+03 
PR144    17.283 m   1.423E+06  5.784E+05 9.745E+04 1.642E+04  2.767E+03 
PM147    2.6235 y   2.038E+05  1.629E+05 9.605E+04 5.663E+04  3.339E+04 
EU154    8.6001 y   1.473E+04  1.359E+04 1.157E+04 9.845E+03  8.380E+03 
 
Actinides              Specific radioactivity   (Ci/tHM) 
Isotope  half life  discharge   1 year   3 years     5 years   7 years 
U 234    2.45E05 y  3.380E-02  5.823E-02  1.080E-01  1.573E-01 2.058E-01 
U 235    7.04E08 y  1.220E-02  1.220E-02  1.220E-02  1.220E-02 1.220E-02 
U 236    2.34E07 y  4.034E-01  4.034E-01  4.035E-01  4.035E-01 4.036E-01 
U 238    4.5E09  y  3.067E-01  3.067E-01  3.067E-01  3.067E-01 3.067E-01 
NP237    2.15E06 y  6.062E-01  6.183E-01  6.188E-01  6.197E-01 6.208E-01 
NP239    2.3553  d  2.718E+07  6.636E+01  6.635E+01  6.634E+01 6.633E+01 
PU238    87.744  y  8.287E+03  8.766E+03  8.752E+03  8.620E+03 8.485E+03 
PU239    24064.  y  3.748E+02  3.822E+02  3.821E+02  3.821E+02 3.821E+02 
PU240    6537.3  y  6.997E+02  7.012E+02  7.039E+02  7.064E+02 7.087E+02 
PU241    14.399  y  1.996E+05  1.902E+05  1.727E+05  1.569E+05 1.425E+05 
PU242    3.87E05 y  4.637E+00  4.637E+00  4.637E+00  4.637E+00 4.637E+00 
AM241    432.23  y  1.810E+02  4.928E+02  1.072E+03  1.596E+03 2.069E+03 
AM243    7380.2  y  6.629E+01  6.636E+01  6.635E+01  6.634E+01 6.633E+01 
CM242    163.19  d  1.206E+05  2.569E+04  1.155E+03  5.200E+01 2.398E+00 
CM244    18.110  y  1.458E+04  1.406E+04  1.303E+04  1.207E+04 1.118E+04 
 
Table 6.4. Radioactivity of fission products and actinides of spent PWR fuel after a burnup 
of 60 GWd/tHM. The specific radioactivity is given for the time of unloading of 
the spent fuel and several years of cooling (Broeders [32]). 
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4.10     Inherent Safety Characteristics of Converter and Breeder Reactor Cores 
4.10.1     Reactivity and Non-Steady State Conditions [2,5,11,12,13,26] 
It has been explained in Section 4.4 that keff =1 corresponds to the steady state condition of 
the reactor core, in which case the production of fission neutrons is in a state of equilibrium 
with the number of neutrons absorbed and the number of neutrons escaping from the reactor 
core. For keff  1, either the production or the loss term becomes dominant, i.e., the number 
of neutrons varies as a function of time. The neutron transport equation or, by way of 
approximation, the multigroup diffusion equation for calculation of the time dependent 
neutron flux must then be solved for the non-steady state case. However, in most cases it is a 
sufficiently good approximation to solve the so-called point kinetics equations in connection 
with equations describing the temperature field and its impacts on keff. 
Axial movements of the absorber rods in the core or compaction of the core change the 
loss term for neutrons and influence keff. The relative change as a function of time of keff(t) is 
called reactivity: 
 
Reactivity 
 eff eff
eff eff
k (t) 1 k (t)(t)    
k (0) k (0)
 
 	 	  (4.4) 
 
The point kinetics equation describing the reactor power as a function of time can be 
derived from the time dependent multigroup diffusion equation and the time dependent 
equations for the precursors of the delayed neutrons under the assumption of separation into 
space and time functions. The point kinetics equations read 
 
 eff
eff
(t)dP(t)  P(t) C(t)
dt l
  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with the initial conditions of 
P(t = 0) =P0 (steady state reactor power) 
C(t = 0) = Co (steady state concentration of the parent nuclei (precursors, see Section 4.1) for 
all delayed neutrons combined in one group). 
 
In these equations, P(t) is the reactor power, C(t) describes the averaged concentration of 
parent nuclei (precursors) of the delayed neutrons,  is the average decay constant of all 
parent nuclei of delayed neutrons, ßeff, the effective fraction of all delayed neutrons 
(integrated over all fissile isotopes and averaged over the reactor), leff the lifetime of the 
prompt neutrons in the reactor, i.e., the average time required for a prompt fission neutron to 
induce a new fission process. Values of ßeff and  are calculated from those indicated in 
Section 4.1 by suitably averaging the decay constants with the corresponding delayed neutron 
fractions of the usually used 6 groups of delayed neutrons. Values of leff are in the range of 
10-3 to 10-5 s for thermal reactors and around 4 x 10-7 s for FBRs. The average decay constant 
for a one-group treatment is in the range of about = 0.08 s-1 for all fissile fuel isotopes. 
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For (t) > the influence of the delayed neutrons can be neglected and the solution for P(t) 
can be simplified to 
 eff
eff eff eff
k (t) 1(t)P(t)  exp   t   exp    t
l k (0) l
   
	 	       
   (4.6) 
The reactivity, (t), is composed of the superimposed or initiating reactivity, i(t), which 
can be caused, e.g., by movements of absorber rods or fuel and the feedback reactivity, f(t), 
which takes into account all repercussions of temperature or density changes in the reactor 
core, 
i f(t) (t) (t) 	    
Movements of absorbers or density changes produce local changes in the macroscopic 
cross sections and the neutron flux in certain material zones in the reactor core and, 
accordingly, also in keff(t) and i(t) (superimposed or initiating perturbations). The resultant 
change as a function of time of the neutron field and the power level alters the temperatures 
in the reactor core. Temperature changes provoke changes in material densities (expansion 
and displacement) and microscopic cross sections by the Doppler broadening of resonances. 
Also the neutron flux spectrum can be shifted by changing the moderation of the neutrons. 
Moreover, the dimensions of the reactor core and its components are changed by thermal 
expansion. All these feedback reactivities, f(t), resulting from changes in power and 
temperature together with external perturbation reactivities constitute a feedback circuit (Fig. 
4.13). 
For numerical treatment, the feedback reactivity, f, is split up into individual 
contributions by different temperature effects 
1
eff
f
i 1 i
kd   Sum
T	
!
 	
!
 
where dTi are the average changes in the temperatures of the fuel, moderator, coolant, 
structural or absorber materials. In LWRs, the coolant is also the moderator. In other types of 
reactors (HTGR), the moderator (graphite) is distinct from the coolant (gas). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13.  Schematic of the reactor dynamics feedback loop. 
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4.10.2 Temperature Reactivity Coefficients 
4.10.2.1      Fuel Doppler Temperature Coefficient [11,12,13,25,26,32,33] 
The fuel Doppler temperature coefficient is due to the fact that the neutron resonance cross 
sections depend on the temperature of the fuel and the relative velocities, respectively, of 
neutrons and atomic nuclei. 
The resonance cross sections, (E,T), for U-238, Th-232 and U-233, U-235, Pu-239, etc. 
show very pronounced peaks at certain neutron kinetic energies. An increase in fuel 
temperature, Tf, broadens this shape of the resonance curve which, in turn, results in a change 
in fine structure of the neutron flux spectrum in these ranges of resonance energy. The 
reaction rates are changed as a consequence. Above all, the resonance absorption for U-238 
increases as a result of rising fuel temperatures, while the effect of a temperature change in 
the resonance cross sections of the fissile materials, U-235 and Pu-239, is so small that it can 
generally be neglected if the fuel enrichment is not extremely high. For these reasons, 
temperature increases in the fuel result in a negative temperature feedback effect (Doppler 
effect) brought about by the increase in neutron absorption in U-238. For Th-232, the effects 
are similar. The Doppler effect is somewhat less pronounced at very high fuel temperatures 
because adjacent resonances will overlap more and more. The resonance structure then is no 
longer as pronounced as at low temperatures, which leads to a reduction of the negative 
Doppler effect. 
Due to the specific energy distribution of the neutron spectrum, the Doppler effect in 
thermal reactors follows 
 
 D
eff f f
k1 1  
k T T
! 
!
  (4.7) 
whereas in FBRs it follows the relation 
 D X
eff f F
k1 1 1    with x 3 / 2
k T 2T
!
 " "
!
  (4.8) 
The Doppler coefficient is always negative in power reactor cores because, given the 
relatively low enrichment in U-235 and Pu-239, respectively, the resonance absorption of 
U-238 will always dominate. It is an instantaneous negative feedback coefficient of 
reactivity, which immediately counteracts increases in power and temperature. (The Doppler 
feedback is virtually missing for highly enriched fuel.) 
Besides the fuel Doppler coefficient, the fuel expansion coefficient also leads to a negative 
feedback coefficient of reactivity. Especially in fast breeder cores it may well attain an 
importance equal to the Doppler coefficient. However, the response times of these feedback 
effects are different. 
4.10.2.2    Coefficients of Moderator or Coolant Temperatures [32] 
The main contributions to the coefficients of moderator or coolant temperatures stem from 
changes in the densities of the moderator or coolant and from resultant shifts in the neutron 
spectrum. Temperature rises decrease the density of the coolant and accordingly reduce the 
moderation of neutrons. The neutron spectrum is shifted towards higher energies. As a result 
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of the lower moderator density and the correspondingly higher transparency to neutrons of 
the core it is also possible that far more neutrons escape from the reactor core and neutron 
losses due to leakage rate will increase. 
For the present line of PWRs, the sum total of the individual contributions to changes in 
various energy ranges finally leads to a negative coefficient of the moderator temperature 
which, however, also depends on the concentration of boric acid dissolved in the coolant and 
the burnup condition of the reactor core. In large graphite moderated HTGRs containing U-
233, the moderator temperature coefficient is usually positive. In small HTRs the moderator 
coefficient is negative. 
Also in sodium cooled FBRs with core sizes in excess of about 100-150 MW(e), the 
coolant temperature coefficient is positive because the neutron spectrum is shifted towards 
higher energies as a consequence of the reduced moderation. The resultant increased 
contribution by the fast fission effect of U-238 as well as the higher -values (see Fig. 4.11) 
add to the reactivity. These positive reactivity contributions cannot compensate all negative 
contributions coming from an increase in the leakage rate of neutrons escaping from the core 
(which is the dominating effect in small sodium cooled FBRs with power levels of less than 
approx. 100-150 MW(e)). 
4.10.2.3      Structural Material Temperature Coefficient 
Especially in FBRs, the structural material temperature coefficient also plays an important 
role. Increasing temperatures cause the core structure to expand radially and axially and, in 
this way, result both in indirect changes in material densities and in changes of size of the 
reactor core and, as a consequence, of neutron leakage. The structural material temperature 
coefficient must be determined by detailed analyses of all expansion and bowing effects for 
given core and fuel element structures also taking into account the core restraint (clamping) 
system. For FBRs, the structural material coefficient is also negative. This is accomplished 
by the specific design of the core support plate and the core restraint system. 
For analysis of the control behavior of a reactor core and its behavior under accident 
conditions, the non-steady state neutron flux, power, temperature and all feedback reactivities 
must be considered in detail. Negative feedback reactivities or temperature coefficients 
always counteract increases in power and temperature. Positive coefficients of moderator or 
coolant can be tolerated as long as all the other temperature coefficients, above all the 
sufficiently fast prompt Doppler coefficient, are negative and larger in magnitude than the 
positive coefficients of moderator or coolant. Table 4.7 shows typical temperature coeffi-
cients of reactivity for various types of reactors. 
 
Temperature coefficient 
k/K 
 
PWR 
 
BWR 
 
LMFBR 
Moderator or 
coolant (fresh fuel) 
-9 x10-5 -10x10-5 +5x10-6 
Doppler coefficient 
(500-2800 °C) 
-1.7x10-5 to -2.7x10-5 -2.5x10-5 to -1.3x10-5 -1.1x10-5 to -2.8 x10-6 
 
Table 4.7.    Typical temperature coefficients of reactivity for various reactor lines. 
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PWRs or BWRs have highly negative coolant or moderator temperature coefficients. 
Sodium cooled FBRs throughout their whole operating cycle have positive coolant 
temperature coefficients. Thermal reactors, such as PWRs and BWRs, have more negative 
Doppler coefficients than FBRs. 
4.10.3        Reactor Control and Safety Analysis [2,9,18,27,28] 
4.10.3.1     Reactivity Changes During Startup and Full Power Operation 
As the reactor core is slowly being started up from zero power to full power the temperatures 
of coolant and core structure rise by several 100 °C. At the same time, the fuel temperature 
increases by more than 1000 °C. This causes a negative reactivity effect, which must be 
overcome by moving absorber (control) rods out of the reactor core. In LWRs, this reactivity 
span is in the range of several percent. In sodium cooled FBRs, it is somewhat smaller mainly 
because of the lower value of the negative Doppler coefficient. 
The buildup of fission products and actinides as well as the burnup of fissionable isotopes 
leads to a reactivity loss of up to 12% in LWRs and about 3% in sodium cooled FBRs. 
Sufficient excess reactivity, i.e., keff.> 1, therefore must be provided in a core with fresh (non-
irradiated) fuel and zero power at the beginning of an operating cycle. At this time, the excess 
reactivity is counterbalanced by the insertion into the core of such absorber materials 
(Section 4.4), which provide a sufficient reactivity span for reactor control. Due to the burnup 
effects as well as fission product buildup mentioned in Section 4.6, the negative reactivity 
must be reduced during the operating cycle. This is accomplished by several methods, e.g., 
withdrawing absorber rods, reducing the concentration of soluble poisons, such as boric acid, 
and by the diminished absorption effect of burnable poisons, such as gadolinium or erbium 
contained in fixed rods. The strongly absorbing isotopes of these elements suffer 
considerable depletion during reactor operation. 
The fraction of excess reactivity for fissile isotope burnup and fission product buildup 
designed into the fresh core determines the length of operation of a core (operating cycle). 
The reactor core is shut down by moving into the core absorber rods with sufficient negative 
reactivity. In this case, the reactivity span from full power (high temperature) to zero power 
(low temperature) has to be overcome. In addition, the reactor core must be held subcritical, 
which means that it has to attain and maintain a keff well below 1. 
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5.     Nuclear reactors with a thermal neutron spectrum 
5.1    Introduction and historical development 
The probability to fission the isotope U-235 by neutrons is highest if the neutron velocity is 
relatively low, i.e. at so-called thermal energies (average 0.025 eV corresponding to 2200 
m/s). The fission neutrons originate at relatively high average kinetic energies (2 MeV). 
Therefore the neutrons are slowed down in thermal nuclear power reactors by scattering 
processes in a moderator, e.g. light water, heavy water or graphite. 
The first commercial nuclear power reactors were ordered in the USA in 1963. These were 
pressurized water reactors (PWRs) developed from the experience with submarine nuclear 
reactors. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) were also ordered after successful testing of the 
Experimental Boiling Water Reactor at Argonne National Laboratory (USA). Both reactor 
types needed low enriched uranium oxide fuel. 
Russia developed PWRs around the same time. It built the first experimental reactor at 
Obninsk in 1954 and  commercial size reactors (Novo-Voronezh) in the 1960. A first 
experimental BWR (Dimitrovgrad) was not pursued for development to a commercial size 
reactor. 
In the begin the USA started with graphite moderated reactors cooled by water (Hanford). 
The UK and France started with MAGNOX reactors using graphite as a moderator and 
pressurized carbon dioxide as coolant gas. These MAGNOX reactors could use natural 
uranium as fuel. 
Canada also started with natural uranium as fuel, but used heavy water as moderator and 
coolant. These CANDU reactors were developed and built as commercial size units with an 
electrical power from 200 to 700 MW(e). 
MAGNOX and CANDU reactors initially used natural uranium fuel. Therefore the burnup 
of their fuel elements was relatively low (7 GWd/t). Their fuel is being enriched now to about 
1.5-2% U-235 to attain a burnup between 12-15 GWd/t for commercial reasons. They are 
designed to load and unload their fuel continuously at full power. High temperature gas 
cooled reactors (HTRs) are being developed in Europe, USA, Japan and China. 
PWRs and BWRs are operated in a batch loading and unloading scheme with shutdown of 
the reactor every 12-24 months for exchange of the spent fuel. For better economy the burn 
up of the fuel was steadily increased. PWRs and BWRs need enrichment up to 4.5 and 5% to 
reach a burnup of their fuel of 55-60 GWd/t. 
5.2 European Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) 
About 265 PWRs were operating in the world in 2008 (Section 2.1). These PWRs were 
manufactured and built by several manufacturers, in the USA, Russia, Europe and Japan. 
Their technical concept is very similar. 
The 1600 MWe European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) designed, manufactured and 
built by AREVA (Framatome-Siemens) as a so-called Generation-3 PWR will be described 
below. Fig. 5.1 explains the main design principles [1]. 
The heat generated by nuclear fission in the reactor core is transferred from the fuel rods 
elements to the coolant in the primary coolant system. The power is controlled by absorber 
rods. The highly pressurized water (15.5 MPa) is circulated by the primary coolant pumps 
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and heated in the core from 295 °C to 328 °C (Table 5.1). A pressurizer controls the primary 
pressure of the coolant. The primary coolant flows to four steam generators, where steam of 
7.8 MPa and 293 °C is generated. This steam drives the turbine and generator. Behind the 
turbine the saturated steam is precipitated in the condenser and the condensate water is 
pumped back as feedwater into the steam generators. The waste heat is discharged from the 
condenser to the environment either to a river or through a cooling tower to the atmosphere. 
The thermal efficiency is about 35.5%. 
 
Fig. 5.1.   Main design principles of the European Pressured Water Reactor (AREVA). 
5.2.1     Core with fuel elements and control elements 
The EPR core consists of 241 fuel elements (Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3). For the initial core these 
fuel elements are split into four groups of different enrichment in U-235. Different fuel 
enrichments shall adapt already from the beginning to the later equilibrium core. This 
equilibrium core will have fuel elements with different burnup which can be unloaded every 
one and a half to two years (batch loading and unloading). The fuel elements can reach a 
maximum burnup of about 70 GWd/t. Some fuel elements contain gadolinium in the uranium 
fuel as a burnable poison either mixed homogeneously with the fuel or arranged hetero-
geneously in special rods. In addition, the coolant water contains soluble boric acid as 
neutron absorber. Both gadolinium and boric acid compensate from the beginning and during 
the operation for the negative reactivity effects of the decrease on U-235 enrichment and 
build-up of fission products. They guarantee an operation cycle length of 1.5 to 2 years. The 
fuel assembly of square geometry consists of 17x17 rods, 265 of which are fuel rods. The 
fuel element has bottom and top pieces and 10 spacer grids distributed over the axial length 
of 4.2 cm (Fig. 5.3). The spacer grids hold the distance between the fuel rods (lattice pitch). 
In addition, 24 guide thimbles support the whole structure of the fuel element. The guide 
thimbles are also used as guide tubes for moveable absorber rods or for the in-core 
instrumentation [2,3,7]. 
Primary system 
Secondary system: 
   -  Steam 
   -  Water 
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Table 5.1. Characteristic data of EPR reactor core (AREVA). 
 
The fresh (non irradiated) fuel rods contain a stack of low enriched uranium dioxide 
sintered pellets with a U-235 enrichment of about 5%. The fuel rod cladding consists of 
zircaloy-M5 with an outside diameter of 9.5 mm and a radial thickness of 0.57 mm. A gas 
plenum is provided axially at the upper end of the fuel rod where the fission gases can 
accumulate. 
The core has a fast acting shutdown control system consisting of 89 rod cluster control 
assemblies (RCCA). Each RCCA contains 24 absorber rods which dive into the 24 guide 
thimbles of fuel assemblies. These absorber rods contain neutron absorbing materials like Ag, 
In, Cd or boron carbide pellets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2.  Nuclear reactor core of EPR with fuel elements (AREVA). 
Reactor core  
Thermal power 4,500 MWth 
Operating pressure 155 bar 
Nominal inlet temperature 295.6 °C 
Nominal outlet temperature 328.2 °C 
Equivalent diameter 3,767 mm 
Active fuel length 4,200 mm 
Number of fuel assemblies 241 
Number of fuel rods 63,865 
Average linear heat rate 156.1 W/cm 
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5.2.2     Reactor pressure vessel 
The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its closure head are made of ferritic steel. The RPV 
contains the inlet and outlet water nozzles for the coolant flow and the upper penetrations for 
control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) and instrumentation tubes. Its outside diameter is 
about 4.9 m and its height including the closure head is 12.7 m. Its cylindrical wall thickness 
is 250 mm. The bottom wall thickness is 145 mm, the closure head wall thickness is 230 mm. 
The RPV internal structures support the fuel assemblies of the core. The space between the 
polygonal core structure and the cylindrical core barrel is filled with a neutron reflector. This 
reduces the neutron leakage from the core and protects the reactor pressure vessel wall from 
too high neutron damage. The upper internal structures house the rod cluster of the control 
assembly guide tubes. They also maintain the fuel elements axially in their position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3. EPR 17x17 rods fuel element Fig. 5.4. Cutaway of reactor pressure vessel of 
 (AREVA).  EPR (AREVA). 
5.2.3    Primary coolant pumps, pressurizer and piping 
The primary coolant pumps provide the forced convection circulation of the coolant water 
which transports the heat from the reactor core to the steam generators (Fig. 5.1). The power 
needed for one primary pump is about 9 MWe. The coolant pipings have an inside diameter 
of 780 mm and a wall thickness of 70 mm. 
CRDM 
adaptor 
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The pressurizer maintains the pressure of the primary system of 155 bars within narrow 
limits. It is connected via a so-called surge line to the hot leg of one of the four primary 
circuits. The pressurizer (Fig. 5.1) is equipped with electrical heaters to raise the pressure 
and, with a water spray system, to lower the pressure. Relief and safety valves at the top of 
the pressurizer protect the primary system boundaries against overpressure. Additional 
motorized valves provide the operator with the possibility to rapidly depressurize the primary 
system in case of specific accident situations. 
5.2.4   Steam generators 
The four steam generators are vertical U-tube natural circulation heat exchangers (Fig. 5.5) 
equipped with an axial economizer. It consists of two parts: 
- the lower part ensuring vaporization of the secondary feed water 
- the upper part for drying the steam water mixture. 
It produces saturated steam of 78 bars and 293 °C. The secondary feedwater is split 
between the cold and hot legs, which leads to an overall thermal efficiency of about 35.5%.  
The steam generator consists of 5980 tubes made of Inconel 690 with 19.05 mm diameter and 
1.09 mm wall thickness. More data are given in Table 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.  Characteristic design data of EPR steam generator (AREVA). 
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Fig. 5.5. Cutaway of EPR steam generator (AREVA). 
 
 
5.2.4.1   Chemical system and volume control system 
 
The chemical system: 
– ensures permanent monitoring and adjustment of the boron concentration in the coolant 
water 
– enables adjustment of other chemical characteristics of the coolant water 
The volume control system: 
– provides the pressurizer spray water 
– injects water in the primary pump seal system 
– provides filling and draining of water during reactor shut down or power rise up 
conditions. 
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5.2.5    Safety injection and residual heat removal system 
The safety injection system has four independent trains each injecting water at medium 
pressure (92 bars) into the primary system from water stored in accumulators. A low pressure 
injecting system pumps water into the primary system when the pressure will have been 
already decreased to low pressure. The residual heat removal system cools the reactor core 
when the reactor is shut down and the steam generators cannot provide efficient cooling, e.g. 
at lower than 120 °C. In addition it cools the spent fuel pool. 
5.2.6    In-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) 
The IRWST contains a large amount of borated water and collects water which is discharged 
inside the containment. It is located at the bottom of the containment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.6. EPR double containment with RPV, cooling systems and molten core spreading 
area (AREVA). 
5.2.7     Emergency feed water system (EFWS) 
The EFWS ensures that water is supplied to the steam generators when all those systems are 
unavailable which supply the feedwater under normal conditions. 
Integrated 
flooding pool / 
sump 
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5.2.8     Emergency power supply systems (EPSSs) 
The EPSSs ensure power supply in case of loss of external electrical power supply by 
electrical grids. These are four emergency diesel generators in a protected concrete building. 
In case these emergency diesel generators should fail (station black out) two additional 
generators (diesel or gas turbine) provide the necessary power. They are located in separate 
buildings. 
5.2.9     EPR safety concept and containment system [4,5] 
The EPR safety concept follows the optimization of all safety systems according to the 
results of a probabilistic safety analysis. This leads to an extremely low frequency of 
occurrence for core melt down accidents. In addition the containment of the EPR is designed 
such that accidents are eliminated which could lead to large releases of radioactive materials. 
Relocation or evacuation outside of the immediate vicinity of the plant, limited sheltering or 
long term food ban would not be necessary in case of a core melt accident. 
The EPR nuclear reactor system is, therefore, equipped with a strong double 
containment of prestressed concrete which can withstand the mechanical consequences of 
severe accidents. In addition it contains a molten core spreading area and cooling system 
below the reactor pressure vessel. Leak tightness of the containment and filter systems 
guarantee extremely low releases of radioactive materials even in case of severe core melt 
down accidents. 
5.3 Russian Light Water Reactors 
5.3.1 Main design characteristics [6] 
Russian LWRs, called VVERs, are built at electrical power of 640 MW(e), 1000 MW(e) and 
1500 MW(e). The design characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel and of the reactor core 
of these VVERs are similar to PWRs built in Europe (Section 5.2). However, the fuel 
elements have hexagonal shape, and the steam generators are arranged horizontally. 
Table 5.2 shows the main design characteristics of the VVER reactors. Fig. 5.7 shows a 
cross section of VVER reactor pressure vessel with the core and the control rod drive 
mechanisms. 
 
 VVER-640 VVER-1000 VVER-1500 
Electrical Power [MWe] 640 1000 1500 
Thermal Power [MWth] 1800 3000 4250 
Pressure of primary water [MPa] 15.7 15.7 15.7 
Pressure steam generator [MPa] 7.1 6.3 7.1 
Average linear power [W/cm] 100 166 156 
Outer diameter of fuel rod [mm] 9.1 9.1 9.1 
Outer diameter of RPV [m] 4.54 4.54 5.3 
Number of coolant loops 4 4 4 
 
Table 5.2.    Some design characteristics of Russian VVERs [6]. 
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Fig. 5.7. Cross section view of Russian VVER reactor pressure vessel with core and control 
rod drive mechanics [6]. 
 
 74 
5.3.2 Safety concept of VVERs 
The safety concept of modern VVERs is very similar to the EPR safety concept. It is based 
on active and passive emergency cooling systems. The VVERs are shut down by 121 
control/shut down rods falling into the core by gravity. In addition, boric acid is injected into 
the primary coolant. 
In case of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) the pressure in the reactor pressure vessel 
drops and water must be inserted from four high pressure emergency hydro accumulators 
which are initially at a pressure of 5.9 MPa. These are followed by eight low pressure hydro 
accumulators at a pressure of 1.5 MPa. The water reservoir of these hydro accumulators is 
sufficient to cool the reactor core for at least 24 hours. 
Special depressurization valves connect the hot and the cold legs of the loops with the 
spent fuel pool. They open passively at a certain pressure difference in case of a large coolant 
pipe break or long term loss of coolant. The coolant coming from the rupture of the coolant 
pipe is collected in the lower part of the containment forming the so called emergency pool. 
When the emergency pool level will have risen to a level between the cold leg and hot leg, 
the valves connecting the emergency pool and the spent fuel pool will open. From that 
moment on all water in the emergency and the spent fuel pool will be available for cooling 
the reactor core and the spent fuel. A molten core retention and cooling device is located 
underneath the reactor pressure vessel. 
The reactor containment is a double containment. The inner containment contains 
measures (hydrogen igniters) to alleviate the consequences of hydrogen combustion. 
Radioactive materials leaking out of the inner containment into the space between the double 
containment are passed through filters. As a consequence similar safety standards are attained 
as described in Section 5.1 for EPR. 
5.4     Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) 
The development of commercial boiling water reactors (BWRs) started in the USA in 1956. 
The BWRs built today by a number of manufacturers in the USA, Europe and Japan are 
characterized by almost identical technical designs. This chapter will mainly deal with the 
1250 MW(e) Generation-III+ SWR-1000 designed by AREVA in Europe. This modern BWR 
is characterized by passive safety systems. Its reactor core and fuel elements are very similar 
to other modern BWRs. Fig. 5.8 shows the main design principles of the SWR-1000. 
The saturated steam produced in the reactor core flows from the reactor pressure vessel 
directly to the turbo-generator system and is pumped back from the condenser to the pressure 
vessel. The condenser is cooled by cooling water from a cooling tower or from a river. 
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Fig. 5.8.   Main design principle of the boiling water reactor SWR-1000 (AREVA). 
5.4.1       Core, Pressure Vessel and Cooling System 
The reactor core consists of an array of 664 fuel elements about 3.0 m long [3,7,8,10]. The 
fuel element contains 128 fuel rods with outer diameters of 10.28 mm in a closed square box 
called ATRIUM-12 fuel elements. Fig. 5.9 shows as an example an ATRIUM-10 BWR fuel 
element having 8 fuel rods less than the ATRIUM-12 fuel element, but equal fuel rod design 
parameters. For moderation of the neutrons and cooling of the core, water flows through the 
core and is allowed to boil in the upper part of the core. 157 cruciform absorber rods, 
containing boron carbide as the absorber material, are installed in between a set of four fuel 
elements. The absorber rods are moved hydraulically into and out of the reactor core from 
below. The fuel rods have claddings of Zircaloy and contain UO2 pellets with an average 
enrichment of about 5% U-235. The fuel is unloaded after a maximum burnup of 65,000 
MWd(th)/t. Roughly one quarter of the fuel elements are unloaded, in a four batch reloading 
scheme after 18 months and replaced by fresh fuel elements. Fuel elements which have not 
attained their maximum burnup at that time are reshuffled in the core. 
Some fuel rods contain gadolinium as burnable poison to compensate for the burnup of 
fissile material and the build-up of absorbing fission products in the fuel during reactor 
operation. An internal water channel of 4x4 cm in the ATRIUM-12 fuel element is designed 
for power flattening across the fuel element. The average power generation density in the 
core is 51 kW/l or 24.7 kW(th)/kg uranium. The water inlet temperature in the core is 220 °C; 
the outlet temperature is 289 °C, which corresponds to a saturation steam pressure of 
7.5 MPa. 
 
fuel element 
loading 
machine 
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Fig. 5.9. ATRIUM-10 boiling water reactor fuel element [7,9,10]. 
 
The steam is generated by water boiling in the reactor core. To provide sufficient core 
flow for ample heat transfer, BWRs employ internal jet pumps. The core with the absorber 
rods is contained in a steel pressure vessel of 23.4 m height and 7.1 m diameter (Fig. 5.10). 
Steam separators and steam driers are arranged above the core. The reactor vessel head can 
be removed for loading and unloading of the fuel elements. The reactor pressure vessel has a 
wall thickness of about 150 mm. It is made of 22NiMoCr37 steel, the inside being plated 
with austenitic stainless steel. 
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Fig. 5.10.   Reactor Pressure Vessel of SWR-1000 (AREVA). 
 
The water circulation is driven by eight internal jet pumps in the reactor pressure vessel 
and through the core. The velocity of the circulating water influences the evaporation rate in 
the core and can be used for changing the reactor power. Reduction of water flow through the 
core will result in a higher evaporation rate and in a larger volume of bubble formation. 
Increasing the volume of steam in the core reduces the moderation of neutrons. As a 
consequence, the reactivity and the reactor power will be reduced. In this way, changes in the 
water flow can be used to control the reactor power without movement of control rods. 
Therefore, BWRs can automatically follow the load requirements of the turbine. The reactor 
power can be controlled by sensing pressure disturbances at the turbine, transmitting these 
signals to the recirculation flow control valve and regulating core flow. 
In order to ensure high quality of the reactor feed water, all the feed water recirculated 
from the turbine condenser is pumped through filters (demineraliser units) and cleared of any 
corrosion products and other impurities. 
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5.4.2    The SWR-1000 inner containment system [8,9] 
The inner containment system is a reinforced concrete containment with an inner steel liner. 
It is subdivided into a pressure suppression chamber and a drywell as well as four large 
hydraulically coupled core flooding pools (Fig. 5.11). The core flooding pools serve as a heat 
sink for passive heat removal from the reactor pressure vessel by emergency condensers and 
the pressure relief valves. 
The reactor pressure vessel, the three main steam lines and the two feed water lines are 
located in the drywell. The core flooding pools contain four emergency cooling condensers 
for passive heat removal in accident situations. In the upper part of the inner containment the 
large shielding and storage pool is located, together with four containment cooling 
condensers. The large shielding pool is hydraulically connected to the fuel element storage 
pool. 
The drywell also contains the core flooding lines for passive flooding of the reactor 
pressure vessel in case of accident situations and the passive pressure pulse transmitters for 
the initiation of safety functions. Finally, the drywell is equipped with two 100% capacity 
recirculation air cooling systems, the high pressure part of the cooling water cleaning system 
and the lines of the residual heat removal system. Table 5.4 indicates the number of different 
safety systems in the inner containment of the SWR-1000. The residual heat removal system 
pumps and the heat exchangers are installed underneath the pressure suppression chamber 
(Fig. 5.11). The whole inner containment is inertized by nitrogen to ensure fire protection and 
prevent hydrogen-oxygen chemical reactions (hydrogen deflagration or detonation) in case of 
a serious core melt down accident. 
 
ITEM Number 
Pressure suppression chamber 1 
Vent pipe 16 
Spring loaded pilot valve 8 
Safety & Relief valve 8 
Scram system 2 x 2 
Core flooding pool 4 
Emergency condenser 4 
Passive pressure pulse transmitter 3 x 4 
Pilot valve 15 
Core flooding system 4 
Shielding storage pool 1 
Containment cooling condenser 4 
Passive outflow reducer 4 
 
Table 5.4. Number of passive shutdown core flooding and residual heat removal system 
components. 
 
The three main steam lines and the two feed water lines connected to the reactor pressure 
vessel are equipped each with two containment isolation valves, one located inside and 
another one outside of inner containment penetrations (Fig. 5.11). These containment 
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isolation valves can be closed in the case of any pipe rupture in the inner containment. This 
action isolates the reactor pressure vessel from the water turbine or condenser cycles. 
The control rod drive and shut down rod system is acting from below the reactor pressure 
vessel. The pressure suppression chamber acts as a heat sink in the event of accident 
situations and provides water inventory for make up in the reactor pressure vessel via the 
residual heat removal system. 
5.4.3     Safety relief valve system 
The safety relief valve system acts for short term removal of excess steam after a turbine trip 
and protects the reactor coolant pressure boundary against overpressure exceeding allowable 
limits. It prevents high pressure melt ejection in case of severe core melt down. Similarly it 
depressurizes in case of pipe rupture and in the event that the water level in the reactor 
pressure vessel falls below specified limits. 
The safety relief valve system consists of 8 safety relief valves together with relief lines 
and steam quenchers. The latter are installed in the four core flooding pools. All relief lines 
lead to the core flooding pools but not into the pressure suppression pool as in earlier BWR 
designs. The safety relief valves are spring loaded valves or they act by solenoid pilot or 
diaphragm pilot valves via the 12 passive pressure pulse transmitters. No actuation by signals 
from the instrumentation and control system is required. 
5.4.4     Emergency condensers 
The emergency condensers are located in the four core flooding pools (Fig. 5.11). They also 
function as completely passive devices for residual heat removal from the reactor pressure 
vessel. They are actuated when the water level in the reactor pressure vessel drops below a 
certain limit. In this case the upper part of the emergency condensers is flushed with steam 
from the reactor pressure vessel which condenses and returns to the lower part of the pressure 
vessel. Passive flow reducers installed in the nozzles of the reactor pressure vessel direct the 
mass flow in the right direction. 
5.4.5     Containment cooling condensers 
Four containment cooling condensers are located in the part of the inner containment above 
the core flooding pools (Fig. 5.11). They remove passively the residual heat from the 
containment atmosphere to the shielding and storage pool. The tube bundles of these 
condensers are arranged at a slight angle to horizontal. In that way natural circulation of the 
water inside the tube bundles develops and transfers the heat from the inner containment to 
the shielding pool. 
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Fig. 5.11.  Containment and Internals (AREVA). 
5.4.6     Passive Pressure Pulse Transmitter 
The passive pressure pulse transmitters function without electrical power supply or actuation 
by the instrumentation and control system. They serve to initiate reactor scram, as well as 
containment isolation of the main steam lines and depressurization of the reactor pressure 
vessel. 
The passive pressure pulse transmitters consist of a small heat exchanger which is 
connected to the reactor pressure vessel. When the water level in the reactor pressure vessel 
drops the primary side of the small heat exchanger fills with steam. This causes the water on 
the secondary side of the small heat exchanger to evaporate leading to a rapid pressure rise. 
This pressure rise triggers the safety function of the diaphragm pilot valves. 
5.4.7     Residual Heat Removal and Active Core Flooding Systems 
Two active low-pressure core flooding and heat removal systems ensure the cooling during 
shutdown conditions. They also remove the heat from the core flooding pools and from the 
pressure suppression pool in the event of a loss of coolant accident. In addition they also 
transfer water during refueling conditions. 
5.4.8     Safety Shutdown Systems 
If there are reactivity perturbations or losses of coolant flow, the reactor is shut down in a 
short time by rapid insertion of the absorber rods. This is achieved by two diverse shut down 
systems: 
– an electrical motor driven operational shut down system 
– a hydraulically acting fast shut down (SCRAM) system. 
Inertisation of inner 
containment by nitrogen 
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As a backup shutdown system, the SWR-1000 can poison the coolant (moderator) with a 
neutron absorbing boric acid and, in this way, also quench the nuclear reaction and shut down 
the reactor. This is a completely independent additional shutdown system. 
5.4.9     Cooling after a severe core melt 
The coolant flooding system can transport water from the core flooding pools to the lower 
area of the drywell. This water pool can cool the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel 
from the outside. In this way a core melt can be retained within the control rod guide 
structures of the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel. The residual heat of the core melt 
can be conducted through the lower steel structures to the water pool. This heat power can be 
transferred by steam to the containment cooling condensers. 
5.4.10     Emergency power supply 
Emergency power for the cooling systems can be supplied by an external electrical 
emergency power grid. In addition, diesel generators can take over in case the external 
electrical emergency power grid would fail. 
5.4.11     SWR-1000 safety concept and containment system 
The SWR-1000 safety concept follows the optimization of all safety systems according to the 
results of a probabilistic safety analysis. The incorporation of passive safety systems together 
with proven active safety systems, the application of fail-safe principles and the principles of 
redundancy and diversity provide an optimal overall safety design. This leads to extremely 
low frequencies of occurrence for core melt down accidents. In addition the safety systems 
and the containment system of the SWR-1000 are designed such that accidents which would 
lead to large releases of radioactive materials are eliminated. Relocation or evacuation 
outside the immediate vicinity of the plant, limited sheltering or long term food ban would 
not be necessary in case of a core melt accident. 
The SWR-1000 is equipped with a strong double containment of prestressed concrete (Fig. 
5.8) which can withstand the mechanical consequences of severe accidents. Its inner 
containment is inertized by nitrogen against hydrogen detonations. Leak tightness of the 
containments and filter system guarantee extremely low releases of radioactive materials 
even in case of severe core melt down accidents. 
5.5     Other Types of Fission Reactors 
A number of additional types of reactors, with other coolants and neutron moderators, exist 
on the market for nuclear electricity generation. Other reactor lines have been proposed as 
projects but not so far put into practice. They will be described very briefly below. 
5.5.1     Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors 
This line uses heavy water as the moderator and heavy or light water as the coolant. It was 
originally developed in Canada (CANDU reactor). Its version using heavy water as the 
neutron moderator and coolant can be run on natural uranium. The fuel elements are replaced 
continuously on-load. More recent developments, such as the Advanced CANDU Reactor 
(ACR), also use light water as the coolant and will be operated on 2% low-enriched uranium. 
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This type is offered in unit sizes of up to 1000 MWe. CANDU reactors represent roughly ten 
percent of all nuclear reactors built and operated in the world (Section 2.1). 
The Steam-generating Heavy Water Reactors (SGHWR) developed in the United 
Kingdom uses light water in pressure tubes surrounded by heavy water as the moderator. The 
light water in the pressure tubes attains boiling temperature. Other heavy water reactors were 
developed in Germany and Japan. However, these lines are not pursued any further. The UO2 
fuel of heavy water reactors reaches a maximum burnup of 7-18 GWd/t. The spent fuel can 
be reprocessed. (Several types of research reactors moderated and cooled by heavy water 
have been built and are still operated world wide.) 
5.5.2.   Gas-cooled Reactors 
Gas-cooled reactors use graphite as the neutron moderator and a gas (carbon dioxide or 
helium) as the coolant. The gas-cooled reactors developed first in the United States 
(Hanford), the United Kingdom, Russia and France allowed the use of natural uranium fuel. 
Accordingly, the attainable fuel burnup was only approx. 6-7 GWd/t. Further development of 
these reactors led to the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) with a fuel enrichment of 
approx. 2-2.5% U-235 and a maximum burnup of approx. 18 GWd/t. The spent UO2 fuel can 
be reprocessed. 
In the United States, Germany and Japan the gas-cooled reactor line was advanced still 
further in an attempt to achieve high gas temperatures of 900-950 °C (Very-High-
Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors, VHTGRs). These gas temperatures are to be employed 
technically as process heat. Besides graphite as the moderator, helium needs to be used as a 
coolant in these designs. Moreover, the UO2 or ThO2 fuel is used in small particles coated 
with pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide. These fuel particles are embedded in a graphite 
matrix. The graphite matrix is surrounded by graphite as a neutron moderator. This results in 
two fuel element designs: so-called prismatic fuel elements and spherical fuel elements 
(spheres or pebbles). The prismatic designs are used in demonstration reactors in the United 
States (Fort St. Vrain), the UK (Dragon) and in Japan (HTTR). The spherical fuel elements 
are employed in so-called pebble bed reactors in Germany (AVR, THTR) and China (HTR-
10). These fuel elements attain burnups of 100 GWd/t and more. 
However, reprocessing them chemically is fraught with immense difficulties as the 
graphite must first be separated from the fuel particles, and the fuel particles with their layers 
of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide must be broken up. Only after these steps can the fuel 
be dissolved and reprocessed chemically. 
High-temperature pebble bed reactors at present are planned mainly as small modular 
HTRs of 200-300 MWth. These modular HTRs are to be proposed to produce process heat of 
high temperatures in Europe, China, USA, Russia, and South Africa. 
5.5.3     Molten Salt Thermal Breeder Reactor (MSBR) 
The MSBR originally was developed at Oak Ridge, USA in the 1960s. It is fuelled with a 
homogeneous salt fluid containing both the fissile uranium and fertile thorium fuel. The fuel 
carrier is a mixture of fluorides of lithium, beryllium, and thorium. The fissile uranium is 
present as UF6. Both U-235 and U-233 can be used and plutonium was used as well during 
the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) at Oak Ridge (USA). The fuel carrier salt is 
pumped through a graphite core structure. The heat produced by the core salt is transferred in 
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a heat exchanger to a secondary coolant (molten salt). This molten salt in a steam generator 
transfers the heat to a water cycle to produce steam. The fission products and protactinium, 
Pa-233, are continuously removed chemically by a purification and on-line reprocessing 
system. 
Although there are design proposals for this reactor line no plans for construction are 
known as yet. 
5.5.4     Limitation to LWRs and LMFBRs 
The studies and findings described above focus almost exclusively on LWRs. LWRs stand 
for eighty percent of the nuclear reactors currently in operation in the world and planned after 
2010. LMFBRs, i.e. sodium-cooled (SFR) and lead-bismuth-eutecticum-cooled (LBE-FR) 
breeder reactors with fast neutrons, probably will supplement or replace LWRs on a large 
scale after 2050. The UO2 and PuO2/UO2 fuels, respectively, of these LWRs and LMFBRs 
can be reprocessed chemically and recycled. The necessary facilities of the Pu/U fuel cycle, 
i.e. reprocessing and refabrication plants, are on stream already and will be expanded further 
in the near future. 
The CANDU reactors and ACRs moderated with heavy water will not be analyzed any 
further in this context as the low burnup (7-18 GWd/t) of the fuel elements makes the 
plutonium produced not proliferation-proof (Section 9 to 14). Also, the line of modern gas-
cooled reactors, such as the HTGR and modular HTR reactors, is not analyzed any further as 
the technical feasibility of reprocessing their fuels has not yet been demonstrated. 
The focus on today's LWR and later LMFBR fuel cycles therefore covers most of the 
presently existing and later operating nuclear reactors. A sufficient number of analyses have 
been published about the possibility of future proliferation-proof fuel cycles. These 
proliferation-proof future fuel cycles also can be combined with transmutation and 
incineration of the minor actinides, neptunium, americium (Section 9 to 14). 
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6.     Fast Neutron Reactors (FRs) 
Fast neutron reactors, with a fast neutron spectrum, operate in the U-238/Pu fuel cycle or in 
the Th-232/U-233 fuel cycle (Section 7). In case of the U-238/Pu fuel cycle plutonium is 
used from reprocessed spent fuel of e.g. LWRs. The core of FRs can be loaded with either 
metallic (Pu-U-Zr-alloy)-, oxide (PuO2/UO2)-, carbide (PuC/UC)- or nitride (PuN/UN)-fuel. 
Sodium was used in most cases as coolant so far, but also lead, lead-bismuth and helium gas 
were proposed. 
6.1 Breeding process 
As explained in Section 4.7 the relatively high -value (neutron yield) of Pu-239 and Pu-
241 leads to a breeding ratio >1 in the neutron energy spectrum range of about 200 keV. This 
neutron energy range can be achieved with either sodium, lead, lead-bismuth or helium gas. 
In the breeding process essentially U-238 is converted into Pu-239 which is fissioned. Fig. 
6.1 shows the breeding process for a breeding ratio BR = 1.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1.  Breeding process (U-Pu-cycle). 
 
As explained in Section 4.8, the breeding ratio BR >1 results in a fuel utilization of more 
than 60%. This can be compared with the 0.6% fuel utilization of a LWR. As the LWR has a 
natural uranium consumption of about 170 t per GW(e)/y at a plant load factor of 0.85 
(Section 2.7), the FR has a uranium consumption of a factor 100 lower, which is only 
1.7 t/GW(e). 
FRs are loaded initially with plutonium or U-233/U-235 coming from reprocessing of 
spent fuel of, e.g. LWRs. After this starting phase FRs need only depleted uranium (0.2% 
U-235 and U-238) or thorium. As natural uranium contains only 0.72% U-235 and 99.28% 
Neutron 
4 x 106 m/s 
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U-238 the consumption rates for FRs for depleted uranium and natural uranium are roughly 
the same. 
In the U/Pu fuel cycle FRs are operated with mixed plutonium-uranium fuel. The uranium 
commonly will be depleted uranium (tails assay from enrichment plants or reprocessed 
uranium). The initially loaded plutonium is acting then like a catalyst and is permanently 
replaced in situ by converted Pu-239 along the nuclear reaction chain: 
n,238 239 239 239
92 92 93 9423.5 min 2.35 dU  U  Np  Pu
   ##$ ####$ ###$  
 
Indirectly only U-238 is fissioned and converted into thermal energy. 
A similar breeding process holds for the Th-232/U-233 fuel cycle: 
n,238 293 233 233
90 90 91 9222.1 min 27.1 dTh  Th  Pa  U
   ##$ ####$ ###$  
 
Like the initially loaded plutonium also the U-233 must first be generated, e.g. in LWRs or 
HWRs to obtain the initial core inventory of a Th-232/U-233 fuelled FR. 
Regarding the available uranium and thorium resources in the world (Section 2) the 
breeding process opens up an energy potential which can be good for many thousand years. 
The time ranges discussed in Section 2 regarding the natural uranium availability of reactors 
with a thermal neutron spectrum (converter reactors) can be multiplied roughly by a factor 
100 based on the same nuclear energy production capacity. With the breeding process fission 
nuclear energy can provide energy on a time scale far beyond any presently conceivable 
planning interest. This is comparable with the energy potential that is hoped to be tapped by 
fusion reactors operating on the D-T cycle with lithium as the breeding material [1,2,3]. 
6.2 Development of FRs 
The principle of breeding had been understood from the onset of development of nuclear 
fission reactors. Accordingly, FRs have been designed, constructed, and operated in the USA, 
the UK, and the USSR since the 1950s [3]. The first generation of FRs were built and 
operated with the aim of investigating fast neutron reactor physics, control stability and to 
demonstrate the selected technical solutions. Early small FRs like Clementine, EBR-I in the 
USA, BR1 and BR-2 in the USSR, Zephyr and ZEUS in the UK were followed by larger 
experimental reactors like EBR-II and EFFBR in the USA, DFR in the UK, BOR-60 in the 
USSR, Rapsodie in France, and the KNK-II test reactor in Germany. They were equipped 
with uranium or plutonium metal – or by PuO2/UO2-fuel and most of  them were mainly 
cooled by sodium [3]. 
In the 1960s it was recognised that FRs needed a fuel allowing high burn-up in the range 
of 100 GWd/t for economical reasons. Therefore, mixed oxide plutonium-uranium (MOX) 
fuel was selected. In addition sodium was adopted exclusively as coolant. Helium gas and 
lead or lead-bismuth were also proposed as coolants. 
Two principle design concepts have been adopted for sodium cooled fast reactors (SFRs). 
Both design concepts need an intermediate sodium coolant cycle. In the loop-type concept, 
the primary pumps and intermediate heat exchangers with non-radioactive sodium are located 
outside the reactor vessel. They are interconnected by coolant pipes. In the pool-type concept 
a larger reactor sodium filled tank houses the pumps and intermediate heat exchangers. Fig. 
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6.2 shows the scheme of a pool-type SFR. The heat produced in the fuel elements is 
transferred by the primary radioactive sodium to the intermediate non-radioactive sodium 
coolant circuit and to the steam generators. Sodium temperatures of 488 °C and steam at a 
pressure of 12.7 MPa are attained. This leads to a thermal efficiency of 42%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig: 6.2.     Design scheme of a pool type SFR (AREVA). 
6.3 Sodium coolant properties [4-12] 
Sodium has a melting point of 98 °C and a boiling point of 880 °C at atmospheric pressure. It 
has a high thermal conductivity of 66.1 W/cm °C and a specific heat capacity of 1.30 kJ/kg 
°C, at 527 °C. Due to its low neutron moderation capabilities the average neutron energy of 
the neutron energy spectrum is in the range of 200 keV. The excellent thermal properties 
allow a power density of 300-400 kW(th)/l in the core and a max. linear rod power of the fuel 
rods of 400-450 W/cm. SFRs have a relatively small reactor core volume and an enrichment 
of the MOX fuel of 15 to 25% fissile plutonium (Pu-239 and Pu-241). Due to relatively low 
microscopic fission cross sections of plutonium in the energy range of 100 keV the neutron 
flux in the core must be in the range of about 5x1015 n/(cm2s). This high neutron flux results 
in relatively high irradiation damage in the structural materials. 
Neutron capture in sodium, i.e. in Na-23, leads to Na-24 which is radioactive and decays 
via –decay with a half-life of 15 hours. 
6.4 Demonstration SFRs [4-13] 
Three sodium cooled demonstration FRs were already taken in operation in the early 1970s. 
The Soviet BN-350 reached first criticality in 1972 and operated until 1999. The French 
Phénix was connected to the electrical grid in 1973 delivered full power until 2009 and the 
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British PFR delivered electricity from in 1975 until 1994. For all three demonstration FRs, 
with a power output of 150-250 MWe, the original design characteristics were confirmed in 
terms of fast reactor core physics, control stability, safety engineering and sodium 
technology. Somewhat later, the FFTF (400 MWth) reached its first criticality in the USA. It 
served as a fuel and materials test facility until 1992. 
First commercial size power SFRs, e.g. BN-600 [600 MW(e)] started operation in the 
USSR in 1980/82 and Superphénix [1200 MW(e)] began operation in France in 1985/86 and 
was shut down in 1998. Other SFR demonstration reactor projects, e.g. CRBR in the USA or 
SNR-300 in Germany were either stopped during the design phase or not taken into operation 
for political reasons. 
Phénix in France operated over 35 years with good operational performance. The Russian 
BN-600 was still operating by 2010 with excellent operational performance over 20 years. 
This demonstrates the technical feasibility of sodium cooled FRs. 
In Japan, the prototype demonstration MONJU (280 MW(e)) is scheduled to go on full 
power in 2012 after problems with a sodium leakage had been overcome and a new licensing 
procedure had been completed. Other commercial size SFRs were still under construction by 
2010 (BN-800 with 800 MW(e) in Russia and PFBR with 500 MW(e) in India). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.3.    Hexagonal core fuel element of the MONJU demonstration FBR [12]. 
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Fig. 6.3 shows the design details of the core fuel element of MONJU. The hexagonal fuel 
element contains 169 fuel rods. These fuel rods have an outer diameter of 6.5 mm, a length of 
about 2.8 m and a cladding thickness of 0.47 mm. Spiral wires around the fuel rod guarantee 
the proper spacing between the fuel rods. The fuel rod contains the PuO2/UO2 pellets of the 
core zone and the UO2 pellets of the lower and upper axial blanket. The inner radial core 
zone is enriched by 16% in Pu-239 and Pu-241, whereas the outer radial core zone has an 
enrichment of 21%. Above the upper axial blanket a gas plenum zone is located where the 
gaseous fission products are collected [11]. 
6.5 Large scale deployment of SFRs 
There are several reasons for the delayed large scale commercial introduction of SFRs, 
despite the fact that they were developed in Europe, the USA, the USSR and Japan already 
since about 1950. 
– The presently assured uranium resources are higher than originally prognosticated. 
– The projection for nuclear energy during and after the oil crisis of the 1970s had been 
overestimated. 
– LWRs are dominating the nuclear energy application now. They demonstrated excellent 
operational and economic performance. They will be built and operated over the next 50-
60 years until the enriched uranium availability will decrease, because of shorter natural 
uranium availability. 
– The next step will be plutonium recycling in the same type of LWRs. The necessary 
reprocessing and MOX fuel refabrication plants have been built already in France, the 
UK, Russia and Japan. 
– SFRs – despite of their technical maturity – are not as economic yet as LWRs. The 
reasons are their higher technical sophistication (two sodium coolant circuits, the use of 
austenitic steels etc) and their higher fuel cycle costs. 
– The use of plutonium in SFR cores and the possibility of breeding relatively pure 
plutonium in their blankets have lead to a stop of SFR development in the USA and 
Germany between 1980-90 as a consequence of their non-proliferation policy. 
Only recently, scientific and technical solutions have been worked out to solve these non-
proliferation problems. They will be explained in Sections 13 and 14. 
As already explained in Section 2 a large scale deployment of SFRs and their fuel cycle 
can be expected around 2040-2050. 
6.5.1 Commercial size SFRs 
Only the demonstration sodium cooled fast reactor MONJU in Japan and the near 
commercial size sodium cooled fast reactor BN-600 will be operating during the next years. 
In addition the commercial size BN-800 and the Indian PFBR (500 MW(e)) will go into 
operation between 2010 and 2015. Also several small lead-bismuth cooled fast reactors were 
decided for construction in Russia based on experience with submarines. 
Japan, France and Russia are developing SFRs up to 1500 MWe which shall become 
competitive with LWRs around 2050. SFRs must be developed together with their fuel cycle. 
It will take several decades to construct and operate several 1500 MWe size SFRs together 
with reprocessing and refabrication plants. 
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6.5.2 BN-600 in Russia [9-15] 
The 600 MWe SFR BN-600 reached first criticality in 1980 and full power operation in 1982. 
It is a pool type SFR design with three secondary heat transfer loops and three steam 
generators. Each steam generator consists of eight sections for the evaporator, superheater 
and reheater. In case of failing tubes, one of  these eight different sections can be isolated and 
be replaced while the reactor is operating on partial load. The core and the intermediate heat 
exchangers together with the centrifugal primary pumps are housed in a large sodium filled 
pool tank (Fig. 6.4). A large head shield plug closes the upper part of this pool tank. It 
contains eccentrically rotating plugs for positioning the fuel element transfer machine exactly 
above a fuel element position for reshuffling or replacement procedures. The upper sodium 
surface in the shield tank is covered by argon gas. The pressure of this cover gas is slightly 
above atmospheric pressure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.4.  BN-600 pool type sodium cooled fast reactor [9]. 
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The core contains 369 hexagonal fuel elements. The height of the core is 103 cm and its 
diameter is 206 cm. The radial blanket has a thickness of 47 cm. The upper and lower axial 
blankets are 30 cm thick each. 
The sodium flows with a velocity of about 5 m/s upwards through the core. The sodium 
core inlet temperature is 365 °C, its outlet temperature is 535 °C. 
BN-600 was originally fueled by enriched uranium oxide with 17%, 21% and 26% 
enrichment in U-235 in the three radial core zones. From 1998 on this enriched UO2 fuel was 
partly replaced by vibro-compacted PuO2/UO2 mixed oxide fuel. A maximum fuel burn-up 
with this fuel of 110 GWd/t was attained. 
BN-600 had already demonstrated excellent operational experience over 28 years by 2010. 
Early fuel rod failures and tube failures in steam generators could be overcome by developing 
better materials and by design improvements [14,15]. 
The excellent operational experience of the French demonstration reactor Phénix (250 
MWe) and Superphenix (1250 MWe) as well as of the Russian BN-600 demonstrated already 
the technical feasibility of these pool type sodium cooled FRs. 
 
  BN-600  
Reactor Power 
Thermal MW (th) 1400 
Electrical net MW (e) 600 
Plant efficiency % 41 
Reactor Core 
Fuel  UO2 and PuO2/UO2 
Core outer diameter cm 205 
Core height cm 103 
Pu eq. enrichment 
Inner core zone % 17/26 
Outer core zone % 21 
Total breeding ratio  0.85-1.0 
Pu eq. mass tonne 2.6 
Total UO2/PuO, mass in core tonne 12 
Fuel rod outer diameter mm 6.9 
Length of fuel pin mm 2445 
Core power density 
Average kW (th)/1 445 
Maximum kW (th)/1 603 
Residence time of fuel d 420 
Max. fuel rod power W/cm 480 
Max. burnup MWd (th)/tonne  110,000 
Blankets 
Fuel  UO2 
Axial thickness cm 30 
Radial thickness cm 47 
 Fertile rod outer diameter cm 1.40  
 
 
Tab. 6.1.  Characteristic design parameters of BN-600 (pool type LMFBR) [9,11]. 
 92 
  BN-600  
Fissile Fuel Bundles 
Number of bundles  369 
Number of pins per bundle  127 
Pin total length m 2.4 
Bundle total length m 3.5 
Cladding material  stainless steel 
Cladding maximum rated temperature °C 695 
Fertile Fuel Bundles 
Number of bundles  362 
Number of pins per bundle  37 
Pin total length m 1.84 
Bundle total length m 3.5 
    Cladding material  stainless steel 
Control Bundles 
Main shutdown system: 
Number of bundles  14 
Number of absorber elements per bundle  7/31/8 
Pin length m 1.1 
Cladding material  stainless steel 
Primary System 
Coolant  sodium 
Primary Na mass tonne 770 
Rated flow tonne/s 6 
Core sodium inlet temperature °C 365 
Core sodium outlet temperature °C 535 
  IHX sodium inlet temperature °C 533 
    IHX sodium outlet temperature °C 362 
Secondary System 
Coolant  sodium 
Secondary Na mass tonne 830 
Rated flow tonne/s 6.1 
SG sodium outlet temperature °C 315 
IHX sodium inlet temperature °C 315 
IHX sodium outlet temperature °C 510 
SG sodium inlet temperature °C 510 
Water-Steam System 
SG water inlet temperature °C 240 
Turbine steam inlet temperature °C 502 
    Turbine steam inlet pressure MPa 13.2  
 
Tab. 6.1. Continued 
 
6.5.3     Commercial size SFR design [14-21] 
Studies on commercial size FR designs with a power output of 1200-1500 MWe were 
performed in Europe, Russia and Japan since about 1990. The objective of such studies was 
to investigate the technical and economical feasibility of such large FRs and how they could 
be introduced into the already existing market of nuclear power reactors. One of these design 
proposals, representing a Japanese sodium cooled loop type fast reactor (JSFR) [16,17,18,19] 
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will be described in this section. It is based on the construction experience of the loop type 
Japanese demonstration fast reactor MONJU. 
JSFR has a thermal power of 3570 MWth and an electrical power output of 1500 MW(e). 
The reactor core rests on steel support structures and is housed in a sodium filled reactor 
tank. The free surface of the sodium is covered by argon gas at a pressure of slightly above 
0.1 MPa. The reactor tank is covered by a thick shield cover plate with eccentrically rotating 
plugs. The guide structures of the control and absorber rods penetrate this shield cover plug 
from above. The fuel element loading and transfer machine is operating from above the 
rotating plugs after the control rod drive mechanisms will have been decoupled. 
The primary radioactive sodium coolant enters the reactor tank with a temperature of 
395 °C and flows from the lower entrance plenum upward through the core. It is heated up in 
the core to an outlet temperature of 550 °C and flows to the intermediate heat exchangers. 
JSFR has only two cooling circuits. The primary pumps are integrated into the 
intermediate heat exchangers. The secondary non-radioactive sodium is pumped to two steam 
generators (SGs) where steam of at 19.2 MPa and 497 °C is produced. The thermal efficiency 
of the JSFR plant would be 42%. 
In comparison to earlier loop type demonstration SFRs, e.g. MONJU, the 1500 MWe 
JSFR has much shorter sodium pipings outside of the pool tank. This is achieved by using 
high chromium steels and simplified geometric configurations with inverse L-shaped pipes. 
The reactor tank and all primary and secondary sodium piping are double walled to avoid 
sodium fire in case of leakage. The space in between double walled pipings is filled with 
nitrogen gas which can be heated. Electrical trace heating on sodium piping can be avoided 
by this design. The two steam generators are equipped with especially developed double 
walled tubes to prevent sodium-water interactions in case of failing steam generator tubes. 
PuO2/UO2 mixed oxide is used as fuel in the core. The reactor core has two enrichment 
zones for radial power flattening. The inner core zone has an enrichment of 18.3% Pu-
239/241, the outer zone 20.9% enrichment in Pu-239/241. This leads to a fissile plutonium 
core inventory of 8.5 te. The breeding ratio is 1.10. The cladding is made of vanadium oxide 
dispersed steel (ODS). It allows a neutron fluence of 5x1023 n/cm2 equivalent to 250 dpa or a 
burnup of the core fuel up to 150 GWd/t over eight years of full operation. After an operation 
cycle period of about 26 months about one fourth of the core will be unloaded. The reactor 
core and radial blanket are surrounded by a core barrel which restrains the core in radial 
direction in order to fulfill earthquake design requirements. Also, the whole coolant circuit 
system is design to obey Japanese aseismic design criteria [16,17,18,19,20,21]. 
JSFR has two diverse shutdown systems, one of which is designed with flexible joint 
absorber parts. This allows absorber insertion under robust restraint conditions in case of 
earthquakes. A third shutdown system is based on the thermomagnetic properties of 
ferromagnetic alloy in the control rod guide structures. The shutdown function is initiated 
passively when the sodium outlet temperature exceeds the Curie point of the holding 
magnets. This third shutdown system prevents sodium outlet temperatures of more than about 
750 °C in case of severe accident situations for which a failure of the shut down systems is 
assumed. Thus sodium boiling and failure of fuel rods in case of anticipated failure of the 
first two shutdown systems is avoided. 
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Fig. 6.5.   1500 MWe sodium cooled JSFR design proposal (JAEA) [16,17,18,19]. 
 
Multilayered molten core debris tray structures are arranged underneath the reactor core 
support structures. These molten core debris tray structures shall retain molten core fuel, 
avoid recriticalities and cool the molten fuel. 
Decay heat removal can be accomplished by natural convection of the sodium in the 
primary and secondary coolant circuits. Under accident conditions additional emergency 
decay heat removal systems start passively. They act on the basis of natural convection of the 
sodium with sodium-air coolers and dampers. No pumps, no pony motors and no air blowers 
are needed in such cases. 
The inner reactor containment is a concrete containment with inside and outside steel 
cladding which can resist all mechanical and thermal loads in case of severe accidents. The 
surrounding outer containment must be designed against external loads, e.g. earthquakes, 
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flooding. etc. As modern pressurized water reactors, e.g. EPR or SWR-1000, also future SFR 
containments must have extremely low leakage conditions and very efficient filter systems to 
avoid large radioactivity releases in case of severe accidents. Thus, evacuation or relocation 
of the population outside of the plant can be avoided even in case of severe accidents. 
6.6     Lead-Bismuth cooled FRs 
Based on experience with lead-bismuth cooled submarine reactors in Russia lead-bismuth 
cooled FRs were proposed first in Russia and later investigated also in Japan and in Europe. 
6.6.1    Lead-bismuth coolant properties 
Lead-bismuth (44.5% lead and 55.5% bismuth eutectic alloy (LBE)) has a melting point at 
125 °C and a boiling point at 1670 °C. Its density at 400 °C is 10.24 kg/m3. Its thermal heat 
conductivity at 400 °C is 13.7 W/(m °C) and its heat capacity is 0.146 kJ/(kgK). Due to its 
low neutron moderation capabilities the average neutron energy of the neutron energy 
spectrum is in the range of about 200 keV. The excellent thermal properties allow a similarly 
high power density in the core as in case of SFRs. The corrosion properties of LBE require 
special cladding surface treatment and protection layers of steels [22,23,24,25,26]. The 
oxygen content must be controlled accurately. LBE does hardly react with oxygen or water 
and, therefore, simplifies the design of LBE cooled FRs. 
6.6.2    Design proposals for Lead-bismuth FRs 
The core of a LBE cooled reactor has hexagonal fuel elements. The coolant fraction in the 
subassembly design is only about 25% due to the thermal properties of LBE. Corrosion 
concerns lead to a LBE coolant velocity of about 2 m/s. The core fuel can be about 16% 
enriched UO2 as in the small size Russian modular type SVBR-75/100 [29,30]. Also 
ThO2/UO2 mixed oxide fuel or PuN/UN mixed nitride were proposed as fuel in the Russian 
BREST-300 design [10,11] or in the Japanese LBE 550/750 MWe design [27,28]. With 16% 
U-235 enriched uranium fuel only a conversion ratio CR = 0.85 is attained. The SVBR has no 
radial blanket fuel elements. 
The coolant circuits can be drastically simplified due to the low chemical affinity of LBE 
against oxygen and water. The steam generators can be directly integrated into the pool type 
tank. Fig. 6.6 shows the Russian small modular lead bismuth cooled SVBR-75/100 [29,30]. 
The core, the primary pumps and the steam generators are integrated into a pool tank. The 
reactortank structures must be designed to withstand the weight of the LBE coolant. 
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Fig. 6.6.     SVBR-75/100 reactor design [29,30]. 
 
Emergency cooling relies entirely on natural convection as described for the case of SFRs. 
In case of failing steam generators the afterheat can also be conducted radially through the 
wall of the reactor tank to an outside water tank. The SVBR-75/100 is shutdown by 
independent and diverse shut down systems. Due to the relatively high density of the lead-
bismuth coolant all steel structures must have higher thickness than in SFRs. Special care 
must be given to an earthquake resistant design. For that reason design proposal for lead-
bismuth cooled FRs are restricted to medium power size up to 500 or 750 MWe in Japan  
[16,27,28]. The small modular type SVBR-75/100 can be assembled to a cluster type plant 
with 8 or 16 SVBR-75/100 reactors with a total output of 800 MWe or 1600 MWe [29,30]. 
6.7     The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) 
The IFR is a sodium cooled pool type fast reactor using metallic uranium-plutonium-
zirconium alloy (U-Pu-Zr)-fuel in combination with pyrometallurgical fuel reprocessing and 
remote injection casting fuel refabrication [31,32,37]. The reactor plant, the pyroprocessing 
plant and the metallic fuel refabrication plant are collocated at one site at Idaho National 
Laboratory. 
The optimization of reactivity temperature coefficients, e.g. Doppler coefficient, sodium 
expansion coefficient, structural expansion coefficients including control rod drive line 
expansion and natural convection flow of the coolant sodium results in an inherent control 
behavior of the reactor without reliance on control rod scram systems [31,32,33]. Off normal 
events with very low probability of occurence, e.g. loss of coolant flow, loss of heat sink or 
run-out of a control rod followed by failure of the shut down systems will lead only to a 
sodium coolant temperature rise up to about 600 °C which is about 200 °C below the boiling 
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point of sodium. The decay heat of the core can be safely removed by natural convection 
flow. 
IFR core designs were reported for 340 MW(e), 600 MW(e) and 1350 MW(e). Table 6.2 
gives an impression of the core design and main design characteristics of a 340 MW(e) IFR 
design. The IFR was designed as an LMFBR [31,32,33] with core internal blanket fuel 
elements or as an FR burner reactor (Advanced burner reactor) for the incineration of the 
transuranium elements (plutonium, neptunium, americium, curium [34,35]). 
 
Electric power  MW(e) 
Reactor outlet temperature (°C) 
Reactor T (°C) 
Core Concept 
340 
510 
135 
Heterogeneous 
Fuel residence time (cycles) 
 Driver 
 Blanket* 
Cycle length (full-power days) 
 
4 
4 
292 
Fuel material 
 Driver 
 Blanket 
Clad and duct material 
 
U-Pu-10% Zr 
U-10% Zr 
HT-9 
Active fuel height (cm) 
 Driver 
 Blanket 
 
91 
112 
Axial blanket thickness (cm) 
Number of pins per assembly 
 Driver 
 Blanket 
0.0 
 
271 
169 
Fuel pin diameter (cm) 
 Driver 
 Blanket 
 
0.72 
1.0 
Cladding thickness (cm) 
Duct wall thickness (cm) 
0.056 
0.36 
*Refers to internal and radial blanket 
 
Table 6.2.     900 MWth IFR Core Design Parameters for 340 MW(e). 
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7.   The Nuclear Fuel Cycles 
7.1   Storage of Spent Fuel Elements after Discharge 
After discharge from the reactor core, the fuel elements are stored at the reactor site for a 
period of one or two years to allow for radioactivity decay and cooling. Spent fuel elements 
are then transported in spent fuel transport casks either to intermediate storage facilities or to 
storage pools at reprocessing plants. The intermediate storage facilities can also be located at 
the reactor site [1,2,3]. 
7.1.1.   Transport of Spent Fuel Elements 
Spent fuel elements are transported in special fuel transport casks, which weigh between 60 
and some 120 t and have load capacities for up to about 12 t of spent fuel (Tab. 7.1). Fuel 
transport casks can be transported by special trucks on the road or on special rail cars. Also 
barge shipments on both inland waterways and oceans are made. The spent fuel elements are 
cooled within the casks either by air (dry casks) or water (wet casks). About 38 spent fuel 
elements are unloaded from a 1300 MWe PWR per year (Fig. 7.1). They can be transported, 
e.g. in two CASTOR V/19 transport cask to an intermediate storage facility [4,7]. 
 
Fig. 7.1.    Transport of spent fuel elements from reactor to intermediate storage (VGB). 
 
The transport casks contain the necessary shielding with steel, lead and water or borated 
water. They are cooled by natural airflow over fins on the outer surface or by forced air 
circulation. Spent fuel casks are designed to withstand severe accident conditions during 
shipment. Releases of radioactivity under such conditions must be rendered impossible. 
Therefore, the casks must be able to withstand such impacts as thermal tests (fire), drop tests 
under gravity, crash tests, and water immersion tests before being licensed for actual 
transport. Special international shipping regulations have been elaborated. 
7.1.2    Intermediate Storage of Spent Fuel Elements 
Spent fuel elements can be stored for intermediate periods of time in water pools (wet 
storage), air cooled casks (dry storage) or in special containers. For wet storage in 
intermediate storage pools or storage pools of reprocessing plants, the spent fuel elements 
are arranged in racks or baskets kept in water pools. The water serves as a heat transfer 
medium for the heat generated in the fuel elements and provides the necessary shielding of 
the fuel elements. It is maintained at a sufficiently high level to provide shielding during all 
PWR-1300 MWe                                  2 transport casks                 Intermediate storage 
38 spent fuel elements                          type CASTOR                    facility 
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fuel handling operations. The walls and floors of storage pools are made of reinforced 
concrete lined with stainless steel [6]. 
LWR spent fuel elements can be stored, if needed, in water pools for many decades. 
During this time period, the fuel elements will not experience appreciable water corrosion on 
their outer surfaces. 
Dry storage of LWR spent fuel elements is feasible in air cooled storage casks made of 
cast iron. European cast iron spent fuel casks take up to 19 PWR or 52 BWR fuel elements 
(FE) (Table 7.1). They are equipped with outside cooling fins and can be stored in large 
intermediate storage buildings (Fig. 7.2). The storage building is cooled by air [5,7]. 
 
Country Type Number of fuel  
elements (FE) 
Total weight 
(tonnes) 
height/ 
diameter (m) 
CASTOR V/19 19 PWR-FE 121 5.86/2.44 
CASTOR V/52 52 BWR-FE 123 5.45/2.44 
CASTOR IIa 9 PWR-FE 116 6.01/2.48 
 
 
Germany 
CASTOR 440/89 84 WWER – 440 FE 116 4.08/2.66 
France TN 13/2 12 PWR-FE 105 5.60/2.5 
Great 
Britain 
Excellox 4 7-15 PWR-FE 91 t 5.6/2.2 
Tab. 7.1.  Design characteristics of fuel element transport casks [4]. 
Dry storage is also used for HWR and HTGR graphite fuel elements. Spherical graphite 
fuel elements of HTRs can be stored under dry conditions in gastight cans. 
LMFBR fuel elements are kept first for some time in sodium cooled storage pools on the 
reactor site. For intermediate storage they are filled in cans, cooled either by sodium and then 
stored under water or only cooled by air or an inert gas (nitrogen). Before reprocessing, the 
sodium is removed from the fuel element surface by melting or steam cleaning in a hot inert 
gas atmosphere. 
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Fig. 7.2.   Storage of intermediate storage containers in air cooled storage building (VGB) 
7.2 The Uranium-238/Plutonium Closed Fuel Cycle [8,9,10,11] 
Uranium can be utilized more efficiently in a closed fuel cycle with reprocessing and 
recycling of the fissile and fertile material. This applies to fuel used in LWRs and LMFBRs. 
For LMFBRs the closed fuel cycle is imperative. Technical aspects of reprocessing and 
recycling (refabrication) in the uranium/plutonium fuel cycle will be described in the 
following sections. 
7.2.1     Reprocessing of Spent UO2 Fuel Elements 
Spent fuel elements with irradiated UO2 fuel and stainless steel or zircaloy claddings are 
transported to the reprocessing plant and stored there prior to chemical reprocessing. The 
steps of disassembly of such fuel elements, dissolution of the fuel as well as chemical 
separation are the same in principle for LWR and LMFBR fuel elements operated on UO2 or 
PuO2/UO2 fuel. 
7.2.1.1     Mass Inventories of Spent Fuel and Waste 
The mass inventories, their heat generation and their potential of radio toxicity constitute 
important parameters on which to base engineered safety measures [7]. 
Customarily, these data are based on 1 t of heavy metal (HM) fuel. In that case, roughly 
1.14 t of UO2 or UO2/PuO2 corresponds to 1 tHM. When loaded into the core, 1 tHM of fresh 
LWR fuel in an equilibrium cycle with 5% U-235 enrichment contains 50 kg of U-235 and  
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950 kg of U-238 (Fig. 7.3). When unloaded from the LWR core after a burnup of 
60 GWd(th)/t, 1 tHM of spent fuel still contains 0.7% of U-235 and 91.96% of U-238, but 
0.66% of U-236, some 1.05% of different plutonium isotopes, 5.5% of fission products 
(FPs), 0.13% of Np-237, americium, and curium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.3. Contents (%) of fresh uranium fuel (U-235, U-238) and spent fuel after 60,000 
MWd(th)/ton uranium (U-235, U-236, U-238), fission products, plutonium and 
minor actinides (Np, Am, Cm). 
 
7.2.1.2     Decay of radioactivity of spent fuel 
The decay of radioactivity of the spent fuel is initially dominated by the fission products. 
Fig. 7.4 shows the decaying radioactivity in Bq per tonne during the first 10 years after the 
spent fuel elements were unloaded from the reactor core. It also illustrates the time periods 
for fuel transport, reprocessing and waste treatment (vitrification of the high level waste 
concentrate). 
 
 
 
93.32% Uranium
5.5% Fission products (FPs) 
1.18% Transurania 
60,000 MWd/tHM 
5,5 % FP 
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Fig. 7.4.     Radioactivity of 1 t of spent fuel as a function of time. 
 
7.2.2      LWR Fuel Element Disassembly and Spent Fuel Dissolution 
In a reprocessing plant (Fig. 7.5 shows the head end of such a plant) the storage pools are 
arranged close to the fuel element disassembly cells. The fuel elements are moved by means 
of a crane from the storage pool into the disassembly cell above it. In this cell, LWR fuel 
elements are cut up by large bundle shears. After the end parts have been removed from the 
fuel elements, the fuel rod bundles are chopped into pieces several cm long. The bundle shear 
is operated remotely and is designed so that it can also be repaired by remotely operating 
tools. The fuel element and fuel rod sections drop directly into a dissolver basket located in 
the dissolver cell underneath. The basket is filled with boiling nitric acid, which leaches the 
fuel out of the chopped fuel rod hulls. After leaching of the fuel, the remaining hulls with tiny 
particles of fuel and fuel element structural parts are dumped from the basket into a container, 
and the container is moved into the hull storage facility. 
The fuel solution still contains small solid parts. This undissolved fraction of plutonium is 
about 1%. The undissolved solid particles are removed through coarse filters or by 
centrifuges. 
Spent fuel reprocessing 
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Fig. 7.5. Head end with waste gas purification as well as reprocessing of spent fuel and 
waste conditioning. 
7.2.3    Gas Cleaning and Retention of Gaseous Fission Products 
During the processes of chopping and dissolution of the fuel, gaseous and volatile fission 
products are released. They must be removed together with water vapor, nitrous gases and 
nitrogen. This mixture of volatile fission products, vapors and gases must be treated in the 
waste gas cleaning system. Gaseous and volatile fission products are made up of the 
following components: 
– Tritium produced by ternary fission and by (n,T)-reactions in light atomic nuclei. 
– Carbon, C-14. is produced by an (n,)-reaction from O-17 and by the (n,p)-reaction of 
N-14. In the gaseous effluent it appears as 14CO2. 
– Krypton is generated as a gaseous fission product. Some 7% of the krypton fission 
products produced consist of Kr-85 isotopes. 
– Xenon is another gaseous fission product. However, only traces of the Xe-133 isotope 
produced must be considered. 
All the other fission product noble gases generated are either stable or have very short 
halflives. 
I-129 and traces of I-131 are partially volatile isotopes initially found in dissolved fuel. 
Ru-106 may volatilize as ruthenium tetroxide evaporating from strong nitric acid 
solutions, but only some 10-4 fractions of Ru-106 enter into the gaseous effluent stream. In a 
similar way, small traces of such -emitters as strontium or -emitters as uranium and 
plutonium can penetrate into the gaseous effluent as aerosols. However, only some 10-4 to 
10-6 fractions of the fuel inventory are carried into the gas stream as aerosols. 
These gaseous effluents are first passed through a condenser. Afterwards, the nitrogen 
oxides are oxidized and washed out. The remaining aerosol fractions only amount to 10-6 to 
10-8 times the inventory. Scrubbers and high-efficiency particulate aerosol (HEPA) filters 
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are used next to remove the aerosols. Iodine is retained very efficiently in silver 
impregnated (AgNO3) filter materials. Tritium as HTO contained in water vapor and 14CO, 
are retained in molecular sieves. The removal of Kr-85 can be achieved by means of low 
temperature rectification. In the same process, the xenon noble gas can also be removed. 
The separated krypton can be stored in compressed gas cylinders. Alternatives may be the 
entrapment in zeolites (crystallized silicates). 
7.2.4    Chemical Separation of Uranium and Plutonium (PUREX process) [8,9] 
The most applied process to date is the PUREX process (plutonium and uranium recovery by 
extraction). The PUREX process uses tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP), which may be diluted by 
kerosene or n-paraffin (hydrocarbon) solvents as organic solvents to extract uranium and 
plutonium. TBP is stable in nitric acid and can selectively extract tetravalent and hexavalent 
uranium and plutonium nitrate complexes. However, this selective extraction capability of 
TBP does not apply to trivalent plutonium nitrate complexes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.6. Simplified PUREX process flowsheet [9]. 
 
For extraction, the fuel solution acidified with nitric acid and containing uranium, 
plutonium, higher actinides and fission products is moved from the middle of column A (Fig. 
7.6) in a liquid-liquid counter current extraction flow past the specifically lighter organic 
solvent (TBP in kerosene) rising from the bottom. In that process, the organic solvent 
extracts uranium and plutonium, while the fission products and actinides remain in the 
aqueous solution. The solution with nitric acid leaves the column at the bottom as high level 
aqueous waste (HLW). It contains the fission products and higher actinides. The aqueous 
waste is evaporated to recover the nitric acid. The remaining concentrate is further treated as 
high level waste concentrate (HLWC). 
The rising organic solvent contains uranium and plutonium and small traces of fission 
products, which are removed by a nitric acid solution injected at the top of the column. The 
organic solvent leaves the columns at the top and is introduced into column B, where the 
tetravalent and hexavalent plutonium is reduced to trivalent plutonium by means of a 
A B C 
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reducing agent stream, e.g. U (IV) nitrate with hydrazine nitrate, hydroxylamine nitrate or 
Fe(II) sulfamate. The most elegant method developed uses electrolytic reduction within the 
extraction apparatus. This trivalent plutonium is soluble in organic TBP-kerosene and, as a 
consequence, is re-extracted into the aqueous phase, while hexavalent uranium remains in the 
organic TBP-kerosene phase. Small amounts of re-extracted uranium are extracted again by 
organic TBP-kerosene introduced at the bottom of the second column. The aqueous 
plutonium product stream leaves the second column at the bottom, while the organic uranium 
product stream leaves at the top and enters the bottom of the third column C, where it is met 
by a countercurrent stream of diluted nitric acid as an aqueous re-extraction solution flowing 
from the top. The uranium product stream with nitric acid then leaves column C at the 
bottom, while the organic solvent leaves at the top. After removal of organic decomposition 
products and fission products by washing, the organic solvent can be recycled into the 
system. 
For sufficient decontamination of uranium and plutonium, the uranium and plutonium 
product streams are required to pass through two further decontamination cycles. The final 
products, after concentration and purification, are plutonium nitrate, Pu(NO3)4, and uranyl 
nitrate, UO2(NO3)2. The plutonium nitrate and a part of the uranyl nitrate solution are mixed 
to form a so-called master mix which has already the plutonium enrichment which is 
needed for the PuO2/UO2 mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The remaining uranylnitrate can be 
used as reprocessed uranium for later re-enrichment, or as blanket material in LMFBRs. 
The resulting waste streams must be treated separately. 
7.2.5     Mass flows and radioactivities in a reprocessing facility [10] 
A reprocessing facility with a throughput of 2 tHM/d of spent LWR fuel operating 300 d per 
year has a yearly capacity of 600 tHM/y spent fuel. Such a reprocessing plant could serve up 
to 30 GWe of LWRs. 
In the first extraction cycle A such a reprocessing plant would produce about 1 m3/d of 
high level waste concentrate (HLWC) with a radioactivity of about 2.2x1016 Bq/m3, about 
1 m3/d of hulls and structural materials with a radioactivity of about 0.9x1015 Bq/m3 and 
about 0.1 m3/d of sludge and insoluble residuals with a radioactivity of about 2x1016 Bq/m3. 
In the second and third uranium and plutonium decontamination cycles B and C some 
0.2 m3/d of organic solvent is produced which contains some traces of uranium/plutonium. It 
contains about 2x1010 Bq/m3 of radioactivity. In addition, about 3 m3/d aqueous MLW of 
2x1012 Bq/m3 with traces of uranium/plutonium are produced. Krypton and Tritium enriched 
water are recycled and conditioned. 
The 600 tHM/y reprocessing plant generates about 125 g/d plutonium as plutonium nitrate 
and about 225 g/d uranium as uranyl-nitrate. 
7.2.6     Reprocessing capacity for spent UO2 fuel [11] 
The PUREX process is entirely used in large scale spent UO2 fuel reprocessing. The largest 
commercial reprocessing plant are operating in France (1700 tHM/y) and the UK (1200 tHM/y) 
whereas medium scale spent UO2 fuel reprocessing facilities are also available in Russia 
(500 tHM/y) [17] and Japan (800 tonnesHM/y) (Table 7.2). Smaller scale reprocessing facilities  
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operate also in India and China. The total commercial UO2 spent fuel reprocessing capacity 
in the world was somewhat more than 4000 (tsHM/y) in 2010. In addition the UK still operates 
a 1500 (tHM/y) reprocessing plant for MAGNOX type fuel. 
It is interesting to note that – except for Japan – all other commercial spent UO2 fuel 
reprocessing capacity is located in Nuclear Weapon States. 
 
Country Plant Fuel type Reprocessing 
capacity (tHM/y) 
France Cap de la Hague LWR 1700 
United Kingdom Sellafield 
Windscale 
LWR 
AGR 
1200 
1500 
Japan Tokai-mura 
Rokkasho-mura 
LWR 
LWR 
90 
800 
Russia Mayak LWR 500 
India Tarapur 
Kalpakkam 
CANDU 
FBR 
100 
100 
China Lanzhou LWR 50 
 
Table 7.2. Commercial reprocessing plant capacity for UO2 spent LWR fuel in the World 
(IAEA) in 2010. 
7.3       Conditioning of waste from LWR fuel reprocessing [12,13,14] 
7.3.1     Storage and cooling of liquid high level waste concentrates (HLWC) 
The HLWC from the first extraction cycle A of the reprocessing plant can be stored in 
stainless steel tanks and cooled by tube coils with circulating water such that the temperature 
remains <65 °C. The decay heat production of the HLWC is about 7 kW/m3. The tanks are 
installed in so-called hot cells lined with steel plates. The tanks stand in a type of pans which 
can collect any leakages. The HLWC can be kept in these tanks for at least 30 years. 
7.3.2     Solidification of the HLWC by vitrification 
For solidification the HLWC is calcinated (expulsion of liquid) and decomposed in oxides at 
about 400 °C. Then it is mixed with glass frites (borosilicate glass) and molten together in a 
furnace by either induction or Joule heating. The molten borosilicate glass can be loaded with 
about 18% of fission products and about 0.4% actinides. The molten radioactive glass is then 
filled into stainless steel canisters with a diameter of 43 cm and an overall height of 134 cm. 
They contain about 0.16 m3 or 400 kg radioactive borosilicate glass (Fig. 7.7). The decay 
heat of such a borosilicate container is about 2.5 kW at the time of vitrification and about 
0.4 kW after 50 years of storage. 
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Fig. 7.7. Borosilicate HLW container [13]. 
 
7.3.3     Conditioning of solid HLW from reprocessing plants 
The hulls and structural pieces of the spent fuel elements together with some insoluble 
residues represent -emitter contaminated long-lived MLW from the reprocessing plant. 
They are initially stored under water. 
Conditioning is achieved by compaction by a factor of five. The structural parts are 
introduced in a strong metallic cylinder and compressed with a 250 MPa press to a metallic 
pancake. Several of these pancakes are filled in so called CSD-C containers (Fig. 7.8) which 
have the same outer dimensions (43 cm diameter, 134 cm height) as the containers with 
vitrified borosilicate glass. 
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Fig. 7.8.   CSD-C container with compacted hulls and steel parts [13]. 
 
7.3.4 Conditioning of solid organic waste from reprocessing plants, refabrication 
plants and nuclear reactors 
Solid wastes like -emitter contaminated papers, plastics, ion exchange resins sludges etc. 
from reprocessing and fuel refabrication plants as well as nuclear reactors are incinerated by 
medium temperature pyrolysis systems (400 °C) and treated by calcination (900 °C). The 
resulting ashes contain more than 99% of the original radioactivity. They are mixed with 
cement based materials (paste of cement, mortar, concrete) and filled in containers of 
different size. 
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7.3.5     Conditioning of liquid organic MLW 
Aqueous MLW solutions are concentrated by evaporation and then treated in a calcinator at 
400 °C. The concentrates are mixed with cement based materials and filled in containers of 
different size. Another waste treatment technique is mixing the concentrate with hot bitumen. 
The product is again filled in drums. 
7.3.6     Treatment of Krypton-85 and Tritium 
Kr-85 with a half-life of 10.8 years can be forced into pressurized steel cylinders of 50 l 
volume. The Kr-85 cylinders are stored in shafts in a Krypton storage facility. 
Tritium with a half-life of 12.3 years can be concentrated during the PUREX process. The 
water with high concentrations of tritium can be stored in tanks. 
7.3.7     Transport and Storage of HLW and MLW 
The transport and intermediate storage of HLW and MLW containers (Sections 7.3.2 to 
7.3.4) is done in, e.g. CASTOR transport and storage containers. These CASTOR containers 
can be filled with 33% of glass containers and 67% of CSD-C containers. Two CASTOR 
containers are sufficient to take the conditioned waste produced by a 1.3 GWe LWR per year 
(Fig. 7.9). These CASTOR containers can be stored in intermediate storage facilities for 
several decades until the waste containers can be finally stored in a deep repository. 
 
Fig. 7.9. HLW radioactive glass containers and -emitter contaminated decay heat producing 
MLW from a 1.3 GWe LWR plant generated per year (VGB). 
chemical reprocessing 
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7.4        Long Term Waste Disposal 
7.4.1     Low level waste disposal without long-lived -emitters 
LLW without long-lived -emitters are conditioned in bitumen or filled in concrete 
containers. It is then stored in concrete building structures which are covered by a concrete 
roof and many meters of sand. Below this concrete building, possible leaks can be detected. 
After about 300 years such a LLW repository can be released from surveillance, because the 
radioactivity will have essentially decayed. An example of such a non -emitting waste 
containing LLW is located at Aube (France). 
7.4.2     Repositories for low heat producing HLW/MLW 
Such repositories for low heat producing HLW/MLW are in operation in granite type of 
geological formations about 500 m deep in Sweden and Finland. These repositories are 
accessible through a vertical shaft or a ramp type gallery. The MLW/LLW containers are 
stored in concrete structures and sealed with bentonite. 
Another type of repository for low heat producing LLW/MLW shall be operated in 
Germany. It is a 800-1200 m deep former iron mine which is protected from water ingress by 
very thick layers of clay located above the LLW/MLW repository. 
7.4.3     Repositories for HLW in deep geological formations 
HLW containers and containers with heat producing MLW will be stored in 500-1000 m 
deep geological formations. These deep repositories are arranged like deep mines with a 
vertical shaft and horizontal galleries. The HLW containers can be stored in boreholes or 
arranged horizontally [15] (Fig. 7.10). 
Salt domes or thick layers of salt at a depth of several hundred meters are ideal for deep 
repositories. However, granite, gneiss, tuff and basalt formations as well as clays are also 
considered attractive. In 2010, there was no HLW repository in deep geological formations in 
operation yet. But many countries have test sites for such HLW repositories. 
A technical multibarrier system surrounds the HLW glass in order to increase the long 
term safety of the vitrified waste against water ingress and dissolution of radioactive 
molecules out of the borosilicate glass. This technical multibarrier system consists of e.g. 
thick steel containers surrounded by copper or titanium layers. In addition a thick layer of 
bentonite and silica sand forms the outer layer. The heat of the HLW will be transferred by 
thermal conduction to the outer layers and to the geological formations. When the HLW 
canisters will have been placed in prepared holes by remote handling techniques the 
remaining void will be backfilled by bentonite and sand. 
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Fig. 7.10. Deep repository for HLW and -emitter contaminated decay heat producing 
waste [15]. 
 
7.5     Direct Disposal of Spent Fuel 
Direct disposal of spent fuel was favored in the United States from 1977 on in order to avoid 
reprocessing spent fuel and Pu recycling with MOX fuel following a strict non-proliferation 
policy. At the same time, this stopped the development of breeder technology with U/Pu fuel 
recycling. 
This type of once-through fuel cycle will not be considered any further here for the following 
reasons: 
– Direct disposal of spent fuel is technically feasible. Even while a repository is being 
filled, monitoring by IAEA inspectors is possible. However, once the repository has been 
closed, it cannot be monitored for many thousands of years. The repository would contain 
hundreds of tons of plutonium and neptunium in spent fuel. Historical experience of 
mankind speaks against successful long-term surveillance in this case. 
The Yucca Mountain repository in the United States, which had been planned for direct 
disposal of spent fuel, for these very reasons had foreseen retrievability of the spent fuel 
elements after a specific period of time. As a result of a decision by the U.S. Department 
of Energy, the Yucca Mountain repository was given up again in 2010. 
The direct disposal option would block the following technical possibilities for the future 
civil use of nuclear power: 
– Plutonium multiple recycling with more than 99% incineration of the plutonium; 
– Multiple recycling of neptunium and americium and their incineration to a level of more 
than 99%. 
– Only incineration of Pu, Np, and Am allows the radiotoxicity level and the heat load of 
the waste to be reduced drastically. 
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– Breeder technology and the use of U-238 are possible only by multiple recycling of 
plutonium. This extends the supply of fuel for the civil use of nuclear power to many 
thousands of years. 
– Only reprocessing and Pu recycling allow the production of proliferation-proof plutonium 
with a Pu-238 content of about 5%. As is shown in Sections 9 to 14, this is the only way 
to achieve a future civil use of nuclear power with proliferation proof plutonium. 
7.6     Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication [16,17,18,19,20] 
Plutonium recycling in thermal reactors, e.g., LWRs, requires the fabrication of mixed oxide 
U/Pu (MOX) pellets. The MOX-powder (master mix) coming from the reprocessing plant is 
blended together with MOX-powder to achieve the required fissile enrichment. The mixed 
powder is precompacted and granulated into a freely flowing powder. This is turned into 
cylindrical pellets which are first sintered at temperatures of 1000-1700 °C and then ground 
to the required dimension (Fig. 7.11). Finally, they are loaded into zircaloy or steel tubes, to 
which end caps are welded. These fuel rods are assembled to fuel assemblies. 
A certain fraction of the mixed oxide pellets will be imperfectly fabricated and are rejected 
during inspection procedures. Such material and grinder fines, which are designated clean 
rejected oxide, can be recycled directly into the manufacturing process. However, a small 
fraction of pellets and powder are contaminated by corrosion products, etc.. These must be 
dissolved in a nitric acid/fluoride solution and, along with filtrates from wash-leach 
processes, be treated chemically as in a PUREX reprocessing step to recover the uranium and 
plutonium. 
As MOX fuel must be reprocessed after having attained its design burnup, the fuel 
fabrication process must guarantee high solubility (> 99%) of the irradiated MOX fuel in 
nitric acid. Such high solubility is required to minimize the plutonium loss in the residues 
during chemical reprocessing. 
Three other refabrication processes can be applied. The sol-gel process allows the direct 
fabrication of spherical MOX particles, which can be pressed and sintered into fuel pellets. 
The AUPuC (ammonium (U,Pu) carbonate) refabrication process also allows the 
fabrication of relatively coarse grain MOX powder. This crystal powder is fabricated 
essentially free of Am-241 and then pressed and sintered into MOX fuel pellets. 
A third MOX fabrication process is based on vibro compaction. The MOX fuel is broken 
into small fuel particles of different size. These are filled into the cladding tube and 
compacted by vibro compaction. 
A MOX fuel fabrication plant with an annual fabrication capacity of 150 tHM/y roughly 
corresponds to the plutonium mass flow produced by the 2 tHM/d or 600 tHM/y model 
reprocessing plant described in Section 7.2.6. 
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Fig. 7.11.    Process scheme for the fabrication of MOX elements. 
 
7.6.1     MOX fuel refabrication capacity in the world 
In most cases MOX fuel refabrication plants are collocated with spent fuel reprocessing 
plants. This avoids long distance transportation of UO2/PuO2 powders. 
The MOX fuel refabrication plants are – except in Japan – entirely located in Nuclear 
Weapon States. Table 7.3 shows the capacities of MOX refabrication plants. In Russia [21] 
and USA additional MOX plants are built for the conversion of weapons plutonium. 
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Country Plant Fuel type Reprocessing capacity (tHM/y) 
France Marcoule LWR-MOX 195 
United 
Kingdom 
Sellafield LWR-MOX 120 
Japan Rokkasho-mura 
Tokai 
LWR-MOX 
FBR-MOX 
130 
20 
USA Savannah River LWR-MOX 70* 
Russia Zheleznogorsk 
Tomsk 
FBR-MOX 
LWR-MOX 
60 
70* 
*Weapons plutonium 
Table 7.3. Reprocessing plant capacity for spent LWR fuel in the World (IAEA) 
7.7        The Uranium/Plutonium Fuel Cycle of Fast Breeder Reactors [22,23,24,25] 
7.7.1     Ex-Core time Periods of FBR Spent Fuel 
Like all recycling converter reactors and near-breeder reactors, FBRs must work in a closed 
fuel cycle. Their systems inventory, consisting of the core fuel inventory and the fuel 
inventory passed through reprocessing and refabrication should be as small as possible for 
economic reasons. At present, it is generally assumed that an ex-core time of two years is 
feasible for the FBR fuel cycle. 
After unloading from the reactor core, the core elements and the radial blanket elements 
are first stored at the reactor site for some 180 days. Then they are transported to the 
reprocessing plant in transport casks, which can contain six to twelve fuel elements each. 
Shipping the fuel elements takes about thirty days. Another thirty days are assumed for 
intermediate storage and pre-treatment of the fuel elements prior to cutting and dissolution. 
Assuming a reprocessing plant with annual reprocessing capacities of about 260 tHM/y (in 
more detail 170 t of core and axial blanket fuel mixed with 90 t of radial blanket fuel), the 
total time required for all steps, from chopping the fuel pins to conversion to PuO2 and UO2 
powder, is estimated to be forty days. Sixty days are assumed for intermediate storage of the 
PuO2/UO2 oxide powder, another thirty days for transfer to the fuel refabrication plant. The 
reprocessing plant and the fuel refabrication plant are assumed to be collocated at one site. 
The associated UO2/PuO2 fuel refabrication plant will have an annual capacity of about 
110 t of mixed UO2/PuO2 fuel for the core and an annual capacity of about 150 t for UO2 
blanket fuel (about 65 t for the axial blankets and about 85 t for the radial blanket). The 
UO2/PuO2 powder will be stored for about thirty days and then transferred in batches to the 
fabrication lines. The fabrication process takes about sixty days, and another thirty days are 
required for fuel element storage prior to shipment to the FBR power plant. Shipment 
requires some thirty days; another thirty days are assumed for storage on the reactor site 
before the fuel is loaded into the core for power generation. 
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Assuming another 180 days for unforeseen delays, which may arise from imperfect 
synchronization between the various fuel cycle operations, the total ex-core or fuel cycle time 
adds up to 730 days or two years. 
7.7.2      Mass Flow in an FBR Fuel Cycle [22] 
A model fuel cycle for reprocessing the UO2/PuO2 fuel discharged from 10 GW(e) FBRs 
roughly corresponds to a capacity of 1 tHM/d or, at 250 equivalent full power load days, an 
annual capacity of 250 tHM. Such a fuel cycle includes reprocessing and refabrication plants 
on an industrial scale. 
From the assumed 10 GW(e) FBRs, an annual 170 tHM of uranium and plutonium in core 
fuel elements and 90 tHM of uranium and plutonium in radial blanket elements are discharged 
and transported to the reprocessing plant per year. These spent fuel and blanket elements 
contain 6.45 t of fission products. Of this fission product volume, some 5.8 t is contained in 
the core fuel elements and in the axial blankets, and some 0.65 t in the radial blanket 
elements. In addition to these quantities of fuel and fission products, there are approximately 
200 kg of higher actinides (Np-237, Am-241, Am-242m, Am-243, Cm-242 and Cm-244). 
In the reprocessing plant, the fission products and the actinides are separated and go into 
the HLWC concentrate. Some 227 tHM of uranium and about 22.1 tHM of plutonium are 
recovered, of which 1.59 tHM of plutonium can be diverted as a breeding gain to start new 
LMFBRs or to feed converter reactors. Roughly 0.1%, i.e., 20 kg of plutonium and some 
200 kg of uranium, initially remain as high level solid or liquid wastes accumulating in the 
reprocessing and refabrication plant. In additional waste treatment steps, plutonium is also 
recovered from the waste so that ultimately only some 20 kg/a of plutonium will be lost to 
the HLW and MLW. 
7.7.3      FBR Spent Fuel Reprocessing [23,25,26,27] 
The PUREX process is also used for reprocessing of spent FBR fuel elements. However, 
technical modifications are required to take into account the specific characteristics of FBR 
fuel elements enriched in plutonium. 
The end pieces of the fuel elements are cut off, and the fuel element wrapper is removed 
mechanically. The fuel rods are then separately cut into pieces 2.5 cm long by means of a 
shear. In this step, core fuel and blanket fuel are mixed. The fuel rod pieces fall into the 
dissolver, where the fuel is dissolved in hot nitric acid. The dissolver geometry must be 
carefully adapted to the higher plutonium enrichment of LMFBR fuel to avoid criticality. 
The fuel solution coming from the dissolver is first clarified by centrifuging or filtration. 
Then the PUREX counter current solvent extraction process is applied. However, the contact 
times of the solvent and the nitric acid solution must be short to limit radiolysis of the 
solvent. For this purpose, pulsed columns or centrifugal contactors are used. 
When decontaminating plutonium and uranium, the higher plutonium concentration must 
be taken into account to ensure that the plutonium fraction in the waste is kept as small as 
possible. The process for conversion of plutonium nitrate and uranyl nitrate into PuO2 and 
UO2 is the same as in an LWR reprocessing plant. Also, plutonium nitrate and uranyl nitrate 
can be directly mixed, co-converted and co-precipitated into mixed UO2/PuO2. 
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The modifications of the PUREX process described above, the smaller dimensions of all 
tanks (higher plutonium enrichment, criticality) ultimately require the construction of special 
FBR reprocessing plants. 
7.7.4     FBR Fuel Fabrication [17,20,29,26] 
The same fabrication processes are applied for FBR fuel as for LWR (MOX) fuel (Section 
7.6.1). The reprocessing plant and the FBR fuel refabrication plant are co-located at one site. 
After storage in a buffer store, the MOX fabrication process begins with mechanical blending 
of UO2 and master mix UO2/PuO2 powders to establish the desired enrichment. Afterwards, 
the fabrication process proceeds with pressing, sintering, grinding and drying of sintered 
pellets. This is followed by assembling the pellets inserting the pellets into cladding tubes. 
Finally, the fuel pins are welded and assembled into FBR fuel elements. 
FBR fuel pellets have somewhat smaller diameters than LWR pellets. The pellet 
fabrication and pin loading operations are carried out in glove boxes. To protect the workers 
against -radiation and neutrons originating from various plutonium isotopes and their 
radioactive daughters (spontaneous fission and (,n)-reactions with oxygen), shielding must 
be provided at the fabrication lines. Future plants are expected to be operated remotely to a 
large extent. Besides the above described fuel fabrication technology also the sol-gel 
precipitation technique, the vibro-compaction technique, and the AUPuC process are being 
employed. 
7.7.5    Status of FBR Fuel Reprocessing and Refabrication 
Several small test and pilot plants for LMFBR fuel reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication in 
the UK and France, had been operated for almost twenty years. They were closed after PFR, 
Phenix and Superphenix had been shut down (Table 7.4). Japan has small scale reprocessing 
test facilities in operation at Tokai-mura for the fuel of JOYO and MONJU. It also has a 
MOX fuel fabrication plant with a capacity of 5-10 tHM/y in operation at Tokai-mura. France 
operated a MOX fuel fabrication plant of 20 tHM/y throughput at Cadarache. Russia will start 
a 60 tHM/y plant at Zheleznogorsk to provide the UO2/PuO2 fuel for BN-800 (Table 7.4). 
 
 Country Location Capacity 
tHM/a 
Status 
FBR fuel 
reprocessing 
UK 
France 
Japan 
Dounreay 
Marcoule 
Tokai-mura 
5 
5 
5 
closed 
closed 
in operation 
FBR fuel 
refabrication 
Japan 
Russia 
France 
Tokai-mura 
Zheleznogorsk 
Cadarache 
5-10 
60 
20 
in operation 
planned 
closed 
Table 7.4.    Status of FBR fuel reprocessing and refabrication. 
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7.8.     The Closed Nuclear U/Pu MOX Fuel Cycle for PWRs 
In a closed fuel cycle the spent fuel, after its radioactivity has decayed to a certain level in 
temporary storage facilities, is shipped to a reprocessing plant for chemical reprocessing. 
After chemical reprocessing, the fissile plutonium as well as the residual uranium can be re-
used to fabricate new fuel elements and be recycled in PWRs (Fig. 7.12). A small fraction of 
the fissile material (about 0.1%) goes into the radioactive waste during chemical reprocessing 
and refabrication of the fuel, where it is lost i.e. stored in a deep geological repository. 
Recycling improves the utilization of fuel (see Section 4.8) and, consequently, decreases the 
consumption of natural uranium. 
Fig. 7.12. The closed nuclear U/Pu (MOX) fuel cycle for PWRs. 
 
Fissile plutonium from several reactors may be collected and used exclusively in special 
fuel MOX recycle reactors. Also, every PWR can recycle its own plutonium generated in 
preceding operation cycles. In both cases this is then called self-generated recycling (SGR). 
7.8.1. Plutonium Recycling as Plutonium Uranium Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel in the 
SGR mode 
In the SGR mode (shown by Fig. 7.13), continuous mixing of recycled plutonium with 
"fresh" plutonium from spent LEU UOX fuel elements leads to an optimum high percentage 
of the fissionable plutonium isotopes Pu-239 and Pu-241 such that up to, e.g. three full 
recycles of the plutonium become possible. Thus, the safety parameters, e.g., the coolant void 
coefficient of full MOX core PWRs can be kept at tolerable values. 
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Figure 7.13. Scenario for plutonium multi-recycling in the SGR mode for a cluster of M of 
PWRs. 
 
The plutonium bearing MOX fuel elements have the same structural design as LEU UOX 
fuel elements of PWRs. Each fuel rod of such a fuel element contains UO2/PuO2 mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel pellets. The average fissile plutonium enrichment is chosen such that the same 
discharge burnup as in the LEU fuel elements can be achieved. If a certain fissile plutonium 
enrichment of, e.g., 6% shall not be exceeded for safety reasons, small amounts of U-235 are 
added to achieve the required criticality values. 
Enrichment zoning within the fuel elements is necessary to avoid local power fissile 
peaks. This is achieved by giving the fuel rods at the periphery of the fuel subassemblies a 
lower Pu enrichment, while all remaining fuel rods of the inner part of the fuel element have 
a higher enrichment. 
UOX  LEU UOX PWR               MOX  MOX PWR cluster 
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Also water filled rods can be arranged evenly distributed in the fuel element. In this case 
all MOX fuel rods can have all the same fissile enrichment. 
 
Isotopic 
composition 
Plutonium in wt% 
10 years after unloading 
(50 GWd/tHM) 
Pu-238  2.8 
Pu-239  55.1 
Pu-240  23.3 
Pu-241  9.3 
Pu-242  7.6 
Table 7.5. Plutonium isotopic compositions of PWR spent fuel after 50 MWd/tHM at burnup 
and 10 years of intermediate storage. (This isotopic plutonium composition differs 
somewhat from the plutonium in Table 12.2 due to different cross section sets 
used.) [28]. 
 
7.8.2. Plutonium incineration in PWRs during several recycling steps 
Broeders [28] analyzed recycling of plutonium in PWRs applying the SGR mode. The 
plutonium from reprocessing of spent fuel element of several LEU MOX PWRs is collected 
until a first full MOX PWR can be started. This is explained in Fig. 7.13. The assumptions of 
Broeders [28] for this SGR recycling strategy were: 
 4.5% U-235 enrichment of the fuel element of the UOX PWRs 
 6% max. Pufiss enrichment for MOX fuel (if needed low enriched U-235 is added to fullfil 
criticality conditions) 
 the plutonium isotopic composition is shown by Table 7.5 
 6 burnup cycles within 10 years, i.e. 20 month per burnup cycle 
 7 years cooling time of the spent after unloading from the core and time for reprocessing 
 3 years time for refabrication of the MOX fuel including time for transport. 
For a maximum average burnup of 50 GWd/tHM and the above time periods for burnup, 
reprocessing, refabrication and transport it is appropriate to consider a cluster of M = 8 
PWRs. Initially these PWRs are operated with LEU UOX fuel with 4.5% U-235 enrichment. 
Their spent fuel is reprocessed and MOX fuel elements with about 6% Pufiss enrichment are 
fabricated. These MOX fuel elements with an isotopic mixture M1 given in Table 7.5 are 
loaded into a first MOX PWR which can be started after 10 years (Fig. 7.14). The plutonium 
from the spent fuel elements of this full MOX-PWR is again mixed with plutonium coming 
from 7 operating UOX PWRs. This mixing procedure is then continued until after 20 years a 
new plutonium isotopic mixture M2 can be loaded to the first full MOX PWR. 
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Time  Reactors 
year Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 1 U U U U U U U U 
 2 U U U U U U U U 
 - U U U U U U U U 
10 6 U U U U U U U U 
 7 U U U U U U U M1 
 - U U U U U U U M1 
20 12 U U U U U U U M1 
 13 U U U U U U U M2 
 - U U U U U U U M2 
30 18 U U U U U U U M2 
 19 U U U U U U M3 M3 
 - U U U U U U M3 M3 
40 24 U U U U U U M3 M3 
 25 U U U U U U M4 M4 
 - U U U U U U M4 M4 
50 30 U U U U U U M4 M4 
 31 U U U U U U M5 M5 
 - U U U U U U M5 M5 
60 36 U U U U U U M5 M5 
 37 U U U U U U M6 M6 
 - U U U U U U M6 M6 
70 36 U U U U U U M6 M6 
U: PWR with UOX fuel;                          Mi: PWR with MOX fuel of generation i = 1....6 
 
Fig. 7.14. Scenario for multi recycling of plutonium in full MOX PWR cores in a pool of 
8 PWRs adequate for a target burnup  50 GWd/tHM [28]. 
 
After 30 years a second full MOX PWR can be added. These two full MOX PWRs 
operate with plutonium isotopic mixture M3 between 30 and 40 years, with plutonium 
isotopic mixture M4 between 40 and 50 years, with plutonium isotopic mixture M5 between 
50 and 60 years and with plutonium isotopic mixture M6 between 60 and 70 years. Table 7.6 
shows the plutonium isotopic composition for the MOX fuels M1 to M6. 
 
Plutonium Compositions 
(wt%) 
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
M1 2.8 55.1 23.3 7.6 7.6 
M2 3.5 49.4 26.2 10.0 9.4 
M3 3.9 46.8 27.9 9.2 10.8 
M4 4.3 43.1 28.9 9.9 12.3 
M5 4.6 41.5 29.3 9.5 13.6 
M6 4.8 40.4 29.6 9.1 14.1 
Table 7.6. Plutonium isotopic compositions M1 to M6 for SGR recycling strategy [28]. 
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This SGR mode plutonium recycling procedure can be terminated, e.g. after 30 or 70 years 
(Fig. 7.14) and the plutonium can be loaded into the cores of FRs having better neutronic 
characteristics for the incineration of plutonium compositions like M2 to M6. Broeders [28] 
noticed that plutonium isotopic compositions like M3 or M4 would lead to untolerable 
coolant temperature coefficients. This unacceptable feature could be counteracted by the 
selection of wider spacings of the MOX fuel rods in the MOX fuel assemblies. 
As can be seen from Table 7.6 the percentage of Pu-238 increases steadily from 2.8% 
(M1) to 4.8% (M6) whereas Pu-239 decreases from 55.1% (M1) to 40.4% (M6). Also, the 
Pu-240 increases from 23.3% (M1) to 29.6% (M6), the Pu-241 from 7.6% (M1) to 9.1% 
(M6) and Pu-242 even from 7.6% (M1) to 14.7% (M6). These changes in plutonium 
compositions occur over 60-70 years of plutonium recycling in operating MOX PWRs. 
In order to fulfill the requirements that the fissile part of the plutonium does not exceed 
the 6% limit and that a certain initial criticality value must be attained also low enriched 
uranium must be added (Tab. 7.7). 
 
Uranium added to 
plutonium mixture 
Enrichment 
wt% 
M1 
M2 
M3 
M4 
M5 
M6 
0.7 
1.5 
2.9 
2.5 
3.0 
3.3 
 
Table 7.7. U-235 enrichment of uranium to be added to the different plutonium mixtures 
M1 through M6. 
7.8.3 Balance of plutonium inventories and incineration of plutonium 
The balance of the plutonium inventories in the fuel cycle of the cluster of M = 8 PWRs 
reveals that a considerable part of the plutonium which is generated by the UOX PWRs is 
incinerated by the full MOX PWRs. Fig. 7.15 shows the plutonium inventory of the cluster of 
M = 8 PWRs for two cases: 
– The straight full line represents the direct spent fuel storage strategy (no reprocessing). 
The plutonium is accumulating and would have to be disposed in a deep geological 
repository. 
– The SGR plutonium recycle strategy is represented by a polygon type set of straight dotted 
lines which are bending more and more, according to the incineration of the plutonium in 
the full MOX PWRs with plutonium MOX fuel isotopic mixture M1 to M5. The 
difference between the full line and the dotted lines represents the plutonium which is 
incinerated by the MOX PWR normalized to 1 GWe. The essential result is that over 60 to 
80 years of SGR recycling about 50% of the plutonium generated by the UOX PWRs 
could be incinerated, i.e. utilized by the MOX PWRs. This is due to the fact that one full 
MOX PWR can incinerate about 420 kg Pu/GWey. 
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Fig. 7.15. Balance of plutonium collected from a cluster of M = 8 UOX: PWRs with 10 
GWe total power operating in the once through direct spent fuel disposal mode 
(full line) and inventory of plutonium in the cluster of M = 8 UOX and MOX 
PWRs with 10 GWe power (Pu content or inventory normalized to 1 GW(e)) [28]. 
 
A similar Pu-recycle scenario can be analyzed by replacing the full MOX PWRs by FR 
burners (Pu incinerators). This is described in Section 7.8.5. FR-burners can achieve a 
plutonium incineration rate of 570 kg Pu/GWea [29,30]. 
7.8.4. Neptunium and Americium generation in the SGR plutonium recycle scenario 
Fig. 7.16 shows that the neptunium generation in the SGR plutonium recycle scenario is 
only slightly different between the UOX-PWR direct spent fuel disposal case and the UOX 
and MOX PWRs operating in the SGR mode. In the SGR mode more neptunium-237 is 
transmuted into Pu-238 by neutron capture. 
The americium production via neutron capture in Pu-242 and beta-decay of Pu-242 is 
shown for the SGR plutonium recycling case and for the UOX direct spent fuel disposal case 
in Fig. 7.17. In the SGR scenario considerably more (factor 2.5 after 50 years and a factor of 
3.5 after 70 years) americium are produced. 
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Fig. 7.16. Amount of neptunium generated by a cluster of M = 8 UOX PWRs (full line). 
Amount of neptunium generated by a cluster of M = 8 UOX and MOX PWRs 
operating in the SGR-mode (dotted line). The amounts are normalized to 1 GWe 
[28]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.17. Amount of americium generated by a cluster of M = 8 UOX PWRs (full line). 
Amount of americium generated by a cluster of M = 8 UOX and MOX PWRs 
(dotted line) operating in the SGR mode. Amounts are normalized to 1 GWe [28]. 
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7.8.5 Plutonium incineration in a MOX-PWR or FR burner or ADS strategy 
If instead of the MOX-PWR strategy described in Section 7.8.1 and 7.8.2 FRs or 
accelerator driven systems (ADSs) are loaded with the plutonium of UOX PWRs similar 
results are obtained [29,30]. However, the plutonium incineration rates are higher. Table 7.8 
shows the higher incineration rates of FR burners, e.g. so-called CAPRA-FRs and the 
plutonium incineration rates of ADSs compared to those of MOX PWRs. 
 
Nuclear Reactor Type MOX-PWR FR-burner 
(CAPRA) 
ADS 
Incineration rate (kg/GW(e)y) 420 570 700 
Table 7.8.     Incineration rates of different plutonium burner reactors. 
 
Assuming these plutonium incineration rates similar analyses as described in Sections 
7.8.1 and 7.8.2 can be performed. This leads to Fig. 7.18 which shows the plutonium 
inventories in the fuel cycle of a cluster of M = 8 UOX-PWRs operating in symbiosis with 
either MOX-PWRs or FR burners (CAPRA type) or ADSs. The inventories are normalized in 
tonnes per GW(e). The straight line represents the once through fuel cycle with direct spent 
fuel storage in the deep geological repository. The plutonium is accumulating as a function of 
time following a straight line in Fig. 7.18. 
The SGR plutonium recycle strategy is represented by polygon type straight lines where 
each new line represents different incineration rates and the introduction of an additional 
MOX-PWR or FR-burner (CAPRA-type) or ADS. The difference in tonnes of plutonium 
between the full line (once through cycle) and the lines for the UOX PWR strategy with 
MOX-PWRs or FR-burners (CAPRA) or ADS represents the plutonium inventory which is 
incinerated by these recycling burner reactors. As to be expected the FR-burners and even 
more the ADSs incinerate the plutonium produced by the UOX-PWRs more efficiently and 
faster than MOX-PWRs. 
For the MOX-PWR some lines are shown as dotted lines from about 75 years on, because 
the coolant temperature coefficient as an important safety related reactivity coefficient could 
become intolerable (Section 7.8.2). This is not the case for UOX-PWRs operating in 
symbiosis with ADS or with FR-burners (CAPRA-type). Both show a potential for 
incineration of all plutonium produced by the UOX-PWRs in a time frame of about 125 years 
(FR burners) or about 85 year (ADSs). 
The results of Figs. 7.15 and 7.18 are theoretical examples following a certain strategy. In 
reality first the UOX-PWR in symbiosis with the MOX-PWR are started. Later FR-burners 
will follow when FRs will be deployed on large scale. This strategy might perhaps be 
followed by the introduction of several ADSs. 
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Fig. 7.18. Balance of plutonium (normalized to 1 GW(e)) from a cluster of M=8 UOX-
PWRs with 10 GW(e) total power operating in either the once through direct 
spent fuel disposal mode (straight line). The polygon type lines show the pluto-
nium inventory (normalized to 1 GW(e) for the cases of UOX-PWRs operating in 
symbiosis with either MOX-PWRs or FR-burners (CAPRA-type) or ADSs. 
 
7.9 Chemical separation (partitioning) of minor actinides 
The PUREX process for the separation of uranium and plutonium from the fission products 
and minor actinides was described in Section 7.2. The separation efficiency for uranium and 
plutonium achieved in the large reprocessing plants La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) is 
approximately 99.9% [31,32,33]. 
7.9.1    Joint chemical separations of plutonium and neptunium 
With slight modifications of the PUREX process neptunium and plutonium can also be 
separated together from uranium on the one side and fission products and the remaining 
actinides on the other side. This was already demonstrated in the large reprocessing plant La 
Hague and by the Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute. The separation 
efficiencies achieved for neptunium were 99% [31,34]. It is also possible to separate the 
neptunium from the liquid HLW which is still stored at reprocessing plants [31,33]. 
Fuel Cycle 
10 Years 
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7.9.2     Aqueous chemical separation of americium and curium 
The chemical separation of americium and curium is more difficult, since some of the fission 
products (lanthanides) and americium as well as curium exist in the threevalent state [32]. 
Therefore, americium, curium and the lanthanides must first be separated together. Several 
chemical processes were developed for this separation step: 
– the DIDPA process by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) [35] 
– the TRUEX process by the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in USA [36] 
– the TRPO process by the Tsinghua University in Beijing (China) [37] 
– the DIAMEX process by the French Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) [34,38]. 
These processes allow separation factors of 99.9%. Some of them were already tested on 
pilot facility scale, e.g. the DIAMEX process in the ATALANTE facility at Marcoule in 
France [39]. 
7.9.3     Chemical separation of Americium/Curium from the Lanthanides 
Special chemical separation processes were developed for the separation of 
americium/curium from the lanthanides. These are: 
– the DIDPA process with the element agent DTPA of JAERI [35,40] 
– the TRPO process with the chemical agent CYANEX 301 by the Tshinghua University in 
Beijing (China) [41] 
– the SANEX process with the chemical agent BTP by the Karlsruhe Research Center 
(Germany) and the Institute of Transurania (European Commission). 
Separation efficiencies of 99.9% were achieved for these separation processes. The SANEX 
process was also tested in the pilot scale test facility ATALANTE in Marcoule, France 
[34,42,43]. 
7.9.4     Chemical separation of Americium from Curium 
Finally, the chemical separation processes TRPO in China as well as EXAm and LUCA in 
Europe were developed to separate americium from curium [41,44,45]. Again 99.9% 
separation efficiencies were achieved, e.g. with the TRPO process. 
Fig. 7.19 shows the sequence of aqueous chemical separation processes as developed in 
France for the partitioning of uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium. 
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Fig. 7.19. Partitioning processes for uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium 
in Europe [34]. 
7.9.5. Pyro-metallurgical methods for the separation of Uranium, Plutonium and 
Minor Actinides 
Besides the above aqueous chemical separation methods also pyrometallurgical separation 
methods were developed in USA, Russia, Europe and Japan. 
7.9.5.1      The Integral Fast Reactor Pyroprocessing Process 
The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in USA develops the pyrometallurgical separation 
process in combination with the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) development (Section 6.7). 
It is based on experience gained with metallic U-Pu-Zr fuel of the EBR-II experimental 
program at Idaho, USA [46,47]. Pyroprocessing technologies aim also at a separation factor 
of >99.9%. However, the plutonium and minor actinides (neptunium, americium, curium) in 
combination with about 30% uranium remain together. The pyroprocessing method is a batch 
mode process, contrary to the aqueous partitioning processes which operate in a continuous 
mode [48,49]. 
In pyroprocessing the chopped U-Pu-Zr fuel rod pieces are placed in steel baskets which 
are placed into an electrorefiner vessel. The bottom of this vessel is covered by liquid 
cadmium (melting point 321 °C). This cadmium layer is covered by a thick layer of a eutectic 
mixture of lithium chloride and potassium chloride (melting point 350 °C). The electrorefiner 
is operated in a temperature of 500 °C. 
The perforated steel basket with pieces of fuel rods is acting as the anode. The actinides 
from the fuel are transported as ions from the anode to two kinds of cathodes. A solid cathode 
where most of the uranium is collected and a liquid cadmium cathode where the remaining 
uranium plutonium neptunium americum
(Am)
curium
(Cm)
Purex (TBP)
liquid high
active waste
Fission products
Diamex
(separation of 
actinides III
lanthanides III)
SANEX
(separation An(III) from Ln(III)
actinides
(III)
+ lanthanides
(III)
Ln(III)
Am + Cm
EXAm, LUCA
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uranium together with plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium are collected. Finally, 
this mixture of uranium, plutonium and minor actinides is recovered in a vacuum furnace 
[49,50]. 
The metal ingots from processing in the vacuum furnace are sent to an injection casting 
station for refabrication of metallic fuel rods (Section 7.9.6.1). 
A similar pyroprocessing approach as at ANL (USA) was developed in Russia for the 
UO2/PuO2 fuel of FRs BN-600 and BN-800 (Section 6). In this Russian DOVITA process 
[51,52] the UO2/PuO2 MOX fuel is converted into chlorides and separated in a melt of NaCl-
KCl at 650 °C. 
7.9.6     Fuel refabrication for incineration of actinides 
At present the refabrication technologies for actinide fuel are still based on existing 
technologies for MOX fuel as described in Section 7.6. The minor actinides are mixed as 
oxide powders into the MOX powders. The following actinide fuels can be fabricated [56]: 
(U Np)O2     (U Pu Am)O2     (U Pu Np)O2 
However, the neutron radiation caused by americium and curium requires heavy shielding. 
Therefore, dust free aqueous fabrication processes line SOL-GEL techniques for the 
fabrication of micro spheres are applied. The micro spheres can be pressed and sintered to 
fuel pellets or vibrocompacted into fuel rod claddings. In addition actinide nitric solutions 
can be infiltrated into porous pellets or micro spheres [52,53,54,55,56]. 
7.9.6.1    Metallic fuel 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed the injection casting refabrication method 
in connection with the IFR pyroprocessing of metallic U-Pu-Zr fuel. The fuel ingots from 
processing furnace are induction heated under vacuum and homogenized to the required 
enrichments. Then the injection casting system is pressurized and the molten fuel is injected 
into tubes (molds) which are rapidly cooled. The tubes are removed, the fuel rods cut to 
length and inserted into cladding tubes together with a small amount of sodium which acts as 
bonding between the fuel rod and the inner wall of the cladding. End caps are welded to the 
fuel rods, the fuel rods are assembled to fuel elements [48,49,50]. 
7.9.7    Intermediate storage of Curium [63] 
The application of pyrochemistry does not allow to separate curium from the other actinides. 
Therefore, uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium do remain together for 
recycling of the transurania in IFRs. 
The application of aqueous reprocessing technologies does allow the partitioning of all 
minor actinides individually (Sections 7.9.1 to 7.9.4). Curium causes high neutron radiation 
and heat loads during refabrication and reprocessing. Therefore, it is proposed to chemically 
separate curium and store it for about 200 years. This allows the isotopes Cm-243 (halflife 
29 y) and Cm-244 (halftime 18 y) to decay into Pu-239 and Pu-240. (The isotope Cm-242 
(halftime 163 d) decays already during reactor operation and subsequent cooling of the spent 
fuel). The small amounts of Cm-245 (halftime 8500 y) does remain and can be recycled later 
together with plutonium. 
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The curium nitride solutions can be infiltrated into porous beads which are subsequently 
calcinated and sintered. These beads can be filled into containers and stored for about 200 
years, before they will be reprocessed again to separate Pu-239 and Pu-240. This treatment of 
the curium isotopes is necessary for aqueous chemical separation and refabrication of the 
actinide containing fuel in order to avoid refabrication of Cm-243 and Cm-244 fuel elements. 
If curium together with the other actinides would be recycled in LWRs californium-252 
will generated producing very high neutron radiation. As Cf-252 has a halflife of about 2 
years such spent fuel would have to be intermediately stored until the Cf-252 will have 
decayed. 
7.9.8     Incineration of minor actinides in nuclear reactors [58,59,60,61,62] 
The minor actinides can be incinerated in LWR or FR cores or blankets. Neutron absorption 
reactions lead to transmutation or fission of the minor actinides. 
Neutronic analyses for destruction rates of neptunium and americium have been 
performed. The following destruction rates were obtained if neptunium is mixed homo-
geneously to the fuel of PWRs or FRs. The americium containing fuel must be arranged at 
the periphery of the cores of either PWRs or FRs. The reason being not to change the safety 
coefficients to intolerable values. Table 7.9 shows typical destruction rates for neptunium and 
americium. 
 
 PWR 1.3 GW(e) 
Destruction rate kg/GW(e)y 
LMFBR 1.5 GW(e) 
Destruction rate kg/GW(e)y 
Neptunium 85 78 
Americium 39 110 
 
Table 7.9. Destruction rate for neptunium and americium in MOX PWRs or MOX LMFBRs 
[59]. 
 
If the actinides uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium, curium, are kept together in 
metallic U-Pu-An-Zr fuel the destruction rates for transurania also about 230 kg/GWey 
[60,61,62]. 
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8.     The IAEA Safeguards System 
INFCIRC/153 concentrates on the surveillance of nuclear material: "The objective of 
safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuc1ear material 
from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear 
explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of 
early detection." (INFCIRC/153, Article 28) [1]. 
For practical purposes, a factor much more important than deterrence to the countries 
involved is the finding by IAEA that no diversion has taken place, the so-called assurance of 
non-diversion. Often this is the condition for a state being supplied with nuclear material, 
representing a general confidence building measure. 
In order to document that no nuclear material was diverted, states bind themselves to build 
up national material accountancy systems, in which nuclear materials inventories are 
continuously recorded by accountancy and measurements. Inventories and inventory changes 
are reported to IAEA in a system of records and reports. 
For this purpose, the signatory country to the NPT [2] first of all reports to IAEA design 
information about all nuclear facilities on its territory. Next, the material balance areas and 
the types of balancing and reporting are defined in facility attachments for each plant. IAEA 
verifies the information provided by plant operators by inspections and independent 
measurements in a defined maximum scope. If there are discrepancies, attempts are made to 
settle them. The system is to prevent and discover, respectively, diversions of nuclear materi-
als by a country. Every state is obliged to establish a physical protection system so as to 
prevent diversion of nuclear material at a sub-national level. Recommendations for the 
physical protection of nuclear material are given by IAEA in document INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4 
[3]. 
8.1 Material Balance Measurements 
Nuclear materials often come in forms that cannot be counted or measured exactly, e.g. 
powders, liquids, metal pieces, scraps etc.. On the other hand the fissile inventories of fuel 
rods and fuel assemblies can only be measured with certain accuracy, i.e. there exists some 
unavoidable measurements accuracy. 
For information to be generated about the nuclear material inventory in a plant, the initial 
inventory and the quantities coming in and going out must be known. This requires 
stocktaking of the real inventory and continuous measurement of all incoming and outgoing 
nuclear materials streams. From time to time new inventories will have to be determined. If a 
new inventory value is within the error limits of material balance measurements, it is stated 
that all material is still present. However, such statement implies an uncertainty, which will 
be explained in more detail below. The material balance is described by 
 
2 i o 1I  = M  - M + I  + MUF   
with: I1 = initial inventory 
I2 = inventory measured after time t 
Mi = sum of material inputs after time t 
Mo = sum of material outputs after time t 
MUF = material unaccounted for. 
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MUF includes measuring errors, process losses and, if applicable, also diverted material 
[1,4]. If MUF exceeds the measuring error, the IAEA inspector can state a loss of material. 
However, such diversion may have been due only to a particularly large statistical variation 
and no actual losses may have occurred. In that case, the IAEA inspector's statement would 
be a so-called "false alarm". On the other hand, despite a loss of material, statistical 
variations may have made MUF so small as to leave the loss undiscovered. 
The relations connecting detection probability, rate of false alarms, detectable quantity and 
measuring accuracy are explained in Fig. 8.1. If a quantity Mo is present, the probability 
P(M), of obtaining the quantity M in a measurement is given by 
 
o(M M )
P(M)    e

%	 
% 
21
2
 
with 
 = standard deviation, if a Gaussian distribution is assumed for the experimental 
measurement errors. 
 
With 90% probability, M will be in the range of Mo ± 1.65. If M<M', with 
M' = Mo -1.65, an alarm is initiated in the example given, i.e. a discrepancy between the 
operator's data and the measurement is reported. In five percent of the cases, this may be a 
false alarm due to statistical variations. The rate of false alarms, , is around five percent. 
If there is a loss of material such that actually only a quantity M1 is available, with 
Mo-M1 = 3.3, a loss is discovered with 95% probability. The detection probability is 
1-ß = 95%, ß = 5%. Losses of Mo – M  3.3 are discovered with p  95% probability at a 
false alarm rate of 5%. If the false alarm rate is reduced to 0.14% with a detection probability 
of 95%, detectable losses are Mo – M  4.65 (Fig. 8.1.1). This likewise applies to an 
improvement in detection probability. 
The criteria to be met by safeguards systems thus are defined by  
(1) the missing amount to be discovered (significant quantity), 
(2) the detection time (timely detection), 
(3) the detection probability for a significant amount, 
(4) the permissible rate of false alarms. 
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Figure 8.1.1. Relations between detection probability, rate of false alarms, detectable quan-
tity and measuring accuracy. 
8.1.1 Significant quantities of fissile materials and timely detection 
The "significant quantity" and "timely detection” concepts have been quantified in the course 
of the implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements. The Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to IAEA has confirmed values for "significant 
quantities," which are indicated in Table 8.1.1. They are derived from so-called threshold 
amounts of special fissile material, which are defined as approximate quantities needed for 
nuclear explosive devices. 
The IAEA has taken a very conservative approach and considers all plutonium capable of 
being used for nuclear weapons. The only exception is plutonium with 80% Pu-238 being 
not considered to be useable for nuclear weapons due to the large heat generation by the Pu-
238 alpha decay. 
Hence the IAEA does not distinguish between reactor-grade or weapons-grade plutonium 
in its safeguards efforts. However, the IAEA does care about uranium isotopic composition 
focusing on fissile U-233 and U-235. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is uranium with 20% 
U-235 or 12% U-233 [4]. 
3.3  
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Material Quantity of safe- Threshold amounts 
 guards significance 
"Direct use" material 
Pu (<80% Pu-238)   8 kg Pu (>95% Pu-239)   8 kg 
U-233   8 kg U-233   8 kg 
Uranium (20% U-235) 25 kg U(>90-95% U-235) 25 kg 
(Plus rules for mixtures where appropriate) 
"Indirect use" material 
Uranium (<20% U-235) 75 kg 
Natural uranium 10 t 
Depleted uranium 20 t 
Thorium 20 t 
(Plus rules for mixtures where appropriate) 
 
Table 8.1.1.   Quantities of nuclear material of safeguards significance (IAEA). 
 
 
Material 
classi- 
fication 
Beginning material form End process form Estimated conversion 
time 
IAEA 
timely 
detection 
1 Pu, HEU, or U-233 metal Finished 
plutonium or 
uranium metal 
components 
Order of days (7-10) one month 
2 PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other 
compounds. 
HEU or U-233 oxide or other 
pure compounds. 
MOX or other non-irradiated 
pure mixtures of Pu or U  
(U-233 + U-235) >20%. 
PU, HEU and/or U-233 in scrap 
or other miscellaneous impure 
compounds. 
Finished 
plutonium or 
uranium metal 
components 
Order of weeks (1-3) one month 
3 Pu, HEU or U-233 in 
irradiated fuels 
Finished 
plutonium or 
uranium metal 
components 
Order of months (1-3) 3 months 
4 U containing <20% U-235 and 
U-233, thorium 
 Order of one year one year 
Table 8.1.2.   Estimated material conversion times (IAEA). 
 
The "detection time" should correspond, in orders of magnitude, to the "conversion time" 
for fissile material. The "conversion time" is defined as the minimum time required 
converting different chemical forms of nuclear material to the metallic components of a 
nuclear explosive device. The "detection time" is defined as the maximum time which may 
elapse between a diversion and its detection by IAEA safeguards. Table 8.1.2 indicates the 
conversion times. IAEA uses these values as guidelines while additional practical experience 
will be acquired in implementing safeguards in different fuel cycle facilities. 
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With these preliminary guidelines on "timely detection" of diversions of "significant 
quantities" of nuclear material, IAEA strives for a safeguards system, which has a high 
probability of meeting these goals. There is a growing tendency, however, not to base the 
credibility of a safeguards system primarily on the degree to which these goals are met but to 
include many other factors which confirm compliance of a state with the NPT requirements. 
The a priori probability of detection sought is usually 90% or higher and most often 95%. 
Since a statement of diversion represents a grave incident, the rate of false alarms must be 
very low. 
In addition to the "abrupt diversion" case, to which the "detection time" applies, a case 
must also be considered of somebody constantly trying to divert small quantities so that, e.g., 
after one year, a "significant amount" will have accumulated (protracted diversion). 
Discovering such action imposes the most stringent requirements on the accuracy of the 
measurements. 
In order to ensure that really all material has been considered in a material balance, 
containment and surveillance measures are adopted. That is to say, containers and fuel 
elements are sealed and transport processes are surveyed optically. Seals can also be used to 
reduce the measuring expenditure in inventory taking. Since sealed containers with 
undamaged seals still contain their material, no new quantitative assay is necessary. 
8.1.2 Methods of Safeguards Techniques 
Implementing the safeguards concept on the basis of measurements and material balances 
requires the existence of suitable measuring techniques. As a consequence, a worldwide 
effort was initiated around 1968 to develop methods of measurement, measuring equipment, 
seals and cameras. It was also tried, in a parallel effort, to cast into more precise terms the 
basic theoretical principles of the system, verify its applicability to specific plants, improve 
the mathematical methods of data analysis, and develop systems for handling the large 
amounts of data. 
Some reactors require additional safeguards measures. For instance, pebble bed reactors 
do not permit fuel element identification, so active neutron interrogation is used for nuclear 
materials assays. Similarly, in fast breeders, fuel elements will be under opaque coolants like 
sodium or lead-bismuth and thus not accessible for direct identification. Passive neutron 
counting during fuel element transportation in the reactor area and sealing of the core fuel 
elements are proposed here. Ultrasonic viewing to confirm seals of the fuel elements is 
required. 
8.1.3 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) 
For safeguarding such facilities as enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, nuclear reactors 
and reprocessing plants, where the nuclear material is present in an unsealed form, the 
concept of material balance areas is applied. 
8.1.3.1    Material Balance Area for a Light Water Reactor 
The Light Water Reactor (LWR) (Fig. 8.1.2), unlike more complicated reprocessing or 
enrichment plants, has only one MBA. A LWR will have the following key measuring points 
(KMPs): 
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– arrival (receipt) of fresh low enriched fuel 
– loading of fresh fuel to the core 
– discharge of spent fuel from the core 
– transfer to spent fuel pool 
– transfer from spent fuel pool to dry storage or reprocessing. 
 
 
Figure 8.1.2. Material balance area of a Light Water Reactor. 
 
8.1.3.2   Material Balance Areas for a Reprocessing Plant 
Reprocessing facilities are e.g. typically divided into three material balance areas, which 
include the spent fuel storage area, the process area, and the product storage area (Fig. 8.1.3). 
In the spent fuel storage area (MBA1), the spent fuel elements arriving from the nuclear 
reactor plant can be verified. However, their fissile material content can be determined by 
non-destructive techniques only to an accuracy of several percent. A better quantitative 
analysis is possible in the second material balance area (MBA2), which includes the whole 
chemical process area. Finally, MBA3 contains the storage area for the purified end product. 
For MBAs 1 and 3, the statement that no material has been diverted can be based on 
containment and surveillance measures, such as seals and cameras. For MBA2, the difference 
between output and input has to be measured and compared with the inventory change. This 
requires inventory taking in the whole process area, which includes a washout of the process 
equipment; this is time consuming and expensive. Thus, only one or two inventory takings 
per annum are acceptable from the plant operator's point of view. This may conflict with the 
timeliness of detection. 
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Figure 8.1.3.   Material balance area and key measuring points, e.g. in a reprocessing facility. 
 
No problem exists in small pilot size plants, where inventory changes remain below one 
significant amount of nuclear material. Typically, also the MUF accumulated during one year 
is less than a significant amount (Table 8.1.1). 
This is different in large commercial size reprocessing plants. Let us assume, for 
illustration, a plant with an annual throughput of 800 tonnes of heavy metal, of which 
roughly 0.9% is plutonium. The plutonium throughput then would be 7.2 t per annum. The 
largest error in the material flow measurement is attributable to the input accountancy tank, 
where the best values achievable are about 2  = ±1%, including sampling, chemical analy-
sis, and volumetric assay (Section 8.4). This leads to an accumulated 3-error during one 
year of ±246 kg of plutonium, disregarding other sources of error. Getting the accuracy down 
to below 8 kg of plutonium would require taking inventories thirty times a year, which is 
economically unacceptable. A significant improvement in input accountability measurement 
does not seem to be feasible in the near term and, moreover, would not solve the problem 
with respect to the many other sources of error [5,6,7,8]. 
Similar problems may be encountered in large fuel fabrication plants with plutonium 
bearing fuel, or in large enrichment plants. Advanced safeguards concepts must therefore be 
applied. 
8.1.4      Advanced Safeguards Approaches 
8.1.4.1   Near-Real Time Accountancy and Extended Containment/Surveillance Systems 
Two different approaches are applied to solve the problems outlined above: near-real time 
accountancy (NRTA) and containment surveillance (C/S) systems. In NRTA, inventory 
taking at the expense of a complete halt of the process is replaced by an essentially 
continuous determination of the plant inventory from readings of the process instruments, 
such as level indicators of vessels, densitometers or flow meters, combined with periodic 
analyses of samples from the vessels. Although these measurements may not be as accurate 
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as those normally used for material balance purposes, they do solve the problem of abrupt 
diversion and they greatly facilitate the detection of protracted diversion. 
In addition, the large number of measurements conducted throughout a year allows trends 
to be discovered, which are well below the measuring error, provided that sophisticated 
statistical methods are applied. This helps in detecting protracted diversion. Problems are 
posed by the fairly large inspection effort required, the limited ability of the inspector to 
verify the origins or the samples received for chemical analysis, and the detailed insight the 
inspector obtains into plant operation (problem of intrusion) [5,6,7,8,9]. 
A totally different approach is the so-called "extended containment and surveillance 
concept" where the inspection effort is concentrated on measurements and surveillance at the 
periphery of a facility, which has the character of a containment. In the pure form of this 
concept, the statement by the inspector that no nuclear material has been diverted is no longer 
based on a material balance and on verification of the presence of the material, but on the fact 
that no diversion of nuclear material across the periphery of the facility has been detected. 
This system requires no overly accurate input accountability measurements, since the 
material in the main process stream can be sealed and traced as it leaves the plant. Only the 
waste streams, which contain about 1% of the nuclear material, have to be assayed. This 
greatly relaxes the accuracy requirements for the measurements. On the other hand, all inputs 
and outputs to the plant, including the inactive ones, must be controlled. Extensive uses of 
cameras and doorway monitors are characteristic of this approach. If the monitor system of a 
passage fails, even for a short time, the inspector is unable to assess whether nuclear material 
has been diverted, and how much. In addition, the inspector must ensure that there are no 
clandestine exits that could have been used to divert nuclear material. 
The system has two advantages: It can be used in parallel, as a national physical protection 
system to detect theft on a subnational basis, and it fulfils the requirement of non-
intrusiveness. However, some combination with materials accountancy is said to be needed, 
where the C/S-system covers the abrupt diversion aspect. 
Even if advanced safeguards systems succeed in meeting the requirement of timely 
detection of significant amounts of nuclear material, there still remains political concern 
about large scale nuclear fuel cycle plants in NNWSs (see Sections 8.4, 8.7 and 8.8). There is 
the possibility of a state suddenly quitting the NPT and immediately possessing large 
amounts of nuclear material for weapons use. 
Various measures have been proposed to reduce this risk, including international 
plutonium storage - or proliferation – proof nuclear fuel cycles [10,29,32] (Sections 10 to 
14). 
8.1.5 Safeguards Measurement Technologies 
The main measurement technologies used for safeguards surveillance are destructive analysis 
(DA) and non-destructive analysis (NDA). DA refers to chemistry, mass spectrometry etc. 
which can be done only in specific laboratories. These methods usually achieve the highest 
accuracy. NDA measures entire items which can no more be destructed for assay. These 
methods are applied for process control, fuel element assay etc.. The typical NDA methods 
are gamma-ray measurements or neutron assay methods. 
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8.1.5.1   Destructive analysis (DA) 
DA refers, e.g. to weight and volume measurements, chemical analysis and mass 
spectrometry. It requires a specific laboratory to receive and analyze the samples of nuclear 
materials [11,12]: 
– Gravimetry consists of very precise weighing of plutonium or uranium which has been 
oxidized to PuO2 or U3O8. Non-volatile impurities are determined spectrographically and 
the gravimetrical results are corrected accordingly. The precision of such measurements 
can have a relative standard deviation of 0.05%. 
– Chemical analysis applies reduction-oxidation titration procedures. Chemical tritration 
measures electrical properties of solutions containing a compound that undergoes a 
chemical reaction, while precisely measured amounts of another chemical are added. The 
IAEA does such chemical analysis in their Seibersdorf (Austria) laboratories with a 
precision of 0.02% for uranium and 0.04% for plutonium. 
– Mass spectrometry measures the mass of ionized particles passing through a magnetic 
field. It allows the determination of the isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium 
samples. The U-235 enrichment can be analyzed to a precision of 0.014% and the Pu-239 
enrichment to 0.02%. 
– Laser induced break down spectroscopy (LIBS) focuses a pulsed laser on a small 
sample of material. This creates a plasma and the resulting excited atoms and ions emit 
light at very precise wavelengths. This light is transmitted through an optical fiber to a 
grating spectrometer. The accuracy can be 0.1% for uranium or plutonium. 
– Alpha spectrometry and isotope-dilution alpha spectrometry measures the radioactive 
alpha particles emitted by plutonium. It is possible to accurately determine the total 
plutonium concentration in dissolver solutions if the plutonium isotopic composition is 
known from other measurements. A well known Pu-242 spike is added to the plutonium 
sample and this is then deposited on a filament. The ratio of the Pu isotopes to the spike 
allows calculating the plutonium concentration with an accuracy of 0.2%. 
– K-edge absorption densitometry measures the absorption of X-rays generated by Co-57 
and Se-75 whose energies are close to the point at which plutonium absorbs X-rays most 
strongly (e.g. at around 110 to 120 keV). It is applied for plutonium concentrations in input 
solutions and process solutions (inline measurements). An accuracy of 0.4% can be 
attained. 
– X-ray fluorescence measures well characterized emissions from various elements when 
they are stimulated by X-rays. This measurement technique has g-detection limits and 
measures the amounts of each element present (but not individual isotopes). It is primarily 
used as online instrumentation for process solutions for accurate determination of the Pu/U 
ratio. It is often used in combination with K-edge measurements to determine Pu/U ratio in 
low concentration solutions, e.g. Pu-dissolver solutions. 
– Spectrometry determines the plutonium concentration of a solution by measuring light 
transmitted through it at a wavelength which is absorbed by plutonium. This method is 
widely used for process control and material accountancy at all stages of the process. 
Verification by IAEA consists in taking and analyzing samples independently in order to 
verify the data furnished by an operator. Often this is done by random sampling. Weight 
measurements (e.g., in fuel rods) can be checked in principle by having the inspector bring 
along a standard only known to him and having it weighed. Volumetric assays can be 
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conducted by adding to the solution a "spike" of the inspector and subsequently assaying for 
the concentration. 
The IAEA inspector can also collect small material samples and ship them to the IAEA-
Seibersdorf analytical laboratory for precise measurement. As an alternative he also can send 
samples to laboratories located in IAEA member states which have been certified by the 
IAEA. 
8.1.5.2   NDA techniques measuring spontaneous or stimulated radiation. 
NDA techniques have been developed to allow inspectors to determine the contents of 
nuclear material in a final product, e.g. fuel elements. Another application of NDA 
techniques is in containers with scrap and waste, which must be included in a material 
balance [11,12]. 
The radiation emitted by the nuclear material is used for measurement. Only neutral 
particles, i.e., gamma-rays, neutrons or anti-neutrinos, have the necessary penetrating 
capability. The easiest way is to use the characteristic radiation of the material investigated. 
Fig. 8.1.4 shows, as an example, the gamma-ray signature, measured by gamma-ray detectors 
for plutonium isotopes, neptunium, americium and tin (Sb-125). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1.4. High resolution gamma spectra of Sb, Np-, Pu- and Am-fraction [13]. 
 
Table 8.1.3 shows the major gamma-ray signatures for uranium, plutonium and americium 
isotopes. The most important one for U-235 is the 185.7 keV gamma ray signature. Using 
high resolution Ge-detectors or CdZnTe- and LaBr3-detectors it is possible to measure the 
complete isotopic composition of uranium (U-232, U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236 and U-238). 
The uranium isotope U-235 can be determined with accuracy better than 2% and with 
special efforts even with 0.2%. 
Similar measurement capabilities are possible for the plutonium isotopes using the 
gamma-ray signatures shown by Table 8.1.3. However, high resolution Ge- or CdTe-
detectors cooled by liquid nitrogen to 77 K must be used. In addition, computer programmes 
must be applied [11]. The most important gamma-ray signatures for Pu-239 are at 129.28 and 
413.69 keV. Pu-242 is essentially an emitter of alpha particles. 
Figure 8.1.5 shows a multi-channel analyzer system with Ge-detector used by IAEA. 
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Figure 8.1.5.    Multi-channel analyzer with Ge-detector used by IAEA [30,31,34]. 
 
A problem is encountered when strong gamma ray attenuation is present. Table 8.1.4 
shows material thicknesses in cm in which the gamma-rays mentioned above are attenuated 
to e-1. A number of sophisticated techniques have been developed to determine the gamma-
ray attenuation of homogeneous or nearly homogeneous materials. Nevertheless, the main 
areas of application of passive gamma counting are uranium and plutonium enrichment, 
liquid samples of plutonium-uranium solutions in reprocessing plants and low density waste. 
Isotope Energy (keV) Intensity (1/g·s) 
U-232 57.8 1.6 x 109 
U-233 54.6 
317.2 
261.4 
6.4 x 104 
8.3 x 104 
105 
U-234 53.2 2.8 x 105 
U-235 185.72 4.3 x 104 
U-236 49.2 1.9 x 103 
U-238 1001.10 1.0 x 102 
Np-237 312.2 107 
Pu-238 43.5 
99.9 
152.77 
766.40 
2.5 x 108 
4.6 x 107 
6.5 x 106 
1.5 x 105 
Pu-239 129.28 
375.00 
413.69 
1.4 x 105 
3.6 x 104 
3.4 x 104 
Pu-240 45.2 
100.4 
160.3 
3.8 x 106 
3.4 x 104 
3.5 x 104 
Pu-241 148.60 
207.98 
7.5 x 106 
2.0 x 107 
Am-241 59.54 4.6 x 1010 
Table 8.1.3.   Major gamma-ray signatures for the fissionable isotopes [11,14,15,16,17]. 
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Gamma ray energies 186 keV 414 keV 
Materials Attenuation distance (cm) 
Low density waste 
H2O 
Al 
Fe 
UO2 
7.7 
7.1 
3.0 
0.84 
0.065 
105 
      9.6 
      4.07 
      1.4 
      0.40 
Table 8.1.4.  Gamma-ray attenuation in various materials to e-1 [7]. 
8.1.5.3    Neutron assay 
Fast neutrons have a much higher penetration capability than gamma-rays. They are emitted 
during spontaneous fission of many heavy nuclei. Table 8.1.5 lists neutron emission rates by 
spontaneous fission and (,n)-processes in oxygen of the most important isotopes. If the 
isotopic composition of a material is known, the amount of that material in a sample can be 
determined by neutron counting, provided the system has been calibrated. Neutron assay and 
gamma-ray measurements can, therefore, be complementary, because the determination of 
the isotopic composition can be obtained from gamma-ray measurements. 
The neutron yield of (,n)-processes (by reaction with light elements, e.g. beryllium, 
boron, oxygen, fluorine) depends on many details and therefore is not well suited as a 
signature for plutonium or uranium. To eliminate the (,n)-contribution, use is made of the 
fact that spontaneous fission neutrons are mostly emitted in pairs, whereas only one neutron 
is emitted in the (,n)-reaction. Thus, a coincidence logic is applied, which only counts the 
neutron pairs (spontaneous fission neutrons) and suppresses the (,n)-neutrons. 
Figure 8.1.6 shows a neutron coincidence counter used by IAEA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1.6.  Neutron coincidence counter used by IAEA [30,31,34]. 
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Neutron coincidence counting is widely used for assaying of plutonium contaminated 
waste. Its main drawback is the fact that primarily the isotopes Pu-240 or Pu-242 are 
measured (highest spontaneous fission neutron emission rate). The uncertainty in isotopic 
composition limits the achievable accuracy of plutonium assays. For uranium or neptunium, 
the spontaneous fission neutron emission rate is too low. In addition, even small amounts of 
curium render the method inapplicable, since the spontaneous fission neutron emission rate 
of curium is four orders of magnitude higher than that of plutonium. 
If no "passive" assay technique is applicable, a so-called "active interrogation” has to be 
applied. For this method, fissions are induced in the material of interest by an external 
neutron source and the neutrons or gamma-rays released in the fission process are detected. If 
neutrons are detected, it is necessary to discriminate between the induced fission neutrons 
and the source neutrons. Several methods are available: 
(1) Discrimination by energy. When the energy of the source neutrons is below the threshold 
of the detector, only the induced fission neutrons are counted. 
(2) Discrimination by time. Delayed neutrons are counted in the time interval when the 
source is switched off. 
(3) Discrimination by multiplicity. The high multiplicity of gamma and neutron emissions in 
the fission process is used in a manifold coincidence measurement. 
 
Neutron emission rates Isotope Halflife 
T1/2(a) 
spont.fiss. 
  
spont. fiss. 
(n/g·s) (n/g·s) 
spont.fiss. (,n)reaction 
U.232 
U-233 
U-234 
U-235 
U-236 
U-238 
Np-237 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
Am-241 
Cm-242 
Cm-244 
<6.8·1015 
>3·1017 
1.5·1016 
1.8·1017 
2.5·1016 
9.86·1015 
1018 
5.0·1010 
5.5·1015 
1.32·1011 
6·1016 
7.0·1010 
1.15·1014 
6.6·106 
1.27·107 
1.71 
1.76 
1.81 
1.88 
1.91 
2.00 
2.15 
2.21 
2.30 
2.15 
2.25 
2.14 
2.45 
2.51 
2.68 
1.4·10-2 2.5·104 
<1.9·10-4 11 
6.8·10-3 7 
5.9·10-4 2.5·10-3 
4.2·10-2 7·10-2 
1.1·10-2 3.9·10-4 
1.1·10-4 0.8 
2.59·103 2.0·104 
2.18·10-2 72 
1.02·103 265 
5·10-2  
1.72·103 4.4 
1.2 4·103 
2.08·107 3.9·106 
1.15·107 9.5·104 
 
Table 8.1.5. Neutron emission rates for spontaneous fission of isotopes [11, 14-24]. 
 
A large number of such active interrogation techniques and instruments have been 
proposed and developed [11]: 
An oscillating Cf source with delayed neutron counting was developed as an active 
interrogation for waste drums containing more than 1 mg of U-235 or transuranic waste 
(differential die-away technique). For the latter also a pulsed 14 MeV neutron generator can 
be used. Detection limits of a few mg to a few 10 mg of Pu-239 or U-235 are attained which 
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satisfy the existing waste disposal criteria [24]. Also a combined thermal-epithermal neutron 
interrogation system was developed for better matrix penetrability of samples in waste assay 
[25]. 
8.1.5.4   Calorimetry 
Calorimetry [11,26] is used as the most accurate NDA method with measurement accuracies 
of 0.5 to 1%. Calorimetry takes advantage of the heat produced by isotopes like Pu-238, 
reactor-grade plutonium, Am-241 or Tritium (Table 8.1.6.). However, the calorimetric 
measurements must be combined with an isotopic analysis (mass-spectrometry or gamma-ray 
measurements). Calorimetric measurements are time consuming, typically several hours up to 
one day. They can only be made in specific laboratories [26]. More recent calorimetry 
developments are based on solid state sensors. 
Isotope Specific thermal power (mW/g) 
U-232 688 
Pu-238 568 
Tritium 324 
Am-241 114 
weapons-grade Pu 3.25 
Pu (30 GWd/t)* reactor-grade 12.1 
Pu (50 GWd/t)* reactor-grade 19.0 
Pu (60 GWd/t)* reactor-grade 24.6 
Pu (70 GWd/t)* reactor-grade 31.47 
U-233 0.28 
Np-237 0.032 
HEU 93% U-235 2x10-3 
*burnup of spent fuel 
 
Table 8.1.6. Specific thermal power in mW/g for different isotopes or mixtures [26]. 
 
8.1.6 Containment and surveillance methods [27,34] 
In the majority of facilities to be inspected, the nuclear material is found in the form of 
separate items only. Item counting, serial number identification and surveillance by visual 
inspection or cameras are adequate safeguards measures in such cases. This has greatly 
facilitated the implementation of safeguards. 
8.1.6.1   Ultrasonic seals for fuel elements 
A promising technique is the identification of randomly distributed discontinuities in a matrix 
by ultrasonic wave propagation and echo registration. The characteristics of these echoes 
vary with each variation of the discontinuity position in the matrix. Such a matrix forms part 
of a cap seal e.g. for LWR fuel bundles. It has to be destroyed when the seal would be 
removed. The seal may contain a fuel element identification known only to the inspector. 
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8.1.6.2     Electronic seals 
Electronic seals may be applied to spent fuel transport and storage casks, concrete lids of 
power reactors, doors and gates of storage areas, piping, and containers with special nuclear 
material. 
The sealing function is realized by using a fibre-optic cable (FOC) or, alternatively, an 
electrical wire. The FOC or wire is looped through the locking mechanism of the container or 
site to be sealed. The two ends are attached to the seal body. The fibre-optic concept has a 
light source (i.e., optical transmitter) and a light sensor (i.e., optical receiver) with the light 
being transmitted through an external FOC of practically arbitrary length. In the wire concept 
the electrical current is monitored as well as the resistance of the wire. Both concepts are 
designed for multiple connection and disconnection of the FOC or wire, i.e., "closing and 
opening of the seal". 
The VAriable COding Sealing System (VACOSS) consists of a seal body containing the 
electronic circuitry and battery, a fibre optic cable, and an interface box to provide 
communication between the seal and the reader. 
The Integrable Re-usable Electronic Seal (IRES) can be used with both a FOC and an 
electrical wire, while the seal detects whether it is being used with a FOC or a wire. The FOC 
is a multimode cable and the light source is a light emitting diode (LED) emitting random 
frames (8 bits) every 500 s in the infrared range. Communication with the seal takes place 
via a serial interface or wireless link (radio module). 
The Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) is used with a FOC only. The FOC is a 
single mode fibre, and the light source is a laser. The open/closed status of the FOC is 
monitored by transmitting and receiving short light pulses at certain time intervals. 
Communication with the seal takes place via a serial interface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.1.7.    Electronic optical sealing system with fibre-optic cable [27,30,34]. 
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8.1.6.3    Laser technology based safeguards survey [34] 
Laser technologies are becoming increasingly important, providing new and novel 
verification and detection tools for current and future safeguards activities. Three-
dimensional (3D) laser imaging in nuclear facilities is applied for design information 
verification (DIV) to confirm the absence of undeclared structural changes. Also, scanning a 
seal's unique microscopic surface structure is used as an inherent "fingerprint" which 
provides increased assurance against seal-counterfeiting. 
8.1.6.4   Remote monitoring [34] 
Remote monitoring transmits NDA measurements and signals of seals, pictures or videos to 
the remote monitoring data processing centers of the IAEA. This provides a full view of all 
data at any time and leads to reduced inspection frequencies. The data transmission can be 
performed either by radio signals, via the INTERNET or via satellites. 
8.1.6.5   Environmental sampling [28] 
Tunable diode laser spectroscopy (TDLS) can be used to detect parts per billion 
concentrations of hydrogen fluoride (HF) or UF6 which is often associated with some forms 
of uranium conversion and enrichment processes. 
Swipes can be taken by 10x10 cm2 cotton samples which are analyzed in specific 
laboratories. 
8.1.6.6   Satellite imagery 
Satellite imagery can be used as a powerful tool for non-proliferation verification. Publically 
available sattelite imagery has attained a resolution of 44 cm for black and white images and 
2.4 m for multispectral application. Some imaging sattelites can acquire images from the 
microwave (radar) region or from the infrared bands. 
Satellite imagery showed already in a number of cases to be very effective in detecting, 
evaluating and monitoring clandestine activities and nuclear facilities [41]. 
8.1.7 Anti-Neutrino measurement 
8.1.7.1  Introduction 
The fission of heavy nuclei (uranium, plutonium and other minor actinides) in nuclear 
reactors produces fission products. These fission products usually decay to more stable nuclei 
via beta-decay and emit aniti-neutrinos. An operating 1 GWe nuclear reactor emits anti-
neutrinos on the order of 1021 per s. The distribution of the fission products is slightly 
different for the fissile isotopes U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Pu-241. It also depends on the 
velocity of the incident neutrons (fast or thermal) [35-39]. The released energy per fission, 
the emitted number of anti-neutrinos and their energy depend also on the fissile isotope that 
undergoes fission. Table 8.1.8 shows the characteristic data for anti-neutrinos originating 
from the isotopes U-235, U-238, Pu-239 and Pu-241. 
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 U-235 U-238 Pu-239 Pu-241 
Released energy per fission 
[MeV] 
201.7 205.0 210.0 212.4 
Mean energy of anti-neutrinos 
[MeV] 
1.46 1.56 1.32 1.44 
Number of anti-neutrinos per fission 5.58 6.69 5.09 5.89 
 
Table 8.1.8. Characteristic data for anti-neutrinos originating from fission of different 
heavy nuclei [37]. 
 
The theoretical anti-neutrino energy spectra are shown for U-235 and Pu-239 in Fig. 8.1.8. 
They differ by about 50% [35,36,37]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1.8. Theoretical anti-neutrino energy spectra for U-235 and Pu-239 [35]. 
 
At constant power of a fission reactor, e.g. LWR, the measured anti-neutrino flux and the 
shape of the anti-neutrino energy spectra are determined by the fissile fuel composition. As a 
function of operation time of the nuclear fission reactor the isotope U-235 decreases and the 
isotope Pu-239 (and other plutonium isotopes) slightly increases. Estimates of the power of 
the nuclear fission reactors by measuring the anti-neutrino flux, therefore, requires the 
knowledge of the fissile fuel composition as a function of operation time [37]. 
8.1.7.2   Anti-neutrino Detection 
The principle employed for the detection of anti-neutrinos is the inverse beta decay process 
+
e + p  e  + n $  
where the proton target is the nucleus of a hydrogen atom of a liquid scintillator. The positron 
produces a prompt signal of light measured by photomultiplier tubes optically coupled with 
$ energy (MeV) 
    U-235 
-·-·Pu-239 
 154 
the liquid target. The neutron is tagged by its capture on Gd nuclei dissolved in the liquid. 
This event occurs after a thermalization of the neutrons or a few ten s after the prompt 
signal due to the positron energy loss. The neutron capture in Gd produces an emission of 
gamma rays with a total energy of about 8 MeV. Therefore, the signature of anti-neutrino 
interaction is provided by a delayed coincidence between these two events [35-39]. Fig. 8.1.9 
explains the detection principle for anti-neutrinos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1.9. Detection principle for anti-neutrinos [37]. 
 
Cosmic rays and their associated secondary particles induce sources of background 
radiation. The muon véto shield tags the transit of these particles in or near the detector. In 
addition shielding of gamma rays and external neutrons is necessary. 
As explained above the fuel composition (burnup of U-235 and generation of plutonium) 
determine the rate of anti-neutrinos and the energy spectrum of the anti-neutrinos emitted. 
Therefore, sophisticated computer programs must predict the spatial fuel composition 
(uranium, plutonium, minor actinides) and the fission product composition. These computer 
programs also allow calculating the anti-neutrino flux and the accompanying energy spectra. 
As measurements show, only the total (superposition from all fissionable isotopes) of the 
rate and the energy spectra of the anti-neutrinos, both measurements and calculations must be 
compared [36,37]. 
8.1.7.3   Application of anti-neutrino detectors for safeguards 
Measurements at several reactors in Russia, USA, Europe and Japan demonstrated that anti-
neutrino detectors located at a certain distance, e.g. 100 m, from the nuclear fission reactors 
allow an independent measurement of the power level and of shutdown periods. In 
combination with sophisticated computer programs also the amounts of uranium and 
plutonium can be measured. 
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IAEA inspectors are not using this detection method yet. But it certainly represents an 
important possibility for independent safeguards measurements for the future [38,39,40]. All 
shut down events of the nuclear reactor can be clearly detected. 
8.1.8 Unattended monitoring systems 
Continuous automatic monitoring of nuclear facilities and transmission of the recorded data 
to the IAEA headquarters is an important tool of international safeguards. Such so-called 
unattended monitoring systems (UMS) were installed by IAEA already in 44 nuclear 
facilities in 22 countries by 2004. 
UMS replace periodic visits of IAEA inspectors to nuclear facilities and allow 
uninterrupted facility operation. The UMS have the following basic characteristics: 
– they are permanently installed and monitor automatically and continuously without the 
need of human interaction 
– they use sensors for radiation, pressure, temperature, flow, vibration, electromagnetic 
fields etc. 
– all components, e.g. cameras, sensors, computers etc., are enclosed on site in tamper-
indicating enclosures to ensure authenticity. 
The IAEA must be able to independently verify its conclusions regarding the nuclear 
material in a facility. Therefore, data recording enclosures are designed such that the IAEA 
can detect any unauthorized tampering. 
The software used is only available to the IAEA. Digital data follow 128 bit encryption 
algorithms. Data encryption is used both on- and offsite for all data. Power supplier are 
designed to be uninterruptable. The IAEA uses both virtual private networks and wireless 
solutions for data transmission to their headquarters. 
8.1.9 Safeguards Application to the Different Parts of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
In the following subsections the aforementioned safeguards methods are applied to the 
different parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. These are 
– uranium enrichment plants 
– nuclear reactors and fuel storage facilities 
– fuel reprocessing and fuel refabrication plants. 
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8.2 Safeguards concept of uranium enrichment plants 
8.2.1 Introduction 
For uranium enrichment two main technologies are presently used in civil nuclear reactor 
technology. These are the gas diffusion and gas centrifuge technology. Both enrich the 
gaseous UF6 molecules of U-235 starting from natural uranium which is found in the 
composition of 0.72% U-235 and 99.28% U-238 (the small fraction of 0.0055% U-234 is 
neglected here) in uranium ores. Gas centrifuge technology has been proven to be much more 
economic than the gas diffusion technology, originally developed and used in the USA and 
France. For economical reasons, these nations will switch over to centrifuge technology in 
the near future. Laser enrichment technology still has to be proven to become as economic as 
centrifuge technology (see Section 3). 
A typical large scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant is characterized [1,14] by 
– a separative work unit (t SWU) capacity of 2900 t SWU/y 
– a feed capacity of 5000 t of Unat in 590 cylinder containers (48 inches diameter) 
– a tails capacity of 4500 t of depleted uranium (0.3% U-235) in 540 cylinder containers 
(48 inches diameter) 
– a product capacity of 500 t of low enriched uranium, e.g. 5% U-235, in 290 cylinder 
containers (30 inches diameter). 
Centrifuge enrichment plants consist of the feed and take off areas, blending stations, a large 
assembly of centrifuges per cascade and several cascade halls (containing cascades connected 
in parallel) (see Fig. 8.2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2.1.    Centrifuge cascade hall of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (URANIT). 
 
As the operation of gas diffusion plants will be terminated in the future, only the 
safeguards concepts for centrifuge plants will be discussed [2,3]. 
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Material Balance Areas (MBA) are the storage area for the feed product as well as the 
storage area for the final enriched product and the tails product. In addition there is the 
process area or centrifuge cascade hall. The conversion time of HEU into weapons useable 
material is set by IAEA to the order of weeks. Hence the time goal for detection is one 
month. IAEA inspectors, therefore, have full access to the cascade hall for monthly 
inspections. They must verify that no UF6 is being produced beyond the declared enrichment 
levels e.g. high enriched uranium (HEU). A physical inventory verification (PIV) is 
performed every year to verify the entire stock of nuclear material on site. 
Design information verifications (DIVs) are carried out initially on the new plant and 
repeated every year. They must confirm that the cascades are built according to the design 
information documents which were originally submitted. Limited frequency unannounced 
access (LFUA) inspections shall verify that the cascade design has not been modified. 
Complementary access visits are required by the additional protocol to the NPT. These are 
unannounced visits several times per year. 
Due to the chemical and physical properties of UF6 [4] and due to design peculiarities of a 
centrifuge enrichment plant being equipped with gas centrifuges connected to many pipings, 
ducts, elbows, filters etc., special care must be given to so-called fissile material holdup. 
Holdup refers to fissile uranium which can deposit in the equipment or in transfer pipes. 
Holdup is difficult to measure. It can amount to kilograms of nuclear material and can thus 
limit the accuracy of the material balance. 
The deposit formation occurs due to the chemical properties of the UF6. When UF6 comes 
in contact with water vapor it reacts to hydrogen fluoride UF and uranylfluoride UO2F2. This 
leads to corrosion and to solid uranium compounds which deposit on surfaces. In addition, 
the alpha particle radiation of the uranium molecules leads to decomposition of UF6 into HF 
and solid uranium compounds which also deposit on surfaces. (UF6 is the only gaseous 
chemical component of uranium.) 
The IAEA inspectors [1,4] must verify that a possible diverter 
– does not produce higher enriched uranium by reintroducing higher enriched UF6 into the 
feed of the cascades 
– does not reconfigure the cascade system 
– does not remove significant quantities (SQ) of highly enriched uranium by false reporting 
or by overstating the amount of nuclear material in the holdup of the plant. 
8.2.2 Inspection techniques [5,6,7,9] 
8.2.2.1 Weight verification 
The UF6 gas cylinder containers are weighed either with the IAEA inspector weigh cells or 
the weigh scales of the plant operator (Fig. 8.2.2). The transportable load cell based system of 
IAEA senses the weight of the suspended product cylinder with an accuracy of better than 
1 kg. This information is used for the annual nuclear material balance check. 
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Figure 8.2.2.  UF6 cylinder containers and IAEA weigh cell (IAEA). 
8.2.2.2 Destructive (DA) and non-destructive (NDA) Assay 
For DA measurements gas mass spectrometers (section 8.6.1) are applied that can have high 
precision of even better than 0.014% [8]. They are taken either from the UF6 gas cylindrical 
containers or from the gas flow in the plant. 
As NDA measurement techniques the gamma-ray techniques and to some extent also 
neutron assay techniques are applied [9] as described in Sections 8.1.5.2 and 8.1.5.3. 
For gamma-ray measurements with a fixed detector sample geometry in the enrichment 
plant and for samples that allow to measure the 186 keV U-235 gamma-rays the count rates 
are directly proportional to the enrichment of the UF6 [9]. Another enrichment measurement 
technique is the gas phase enrichment monitor. Samples are taken from plant sampling points 
in the feed, final product or tails lines. The sample cylinder is then connected to the monitor. 
For the measurement the attenuation of the 59.5 keV gamma-rays of an Am-241 source and 
the 185.7 keV gamma-rays of U-235 are compared. Measurement accuracies are in the range 
of 1% [9]. 
There is also experience in using thermoluminiscent dosimeters (TLD) for certain 
equipments of the enrichment plant. Gamma-rays have advantages over neutrons in 
measuring holdups, because they can be collimated allowing the locations and distribution of 
deposits to be defined. Sodium iodine and bismuth germanate detectors can be applied. In 
addition, Peltier cooled cadmium tellurium detectors are in use as portable gamma-ray 
detectors. 
The IAEA uses the online enrichment measurements CEM (continuous enrichment 
monitoring) and CHEMO (cascade header enrichment monitor) for safeguards verification. 
These are passive gamma-ray measurements combined with X-ray fluorescence detection to 
measure the enrichment of the UF6 gas in outgoing piping from the centrifuge cascade hall 
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[4,10]. This allows a Yes or No answer, whether enrichment 20% U-235 in the UF6 gas is 
exceeded with a false alarm probability of 0.001. The CHEMO system can transmit a 
message daily to the IAEA confirming that the measurements are within the bounds of 
declaration. 
8.2.2.3 Holdup of nuclear materials within the enrichment plant 
The Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) assay method was developed to simplify the 
analysis of holdup measurements [5,6]. This method requires a portable spectroscopic system 
and a calibrated detector. As a final result the specific isotope mass for an area deposit is 
obtained. 
Portable neutron monitors use four He-3 tubes surrounded by polyethylene as moderator. 
They are designed for either single counting or neutron coincidence counting. 
A neutron holdup assay method for uranium enrichment facilities [7] uses Monte Carlo 
techniques modeling the centrifuge cascade hall. In addition a calibration method is used 
which relates the average neutron count rate at certain positions in the hall to the mass of the 
uranium holdup. The average neutron count rate is measured by portable detectors. This 
neutron assay method avoids the attenuation problems caused by structures etc. of the 
gamma-ray measurements. 
The precision of gamma-ray or neutron holdup measurements is usually of the order of a 
few percent. However, the accuracy or the system error is very difficult to determine because 
it is difficult to know the true mass and location of nuclear material holdup in the complex 
facility [5]. Therefore, IAEA inspectors rarely rely on the measurement of holdups. 
8.2.3 Unattended safeguard systems for enrichment plants 
An unattended safeguard system was proposed by Pickrell et al. [11]. It is based on the fact 
that natural uranium is always accompanied by very small amounts (0.0055%) of U-234 
which is an emitter of alpha particles. The latter react with the fluorine in UF6 in an (,n) 
reaction generating neutrons. U-234 is enriched by gas centrifuges with a higher enrichment 
factor than U-235. Therefore, the rate of neutrons generated by (,n)-reactions increases 
considerably if U-235 is enriched over a certain limit. These neutrons can be detected by 
neutron monitors arranged in matrix form above the centrifuges. The neutron signals can be 
evaluated by IAEA. 
A real time safeguards system for centrifuge enrichment plants was proposed by Delbeke 
et al. [15]. 
8.2.4 Containment and surveillance 
As containment surveillance methods the IAEA applies three-dimensional laser imaging for 
design information verification (DIV) with the aim to confirm whether undeclared structural 
changes have been made. 
Cameras as well as passive seals (metal and paper seals) or active seals: fiber optic seals 
(VACOSS, EOSS) and ultrasonic seals are important devices of the IAEA verification 
system (Section 8.1.6.2). 
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8.2.5 Environmental sampling 
Tunable diode laser spectroscopy (TDLS) as well as light detection and ranging (LIDAR) are 
applied for the detection of parts-per-billion concentrations of HF (hydrogen fluoride to 
detect undeclared activities of uranium conversion or enrichment plants. 
Within the enrichment plants swipes are taken many times a year at many locations of the 
enrichment plants. These swipes are sent to the Seibersdorf Laboratories of the IAEA or to 
licensed Network Analytical Laboratories for further analysis. 
The use of swipes is based on the assumption that every component of the enrichment 
plant will release small amounts of UF6 to the environment. Although these releases are 
extremely small, they are detectable and their analysis provides an indication (U-234, U-235, 
U-236, U-238 isotopic amounts) of the enrichment of the material that has been processed in 
the plant [12]. 
Environmental samples are collected by swiping selected areas of the enrichment plant 
with 10 x 10 cm2 cotton cloth form sampling kits prepared in ultra clean conditions. These 
are sent to the laboratories and analyzed by using Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry or 
Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry. 
The time required for particles to be released and settled on surfaces is estimated to be one 
to six weeks. A routine detection time of three months, therefore, appears achievable. This 
detection time is an important deterrent to a possible diverter [11,13]. 
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8.3     Safeguards for Light Water Reactors (LWRs) and spent fuel pools 
8.3.1   Light Water Reactors and fresh fuel elements 
Light Water Reactors (LWRs) contain two types of nuclear fuel. Low enriched, e.g. 5% U-
235 and 95% U-238 fresh fuel, and irradiated fuel with additional amounts of fission 
products, plutonium and minor actinides (neptunium, americium and curium). When the 
irradiated fuel elements are unloaded from the reactor core operating in multi-batch mode 
after typically 12 to 18 months full power, the spent fuel contains about 0.8% U-235, 0.9% 
plutonium and 0.1% minor actinides. 
The irradiated or spent fuel is considered direct-use material, since it contains plutonium 
(significant quantity 8 kg). The conversion time for converting the plutonium of the irradiated 
fuel into nuclear weapons useable metallic plutonium is considered to be 1 to 3 months. The 
IAEA goal for timely detection is assumed to be 3 months. Hence the IAEA inspector is 
required to visit the LWR plant on a 3 months basis [1,2,3] (see Section 8.1.1). 
When the core will be refueled and spent fuel is unloaded the IAEA inspector will be 
responsible for verifying the new fresh fuel elements loaded into the core, the remaining core 
fuel elements with partially irradiated fuel and the unloaded spent fuel elements. 
The material balance areas (MBA) for LWRs are shown in Section 1.3.1 (Fig. 8.1.2). 
The inspector relies on containment and surveillance methods (cameras and seals) and 
visual inspection as well as NDA methods. The fresh fuel elements can be measured by 
observing the 185.7 keV gamma rays of U-235 with the help of mini-multichannel analyzers 
(MMCA) connected to a CdZnTe-detector (Fig. 8.3.1). 
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Figure 8.3.1.  Mini-multi-channel analyzer (MMCA) with detectors for fresh fuel assay [4,5]. 
 
The safeguards objective of the IAEA is to verify that the operator of the reactor plant 
does not divert fissile material either in abrupt or protracted diversions, e.g. by replacing 
single irradiated rods or the irradiated fuel element by dummies and diverts the fuel elements 
with fissile fuel. 
8.3.2   Safeguards surveillance of spent fuel elements 
In spent fuel elements the gamma-ray signatures will be masked by the intense radiation 
emitted by fission products in irradiated or spent fuel elements. More than several hundred 
fission products are created in significant amounts during fission of uranium, plutonium or 
minor actinides. Some of these fission products emit delayed neutrons during their further 
decay. Only about 10 of these isotopes can be directly measured due to their characteristic 
gamma-radiation. Minor actinides which are built up after neutron absorption in plutonium or 
americium isotopes also emit spontaneous fission neutrons. Alpha-decay of these isotopes 
can lead to neutron emission after (,n) reactions with light elements, e.g. oxygen, carbon 
etc.. 
For refueling LWRs will be shut down. The pressure vessel is opened and spent fuel 
elements having attained their specified burnup, e.g. 60 GWd/t, will be unloaded from the 
core and transferred under water into the intermediate fuel element storage pool. The spent 
fuel elements are usually replaced by fresh fuel elements. All fuel elements have seals or 
tags. The loading and unloading process is accompanied by video surveillance. The simplest 
verification measure is visual inspection by underwater cameras. Within the spent fuel 
storage pool Cerenkov viewing detectors (Fig. 8.3.2) which amplify the Cerenkov light 
produced by spent fuel elements can be used to qualitatively verify the burnup and cooling 
time of the spent fuel elements. 
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Figure 8.3.2.  Cerenkov viewing detector [4,5]. 
 
For cooling times longer than about one year the total gamma-ray and neutron radiation is 
proportional to the burnup of the spent fuel elements [1,2]. This gamma-ray and neutron 
radiation can be measured by ionization and fission chambers. For this procedure the spent 
fuel elements are partially lifted from this storage position in the so called intermediate spent 
fuel storage pool. This measurement can be performed with the FORK detector (Fig. 8.3.3) 
by IAEA inspectors [3,4,5,7]. Total neutron counting measurements have some advantages 
over total gamma-ray measurements, as the gamma-rays are attenuated by the fuel. However, 
total neutron counting is not precise enough to identify single missing fuel rods in an 
irradiated fuel element. Nevertheless they can identify misdeclared irradiated fuel 
subassemblies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.3.3. FORK detector and partially lifted fuel element. 
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8.3.3     Gamma-ray spectroscopy 
High-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy can be used if full knowledge of the fuel assembly 
geometry is provided and attenuation factors of the gamma-rays by the fuel are known. The 
spent fuel burnup can be obtained from the measurement of the activity of Cs-134 to Cs-137 
[2]. 
The IAEA uses CdZnTe detectors and a multichannel analyzer to measure gamma-rays 
from fission products like Cs-134, Cs-137, Pr-144, Eu-154 and others [4,5]. 
8.3.4   Active and passive neutron interrogation methods 
A method for the non-destructive assay of spent LWR fuel assemblies based on combined 
active and passive neutron counting was reported by Wuerz et al. [6]. The method allows the 
determination of the burnup, the total fissile content, the original enrichment of the spent fuel 
element as well as of the type of fuel (uranium or mixed oxide (MOX) fuel). The method was 
originally developed for criticality control at the front end of a reprocessing plant. It can also 
be used for fuel storage facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3.4.  Principle of the method of active and passive neutron interrogation [6]. 
 
Measurements were undertaken in spent LWR fuel storage pools of a reprocessing plant 
and LWR power stations [6,7]. Without prior knowledge of any fuel assembly data, the 
burnup of uranium fuel assemblies can be determined with an uncertainty of 1200 MWd/t. 
The initial enrichment of uranium fuel assemblies can be measured with an accuracy of 5%. 
Using these data and accuracies, the total plutonium content can be determined from isotopic 
correlations with an accuracy of better than 0.3 kg/t for pressurized water reactor (PWR) 
and 0.5 kg/t for boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies. 
The principle of the method is shown by Fig. 8.3.4. The assay is performed under water. A 
Cf-252 neutron source is positioned next to the fuel assembly surface. A neutron detector at 
the opposite side of the assembly is used for the measurement of thermalized neutrons. The 
total number of neutrons measured consists of 
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 irect neutrons penetrating the assembly without being captured or scattered 
 neutron induced fissions 
 inherent spontaneous fission neutrons from the spent fuel. 
For the passive assay (Fig. 8.3.5) the neutron source is removed and up to four neutron 
detectors measure the inherent spontaneous fission neutrons from the spent fuel. 
Both measurements contribute to the final experimental results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3.5.   Arrangement of LWR fuel element and Cf-252 neutron source. 
8.3.5      Advanced antineutrino measurements 
Antineutrino detectors were developed in several countries between 1995 and 2010 and 
tested at nuclear reactors. They can measure the power level of a reactor plant from a 
distance of about 100 m away from the plant. The data could be processed and transmitted to 
the IAEA data center (see Section 8.1.7). 
FE
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8.4     Safeguards survey of large scale reprocessing plants 
The safeguards approach of large scale reprocessing plants, e.g. the 800 t/y throughput of 
spent fuel plant at Rokkasho, Japan, follows systematic design information and verification 
(DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. In addition it 
comprises installed, unattended radiation and spent fuel solution measurements as well as 
monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. These 
independent or authenticated data will be transmitted over a network to a data recording 
center of the IAEA for evaluation. Near real-time accountancy (NRTA) uses short period 
sequential analysis which can be combined with plutonium/uranium solution monitoring data 
to provide higher assurance in the verification of fissile material (Sections 8.1.4 and 8.7). 
Containment and surveillance measures are combined with the NRTA concept. 
Figure 8.4.1 explains the flow diagram of nuclear material in a large scale reprocessing 
plant. In the following sections the flow of fissile material through the reprocessing plant 
along with safeguards measurement techniques is explained. Section 8.4.9 deals with a 
specific safeguards concept proposed by IAEA for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. 
8.4.1    Spent fuel storage pool 
Seals are attached to the shielded transport cask and to the spent fuel elements. In the spent 
fuel element storage pools active and passive neutron assay methods can be applied as 
described in Section 8.1.6. This allows confirmation of the burnup and the 
uranium/plutonium content of each fuel element. 
Systems of cameras with video recording and radiation detector systems are implemented 
in all areas, where fuel is moved or handled (spent fuel storage pool and fuel element 
chopping area). 
The chopped pieces of fuel fall into the dissolver where the fuel is dissolved in boiling 
nitric acid. The remaining hulls and structural pieces of fuel elements are washed and become 
radioactive waste. The solution of dissolved fuel and fission products is clarified in a 
centrifuge to remove not dissolved products (sludge). The solutions are then collected in an 
accountancy tank where the uranium and the plutonium content is measured. All this 
equipment is located behind heavy shielding and not directly accessible. 
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8.4.2    Safeguards measurement for the accountancy tank 
For the fuel solution in the accountancy tank both DA and NDA measurement techniques are 
applied as already described in Section 8.1.5. Liquid samples from the accountability tank are 
pneumatically transferred to the measuring station. The X-ray fluorescence and the K-edge 
densitometry are applied to measure the total plutonium and uranium concentrations. In 
addition, volume and weight measurements of fuel solution samples or of the accountancy 
tank itself constitute important information. 
For the X-ray fluorescence method an X-ray source, e.g. Co-57 (122 and 136 keV) 
irradiates the sample and ionizes electrons of the K-shell of the uranium or plutonium atoms. 
They emit so called K-shell X-rays which can be detected by a Ge-detector. The Co-57 X-ray 
source must be arranged such that the Ge-detector remains shielded [5]. 
K-edge densitometry works with two X-ray sources, one below and one above the K-edge 
of e.g. plutonium. Such X-ray sources are Co-57 with 122 keV and Se-75 with 121 keV (see 
section 8.1.5). The accuracy of measurement with both methods (X-ray fluorescence and K-
edge densitometry) is between 0.2 and 0.6% [7]. Isotope dilution gamma-ray spectrometry 
(section 8.1.5) can also be used to measure dissolver solutions with uranium and plutonium. 
This method allows determining both the uranium and plutonium concentrations and the 
isotopic compositions with an accuracy of about 0.4% [7]. 
8.4.3   Separation of fission products and actinides 
The high radiation of the fission products and the actinides require remotely controlled 
chemical processes. From the accountancy tank the fuel and fission product solution flows to 
the solvent extraction part of the plant. There, the fission products and actinides are separated 
first. After going through several purification cycles part of the uranium and plutonium 
solutions are mixed in a certain ratio (master mix). The remaining uranium nitrates are 
separately treated. Uranium and plutonium nitrates undergo a co-denitration and heat 
treatment process to be converted to UOX and MOX powders. 
8.4.4   Near real time accountancy 
Near real time accountancy (NRTA) is applied to give timely information on the fissile 
material balance in the plant and to analyze possible trends (Section 8.1.4). The movement of 
solutions is followed through the process to confirm transfers into and out of material balance 
areas (MBAs). The basic principle of NRTA is to monitor the in-process inventory of 
plutonium frequently (daily or weekly) applying a combination of direct measurements from 
in-process instruments, off-line analysis, and indirect data from computer simulations of the 
chemical processes. Most tanks and many process vessels are amenable to measurements or 
estimation of their inventories. One obvious advantage is that the throughput over a short 
interval, e.g. weeks, is significantly smaller than over an entire year. This means that the 
effects of some of the overall measurement accuracies are significantly reduced. Another 
advantage is that many more measurements are taken which improves the timely 
detectability. 
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8.4.5    Safeguards measurements in product storage areas 
The MOX powder can be assayed by DA methods with an accuracy of 0.15 to 0.2% [2,7]. 
The MOX powders are filled in cans, sealed and weighed with high precision. Several cans 
are put together in canisters which are again sealed. The canisters undergo additional 
measurements by neutron coincidence detectors and gamma detectors to determine the 
amount of uranium and plutonium and their isotopic compositions (section 8.1.5.3). The 
accuracy achieved is 0.2 to 2% [5]. They are then transferred to the intermediate product 
storage areas, where also the remaining uranium dioxide products are stored. 
8.4.6     Waste streams 
There are two radioactive waste streams which contain fissile materials (Fig. 8.4.1) 
– the hulls and structural pieces of the fuel element with small amount of fissile material on 
their surfaces 
– the high active waste containing the fission products and the minor actinides. 
The safeguards verification of those two waste products will be discussed in Sections 
8.4.9.1 and 8.5. 
The low active and medium active waste streams do not contain fissile material. 
8.4.7     Containment and Surveillance (C/S) 
C/S technologies (seals, cameras and radiation detectors) are used extensively in the spent 
fuel storage pool, in the fuel element chopping area (head end) and in the final product 
(MOX- und UOX-powders) storage areas. The objective is to ensure that no fuel assemblies 
or fuel rods are removed without declaration. 
8.4.8     IAEA resident inspectors 
In addition to the above safeguards measurements for the material balance and containment 
and surveillance measures the IAEA can have resident inspectors at the reprocessing plant. 
They have full access to all facilities, to the operational staff and to measurement systems 
during continuous operation. An IAEA on site laboratory can also take samples for 
destructive analysis. 
8.4.9     Material balance areas for a large scale spent  fuel reprocessing plant 
The safeguards concept of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant is described by Fig. 8.4.2: The 
spent fuel reprocessing facility is divided into five Material Balance Areas (MBAs). These 
MBAs are subdivided into Key Measurement Points (KMPs) with the objective of timely 
detection as well as Physical Inventory Verification (PIV). Flow key measurement points 
(arrows in circles) have also been identified for all nuclear material streams or routes which 
cross MBA boundaries. In addition to flows that cross MBA boundaries, other strategic 
points are defined for verification of flows within the MBAs (points in circles). 
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Figure 8.4.2.    Material balance areas (MBAs) and key measurement points (KMPs) in a 
large scale spent fuel reprocessing area. 
8.4.9.1     MBA 1 – Spent Fuel Receipt and Storage, and Head-End Areas 
Spent fuel assemblies received into the facility, are unloaded from the transport cask and 
transferred into the storage ponds where they are verified using the integrated spent fuel 
verification system. This system consists of time synchronized cameras and radiation 
detectors. Batches of dissolved spent fuel, for transfer to the main chemical process, will be 
verified for volume using a spent fuel solution measurement and monitoring system. 
Uranium and plutonium will be verified by sampling using an automatic sampling system or 
analysis by Hybrid K-edge Densitometry (Section 8.1.5.1 and [1,3,7]). 
The flow of spent fuel assemblies from the storage pond transfer channel to the chopping 
machine and the movement of the hulls/end-pieces drums will be monitored using the 
integrated head-end verification system consisting again of a number of camera/radiation 
detectors mounted in the cell walls, with additional camera units installed in the shear cell. 
MBA-1: Spent fuel receipt and storage 
area, Head-end area 
MBA-3: Waste treatment and storage area 
MBA-2: Main process area (including U 
conversion and laboratories 
MBA-4: MOX conversion area 
  MBA-5: Product storage area 
KMP A: Spent fuel receipt and Storage 
area 
  
KMP B: Head-End area KMP E: Nuclear material in the U conversion 
area 
KMP C: Nuclear material in main process 
area 
KMP F: Nuclear material in the waste treatment 
and storage area 
KMP D: Nuclear material in the analytical 
laboratory 
KMP G: Nuclear material in the MOX conversion 
area 
  KMP H: UO3 product material in the storage area 
  KMP J: MOX product material in the storage 
area 
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Solid waste in the form of leached hulls and fuel end-pieces will be verified indirectly by 
determining the Cm-244 using the hulls monitoring system and then relating this to the 
U:Pu:Cm-244 ratios in the spent fuel dissolver solutions. 
8.4.9.2   MBA 2 – Main Process Area 
8.4.9.2.1    Verification of flow within the MBA 
Assurance that the process flows and facility operations are as declared will be achieved 
through solution monitoring. This includes not only sensors for temperature and for pressures 
to determine solution levels and density, but also neutron sensors on the extraction systems. 
In addition, random samples will be taken during the month and analyzed. Short period (5-15 
days), sequential evaluations of the material unaccounted for (MUF) will be performed using 
NRTA methods. 
8.4.9.2.2    Verification of inventory 
Inventory verification will be carried out on a monthly basis during which the volume of all 
vessels will be verified and samples will be taken according to a random sampling plan for 
destructive analyses. Un-measurable inventories will be estimated using established process 
design algorithms. The MUF will be evaluated on an interim basis using Near-Real-Time-
Accountancy (NRTA) methods. 
Plutonium will be analyzed using a spectrophotometric method and Uranium is analyzed 
using isotope dilution mass spectroscopy. High Active Liquid Waste (HALW) batches which 
are shipped to Waste Treatment will be verified for volume and sample taking. High Active 
Solid Wastes (hulls and end-pieces) that are shipped to the Waste Storage Area will be 
verified using the waste crate assay system, which is based on passive neutron counting to 
measure the plutonium content (see Sections 8.4.7.1, 8.4.7.3 and 8.5). 
8.4.9.2.3     Verification of physical inventory 
A physical inventory verification (PIV) will be carried out once per year, during which the 
clean-out status and remaining solutions will be verified. 
8.4.9.3     MBA 3 – Waste Treatment and Storage Area 
Canisters of vitrified HAW are verified using a vitrified canister assay system. This system 
determines the Cm-244 content of the canister from neutron emission and uses the ratio of 
Pu:U:Cm-244 established by sample taking. 
Physical inventory verification carried out once per year, during which the declared clean-
out and inventory in the liquid waste treatment area will be verified. 
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8.4.9.4     MBA 4 – MOX Conversion Area 
Verification of inventory changes 
The MOX powder canisters will be verified prior to transfer to storage using a plutonium 
canister assay system. This system is based on high level neutron coincidence counting and 
high resolution gamma spectroscopy. A camera is recording the canister identification seals. 
In addition, samples of MOX powder will be taken for destructive analyses. 
8.4.9.5     MBA 5 – Product Storage Area 
Verification of inventory changes 
Receipt of MOX canisters is verified using a series of neutron detectors and surveillance 
cameras. The neutron detectors combined with surveillance are located so as to detect the 
passage and direction of travel of a filled or empty MOX canister as it moves to the MOX 
storage room. 
Verification of physical inventory 
Physical verification of uranium and plutonium in storage is carried out once per year. 
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8.5     Nondestructive assay of residual fuel on leached hulls and dissolver sludge 
In reprocessing plants the chopped pieces of spent fuel elements fall into a basket of the 
dissolver tank. Boiling nitric acid dissolves the fuel and the hulls of the chopped fuel rods 
(Section 8.4.9.1). Pieces of structural material of the fuel elements remain in the basket. They 
are washed with nitric acid, but some particles of the fuel remain on the surface of the hulls. 
In addition there is small sludge of undissolved material which also contains small amounts 
of fuel. The amount of hulls and sludge are about 0.2 m3/t of spent fuel [3]. They become 
high level solid waste. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5.1.    Arrangement for measurement of hulls in the dissolver basket [3]. 
 
Several nondestructive assay methods apply passive and active neutron counting [1,2,3]. 
A method which applies both active and passive neutron counting was described in [3]. For 
the active neutron counting a stationary Cf-252 neutron source is used. The method relies on 
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the same principle which was already mentioned in Section 8.3.2 (Fig. 8.3.3) for spent fuel 
element assay in spent fuel storage pools. 
The measurement system is schematically shown in Fig. 8.5.1. The dissolver basket with 
the hulls is put into a water tank which is surrounded by a polyethylene (PE) reflector. There 
the stationary neutron source and on the opposite side 3 boron-10 lined neutron detectors are 
located. 
The neutron counting is performed in 2 steps – with and without – Cf-252 neutron source. 
The minimum detectable amount of residual fuel is 30 g plutonium/m3 for hulls and 90 g 
plutonium/m3 for sludge. 
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8.6   MOX fuel fabrication process 
In a large scale MOX fuel fabrication plant the MOX-powder (master mix) coming from the 
reprocessing plant (Section 8.4) is blended together with uranium oxide (UOX)-powder to 
achieve the required fissile enrichment. The mixed oxide powder is then mixed with a binder 
and pressed into green pellets. These are sintered in a sintering furnace at temperatures of 
1000 and 1700 °C and then ground to the required dimensions. Finally they are loaded into 
zircaloy or steel tubes, to which end caps are welded. A high number (169 to 256) of fuel 
rods are then assembled to a fuel element [1]. Fig. 7.11 in Section 7.5 shows the MOX fuel 
fabrication process schematically. 
8.6.1 MOX fuel fabrication plant 
Modern MOX fuel fabrication plants are designed to produce MOX-fuel assemblies remotely 
in a fully automated process (Fig. 8.6.1). MOX powder is transported in canisters from the 
reprocessing plant to the MOX fuel fabrication plant. There, the powder is transferred to the 
process glove boxes by an automated transfer machine. Due to the remote operation and the 
high radiation field in process areas, the MOX fuel storage areas are not normally accessible 
[1,3]. 
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Figure 8.6.1. Glove box and intermediate storage area. These are connected by automatic 
transfer machines. During maintenance periods, the nuclear material can be 
removed from the glove box and placed in the storage area to reduce 
personnel exposure. 
8.6.2 Safeguards approach 
According to INFCIRC-153 the significant quantity (SQ) for MOX fuel is 8 kg (Tab. 8.1.1 
Section 8.1.1). The timely detection period is one month. The entire MOX fabrication plant is 
included in one single Material Balance Area. The safeguards objective of IAEA is to detect 
both abrupt or protracted diversion and losses of nuclear materials across a material balance 
period of 1 month. 
Key activities of the IAEA inspectors are: 
– verification of transfers in and out of the plant 
– interim inventory verification to confirm on a monthly basis that 8 kg of plutonium or 
more are not missing from the plant 
– yearly physical inventory verification (PIV) to close the material balance period  
– application of containment/surveillance measures 
Nuclear material entering the plant in canisters contains seals which are verified by 
cameras. The oxide fuel powders are weighed before mixing and analyzed by destructive 
analysis (Section 8.1.5). The remote processing of the MOX powders and pellets takes place 
in glove boxes. These glove boxes are connected to intermediate storage areas. The material 
is transferred for processing in dedicated transfer containers from the intermediate storage to 
a glove box. When entering the glove box the container is weighed by a weigh cell. After 
processing in the glove box the fuel is transferred back to intermediate storage. The container 
is weighed again upon leaving the glove box [2]. 
Traverser
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The automated remote processing of the MOX fuel as well as the advancement of 
measurement capabilities and data processing allow the possibility of unattended mode 
verification by IAEA. The underlying measurement principle for the unattended mode 
verification is the measurement of the Pu-240 effective content by High Level Neutron 
Coincidence Counters (HLNC). These HLNCs stay continuously in the counting mode and 
automatically record the results which are transmitted to the data processing system. The 
HLNCs must be carefully calibrated [4]. In addition High Resolution Gamma Spectrometer 
(HRGs) and mass spectrometry are applied to determine the isotopic composition of the 
plutonium and confirm the effective Pu-240 content [1,2,3]. 
Hold-up of nuclear material in the process glove boxes is measured by a transportable 
glove box accountancy system. Near real time accountancy (NRTA) is applied in connection 
with all above described measurement and data processing systems. This allows the detection 
of possible falsifications of items in the inventory with virtual certainty within a sufficiently 
long time period [2]. The total process inventory is presented in accountable form and is 
verified at monthly intervals [2,3]. 
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8.7 Assessment of Criticism of Safeguards for Large Scale Reprocessing Plants 
8.7.1 Introduction 
As referred to in Sections 8.1 and 8.4, the IAEA safeguards concept for large-scale 
reprocessing plants is based on a combination of 
– materials accountancy, 
– near real-time accountancy (NRTA), 
– containment/surveillance measures (C/S). 
This three-stage combined safeguards concept has been the subject of critical discussion 
again and again over the past few decades. One case in point referred to in that criticism was 
the Japanese reprocessing plant of Rokkasho-mura with its planned annual throughput of 800 
tons of spent fuel. This reprocessing plant is the first commercial facility for reprocessing 
spent fuel to be built and operated in a non-nuclear-weapon state. 
The two big commercial spent fuel reprocessing plants of La Hague (1700 t/a) and 
Sellafield (1200 t/a) are located in the two nuclear weapon states of France and the United 
Kingdom, respectively. They are not criticized by the same groups discussing critically the 
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Rokkasho-mura plant [2,3]. France and the United Kingdtom are not required to place their 
reprocessing facilities under full IAEA safeguards [1]. Only parts of these large scale 
reprocessing plants are inspected by IAEA. 
From the outset, the Rokkasho 800 t/a reprocessing plant had been planned in the presence 
of IAEA inspectors (Design Information Verification). The safeguards concept of the plant 
was defined jointly by the operator and IAEA after many years of public scientific 
discussion. So-called IAEA Resident Inspectors are permanently present. On site there is an 
IAEA laboratory facility for destructive analyses, which avoids time consuming shipment of 
radioactive samples from Rokkasho-mura to the IAEA laboratories at Seibersdorf. 
8.7.2 Basis of Criticism 
The basis of criticism can be summarized as follows [2,3]: 
– INFCIR-153 requires all reactor-grade plutonium with a Pu-238 isotopic content "80% to 
be treated exactly like weapon-grade plutonium. 
– The significant quantity of plutonium is 8 kg (Table 8.1.1). The time span for timely 
detection by IAEA inspectors is one month (Table 8.1.2). The detection time is the time 
span between diversion and detection by IAEA. Critics [1,2] assume a period shorter than 
a month, i.e. 7-10 days. The probability of detection recommended by IAEA-SAGSI is 
assumed to be 90-95% with a false-alarm rate of 5%. 
– Exact compliance with these criteria also constitutes the basis of the U.S. Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. In the opinion of critics, failure to observe the above 
criteria would not constitute a basis of effective safeguards control and, consequently, 
imply a high proliferation risk. 
– At the first stage, “Materials Accountancy,” of the IAEA safeguards concept it must be 
taken into account that measurement errors may occur in material balance accountancy of 
the nuclear materials in place (Section 8.1.1). As long as the measurement errors of the 
quantities of materials to be accounted for are relatively small compared to the significant 
quantity, SQ = 8 kg of plutonium, any diversion of nuclear materials can clearly be 
detected. However, there will be a problem when the errors in measurement of larger 
quantities of material greatly exceed a significant quantity, SQ, or even assume a multiple 
of an SQ. In that case, it will no longer be possible to distinguish clearly between a 
potential diversion of nuclear material and the measurement error produced within the 
established probabilities of 95% for detection or 5% for false alarm [1]. This is the case, 
for instance, when the overall measurement error is roughly 1%, and the quantity of 
plutonium to be accounted for over one year is approximately 7.2 tons contained in 800 
tons of spent UOX fuel (0.9% plutonium in spent UOX fuel). This is in line with the 
design data of the Japanese large-scale reprocessing plant of Rokkasho. 
The Rokkasho plant annually, i.e. in 200 days of operation, processes 800 tons of spent 
UOX fuel elements with a mean concentration of 0.9% plutonium. This is 7.2 tons of 
reactor-grade plutonium per year. The measurement error in overall accountancy 
corresponds to 1%, i.e., the absolute value of the error in material unaccounted for, , 
(MUF) is 72 kg of plutonium or nine significant quantities, SQ. The 95% probability of 
detection and the 5% probability of false alarm correspond to 3  (MUF) = 246 kg of 
reactor-grade plutonium or more than 30 significant quantities. 
One obvious solution to the problem would be to reduce the period of one year to, e.g., 
one month or one week. However, this is not possible in practice as the plant must be 
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subjected to a complete washout for every material balance accountancy operation. Only 
one or two inventory balance accountancy procedures in a year make practical sense. 
As a way out of this dilemma, the method of Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA) and 
increased Containment/Surveillance (C/S) was developed. 
8.7.3 Material Accountancy, Near Real Time Accountancy and Containment and 
Surveillance 
NRTA means more frequent material balance accountancy without plant shutdown or 
washout. Continuous measurements by the process instrumentation are used for this purpose 
(Section 8.1.4.1). Both are available to the IAEA inspectors at any time. 
At 200 days of full-load operation, the daily throughput of the Rokkasho 800 t/a 
reprocessing plant is 4 t/d of spent UOX fuel. At 0.9% plutonium concentration this leads to a 
plutonium throughput of 252 kg per week. The maximum measurement accuracy of 1%, for 
95% probability of detection and 5% false alarm rate, results in a minimum diversion 
quantity of 3  (MUF) = 7.6 kg. This greatly reduces the risk of abrupt diversion. However, 
critics doubt [1,2] that the risk of protracted diversion can be diminished. This assertion is 
supported by an analysis by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment [3], among other 
references, which states that IAEA first would have to substantiate its hopes in the NRTA 
method. 
Employing more powerful containment/surveillance (C/S) methods as exemplified by 
seals, cameras etc. (Section 8.1.6) is considered by critics [1] as an important additional 
measure offsetting the deficits of the NRTA method referred to above. However, the absence 
of a logical way of combining the C/S method and the NRTA method into one quantifiable 
concept is criticized. Still, this is not a valid argument in itself. 
IAEA together with the Japanese operator of the Rokkasho plant took into account all 
arguments put forward by the critics as outlined in the concept described in Section 8.4. This 
also applies to the MOX fuel refabrication plant built in Rokkasho-mura. Future operation of 
the reprocessing and refabrication plants will have to demonstrate the effectiveness of this 
three-stage combined safeguards concept of IAEA. 
In addition, critics express concern that any NNWS acceding to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and running a reprocessing plant under IAEA safeguards may opt out of this NPT. It 
would then be able to use the available plutonium for building nuclear weapons right away. 
Given the continued existence of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the non-
proliferation policy accompanying it in the United States, there is a lot of mistrust of any 
reprocessing or MOX fuel refabrication activity in NNWSs. 
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8.8 Countercriticism and potential solution by proliferation-proof civil nuclear fuel 
cycles 
The chief cause of existing mistrust is adherence to the ultraconservative provisions in 
INFCE-153 with the requirement that any kind of reactor-grade plutonium, except for 
plutonium with a Pu-238 isotopic content of 80%, be treated like weapon-grade plutonium. 
This requirement, that any reactor-grade plutonium be treated like weapon-grade plutonium, 
is not supported by scientific technical findings published in the open literature (Sections 9-
13). 
INFCE-153 dates from 1971. At that time, plutonium existed only in spent fuel elements 
from CANDU and gas-graphite reactors with <7 GWd/t burnup. That plutonium was far 
closer to the definitions of weapon-grade plutonium than today’s reactor-grade plutonium in 
spent fuel elements with a burnup of 50-60 GWd/t from LWRs. These decisive differences 
are discussed in detail in Sections 9-10. 
The difficulties of the NRTA concept emphasized by the critics are due very much also to 
this equating of reactor-grade plutonium with weapon-grade plutonium. 
The differences between reactor-grade plutonium and weapon-grade plutonium are 
elaborated in Sections 9 and 10 below. A proposal is made to modify reactor-grade 
plutonium by changing the fuel in such a way that the concentration of the Pu-238 isotope is 
raised to roughly 5-6% or more. In this way, this is changed into denatured or proliferation-
proof plutonium which cannot be used any more for making nuclear explosive devices 
(NEDs). Unlike some definitions in the literature and by IAEA, proliferation resistance as 
used in this publication does not mean an impediment to building nuclear weapons, but 
indicates that raising the Pu-238 isotopic concentration to more than, e.g., 5-6% makes NEDs 
technically unfeasible. The heat produced by such reactor-grade plutonium would cause the 
ambient chemical explosives to melt or initiate a chemical self-detonation of the explosive. 
This is not meant to cast any doubt on the current IAEA safeguards system but remove the 
mistrust against reprocessing and plutonium recycling, and reduce it to a scientific basis. 
Sections 9 and 10 show that this proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium can no 
longer be used for making nuclear weapons. Consequently, the risk anticipated to arise 
from the measurement error of 1%, which cannot be underrun in large-scale 
reprocessing and refabrication plants, is no longer relevant. There is no reason to fear 
either abrupt or protracted diversion. Opting out of the NPT and subsequently making 
use of the proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium to build nuclear weapons would 
make no sense. The reactor-grade plutonium then in possession of the government 
could not be used to make nuclear weapons. 
A specific attempt to produce weapon-grade plutonium by shutting the nuclear reactor 
down and unloading it at an early point in time (after some weeks) and reprocessing such 
low-irradiated LEU UOX fuel elements or special U-238 elements can only be detected by 
IAEA safeguards, e.g. anti-neutrino detectors combined with data transmission to the IAEA 
headquarters. If, however, the reactor is fueled with MOX fuel from proliferation-proof 
reactor-grade plutonium, this too cannot be used any more for nuclear weapons at any point 
in time. 
If an NNWS does not accede to the NPT and builds and runs on its own all nuclear plants 
required for making weapon-grade plutonium, it can be prevented from doing so only by 
diplomatic measures or other deterrents. 
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8.9 Proliferation-resistant or proliferation-proof? 
It is known from pre-ignition theory [1] that the spontaneous fission neutron source produced 
by the even plutonium isotopes Pu-238, Pu-240 and Pu-242 decreases the attainable nuclear 
explosive yield of plutonium based nuclear explosive device (NEDs) (Section 9). Such NEDs 
become less attractive for military purposes. Therefore, a certain proliferation resistance is 
attributed to such plutonium isotopic compositions having higher contents of Pu-238, Pu-240 
and Pu-242. 
Plutonium resistance can also be attained by other means, e.g. 
– denaturing of U-235 or U-233 by suitably large contents of U-238 increases the critical 
mass of such uranium isotopic compositions, e.g. to 800 kg for 20% U-235 in U-238 
which would make such NEDS technically unfeasible. Therefore, enrichments of <20% 
U-235 in U-238 or <12% U-233 in U-238 are considered non-useable for NEDs [2,3]. 
– high spontaneous fission neutron radiation and gamma radiation does impede the 
fabrication process of NEDs 
– plutonium with an isotopic content of >80% Pu-238 is considered non-useable for NEDs 
by IAEA (Section 8.1.1). 
– reactor-grade plutonium from spent LWR fuel with a burnup of 60 GWd/t has such a high 
spontaneous fission neutron rate that pre-ignition would allow only so-called minimum 
nuclear explosive fizzle yields. In addition the relatively high alpha decay heat power 
would lead to intolerable temperatures in the implosion lenses of the NED (Section 9 and 
10). 
Theoretical concepts have been developed to define the degree of proliferation resistance. 
Attractiveness levels and safeguards categories were defined [3] and the multi-attribute utility 
analysis approach was proposed [4]. The figure of merit concept (FOM) in combination with 
different safgeguards categories was applied [3,5,6]. 
However, the results of such approaches are pre-determined by the definition of the 
attractiveness level or the definition of a figure of merit (FOM). Two examples shall explain 
the problem: 
– the definition of the figure of merit is based on the formula [5,6] 
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M is the bare critical mass of the fissile metal product in kg 
h is the heat content in W/kg 
D is the dose rate of a fissile material sphere evaluated at 1 m from the surface 
in rad/(hkg) 
– This formula contains – among the two other criteria for critical mass and the radiation 
limit – a term for a heat power criterion which is based on the requirement that only 
plutonium with more than 80% Pu-238 isotopic content produces enough alpha-particle 
decay heat that it is non-useable for NEDs. The number 4500 is obviously based on a 
critical mass of 9.86 kg plutonium with 80% Pu-238 and an alpha-particle heat production 
of 570 W/kg Pu-238, i.e. 9.86x0.8x570 = 4500. 
The thermal analysis in Section 10 will show, however, that a near-critical metallic sphere 
of plutonium is already fully molten with only about 20-25% Pu-238 content. If this 
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sphere of plutonium metal is surrounded by a reflector and by the implosion lenses the 
high explosives in the implosion lenses will melt or start chemical self-explosion already 
at a much lower Pu-238 content of about 5-7%. This means that the criterion of 80% Pu-
238 in plutonium is unreasonably high. 
– the definition of attractiveness factors based on the spontaneous fission neutron source 
only deals exclusively with the pre-ignition problem and neglects the alpha-particle heat 
production of the isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-240. Pellaud [7] proposed a criterion of 30% Pu-
240 in the plutonium for sufficient proliferation resistance. As will be shown in Section 9 
such a criterion would still lead to nuclear exposure yields around 0.5 kt TNT. The alpha-
particle heat power in such a NED is so low that such NEDs would be technically feasible 
and the proliferation resistance is low. 
Therefore, the above theoretical approaches are not applied in the following Sections 9 to 14. 
Only the theoretical methods of reactor physics and thermal analyses as well as material 
characteristics such as melting points or temperatures for chemical self-ignition are applied to 
a detailed analysis of so-called hypothetical nuclear explosive devices (HNEDs). This allows 
limits for the Pu-238 isotopic content of reactor-grade plutonium to be determined above 
which reactor grade-plutonium becomes non-useable for NEDs. Such plutonium is 
considered proliferation-proof in the following Sections 9 to 14. 
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9. Reactor-grade plutonium as a proliferation problem 
9.1 Introduction 
As outlined already in Section 1 reactor-grade plutonium presently is considered the main 
proliferation problem. 
After the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program [1], the USA decided around 1980-
1982 to give up chemical reprocessing of spent LWR fuel and refabrication of 
plutonium/uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel as well as the use of MOX fuel in nuclear 
reactors. It had become apparent by then that the amount of civil plutonium produced in 
LWRs in the USA and elsewhere had exceeded the amount of military weapons plutonium in 
the NWSs (Sections 1.3 and 1.4). At the same time, leading US scientific organisations and 
US authors, e.g. the National Academy of Sciences [2], the American Nuclear Society [4], 
and Garwin [3] stated that reactor-grade plutonium could be used for nuclear weapons. These 
statements were repeated frequently. They are summarized in Fig. 9.1: 
Fig. 9.1.   Statement regarding the misuse of reactor-grade plutonium [2,3,4]. 
 
Also the fast reactor (FR) programs were given up in several countries in the following 
decade. Declared US national nuclear waste policy was the direct disposal of spent fuel. 
Germany, among other nations adopted the same waste management policy for its nuclear 
fuel cycle in 2005. Other countries, such as France or Japan, did not follow this line. 
More recent discussions in the USA envisage retrievability of conditioned spent fuel from 
geological disposal sites to provide for a later turnaround of the fuel cycle policy of US-DOE 
[5]. Also, new research programs including recycling strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle (use 
of reprocessing and fuel refabrication) were initiated [5,6]. 
A number of publications, e.g. by DeVolpi [8,27], Pellaud [9], and DeVolpi et al. [10] 
either expressed doubts about the validity of the statement quoted above in Fig. 9.1 or 
complained that it was not scientifically sound, let alone justified [11]. 
Therefore, Kessler et al. [12], attempted to find a scientific basis for these statements and 
the issues it entailed. They analyzed the potential nuclear explosive energy and the 
thermodynamic characteristics of so-called hypothetical nuclear explosive devices (HNEDs) 
based on reactor-grade plutonium. There was found to be a limit for reactor-grade plutonium 
containing a certain percentage of Pu-238 at which such devices would become technically 
unfeasible [13]. The reason is that the heat produced by Pu-238 would cause the chemical 
high explosives around the fissile material either to melt or to ignite spontaneously in a 
chemical reaction. Denatured reactor-grade plutonium of this type could be produced in 
various fuel cycle options investigated [14]. They require closed fuel cycles with 
reprocessing and refabrication of the fuel. All plutonium can be burnt except for unavoidable 
Unfortunately, plutonium of the quality produced in current nuclear 
power reactors, following separation from spent fuel and purification, 
can be used to make nuclear explosives, using technology 
comparable to that of the earliest plutonium weapons. While weapons 
made from this plutonium would have much less reliable and 
considerably lower explosive yields than similar weapons made from 
weapon-grade plutonium, they remain nevertheless highly dangerous 
nuclear explosives. 
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losses in chemical reprocessing and refabrication, which must be disposed of together with 
the fission products [15]. These new fuel cycle strategies would allow a proliferation-proof 
denatured reactor-grade plutonium fuel cycle [14]. 
Even the minor actinides could be incinerated provided the necessary chemical separation 
processes were applied on a technical scale [16,17,18]. The minor actinides could also be 
taken care of by recycling in different reactors, e.g., LWRs, fast-spectrum reactors (FRs), or 
accelerator driven systems (ADSs) [15]. However, this raises also questions of possible 
misuse of neptunium and americium [23,24,25]. The main findings of the analyses will be 
outlined below in the following Sections. 
9.2 Nuclear characteristic data of plutonium which are important for the assessment 
of the plutonium proliferation problem 
For nuclear explosive devices (NEDs) the metallic form of the fissile materials, e.g. 
plutonium or uranium with its highest density is used. This leads to a neutron spectrum with 
an average neutron energy of about 1 MeV. In this energy range (Fig. 9.2) all plutonium 
isotopes (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242) have relatively high microscopic fission 
cross sections [19]. Also Am-241 has a relatively high microscopic fission cross section. 
The spontaneous fission neutron rates of the plutonium isotopes Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, 
Pu-241 and Pu-242 were already given in Tab. 8.1.5 (Section 8.1.5.3). These spontaneous 
fission neutrons are extremely important for the so-called pre-ignition problem of plutonium 
based NEDs and for the achievable nuclear explosive yield, as will be explained in Sections 
11 and 12. 
The spontaneous fission neutron rates for the different plutonium isotopes are collected in 
Table 9.1. The critical masses for keff = 1 can be calculated by the numerical solution of the 
Boltzmann neutron transport equation applying the respective group cross section sets 
(Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The critical masses are listed in Table 9.1 [19]. 
The heat produced by -decay of the different plutonium isotopes Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-
240, Pu-241 and Pu-242 is also listed in Table 9.1. This alpha-particle heat produced in 
reactor plutonium can make so-called HNEDs technically unfeasible (Section 10). Pu-238 is 
a strong -emitter with a half-life of 87.7 a. It produces 570 W/kg alpha-particle heat power. 
A reflector of natural uranium or beryllium etc. decreases these critical masses even 
somewhat further. For weapons plutonium with a high Pu-239 isotopic content (94%) the 
critical mass (with reflector) is in the range of 7.2 to 7.5 kg, whereas for reactor-grade 
plutonium the critical masses (with reflector) are in the range of 10 to 13 kg (Section 9.3). 
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 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
-heat power [W/kg] 570 1.9 6.8 3.3 0.15 
spontaneous fission 
neutron source [n/g s] 
2600 0.02 910 0.05 1700 
Bare critical mass [kg] 
(Plutonium metal) 
8.2 10.0 33.6 12.4 70.2 
Table 9.1.  Characteristic data of different Pu-isotopes [8,19]. 
Incident neutron energy 
[MeV] 
 
Fig. 9.2. Fission neutron cross sections of the principal plutonium and uranium 
isotopes (and americium-241, decay product of Pu-241) as a function of 
neutron kinetic energy [19]. 
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The relatively low critical mass of the different plutonium isotopes (Table 9.1) is often the 
basis of conclusions that a NEDs – albeit perhaps of unpredictable yield because of the high 
spontaneous fission neutron source – could be designed using any isotopic composition of 
plutonium. However, this conclusion neglects the very important fact that a Pu-238 content 
of several percent makes such NEDs or better HNEDs technically unfeasible (Section 10). 
9.3     Isotopic compositions of weapons plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium. 
Table 9.2 shows the isotopic composition and characteristic data, e.g. critical mass, -particle 
heat power and spontaneous fission neutron source of super-grade weapons plutonium and of 
weapons plutonium (as defined by US-DOE and US-NRC). In addition, it presents the 
characteristic data for plutonium which can be generated after very short irradiation time 
(1.250 MWd(th), e.g. in a heavy water moderated CANDU reactor. In AGRs or LWRs the 
plutonium isotopic composition would be similar for such short irradiation times of about 2 
months [21]. Super-grade weapons plutonium can only be generated within even shorter 
irradiation times. While the LWRs would have to be shut down each time for unloading of 
such short irradiated fuel elements, the CANDUs and AGRs with continuous fuel element 
loading and unloading capabilities would be better suited for such operations. 
Table 9.2 shows also an assumed isotopic composition of the US-test of 1962 reported by 
the US-DOE in 1977 and confirmed in 1994 [7] with plutonium originating from AGR spent 
fuel of the UK. The assumed isotopic content of 12% Pu-240 was estimated by Pellaud [9] 
and discussed by Carlson et al. [20]. 
Table 9.3 presents the plutonium isotopic compositions and characteristic data, e.g. critical 
mass, alpha-particle heat power and spontaneous fission neutron source for AGR and 
CANDU spent fuel after 5000 MWd/te and 7.500 MWd/te burnup. These reactors allow only 
low burn-up, since they are fueled with either natural uranium or only 1.5% U-235 
enrichment of their fuel. Isotopic compositions of plutonium from MAGNOX and CANDU 
spent fuel are very similar. 
Table 9.3 shows these characteristic data also for plutonium produced in the blankets of 
FBRs. This FBR blanket plutonium is very similar to the weapons plutonium category shown 
in Table 9.2. 
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Table 9.4 shows the plutonium isotopic composition of LWR spent fuel as a function of 
burnup. The average burnup of LWR spent fuel was about 33,000 MWd/te around 1990. This 
burnup was increased for commercial reasons up to about 55,000 MWd/te until 2010. The 
future objective for LWR fuel is a burnup of 60,000-70,000 MWd/te for LWRs. 
Table 9.4 shows that the Pu-238 content increases steadily with burnup to about 5% for a 
burnup of 72 GWd/t. Due to the relatively short half time for -decay of 87.7 a for Pu-238 
this isotopic concentration decreases slightly (about 7% of its initial value) during 10 a after 
unloading of the spent LWR fuel from the reactor core. The even shorter half time for -decay 
of Pu-241 of T1/2 = 14.35 a leads to a decrease of about 64% of the concentration for Pu-241 
after 10 y from unloading the LWR spent fuel elements from the reactor core. This decrease 
of the concentration of Pu-241 leads to buildup of Am-241. This would require frequent 
chemical separation of the americium from the reactor-grade plutonium. 
 
Type Spent fuel 
burnup 
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 Subcritical 
mass [kg] 
keff = 0.98 
alpha-
particle 
power 
heat [W] 
Spont. 
neutron 
source [n/s] 
C-1 30 GWd/t 0.016 0.565 0.238 0.128 0.054 9.24 112 2.92106 
C-2 50 GWd/t 0.029 0.533 0.233 0.139 0.066 9.84 187 4.15106 
C-3 60 GWd/t 0.038 0.518 0.231 0.142 0.072 9.85 243 4.24106 
C-4 72 GWd/t 0.050 0.502 0.226 0.145 0.078 9.88 311 4.61106 
The alpha-particle decay heat of 112 (W) for C1 is corrected against the value of 144 W in [13] because the 
alpha-particle heat of Pu-242 was to high. 
Table 9.4. Isotopic composition (weight fractions) as well as subcritical mass (reflector of 
5 cm uranium), -decay heat power and spontaneous fission neutron source of 
plutonium separated from LWR spent fuel versus its burn-up and for a decay time 
of 1 year (Chebeskov [21]). 
 
Table 9.5 presents another plutonium isotopic composition evolving after three times 
recycling of the plutonium in MOX fueled LWRs [22]. This plutonium isotopic composition 
was also used for the calculation of the potential explosive yield calculations [12] which will 
be discussed in Section 9.12. This plutonium (called D-1 in Table 9.5) is considered 
proliferation-proof [13,23]. 
 
Type Pu(1) Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 Subcritical 
mass [kg] 
keff = 0.98 
alpha-
particle 
heat 
power [W] 
Spontaneous 
fission neutron 
source [n/s] 
D-1 multi-
recycling 
in MOX-
LWR 
0.055 0.341 0.311 0.106 0.187 12.91 445 9.6106 
Table 9.5. Isotopic composition (weight fraction) as well as subcritical mass (reflector 5 cm 
uranium), -decay heat power and spontaneous fission neutron source for 
plutonium composition Pu(1) from [13,22]. 
 
In Table 9.6a and 9.6b additional reactor-grade-plutonium isotopic compositions and 
characteristic data are given, e.g. critical mass, -particle heat power and spontaneous fission 
neutron source. They are all considered proliferation-proof as shown in [13,23,25]. This will 
be explained and discussed in Section 10. These plutonium isotopic compositions belong to 
future fuel cycle options which are specifically proposed in Section 12.4 to generate 
proliferation-proof reactor-grade-plutonium [14,23,25]. 
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U  wt % 
 
Plutonium  wt % 
 
Fuel 
type 
 
pitch/ 
diameter 
P/D 
 
Fuel composition 
 
Th 
wt % 
Total Fissile 
Fraction 
Total Fissile 
Fraction 
 
MA 
wt % 
E-1 1.44 Re-enriched 
recycled U (RRU) 
0 100 5.52 0 0 0 
E-2 1.34 RRU U + Pu 0 93.9 5.00 6.1 64.5 0 
E-3 1.41 RRU U + Pu + MA 0 92.5 5.00 6.5 64.5 1.0 
E-4 1.59 Enriched U + Th + 
Pu+MA 
52.6 35.1 6.00 10.7 64.5 1.6 
RRU (Re-enriched reprocessing uranium), MA (minor actinides) 
Table 9.6a. Different initial fuel compositions of PWR cores for the generation of denatured 
proliferation resistant plutonium [14]. 
 
Plutonium composition [%] Fuel 
type 
Burnup 
[GWd/t] 
Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Subcritical 
mass [kg] 
(keff = 0.98) 
Alpha- 
particle heat 
power 
[kW] 
Spont. 
neutron 
source 
[n/s] 
E-1 50 0.095 0.505 0.217 0.132 0.051 9.48 0.536 5.04106 
 58 0.114 0.461 0.225 0.134 0.066 9.78 0.659 6.0106 
E-2 58 0.058 0.41 0.263 0.178 0.091 10.61 0.380 5.78106 
 66 0.068 0.398 0.258 0.18 0.096 10.64 0.441 6.11106 
E-3 49 0.096 0.393 0.272 0.157 0.082 10.58 0.611 6.73106 
 58 0.107 0.374 0.268 0.161 0.090 10.67 0.684 7.2106 
E-4 49 0.089 0.337 0.329 0.150 0.095 10.49 0.567 7.24106 
 58 0.10 0.306 0.333 0.158 0.103 10.59 0.640 7.82106 
 
Table 9.6b. Isotopic composition (weight fraction), spherical masses (reflector: uranium), -
decay heat power and spontaneous fission neutron source of proliferation-proof 
plutonium from different fuel types (Table 9.6a) as a function of burnup in 
[14,23]. 
 
Tables 9.2 to 9.6.b show the wide variety of plutonium isotopic compositions generated by 
the application of civil nuclear energy. They have similar critical keff = 1 or subcritical (keff = 
0.98) masses between 7 and 13 kg. However, the -particle heat power varies between 14 (W) 
and 680 (W) for a subcritical (keff = 0.98) NED or HNED. The spontaneous fission neutron 
sources of such NEDs or HNEDs vary between about 2x105 n/s and 7.8x106 n/s. 
The IAEA takes a very conservative approach and considers any kind of plutonium 
composition capable of being used for nuclear weapons (only exemption is plutonium with 
≥80% Pu-238). The IAEA does define 8 kg plutonium as quantity of safeguards significance 
(Table 8.1.1, Section 8.1.1) and does not distinguish between weapons-grade plutonium and 
reactor-grade plutonium. This has lead to critical discussions [8,9,10,11,23,27]. It will be seen 
in Section 9.12 and 10 that the critique is justified. 
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Distinction should be made between: 
– weapons type plutonium (Table 9.2 cases A-1 to A-3 and Table 9.3 case B-3) 
– reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel with low burnup (cases B-1 and B-2 in Table 9.3) 
– present LWR reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel with a burnup 30,000 to 60,000 
MWd/t (cases C-1, C-2 and C-3 in Table 9.4) 
– proliferation-proof plutonium with a Pu-238 isotopic content of more than 5 to 6% (case 
C-4 in Table 9.4, case D-1 in Table 9.5, cases E-1, E-2, E-3, and E-4 in Table 9.6b). 
9.4    The potential nuclear explosive yield of reactor-grade plutonium 
9.4.1     Introduction and scientific approach 
The scientific assessment of the question whether reactor-grade plutonium can be used for 
nuclear weapons must include the investigation and discussion of the following: 
– a neutronic evaluation of the super prompt critical explosion of a subcritical sphere of 
reactor-grade plutonium initiated by an implosion type compaction process (Section 9.10 
to 9.12) 
– a thermal analysis of the implosion type design of a hypothetical nuclear explosive device 
(HNED) in case of considerable alpha-particle heat power produced by the reactor-grade 
plutonium including realistic dimensions and material characteristics (thermal conduc-
tivity, melting points etc.) (Section 10). 
– an evaluation of the technical difficulties involved in constructing an implosion type 
nuclear explosive device with reactor-grade plutonium (Section 10.14.4). 
The statements given by US scientific organisations shown in Fig. 9.1 seem to deal only 
with the neutronic evaluation. The problems resulting from the thermal and technical analyses 
were obviously considered as a minor problem in this statement. While this is correct for 
weapons-grade plutonium, it is not correct for reactor-grade plutonium from LWR spent fuel 
with higher burnup or even for reactor-grade plutonium with a Pu-238 isotopic content of e.g. 
about 5 to 6%. This latter plutonium can be considered proliferation-proof. 
Section 9.3 presented four fuel cycle options (see Table 9.6a and 9.6b) which lead to 
sufficiently high Pu-238 percentages in the spent fuel. Fuel types E-1 contains RRU in the 
fresh fuel elements and would lead to denatured proliferation-proof plutonium with more than 
9% Pu-238 after a burnup of about 50,000 MWd/te. Fuel type E-2 contains plutonium 
separated from present spent LEU-UOX LWR fuel with a burnup of 50,000 MWd/te and 
additional RRU. It would lead to about 6% Pu-238 in the denatured proliferation-proof 
plutonium after a burnup of 60,000 MWd/te. Fuel type E-3 contains the plutonium and RRU 
as fuel type E-2 and in addition about 1% minor actinides. It would produce denatured 
proliferation-proof plutonium with about 11% Pu-238 after a burnup of 60,000 MWd/te. In 
fuel type E-4 some of the uranium in fuel type D-1 would be replaced by thorium. This again 
would lead to denatured proliferation-proof plutonium with 11% Pu-238 and about 3% U-233 
(denatured in U-238) after a burnup of 60,000 MWd/te. All these Pu-238 percentages would 
lead to high enough alpha-particle heat power between 0.38 and more than 0.68 kW in the 
HNEDs. All these high Pu-238 percentages could, of course, be adjusted to obtain lower 
percentages of Pu-238 by adapting the initial fuel compositions. 
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9.4.1.1     Future proliferation-proof fuel cycles 
In a future transition phase of nuclear energy all the existing present plutonium – after 
reprocessing – could be converted in into denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium within 
about five to six years of irradiation time in LWRs of NWSs. RRU could be enriched in 
already existing enrichment centers. Existing reprocessing centers could be extended by 
additional reprocessing centers preferably in NWSs. The conversion of present reactor-grade 
plutonium is only a question of reprocessing and refabrication capacity, since refabrication of 
the fuel and burnup of, e.g. the fuel type E-1, E-2, E-3 and E-4 and reprocessing of the spent 
fuel needs only about 12 a. 
Denatured proliferation-proof plutonium would need only similar safeguards measures by 
the IAEA as presently required for LEU-UOX LWR fuel or <12% U-233 denatured uranium. 
This denatured proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium could then be incinerated in a civil 
denatured proliferation-proof fuel cycle in NNWSs. 
Only for reactor-grade plutonium with an alpha-particle heat power below the above 
discussed limits and plutonium from fuel elements of research reactors or plutonium from 
defective fuel elements (which must be unloaded before reaching their maximum burnup) 
present IAEA safeguards measures for plutonium must remain. 
9.4.1.2     Minor actinides as a proliferation problem 
An additional proliferation problem arises for the minor actinides neptunium and americium. 
Reactor americium can be considered proliferation-proof as it appears in all fuel cycle 
strategies as a mixture of the three isotopes Am-241, Am-242m and Am-243. Also the isotope 
Am-241 which originates from the decay of Pu-241 can be considered as proliferation-proof. 
This was shown by Kessler [24] (Section 11). 
The minor actinide neptunium is nuclear weapons useable and cannot be denatured. 
Therefore, all proposals to keep the minor actinides together with the plutonium in fuel type 
like, e.g. fuel type E-3 or E-4 are not yet a solution for the proliferation problem. Neptunium 
can be separated chemically like reactor-grade plutonium. This should be done only during 
the transition phase preferably in reprocessing centers of NWSs. In the subsequent phase of a 
civil denatured proliferation-proof fuel cycle neptunium must be avoided. A proposal for a 
fuel strategy which avoids neptunium, while denatured proliferation-proof plutonium and 
americium can be incinerated is discussed in Section 13. The reprocessing centers in the civil 
denatured proliferation resistant fuel cycle could also be multilateral reprocessing centers as 
recommended by IAEA [26]. 
9.4.2     Earlier analysis of the potential nuclear explosive yield 
No detailed model for the analysis of the potential nuclear explosive yield of reactor-grade 
plutonium had been published until 2009. Only relatively simple parametric models were 
given by Seifritz [28], deVolpi [8], and by C. Mark [19]. 
In an new attempt to find a scientific basis for the statements quoted above and for issues 
raised, the theory and calculation procedures developed for reactor safety analysis of early 
plutonium metal-fueled fast reactors were used by Kessler et al. [12]. These calculation 
models from the early stages of reactor safety studies, the so-called reactor disassembly 
analysis (Bethe et al. [29], Jackson et al. [30], Smith et al. [31]), are very similar to the 
explosion analysis of an HNED, based on reactor-grade plutonium. 
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9.5     Design principle and geometrical dimensions of early NEDs 
One part of the statement of Fig. 9.1 claims that reactors 
".....can be used to make nuclear explosives, using technology 
comparable to that of the earliest nuclear weapons,.....". 
It is, therefore, important to understand the design principles of the earliest NEDs. It is 
known from Los Alamos Primer [32] or historical books, e.g. by R. Rhodes [33], about the 
development of an atomic bomb that the so-called implosion method must be applied. The 
reasons are the high spontaneous fission neutron rates of some of plutonium isotopes, e.g. 
Pu-240. Weapons-grade plutonium must consist essentially of the isotope Pu-239 and only a 
very small amount (one to several %) of the isotope Pu-240. As can be seen from Figs. 4.8a 
and 4.8b (Section 4) this is only possible for fuel of extremely low burnup. 
Information on the dimensions of a nuclear explosive device is very rare in the open 
scientific literature. According to R. Rhodes [33] the first nuclear fission bomb with weapons-
grade plutonium (Fat Man) functioned along the implosion method and had the following 
design shown in Fig. 9.3. 
 
 
Fig. 9.3.   Design of the first plutonium NED (Fat Man) [33] 
 
 in the center of the NED was the super-grade weapons plutonium sphere of 6.2 kg Pu-
metal (delta phase plutonium with a density of 15.8 g/cm3 and 0.8% gallium. The bare 
sphere consisted of 2 hemispheres (4.5 cm radius) with a small 2.5 cm hole in the center 
for the initiator (neutron source). The plutonium isotopic composition was 99.1% Pu-239 
and 0.9% Pu-240 [74]. 
 this Pu-sphere was surrounded by a 13.5 cm thick reflector or tamper of natural uranium 
metal (density 19.8 g/cm3) weighing 120 kg [74]. 
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 Around this reflector followed an aluminum layer of 11 cm thickness for dampening and 
smoothening the Rayleigh Taylor instabilities generated by small imperfections of the 
spherical shock waves. 
 the aluminum layer was surrounded by 32 explosive lenses (20 hexagonal and 
12 pentagonal). They had been molded and machined with high precision such that they 
fitted exactly together to a hollow sphere (Fig. 9.3). Each explosive lense had 2 electrical 
detonators. All detonators were fired simultaneously with a very small time jitter of about 
10-6 sec. 
 Around the explosive lenses was an aluminum shell, which was housed in an outer steel 
shell. 
– The initiator (neutron source) consisted of 92% Po210/Be and was inherent i.e. produced no 
neutrons up to the moment when the spherical shock wave from the chemical detonation of 
the implosion lenses destroyed the foils between the Po210 and the Be and mixed both 
materials together. This suddenly generated about 9.5٠107 n/s. This had to happen only 
when the Pu was compressed at its maximum i.e. the shock wave had reached the center. 
– All dimensions added up to an outer diameter of about 150 cm. Its total weight was 4.6 te. 
The nuclear explosive yield was 22 kt (TNT) [33,74]. 
The sophisticated art of the implosion method consists in the geometry of the implosion 
lenses and the choice of the explosives. "Fat Man" had 2 different explosives: Baratol with 
a "relatively slow" detonation velocity (5 km/s) and Composition B with a "relatively fast" 
detonation velocity (8 km/s). When the explosive system is fired by the electrical 
detonators at the outer surface the detonation waves spread out spherically around each 
initial detonation point (Fig. 9.3). The detonation waves will show interferences with each 
other, but not have the form to be able to compress the Unat-Pu-sphere. Therefore when the 
detonation wave reaches and penetrates into the slow explosive its propagation 
(detonation) velocity becomes smaller, whereas around it the detonation waves in the fast 
explosive overtake those in the slow explosive and assume a detonation front (convex to 
concave), which becomes more and more spherical with its center identical to the center of 
the plutonium-sphere. Oscillations (Raleigh-Taylor instabilities) whose amplitude would 
increase during propagation to the center are dampened and smoothened by the Al-hollow 
shell. 
The active chemical explosive lense system of "Fat Man" was 47 cm thick and weighed 
2.5 tonnes [74]. 
 
Hollow spherical shells of plutonium metal are more efficient for the implosion process 
than solid plutonium spheres (Seifritz [28] and Leuthäuser [34]). However, single hollow 
shells were not realized in the early phase of NED designs, because of fears that the 
hydrodynamic stability would not be sufficient. This stability problem was solved by putting a 
smaller solid Pu-sphere into a hollow Pu-sphere with some open space in between [28,35]. 
Therefore, part of the plutonium was arranged in the center levitated by wires (very thin but 
strong enough) and the remaining part was arranged as a hollow spherical shell. The 
implosion shock wave is accelerating the outer spherical shell parts and impacting then on the 
inner solid sphere. This is claimed to lead to higher compression and higher explosion yields 
[28,33,34]. It will be shown in Section 9.12 that these designs are not important for the 
analysis of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium and early pre-ignition. But they will be 
analyzed in the thermal analysis of HNEDs (Section 10). 
In the USA and in Russia [36] the gun type design was soon given up in favor of the 
implosion principle (hollow shell) also for U-235 as fissile material. Composite U-235 and 
Pu-designs (Pu as a solid inner sphere and U-235 as a hollow spherical shell) together with  
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newly developed external impulse neutron initiators lead to a decrease in dimensions and 
weight and increased the yield by a factor 1.5 to 1.7. Obviously many nuclear weapons of the 
weapons countries followed this composite design. 
9.6 Scientific basis for the discussion of the potential nuclear energy of reactor-grade 
plutonium 
In an effort to find a scientific basis for the statements quoted in Fig. 9.1 and the issues raised 
about the potential yield of reactor-grade plutonium based HNEDs, Kessler et al. [12] 
described a model for calculating the power burst initiated by a strong positive reactivity 
insertion. This will be caused by compression of a plutonium metal sphere surrounded by a 
natural-uranium metal reflector. A verification of the calculation procedures and materials 
characteristics data employed, especially the equation of state, is achieved by recalculation of 
the results of a nuclear explosion published in part by Sandmeier [37]. 
The theoretical models of plasma physics will have to be applied here, as in reactor safety 
analysis the equation of state data of the fissile materials are needed only for a temperature 
range less than 7000 K. After all, calculations of nuclear explosion yields indicate that 
temperatures of millions of K and pressures of 103-104 TPa are reached. The theoretical 
model chosen, the materials data and the equation of state data employed are seen to 
reproduce the published results of Sandmeier [37] sufficiently well. In the later Section 9.9 a 
confirmation of the so-called Serber relation is also shown [28,32]. 
On this basis, the differences are discussed between nuclear explosive devices (NEDs) and 
so-called HNEDs (hypothetical nuclear explosive devices) for which reactor-grade plutonium 
shall be used. 
Spherical critical arrangements with fast spectra based on uranium metal or plutonium 
metal, e.g. GODIVA or JEZEBEL, had been built and operated for studies of reactor physics 
and reactor kinetics (Paxton [38] and Wimett et al. [39]). Later, such safety analyses were also 
conducted for the early metal-fueled experimental fast reactors, like EBR-I and EFFBR 
(McCarthy [40] and Nicholson [41]). Originally, these tools had been developed for 
calculating spherical geometries. 
In such power burst experiments and safety analyses of spherical critical arrangements, the 
neutron density or power rises extremely fast after transition to the prompt critical regime. 
Unless the power rising exponentially is not turned around in due time by a sufficiently 
strong, inherent negative Doppler coefficient, the rapidly accumulating internal energy causes 
melting of the fuel, fuel vapor pressure buildup, and fast disintegration of the device under 
high internal pressures. 
The high internal pressures drive the whole NED or HNED apart in an explosion 
expanding rapidly. The theoretical treatment of this so-called disassembly mechanism in the 
spherical HNEDs to be investigated is identical to the approach applied to the early spherical 
fast spectrum criticals or experimental fast reactors (McCarthy [40] and Nicholson [41]). 
Although the calculation models of so-called unprotected reactivity accidents (no 
shutdown by absorber rods) in reactor safety and explosion yield of HNEDs are similar, many 
physics parameters differ greatly: 
 the high density of metal fuel and the absence of a coolant or moderator make for a very 
hard neutron spectrum with an average neutron kinetic energy around 1 MeV which is 
above the resonance energy range. This is responsible for the absence for a Doppler 
coefficient in HNEDs. 
 the neutron lifetime in HNEDs is at least one order of magnitude shorter than in FR cores. 
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 the extremely high reactivity ramps and the absence of a Doppler coefficient raise the 
power or power density many orders of magnitude above the levels in reactor cores. 
Internal energies accumulate so fast that the internal pressure rises to approx. 104 TPa and 
the HNED explodes, releasing large amounts of energy. 
All HNEDs investigated are spherical, containing a solid spherical or a hollow spherical 
metal core of reactor-grade plutonium (Fig. 9.4). From the very beginning of nuclear weapon 
development it had been obvious that – because of the strong internal source of spontaneous 
fission neutrons – only implosion in a spherical geometry would be successful if plutonium 
was used as a fissile material (Mark [19]). It will be shown in Section 12 that the reactor-
grade plutonium due to its higher spontaneous fission neutron rate always leads to very early 
pre-ignition of the nuclear power burst. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.4. Geometric arrangement for studies of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium. 
9.7 Equations describing the superprompt critical power excursion and explosion 
The compaction of reflector and the plutonium sphere by the spherical shock waves generated 
in high explosive lenses causes an increase in criticality keff(t). After start of the neutron chain 
reactions, the neutron density or the neutron flux increase exponentially. 
Under the assumption of spherical symmetry, the plutonium sphere and reflector can be 
divided into spherical shells described by materials characteristics, e.g. material density, 
nuclear cross sections, and distributions of neutron density, power, temperature etc. (Fig. 9.5). 
Only the superprompt critical regime has to be considered as the delayed neutron regime is 
passed extremely fast by strong positive reactivity insertions caused, e.g., by strong shock 
compression. Delayed neutrons do not play any role, decay times of the delayed neutron 
precursors being too long (Section 4.10). 
Neutron density or neutron flux and power start originally at very low levels determined 
either by a neutron source suddenly generating neutrons or by inherent spontaneous fission 
neutrons causing pre-ignition. 
fissile core
reflector-tamper
high explosive, 10 cm
aluminum casing, 1 cm
i xplosive lenses 
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Fig. 9.5.  Spherical shells of the HNED for the numerical analysis. 
 
Calculation starts from steady state. SN-neutron transport calculation [42,43,44] for the 
spherical HNED leads to the initial keff at t = 0 and to the radial neutron flux and radial power 
distribution. The nuclear cross-sections required for the SN-calculation are provided from an 
appropriate multigroup cross section set [45]. Initial SN-calculation furnishes the keff or the keff 
–1 = k for the uncompressed state of the plutonium core-reflector system. Additional Monte 
Carlo [46] or perturbation calculations [43,47] lead to the effective neutron life time, eff  [s]. 
The power density evolution as a function of space and time L(r,t) in the superprompt 
critical regime is determined by these equations: 
L(r,t) = L(t) · w(r,t)                                                     (9.1a) 
with 
t
0
α(t')dt'
L(t) = L(0)  e 
,
                                                   (9.1b) 
where 
eff
Δk(t)α(t) =  
(t)
,   (9.1c) 
α(t) is called "Rossi alpha",  
(t) describes the increase in k(t) caused by external compression of the HNED, as well as 
the decrease of k(t) due to density variations within the HNED and compression or 
expansion effects during the explosion, 
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L(r,t) power density as a function of space and time within the HNED, 
L(r,0) initial power density as a function of space at t = 0, 
w(r,t) is equivalent to the normalized fission rate as a function of space and time as 
determined by SN-calculations, 
w(r,0) is the normalized fission rate as a function of space as determined by the initial SN-
calculation at t = 0. 
As the power density, L(r,t), increases rapidly within very short times, no allowance needs 
to be made for heat transfer by conduction or radiation. 
The energy density, Q(r,t), is given by 
(r, t) = (r, t') dt ',
   t
0
Q  L                                                           (9.2) 
the fissile material temperature, by 
p
(r,t)θ(r,t) = 
ρ(r,t) c (θ)
Q                                                        (9.3) 
with 
 (r,t) materials density as a function of space and time, 
cp(
) specific heat as a function of temperature. 
 
The pressure, p(r,t), follows from the equation of state, generally written as 
/ 0p(r,t) = f θ(r,t),ρ(r,t)                                                    (9.4) 
The spatial gradients of pressure furnish the acceleration of each mass point during 
disassembly as obtained by applying the law of inertia [29,40,41]. When a unit mass of 
material is displaced from its initial location, r, to a position, r + u (r,t), with the displacement, 
u(r,t), then 
2
2
(r,t) 1 p(r,t) = -   
t ρ(r,t) r
! !

! !
u                                                    (9.5) 
Integration of acceleration over time leads to the velocity of each mass point. Integration of 
that velocity over time results in the displacement, u(r,t), of each mass point during 
disassembly. 
9.7.1     Numerical Solution of the Coupled System of Equations 
For numerical solution of the coupled system of Eqs. (9.1) through (9.5) the spherical HNED 
plutonium core and the natural-uranium reflector system are divided into a number of 
spherical shells (Fig. 9.6) with an inner radius, Rk, and outer radius, Rk+1. Each spherical shell 
is characterized by constant materials characteristics and constant values of these variables: 
mass, Mk; power density, Pk; internal energy density, Ek; temperature, 
k; neutron flux, k; 
density, k; pressure, pk in a moving Lagrangian coordinate system (Harlow et al. [48]). 
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Fig. 9.6.    Mesh for space and time. 
 
The time coordinate is subdivided into time increments, t (Fig. 9.6). For each time 
interval, t, Rossi alpha is considered constant while the total power or power density varies 
over t as 
exp(·t)                                                                   (9.6). 
The total power over the time interval, t, is distributed over all spherical shells according 
to the fission rate distribution, w(r,t), calculated previously. 
The density is determined from the original mass (conservation of mass) of each spherical 
shell and its new volume (calculated from the new boundaries) at time t. The new pressure is 
determined via the equation-of-state relation (Eq. (9.4)) from the energy, Q(r,t), (Eq. (9.2)) or 
temperature, 
(r,t), (Eq. (9.3)) and the new materials density, (r,t), at time t. The spatial 
pressure gradients are used to calculate the average acceleration (Eq. (9.5)) of the mass points 
and, hence, the new velocity at time t. Further integration over the velocities leads to the new 
radial positions of each spherical shell and its boundaries. The numerical solution is 
performed in the Lagrangian coordinate system [48]. The so-called viscous-pressure approach 
[49] is used for hydrodynamic calculations in the presence of a steep shock front. If 
temperatures, densities and displacements change during thermodynamic and hydrodynamic 
calculations so as to exceed certain numerical limits, a new SN-calculation is initiated to 
determine a new w(r,t) space function. Especially during the explosion process this SN-
calculation, because of the drastic expansion and the decrease of materials densities, leads to 
new, lower keff(t) values and, hence, to negative kexpl(t) or expl(t) values. These are added to 
the positive kcomp or comp values of the compression phase and lead to a new total tot(t), 
  tot (t) = comp(t) + expl(t). (9.7) 
In a first step, this consecutive numerical procedure leads to rapid quasi-exponential power 
rise and, once sufficiently high energy density has been reached, to a fast increase in 
temperatures, materials densities, pressures, and to acceleration at almost all mass points. As 
the explosion progresses, more and more negative values of expl are generated until tot(tp) 
becomes zero, at tp (peak power) 
 tot (tp) = comp(tp) + expl(tp) = 0 
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This mitigates the quasi-exponential increase in power until peak power is reached at αtot(t) 
= 0. 
Now the total power or power density, and also pressures, temperatures, and densities 
decrease rapidly while the whole HNED explodes. From a certain point of time on the release 
of nuclear energy as given by the total power integrated over time reaches an asymptotic 
value referred to as the explosion yield of the HNED. 
9.8   Recalculation of the Sandmeier Case [12] 
The only rather detailed analysis of a nuclear explosion ever published was part of a study of 
electromagnetic pulse analysis [37]. This recalculation of the "Sandmeier case" is an attempt 
to verify the theoretical concept of Section 9.7 and confirm the materials characteristics 
assumed, especially the equation of state used. An analytical model by Seifritz [51] was 
employed in the same way. 
As not all input data and intermediate results were published at the time [37], additional 
guesses and assumptions had to be made about the geometry and critical dimensions, initial 
power and materials data. It is assumed that the publication of Sandmeier [37] describes an 
implosion-type device based on weapons-grade plutonium. 
9.8.1     Dimensions for initial conditions 
An implosion-type device based on weapons-grade plutonium (Table 9.7) with keff = 0.98 
would have a radius of 4.806 [cm], if reflected by 5 [cm] of natural uranium metal. The keff = 
0.98 is chosen for two considerations: 
— safety reasons require a certain amount of subcriticality. 
— keff should not be too low, for shock compression should lead to sufficient supercriticality 
A keff = 0.98 was used by DeVolpi [8] and Kessler [12,13] for the same reasons. 
If the above spherical implosion device (4.806 cm radius and 5 cm thick reflector) would 
be compressed into a smaller solid sphere of twice the original density (compression ratio, cr 
= /o = 2, with o = uncompressed density,  compressed density) its radius would be 2.81 
cm and the density would increase from 15.8 g/cm3 to 31.69 g/cm3. The compression to cr = 2 
would lead to supercriticality of keff = 1.4685. 
 
Weapon-grade plutonium* [2,19] 
Pu-238 0.01 % 
Pu-239 93.80 % 
Pu-240 5.80 % 
Pu-241 0.13 % 
Pu-242 0.12 % 
Impurities 0.14 % 
       *neutron background 52x103 n/kg·s, heat generation 2.5x10-3 kW/kg 
 
Table 9.7.   Isotopic composition in % of weapon-grade plutonium [2,19]. 
    202
9.8.2     Neutron Lifetime, eff 
The lifetime of the weapons-grade plutonium sphere with a 5 cm Unat reflector is 1.18x10-8 s. 
This is similar to the 10-8 s assumed by Mark [19]. If compressed to cr =2 the lifetime would 
be about 20% smaller. 
9.8.3     Rossi alpha 
These supercriticality and lifetime results allow the Rossi alpha (Eq. (9.1c)) to be calculated. 
In the "Sandmeier case," [37] the published Rossi alpha is a constant value of  = 132x106 s-1 
up to the start of expansion (explosion) of the plutonium sphere. This means that a 
compression ratio much higher than the cr = 2 must have been employed. Mark [19] mentions 
kmax = 1 or keff,max = 2, which would correspond to a homogeneous compression ratio of 4 or 
5 (especially in regions around the center) of the weapon plutonium sphere with a uranium 
reflector (see Section 9.10.6). For example: with ℓeff = 0.8x10-8 s accounting roughly for a 
compression ratio cr = 4 to 5, and kmax = 1, this would lead approximately to α = 132x106 s-
1, as assumed by Sandmeier et al. [37]. 
9.8.4     Initial Power and Temperature at t = 0 
In the Sandmeier case [37], the chain reaction is started by a neutron source right after full 
compaction of the weapon plutonium sphere and reflector system. At a time t = 30.32x10-8 s, 
the number of neutrons is 2.35x1017. This is consistent with a neutron source of 108 n/s at t = 
0 or 1 neutron per 10-8 s, as reported also in Rhodes [33]. It is easy to recalculate the 
Sandmeier value of 2.35x1017 neutrons by starting with 1 neutron and applying  =  
1.32x106 s-1. 
However, the initial power at t = 0 is required to solve Eqs. (9.1) to (9.5). For this reason, 
inhomogeneous neutron transport calculations were necessary with a homogeneously 
distributed internal neutron source of 108 n/s. The results for the total fission power over the 
HNED at t = 0 is: 
L(0) = 6x10-3 [W] 
In addition, an initial temperature of, e.g. 
(0) = 300 K is chosen. The alpha heat power of 
18 W, for the whole weapon plutonium sphere only causes a negligible temperature rise in the 
device. The alpha-particle heat power of the Unat reflector is neglected. 
9.8.5       Materials Data and Equation of State 
9.8.5.1    Uranium Metal 
The density of uranium metal is 18,900 kg/m3, its thermal conductivity is 34 W/cm K. The 
specific heat of uranium metal is cp = 0.142 kJ/kg K, the melting point is 1405 K, and the 
boiling point is 4093 K, the heat of fusion is 160 kJ/kg, and the heat of vaporization is 
1752 kJ/kg [52]. 
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9.8.5.2    Plutonium 
Plutonium metal has five allotropic phases in its solid state (Table 9.8) [50,52]. 
 
Phase Temperature 
[K] 
Density 
[kg/m3] 
Specific heat 
cp [kJ/kg] 
 
 340 19,700 0.155 melting point: 913 [K] 
ß 463 17,700 0.148 boiling point: 3528 [K] 
 543 17,140 0.155 heat of vaporization: 1409 [kJ/kg]  
1 600 15,800 0.157  
2 773 16,500 0.147  
liquid 923 
933 
973 
 
16,600 
0.173 
0.175 
0.175 
 
Table 9.8.  Allotropic phases and specific heat of plutonium metal [50,52]. 
 
All publications in fast reactor safety research dealing with equation-of-state data of 
uranium and plutonium only cover the temperature range below 7000 K, which is a mere 
3472 K above the boiling point [53,54,55]. Nuclear explosion yield calculations, however, 
range up to temperatures of millions of K and pressures to the order of 103 to 104 TPa. These 
cases require the use of refined models of kinetic gas theory [56] comprising ionization, 
radiation and quantum theoretical models. Specific internal energies of 5x105 to 1015 J/kg at 
various particle densities are attained. The pressure1, p (10-1 TPa), and the specific internal 
energy1, E (108 J/kg), can then be described by this relation [28,34]: 
p = (-1) ·  · E                                                                (9.8) 
p = pressure in 10-1 TPa  = polytropic exponent, cp/cv 
 = density in 10-3 kg/m3 E = specific internal energy in 108 J/kg 
In this case, the specific internal energy, E, can be determined from 
dE = dQ – p · dv                                                               (9.9) 
where dQ is the increase in energy during the power excursion (see Eq. (9.2)), 
dE = increase in specific internal energy,  dv = differential change in 1/ = v. 
With these formulae no calculation of temperature but solely that of the change in specific 
internal energy, dE, is required. 
The polytropic exponent, , is determined from plasma physics [28,56]. Figure 9.7 shows 
the polytropic exponent, , for specific internal energies between 105 and 1015 J/kg and 
particle densities of 4.78x1028 particles/m3 down to 1023 particles/m3 for uranium [34,57]. 
For the purposes of this study, the polytropic exponents, , are identical for uranium and 
plutonium. 
For high specific internal energies above 1014 [J/kg] of the ionized gas (plasma) of uranium 
or plutonium the polytropic exponent reaches an asymptotic value of  = 4/3. 
 
                                                 
1 Footnote: The dimensions of specific internal energy, E  [108 J/kg], pressure [10-1 TPa], and density 
[10-3 kg/m3] correspond to Eq. (6) (Duderstadt et al., 1982 [56]). 
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Fig. 9.7.  = cp/cv as a function of the specific internal energy E (J/kg) and particle density 
per (m3) uranium [34,51]. 
 
For densities higher than o = 18,900 kg/m3 or particle densities higher than 4.78x1028 m-3 
and specific internal energies above 5.4x105 J/kg, the following formula (regression curve) is 
used [51]: 
0.1771
o
4 4.025 ρ                       γ     1 0.0876 1
3 E ρ
 & '
	     ( )
* + 
                                     (9.10) 
E in J/kg. 
The data for uranium and plutonium indicated above are employed in this procedure: 
― The specific internal energy at the boiling point of plutonium and uranium is roughly 
0.54x106 J/kg. 
― Up to the boiling point 
a specific heat: 0.142 kJ/kg K for uranium, 
a specific heat: 0.159 kJ/kg K for plutonium 
is used. 
For the pressure up to the boiling point 
 p =  ·  +  · 
 + 3 (9.11) 
with 
 = 0.0072  = 278.46 3 = -0.3946 for Pu-metal 
 = 0.00619  = 278.46 3 = -0.4055 for U-metal 
is used. Here the following dimensions are valid: 
p = pressure in 10-1 TPa  = density in 10-3 kg/m3 
 = temperature keV. 
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The relation for p was suggested by Stratton [58]. It results in positive pressures only when 
an outside pressure of, e.g. 0.1 TPa (pressure of the chemical high explosive acting on the 
outside surface of the uranium reflector) is exceeded. 
 Above the boiling point, Eqs. (9.8) through (9.10) and Fig. 9.7 are appplied as described 
above. 
9.8.6     Results of Recalculation of the "Sandmeier Example" [12] 
Figure 9.8 shows the relative radial fission rate or relative power density as a function of the 
radius for t = 0. Due to the lower enrichment (0.7% U-235) in the Unat reflector, the fission 
rate is at least one order of magnitude lower than in the weapon plutonium sphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.8. Sandmeier example, weapons-grade plutonium, relative fission rate as a function 
of radius at t = 0. 
In the first phase, the power rapidly increases from its initial level as an exponential 
function of time, as only the constant Rossi alpha of 132x106 s-1 and no negative expansion 
reactivity is acting. At 0.309x10-6 s the boiling point of plutonium metal is reached. From then 
on, the internal pressures increase. 
Figure 9.9 shows the Rossi alpha value as a function of time in 10-6 s and the expansion of 
the outer radius, R(t), of the weapon plutonium sphere. After 0.39x10-6 s, the weapons-grade 
plutonium sphere starts to expand more and more rapidly. This causes a negative feedback 
reactivity, or kexpl. 
The curves for R(t) and (t) can be considered proportional, which is one of the essential 
assumptions underlying the derivation of the Serber relation [32]. Initially, Rossi alpha (t) 
remains constant. The exponential power rise produces only sufficient nuclear energy in the 
time period up to approximately 0.39x10-6 s. At that time, the specific energy will be high 
enough for high internal pressures to be generated and the weapons-grade plutonium sphere to 
start expanding. This causes a decrease of (t) (Fig. 9.9). 
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Fig. 9.9.   Rossi  (t) and outer radius, R(t), of the Pu sphere as a function of time. 
 
Figure 9.10 shows the total power in the weapons-grade plutonium sphere and the Unat 
reflector as a function of time. When tot becomes zero, the power as a function of time 
reaches a maximum and then decreases rapidly. Only the time between 0.36x10-6 s and 
0.45x10-6 s is shown (Fig. 9.10) when major essential contributions to the explosion energy 
release occur. Figure 9.10 also shows the partial contributions to the release of explosion 
energy integrated over power and time for each time interval of 0.01x10-6 s. 
The values in kt of TNT equivalent are based on the  
energy equivalence of 4.187x1012 J  1 kt TNT [50]. 
The integral over the intervals between 0.36x10-6 s and 0.45x10-6 s adds up to 24.7 kt of 
TNT (equivalent). 
Figure 9.11 shows the nuclear energy released or the nuclear energy yield as a function of 
time in 10-6 s. 
Energy release: 1.036x109x105 J x 
1210 kt 
4.187 J
  
   
 = 24.7 kT TNT 
 
Recalculation of Sandmeier’s case in NS&E [29] for W-Pu
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Fig. 9.10. Power in W as a function of time. Only the time range between 0.36x10-6 s and 
0.45x10-6 s is shown, where essential released energy occurs, indicated in kt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.11.   Energy release as function of time 10-6 s. 
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9.8.6.1    Comparison with the Results Published by Sandmeier 
The increase in internal pressure up to the TPa range, begins at 0.386x10-6 s in Sandmeier's 
publication [37] and at 0.39x10-6 s in the above calculation. Peak power is reached at 
0.44x10-6 s versus 0.41x10-6 s and the total nuclear explosion energy or nuclear explosion 
yield is 24.2 kt of TNT (equivalent) [37] as against 24.7 kt of TNT (equivalent) [12]. 
These results allow the conclusion to be drawn that the theoretical model described in 
Section 9.7 and the materials data and the equations of state in Section 9.8.5 employed are 
able to describe a nuclear explosion sufficiently well. 
9.9    Verification of Serber's Relation, Δ

3
max
2
k 
eff
Y  
The so-called Serber relation [32], was used in earlier publications by Locke et al. [57], 
DeVolpi [8], Seifritz [28], and Mark [19]. According to this relation the energy yield of an 
exploding nuclear device is proportional to Δ 3maxk  (maximum reactivity introduced by 
spherical compression) and inversely proportional to 2eff  (effective neutron lifetime). This is 
based on the assumption of proportionality between Rossi alpha, (t), and the expanding 
outer radius of the plutonium sphere, R(t), in the expansion phase of the nuclear explosion 
(see Fig. 9.9). 
Serbers relation can be verified by performing several calculations for plutonium spheres 
compressed to different states. 
Calculations were run for three different compression states with three different values of 
Rossi alpha:  = 132x106 s-1 (which is equal to the  used in the "Sandmeier example" [37]), 
 = 76.2x106 s-1 and 34.6x106 s-1. 
As can be seen from Fig. 9.12, the Serber relation, 
 Δ α Δ
3
2max
max max2
k   =   
eff
Y k

 (9.12) 
is roughly met by the calculations according to the physics model (Section 9.7). Deviations in 
relative yield between the Serber relation and results of the above model calculations can be 
of the order of 30%. 
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Fig. 9.12. Comparison of Serber relation [32] and calculations by Kessler et al. [12] 
9.10     Calculation of explosion yields of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium 
A constant Rossi alpha of  = 132x106 s-1 was set for recalculation of the "Sandmeier 
example" [37]. No compression or reactivity calculations were necessary since this Rossi 
alpha value was assumed to be based on the shock wave already having reached the center 
and the weapons-grade plutonium metal sphere being fully compressed. 
Calculations of the explosion yields of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium require the 
density changes during the compression phase caused by the shock waves to be calculated and 
the reactivity increase, k(t), or the Rossi alpha, (t), from the onset of compression to be 
determined. This is necessary because pre-ignition (buildup of persistent fission chains) can 
start immediately after prompt criticality has been reached (see Section 9.11). Also, the shock 
wave will be stopped when the internal pressure caused by the rapid energy increase, at a 
certain point, r, within the reactor plutonium sphere, will exceed the pressure of the shock 
wave moving inward. 
9.10.1 Initial conditions for shock compression by outer chemical high-explosive lenses 
The geometric shape and the dimensions of chemical high-explosive lenses, and the choice of 
high explosives, in practice must be such as to produce an almost perfectly convex spherical 
shock wave impinging upon the outside surface of the Unat reflector [19]. Since a perfectly 
convex spherical shock wave must be assured for the calculation the resulting nuclear energy 
yield will constitute an upper bound of the nuclear energy yield attainable in practice. 
The geometry and the composition of spherical high-explosive lenses are classified. Any 
effort to model the spherical high-explosive lenses thus is impossible. 
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9.10.1.1     Shock compression in planar geometry 
Zeldovich et al. [59], Johansson et al. [60], Leuthäuser [34], and Seifritz [28] explained that 
the pressure of the shock wave on the outer surface of the reflector layer in a planar geometry 
can be determined by having the Hugoniot curve of the uranium layer (Unat reflector) intersect 
the pressure curve of the detonating chemical high explosive (Chapman-Jouguet point). The 
Hugoniot curve for uranium was determined by Johansson et al. [60]. These data were used to 
produce the characteristic results [34] for the shock wave (pressure p, velocity u, temperature 
T) on the outside of an idealized planar uranium reflector listed in Table 9.9. 
Comparing the detonation pressures and shock velocities for the three high explosives in 
Table 9.9 with data of other high explosives (Dobratz [61], Gibbs et al. [62], Mader et al. 
[63]) leads to the conclusion that the Chapman-Jouguet point data for a planar geometry are 
very similar for most other chemical high explosives. 
 
 Composition B RDX HMX 
p [TPa] 
u [m/s] 
T [K] 
0.052 
750 
540 
0.059 
830 
660 
0.068 
920 
770 
Table 9.9. Characteristic shock wave data at the Chapman-Jouguet point for various 
explosives [34]. 
9.10.1.2     Shock compression in a spherical geometry 
The physics of spherical shock waves is much more complicated than for planar geometry. 
The convergent flow in a spherical geometry leads to higher velocities and pressures as the 
shock wave travels outside in, i.e. towards smaller radii. Bushmann et al. [64] point out that 
maximum particle velocities of up to 8000 or 9000 m/s and pressures of a few 0.1 TPa can be 
achieved only in a spherical convergent flow. However, these pressures and high particle 
velocities can only be attained at very small locations close to the center of a spherical 
geometry. Experiments of this kind are very difficult technically because of the requirement 
of accurate initiation of the detonation over the outer surface and the need for advanced 
measurement techniques. Although the detonation (shock) velocity is around 8000 to 9000 
m/s for most explosives such propulsion velocities are practically unattainable by finite-size 
explosion charges. These high velocities cannot be achieved with thick impactors because the 
time for chemical interaction of the explosion products is too short [64]. 
9.10.1.3     Maximum velocities and pressures achieved 
Hypervelocity launchers allow particle velocities of up to 11 km/s and 15.8 km/s to be 
achieved (Kinslow [65] and Chabildas et al. [66] Table 9.10). However, such flyer plate 
experiments are not representative of the case described here, as they are only possible with 
small samples of less than 10-3 kg. 
The highest pressures ever recorded in measurements by Al'tschuler (planar geometry) of 
underground nuclear explosions were 3.4 TPa and a compression ratio of 3.4 (Al’tschuler et 
al. [67]). 
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Type of 
experiment 
highest velocity 
[km/s] 
impact weight 
[g] 
Two stage light 
gas gun 
15.8 
11.3 
4.7 
0.21 
0.44 
2500 
Electromagnetic 
gun 
6 
9.5 
0.024 
0.01 
Explosively driven 
guns 
8 
5.8 
7.4 
102 
High explosives 
and 
shaped charge accelerators 
16.5 
5 
0.08 
0.18 
Table 9.10. Summary of high velocity impact experiments [65,66]. 
9.10.1.4 Amplification of shock wave pressure in spherical chemical high-explosive 
lenses 
The chemical high-explosive lenses surrounding the fissile part of a HNED have two 
functions: 
– Turning the concave spherical shock wave at the ignition points on the outside surface into 
a convex concentric wave acting on the uranium reflector of the HNED (see Fig. 9.3) 
(Rhodes [33]). 
– To increase the pressure as a function of the decreasing radius (convergent flow). 
Shock wave similarity calculations for 25-40 cm thick spherical hollow shells of high 
explosive materials [12] revealed that the shock wave pressure of the spherically convergent 
flow can be magnified up to 0.11 TPa for 25 cm thick implosion lenses. Thicker than 25 cm 
spherical shells of high explosive material are not technically feasible if reactor-grade 
plutonium with more than 2.1% Pu-238 or with more than 0.120 kW of the particle-heat 
power of the HNED is used [12,23]. 
On the basis of these results two levels of technology were defined for the pressure acting 
on the outer surface of the reflector [12]: 
 low technology 0.06 – 0.08 TPa, 
 very high technology 0.08 – 0.11 TPa. 
9.10.2   Hydrodynamic shock compression 
The simplified Navier-Stokes equations for the conservation of mass, momentum, and energy 
must be solved for spherical geometry to describe hydrodynamic shock compression. As very 
high pressures and temperatures are involved, usually the simplified plasma hydrodynamic 
equations for the electrons and ions are solved. Deriving those differential equations in time 
and space is best described by Zel’dovich et al. [59] and Duderstadt et al. [56]. For numerical 
calculations, these hydrodynamic differential equations are solved in a Lagrange coordinate 
system [48,56]. 
Kessler et al. [12] used the similarity between the implosion of a solid or hollow spherical 
pellet after external exposure to laser beams or ion beams in inertial confinement fusion 
research [56] and the actual problem of imploding a solid or hollow Pu-sphere by shock 
waves initiated by chemical high-explosive lenses. The problem is adapted by setting an 
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outside boundary condition of a convex perfectly spherical shock pressure exerted on the 
outer reflector surface. 
9.10.3   Equation of state (EOS) data for compression of Pu and U metal 
Data published by Johansson et al. [60] and Benedict et al. [68] for the range up to 0.06 TPa 
were used by Kessler et al. [12]. Johansson et al. [60] also describe an experimental relation 
between the shock velocity, D, and the particle velocity, up, for uranium metal, 
D = co + S ·up, 
where D is the shock velocity [103 m/s], co and S are constants, up is the particle velocity 
[103 m/s]. 
Particle velocities and shock velocities will be shown in Section 9.10.4 below. 
The relation presented in Fig. 9.13 was derived (Baumung [69]) by applying the Hugoniot 
equations for the densities, pressures, and velocities on both sides of the shock front where the 
ratio, o/ (o – initial density,  – compressed density), is given as a function of pressure, p, 
in 0.1 TPa 
 co = 2.6x103 m/s S = 1.45 for U metal, 
 co = 2.51x103 m/s S = 1.3 for Pu metal. 
For the pressure range of >0.05 TPa, also data derived from Kirzhnits [70] and Höbel et al. 
[71] on the basis of KATACO calculations are shown in Fig. 9.13. They are applicable 
especially in the 0.1 TPa range. 
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . . .
 
Fig. 9.13.  Equation of state or compression data for plutonium and uranium metal. 
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9.10.4   Calculations of Hydrodynamic Shock Compression in HNEDs 
Results of shock compression calculations of HNEDs will be presented below. In these 
calculations, a concentric shock pressure of 0.11 TPa is assumed to act on the outside of the 
reflector. 
The plutonium sphere and the natural-uranium reflector system are divided into 40 
spherical shells (the plutonium sphere into 20 spherical shells, natural uranium reflector into 
20 spherical shells). As can be seen from Fig. 9.14, radial shock compression follows the 
familiar pattern of theoretical prediction (Duderstadt et al. [56]). The shock front travels from 
the outside radius to the center of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere roughly in 27x10-6 s 
(Fig. 9.14). It would then be reflected, and a relaxation wave would travel back through the 
system of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere and the reflector. The onset of bending of each 
line shows the arrival of the shock wave at the radii of the different shells. The slope of the 
lines after arrival of the shock wave represents particle velocity. 
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Fig. 9.14. Spherical shell radius as a function of time [10-6 s] in a solid plutonium sphere and 
a natural uranium reflector. 
Figure 9.15 presents the pressure in each of the 20 spherical shells of the uranium reflector 
and each of the 20 spherical shells of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere. Pressures in the 
uranium reflector slowly rise to some 0.15 TPa and then drastically surge to approximately 
0.4 TPa and more when the convergent shock wave approaches the center of the reactor-grade 
plutonium sphere. (Theoretical prediction would have a singularity at r = 0). 
Figure 9.15 shows density, , as a function of time for the different spherical shells as the 
shock front progresses from the outside boundary of the uranium reflector to the center of the 
plutonium sphere. The density, or compression ratio, is not constant over space and time. The 
uranium metal is compressed in the uranium reflector from 18,900 kg/m3 to some 
32,000 kg/m3 and becomes the higher the closer the shock wave approaches the center. 
Density increases twofold and threefold and more in the very small region around the center 
of the plutonium metal sphere. 
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Fig. 9.15. Pressures in each spherical shell as a function of time (10-6 s) in the solid 
plutonium sphere with a natural-uranium reflector. The outside pressure at the 
reflector boundary is a constant 0.11 TPa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.16. Density of each spherical shell as a function of time (10-6 s) in a solid plutonium 
sphere with a natural uranium reflector. The outside pressure at the reflector 
boundary is a constant 0.11 TPa. 
Figure 9.17 shows these particle velocities rising to a maximum of approximately  
5x103 m/s as the shock wave progresses to the center of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere. 
Pressure = 0.11 TPa
Pressure = 0.11 TPa
    215
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.17. Particle velocity, uP, of the different spherical shells at different times (10-6 s) in 
a solid plutonium sphere with a natural-uranium reflector. The outside pressure 
at the reflector boundary is a constant 0.11 TPa. 
 
Finally, Fig. 9.18 indicates materials temperatures (K) in the spherical shells evolving as a 
result of shock compression. In the plutonium sphere, temperatures increase to more than 
3000 K starting from a temperature of about 625 K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.18. Temperature (K) in the different spherical shells as a function of time (10-6 s) in a 
solid plutonium sphere with a natural-uranium reflector. The outside pressure at 
the reflector boundary is a constant 0.11 TPa. 
Pressure = 0.11 TPa 
Pressure = 0.11 TPa 
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9.10.5 Shock compression during implosion of a hollow spherical Pu shell with a Unat 
reflector 
Figure 9.19 shows the diagram of implosion of a hollow spherical plutonium shell with a 
natural uranium reflector, and with the same constant outside pressure of 0.11 TPa exerted by 
the high-explosive lenses on the outside of the reflector. Shock compression is faster than in 
the solid Pu sphere. Between 16x10-6 s and 20x10-6 s, the innermost shells start moving and 
flying to the center of the hollow sphere where they are compacted. 
More characteristics of HNEDs with hollow spherical fissile parts will be discussed in 
Section 9.12.7. 
Pressure = 0.11 TPa
Time [10-6 s]
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
Fig. 9.19. The boundaries of each spherical shell as a function of time 10-6 s in a hollow 
plutonium sphere and a natural-uranium reflector. The gradient of the shell 
boundaries as a function of time represents the particle velocity, uP. The outside 
pressure at the reflector boundary is a constant 0.11 TPa. 
9.10.6.   Effect of Spherical Compression on keff 
The MCNP 4C3 Monte Carlo Code with its incorporated ENDF/B-VI ZAA.600 set of cross 
sections (Section 4) was used to calculate the reactivity effects of an artificial homogeneous 
compression of the plutonium sphere plus uranium reflector system. Again the reactor-grade 
plutonium core and the Unat reflector system were divided each into 20 spherical shells, and 
the spherical shells were compressed successively (Fig. 9.5) from the outside progressing 
inward to the center. 
Figure 9.20 shows keff as a function of the compressed thickness or number of spherical 
shell (only every second result is shown) of the Unat reflector and the Pu-sphere starting from 
the outside radius of the reflector. Starting from keff = 0.98, shaped curves are obtained for the 
three compression ratios, cr = /o selected: 
cr =        1.2        1.5        2.0. 
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Figure 9.20 applies to plutonium with 8.7% Pu-238, 5.81 cm radius of the Pu-sphere, and a 
5 cm Unat reflector (referred to as Pu-(2) in Kessler [12] and Table 9.12). As the reflector 
consists of natural uranium, the increase in keff initially is very slight. Compression of the 
outer layers of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere contribute considerably more to the keff 
rise. Finally, as the center is being approached, increasingly smaller volumes and masses are 
compressed. Despite the effect of higher importance of these central volumes, the increase in 
keff becomes smaller and smaller. 
 
Fig: 9.20. keff as a function of the compression ratio and the number of compressed spherical 
shells (from outside). The natural-uranium reflector of 5 cm thickness and the 
reactor-grade plutonium sphere of 5.8 cm radius are subdivided into 20 radial 
shells each (only every second result shown, cr = compression ratio). 
 
At full compression of the natural uranium reflector and the plutonium sphere, these 
supercriticalities are obtained (Table 9.11): 
 
cr 1.2 1.5 2.0 
keff 1.095 1.24 1.45 
Table 9.11. Compression ratios cr and keff at full compression of the plutonium sphere plus 
Unat reflector system 
Criticality and prompt criticality are reached when the compression reaches around 4.3 cm 
from the outer surface of the uranium reflector for a compression ratio, cr = 1.2. For the 
higher compression ratios, cr = 1.5 or 2.0, the values are approximately about 3 cm or 
2.25 cm, respectively. Obviously, if the start had been at keff = 0.90 instead of 0.98, as 
discussed in Section 9.8.1 above, maximum supercriticality at full homogeneous compression 
5 cm 5.8 cm
prompt critical 1+ß
10 20 30 400
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
cr =2
cr =1.5
cr =1.2
keff as a function of compression 
Uranium reflector Plutonium core 
Number of compressed cells (counted from outside) 
k e
ff 
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would have been only keff = 1.013. This would result in an extremely low nuclear explosive 
energy yield. 
The different plutonium compositions investigated in Kessler [12] are shown in Table 9.12. 
These plutonium compositions were also used for compression analysis (Table 9.13 and Fig. 
9.21). 
 
 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Pu-(0) 1.6 58.8 20.8 13.8 5 
Pu-(0') 2.8 55.8 23.8 9.8 7.8 
Pu-(1) 5.5 34.1 31.1 10.6 18.7 
Pu-(2) 8.7 30.1 30.6 11.3 19.3 
Pu-(3) 12. 26. 30. 12. 20. 
Pu-(4) 15.2 27.5 28.6 11.5 17.2 
Pu-(5) 20.3 30. 26.3 10.7 12.7 
Pu-(6) 24.5 32. 24.5 10. 9.0 
Table 9.12.    Reactor Pu-compositions in weight% used for the parametric analysis [12]. 
 
Figure 9.21 shows the keff results as a function of compression for all Pu-compositions 
from Pu-(0), Pu-(0'), Pu-(1) to Pu-(6) of Table 9.12 for a compression ratio, cr = 2.0 (only 
every second result is shown). The curves are very similar for all Pu-compositions. This is 
due to the fact, of course, that Pu-238 and all other Pu-isotopes have similarly high fission 
cross-sections at neutron energies of approximately 1 MeV [19]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.21. keff for all Pu-mixtures Pu-(0) to Pu-(5), and a compression ratio, cr = 2  
 (spherical shells successively compressed one after the other from the outside; 
only every second value is shown). 
Number of compressed shells (counted from outside)
Supercriticality as a function of compression
for a compression ratio of 2
5 cm 5.8 cm
10 20 30 400
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
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The keff curves were calculated also for higher compression ratios. The curves are similar, 
but rise to considerably higher supercriticalities at full compression of the reflector and 
reactor-grade plutonium sphere (Table 9.13). 
In Table 9.13, these keff values for the supercriticality at full homogeneous compression of 
the reflector and plutonium sphere system are shown for various compression ratios, cr, and 
Pu compositions. Again, the keff values are similar for all reactor-grade plutonium 
compositions. 
 
 
Table 9.13. keff after compression of the 5 cm Unat reflector and the reactor-grade plutonium 
sphere for plutonium composition Pu-(0) to Pu-(6) and for the compression ratio, 
cr. 
9.10.7    Reactivity increase as a function of compression time 
The procedure of calculating the reactivity or the associated value, keff, and Rossi alpha, α(t), 
as a function of time during shock compression of the HNED is discussed in this Section. 
9.10.7.1     Description of the calculational procedure 
The previous section showed the variation of keff when the spherical system of a Pu sphere 
with a Unat reflector is compressed from the outside. The HNED was divided, e.g., into N = 40 
spherical shells and compressed, one shell after the other, until the whole Pu-sphere-Unat-
reflector system was compressed to a homogeneous compression ratio, cr. Table 9.13 
summarizes the keff values for different reactor-grade plutonium compositions and for the 
final compression state of the plutonium sphere as well as for different compression ratios. 
Figures 9.14 and 9.15 of the previous Section 9.10.4 demonstrated that particle velocity 
causes the density (Fig. 9.16) to change differently in each shell as a function of time. These 
data can be written in the form of a matrix. In this matrix, the densities, n, of shell n appear 
in rows of a total length, e.g., N = 40, for each point in time, t, considered. The elements of 
the matrix are tnρ . 
Dividing these matrix elements by their initial density, 0ρn , at time zero, 
0ρ ρtn n/ , produces a 
similar matrix for the compression ratios, tncr . 
Section 9.10.6 above already described how the keff values can be determined for the 
compression of a certain number, n, of shells for different discrete constant compression 
ratios, e.g., cr = 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0. 
     cr 
Composition 
1.2 1.5 2 2.5 3 4 5 
Pu-(0) 1.0960 1.2508 1.4599 1.6270 1.7602 1.9589 2.0988 
Pu-(0') 1.0969 1.2511 1.4599 1.6240 1.7563 1.9526 2.0919 
Pu-(1) 1.0955 1.2453 1.4481 1.6063 1.7335 1.9204 2.0531 
Pu-(2) 1.0942 1.2429 1.4435 1.6009 1.7267 1.9142 2.0443 
Pu-(3) 1.0933 1.2415 1.4417 1.5976 1.7224 1.9086 2.0379 
Pu-(4) 1.0927 1.2416 1.4418 1.5976 1.7241 1.9106 2.0436 
Pu-(5) 1.0940 1.2432 1.4442 1.6025 1.7296 1.9172 2.0484 
Pu-(6) 1.0951 1.2438 1.4461 1.6046 1.7312 1.9195 2.0553 
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For a specific plutonium composition, e.g., Pu-(0'), Pu-(0) to Pu-(6), kn is now used for the 
keff of the number, n, of shells compressed to different compression ratios starting from the 
outside of the reflector. These data can also be arranged in a matrix. 
As these shock compression calculations yield data mostly lying between our kn values 
calculated for cr = 1.2, 1.5, 2.0 etc., we can interpolate each value. 
9.10.7.2     Calculation of k(t), Neutron Life time, and Rossi alpha, (t) 
Interpolation programs then allow the reactivity contribution at each discrete point in time to 
be calculated by summing up all contributions from the different shells compressed by the 
shock wave inward traveling. Dividing k(t) by the neutron life time, ℓeff, provides Rossi 
alpha, αcomp(t), (Section 9.7). 
The neutron life time, ℓeff, for the natural-uranium reflector and reactor-grade plutonium 
sphere system was calculated by the MCNP 4C3 Monte Carlo code and its incorporated 
ENDF/B-VI ZAA.600 cross-section library. For the uncompressed Pu-sphere-natural-
uranium-reflector system, a ℓeff = 1.4x10-8 s was obtained. ℓeff = 1.3x10-8 s was calculated for 
the compressed reactor-grade plutonium sphere with a natural-uranium reflector and cr=2. As 
the influence of the compression ratio on neutron lifetime, ℓeff, is small (Section 9.8.2), a 
constant average neutron lifetime, ℓeff = 1.35x10-8 s, was assumed for subsequent calculations. 
Figure 9.22 shows the development of αcomp(t) for a pressure of 0.11 TPa exerted by the 
chemical high- explosive lenses on the outside surface of the reflector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.22. Rossi alpha, (t), as a function of time (10-6 s) for reactor-grade plutonium of the 
composition Pu-(1) and the pressure case of 0.11 TPa exerted on the outer surface 
of the reflector. 
The curve for αcomp(t) starts from t = 0 with a negative value according to keff = 0.98, which 
leads to k(0) = keff -1 = -0.02 or αcomp(0) = -1.48x106 s-1 (assuming ℓeff = 1.35x·10-8 s). At t = 
8.44x10-6 s, comp corresponds to prompt criticality. From then on, comp raises sharply to 
values of around 40x106 s-1 at approximately 24x10-6 s. The total compression of the HNED 
would lead to Rossi alpha, (t) = 53.03x106 s-1, at 27.6x10-6 s after the onset of compression. 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
Time [10-6s]
0.11 [TPa]
compression
(t) = (keff(t) – 1)/leff
leff = 1.35·10-8 [s]
(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
    221
9.10.8 Spontaneous fission neutron source multiplication 
The geometric arrangement, with keff = 0.98, of a reactor-grade plutonium sphere surrounded 
by a natural-uranium reflector and chemical high-explosive lenses is equivalent to a 
subcritical experiment in a zero-power reactor facility. If this reactor-grade plutonium sphere 
has an inherent spontaneous fission neutron source, Sinh, homogeneously distributed over the 
radius of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere, this Sinh – according to Weinberg et al. [44] – is 
multiplied by 1/(1 – keff) = M. 
This leads to the multiplied fission neutron source: 
SM = MSinh = 1/(1-keff)Sinh. 
This is well known in reactor physics and follows from the theory of subcritical 
experiments in zero-power reactor facilities. This feature was first introduced by DeVolpi [8] 
into the analysis of HNEDs. 
This neutron source multiplication factor can be verified also in inhomogeneous neutron 
transport calculations with, e.g. the ONEDANT code using 30 energy groups [12]. The 
plutonium composition of Pu-(1) (see Table 9.12) was chosen with a radius of the reactor-
grade plutonium sphere of 5.8 cm, and a 5 cm thick reflector of natural uranium at keff = 0.98, 
and a total inherent spontaneous fission neutron source of Sinh = 9.6x106 n/s homogeneously 
distributed over the volume of the plutonium sphere (Table 9.14). The ONEDANT calculation 
resulted in a multiplied fission neutron source, SM = 4.8x108 n/s, corresponding, as expected, 
to a neutron source multiplication, M = 50. 
This ONEDANT calculation also furnished the initial steady state power generated by the 
multiplied inherent fission neutron source as 
7.73x109 fission/s in the HNED or 0.247 W. 
This is the initial power L(0) of the HNED for the subsequent calculations in Section 9.12. 
9.11. Pre-ignition by spontaneous fission neutrons in HNEDs with higher Pu-238 
contents 
Spontaneous fission neutrons from the plutonium isotopes, Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242, appear 
with a certain probability function (Hansen [72]). Under certain conditions, they can start the 
chain reaction (pre-ignition) as early as in the compression phase. Pre-ignition is a stochastic 
problem requiring treatment by probability theory (Hansen [72] and Seifritz [28,73]). 
9.11.1     Pre-ignition as a consequence of strong spontaneous fission neutron sources 
The theory of weak spontaneous fission neutron sources by Hansen [72] originally was 
developed and applied for GODIVA neutron burst experiments at Los Alamos. It can be used 
as well to explain the pre-ignition probability in nuclear explosive devices with a relatively 
small spontaneous fission neutron source, e.g., for weapons-grade plutonium. This theory of 
weak spontaneous fission neutron sources is only valid for spontaneous fission neutron 
sources very much smaller than 9x107 n/s. 
So-called strong spontaneous fission neutron sources in the range of >1.5x108 n/s (see 
Table 9.14) lead to persistent fission chains, which are possible only after prompt criticality. 
The delayed neutrons do not play a role, as the delayed neutron precursor atoms have decay 
times much too long (in the range of milliseconds to seconds), whereas power excursions in 
HNEDs occur in a time range of microseconds. 
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The s-shaped or sigmoidal curve for keff(t) or the Rossi (t) during shock compression (see 
Fig. 9.22) was approximated previously by a linear function or ramp starting from prompt 
criticality (Hansen [72], Seifritz [28], Mark [19]). Such a ramp type increase in the criticality 
factor, keff(t) or k(t) = keff(t)–1, for a compression time, t0, starting from prompt criticality 
can be represented in Fig. 9.23.a. 
Similarly, Rossi alpha, 
eff
k(t)(t) = , 
can be considered over the time period t0 (Fig. 9.23.b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.23. (a) k(t) as a ramp function of time, t1, starting from prompt criticality, (b) Rossi 
(t) as a ramp function of time, t1, starting from prompt criticality. 
 
Fig 9.23a allows Eqs.(9.13) and (9.14) for the differential probability, p(t1), and the 
integral or cumulative probability, P(t1), of pre-ignition at time, t1, to be derived (Hansen [72], 
Seifritz [28]). 
The differential probability, p(t1), of a first persistent fission chain being sponsored at time 
t1 in the time interval, dt1, is given by 
2 -1max maxM M
1 1 1 1 1
2 0 2 0
2Δk - kS Sp(t ) • dt  =   •  • t  • exp  •  •t  dt  s
ν•Γ t • t
      4 
                     (9.13) 
and the integral or cumulative probability, P(t1), that persistent fission chains occurred until 
the time t1 (integral of the differential probability between zero and t1) is given by 
2max M
1 1
2 0
k SP(t ) = 1-exp -  •  • t
 t
 
  4 
                                                  (9.14) 
where 
kmax = maximum keff,max – 1 at full compression 
  = average number of prompt neutrons per spontaneous fission 
42 = Diven factor: 0.8 for delta function distribution (weak source) and 1 for Poisson 
distribution (strong source) 
SM = total multiplied spontaneous fission neutrons per sec 
t1 and t0 see Fig. 9.23a and b. 
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As pointed out in Kessler [24], Eq. (9.13) and (9.14) are also consistent with the formalism 
derived in Mark [19] if kmax/·42 = ½. 
Table 9.14 shows both the inherent and the multiplied total neutron sources for reactor-
grade plutonium compositions as considered in Kessler et al. [12]. Below, the focus will be 
only on Pu-(1) as it has an isotopic concentration of 5.5% Pu-238 and a relatively high critical 
mass among Pu-(1) to Pu-(6). 
 
 
 Pu-238 
content 
[%] 
Radius [cm] 
at keff = 0.98 
Subcritical 
mass keff = 0.98 
[kg] 
Spontaneous fission 
neutrons 
Sinh [n/s] 
Subcriticality 
multiplication M = 50
SM [n/s] 
Pu-(0) 1.6 5.19 9.248 2.92x106 1.46x108 
Pu-(0') 2.8 5.30 9.848 4.15x106 2.07x108 
Pu-(1) 5.5 5.80 12.906 9.6x106 4.80x108 
Pu-(2) 8.7 5.81 12.973 10.8x106 5.40x108 
Pu-(3) 12 5.83 13.188 12.1x106 6.00x108 
Pu-(4) 15.2 5.7 13.250 11.6x106 5.80x108 
Pu-(5) 20.3 5.52 11.126 10.9x106 5.45x108 
Pu-(6) 24.5 5.38 10.300 10.4x106 5.20x108 
Table 9.14. Values of inherent and multiplied spontaneous fission neutron sources for Pu 
mixtures of Pu-(0) to Pu-(6). 
 
As the spontaneous fission neutron source for the HNEDs is higher than 9x107 n/s (see 
Table 9.14), there will be a Poisson distribution of the spontaneous fission neutrons (Hansen 
[72], hence 2  14 	 . 
Eq. (9.14) (cumulative probability of pre-ignition) is now applied to two cases for which 
the potential explosive yield of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium will be calculated later. 
Fig 9.24 shows Rossi alpha, (t), for the two cases of 0.06 TPa (Case A) and 0.11 TPa (Case 
B) representing the pressures exerted in the examples on the outer surface of the reflector 
(Section 9.10.1.4). Section 9.12 below will show the shock waves to be stopped at 
11.47x10-6 s for Case A (0.06 TPa), and at 9.307x10-6 s for Case B (0.11 TPa). From these 
points in time on Rossi alpha, (t), will remain constant at 9.26x106 s-1 for Case A (0.06 TPa), 
and at 12.72x106 for Case B (0.11 TPa). These constant Rossi alpha values will be taken as 
max (see Fig. 9.23b and 9.15). 
From these constant maximum Rossi alpha values, max, also kmax (see Fig. 9.23a) can be 
calculated by multiplying the Rossi alpha values with the neutron lifetime, eff  =   1.35x10
-8 s 
furnishing (see Table 9.15) the corresponding kmax = 0.125 (Case A with 0.06 TPa and kmax 
= 0.1717 for Case B (0.11 TPa). Now a ramp can be considered between prompt criticality at 
t = 0 and the values, max or kmax (see Fig. 9.24). 
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Fig. 9.24. Rossi alpha, (t), for Case A (0.06 TPa) and Case B (0.11 TPa). From prompt 
criticality to the time when (t) remains constant, the sigmoidal curve is 
approximated by a ramp function for pre-ignition analysis. 
 
Case A: 0.06 TPa, Fig. 9.24 Case B: 0.11 TPa, Fig. 9.24 
kmax = 0.125 
  = 3.1, 42 = 1 
t0 = 11.47x10-6 s 
max = 9.26x106 s-1 
eff  = 1.35x10
-8 s 
kmax = 0.1717 
  = 3.1, 42 = 1 
t0 = 9.307x10-6 s 
max = 12.72x106 s-1 
eff  = 1.35x10
-8 s 
Table 9.15.  Characteristic input values for the cases A and B. 
For both Cases A and B, the minimum and maximum values of the total multiplied 
spontaneous fission neutron source, SM, of Table 9.14, are taken, i.e. 1.46x108 n/s and 6x108 
n/s. The kmax or max and t0 values define a ramp (see Fig. 9.24 and Table 9.14) (an 
overestimation compared to the sigmoidal curves in Fig. 9.24). 
Evaluation of Eq. (9.14) with the input data from Table 9.15 leads to Figs. 9.25 and 9.26 
with the cumulative probabilities for pre-ignition for the two cases, A and B. In case A (Fig. 
9.25), the cumulative probability can be seen to become 1 between t1/t0 = 0.2 and 0.3, 
depending on the spontaneous fission neutron source. In Case B (Fig. 9.26), with the steeper 
reactivity ramp (faster compression), the cumulative probability of pre-ignition becomes 1 
between t1/t0 = 0.15 and 0.3. The differential probabilities of pre-ignition (Eq. (9.13)) can be 
seen from Fig. 9.25 and 9.26 as the slope (differentiation) of the curves. It is a maximum at 
time t1 = 0, dropping to zero when the cumulative probability of pre-ignition approaches 1. 
The average time 1t  at which pre-ignition occurs is given by (Hansen [72] and Seifritz 
[28]) 
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 (9.15) 
For the two cases, A and B, the average time, 1t , of pre-ignition after prompt criticality 
becomes 1.22x10-6 s or less (see Table 9.16). 
 
 
Case Spontaneous fission neutron 
source, SM (n/s) 
Average time of pre-ignition, 
1t  (s) 
1.46x108 1.22x10-6  
A 
6x108 0.61x10-6 
1.46x108 0.94x10-6  
B 
6x108 0.47x10-6 
Table 9.16.   Average time, 1t , of pre-ignition after prompt criticality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.25. Cumulative probability of pre-ignition (Case A for 0.06 TPa) and two different 
spontaneous fission neutron sources. 
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Fig. 9.26. Cumulative probability of pre-ignition (Case B for 0.11 TPa) and two different 
spontaneous fission neutron sources. 
9.11.2 Pre-ignition as a consequence of strong spontaneous fission neutron sources 
and sigmoidal Rossi alpha, (t) 
The previous section only covered ramp-type Rossi alpha, (t), insertions. This is only an 
approximation of (t). The case of sigmoidal Rossi alpha, (t), as shown in Figs. 9.22 or 9.24, 
was solved comprehensively by Seifritz [73]. 
The cumulative probability of pre-ignition, for sigmoidal (t) (see Figs. 9.22 and 9.24) 
changes then in 
1t
eff
1 M
2 eff0
2 Δk(t')P(t ) = 1-exp    S     dt'
ν  Γ
 
     
   
,                                          (9.16) 
eff  = prompt neutron lifetime (s) 
ν  = 3.1 average number of fission neutrons for plutonium 
42 = Diven factor = 1 for Poisson distribution (strong source) 
                             = 0.8 for delta function distribution (weak source) 
k(t') = keff(t')-1 
SM = multiplied fission neutron source (subcriticality multiplication of 1/(1-0.98) = 50 
taken into account) 
t1 = time after prompt criticality. 
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The solution of Eq. (9.16) leads to the probability density function for pre-ignition. For 
reactor-grade plutonium with a multiplied fission neutron source of SM = 2x108 n/s, and kmax 
= 0.44, and for a compression time of 10-5 s, an average time of pre-ignition of 
1t  	 1.02 x 10
-6 s 
and a most probable time, tm,p, of pre-ignition, 
tm,p = 0.88 x 10-6 s 
are obtained (Seifritz [73]). 
These results vary somewhat with kmax and compression time, but are basically similar to 
the results in Table 9.16 (Section 9.11.1). Seifritz [73] also shows that the relative time jitter, 
t, around the average time of pre-ignition is only 
-6Δt =  0.5x10  s  
Consequently the spread of possible differential probabilities becomes extremely narrow, 
and the expected explosive yields become quasi-deterministic (Seifritz [73]) for the 
HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium. 
With the results from Sections 9.11.1 and 9.11.2 the next sections will contain a parametric 
approach to calculating the explosion yield of reactor-grade plutonium. Pre-ignition is 
assumed 
to occur at 0 or 10-6 or 3x10-6 s after prompt criticality. 
9.11.3      Pre-ignition of hybrid HNEDs 
Hybrid HNEDs would contain in part reactor-grade plutonium and part highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) – like hybrid nuclear explosive devices – combining weapon-grade plutonium 
and HEU (DeVolpi [8]; Podwig [36]). Although this does not address the real proliferation 
question, for reactor-grade plutonium from civil nuclear energy programs and HEU are only 
available in nuclear weapon states (NWSs), these cases were analyzed [12]. 
It is shown there that the total critical mass of reactor-grade plutonium and HEU can be 
decreased. However, the multiplied fission neutron source becomes as strong as in HNEDs 
solely employing reactor-grade plutonium (Table 9.14). This again would lead to early pre-
ignition immediately upon prompt criticality (as is shown in the sections above) and entail 
similar consequences for the nuclear explosive yields attainable as will be shown below for 
HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium. 
9.12.     Calculation of Explosion Yield for HNEDs with Reactor-grade Plutonium 
The only explosive yield estimate ever published for reactor-grade plutonium (Mark [19]) 
indicated a minimum fizzle yield of 0.54 kt TNT (equivalent) for reactor-grade plutonium 
from spent LWR fuel with a burn-up of 30 GWd/t. Tables 9.12 and 9.14 show the Pu-(0) 
plutonium composition, which corresponds to the reactor-grade plutonium investigated by 
Mark [19]. It has a near critical radius of 5.19 cm (with 5 cm Unat reflector) for keff = 0.98 
(Table 9.14). 
The Pu-(1) reactor-grade plutonium composition was chosen for the nuclear explosion 
yield analyses by Kessler et al. [12]. This plutonium composition has the highest Pu-238 
content of Pu-(0'), Pu-(0), Pu-(1) (Tables 9.12 and 9.14) and the largest near critical radius for 
keff = 0.98. Consequently, it has also the highest fissile volume and would lead to the highest 
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nuclear explosion yield. This would constitute an upper limit for all plutonium compositions 
derived from spent LWR UOX fuel up to a burn-up of 60 GWd/t, and for spent LWR MOX 
fuel up to a burn-up of 50 GWd/t. 
9.12.1    Compression Shock Waves and Initial Power 
The results for this Pu-(1) reactor-grade plutonium composition and for two levels of pressure 
exerted by the high-explosive lenses on the outer surface of the reflector of 
 0.06 TPa   (low technology) 
and 0.11 TPa    (very high technology) 
are presented and discussed below. The classification into low and high technology for 
implosion lenses was defined in Section 9.10.1.4. 
The Pu-(1) plutonium composition has a near-critical radius of 5.80 cm for keff = 0.98. The 
reflector of natural-uranium metal is 5 cm thick. 
Figures 9.27 and 9.28 show the development of Rossi alpha, (t), for the two cases of 0.06 
TPa and 0.11 TPa. In the case of 0.06 TPa, prompt criticality is attained 16.93x10-6 s after the 
onset of shock compression. In the case of 0.11 TPa, this time span is shorter, prompt 
criticality being reached 8.44x10-6 s after the onset of shock compression. 
Only part of the Rossi alpha, (t), curves is shown in Fig. 9.27 and 9.28 compared to Fig. 
9.22 (Section 9.10.7.2) which shows (t) for the full shock compression time of case B (0.11 
TPa). For case A only the characteristic values are reported. Table 9.17 shows these points in 
time when max or kmax and keff,max would be attained for Case A (0.06 TPa) and Case B 
(0.11 TPa). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.27. Rossi alpha, (t), for the 0.06 TPa case for two time schedules: onset of 
compression and onset when prompt criticality is attained. 
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Fig. 9.28. Rossi alpha, (t), for the 0.11 TPa case for two time schedules: onset of 
compression and onset when prompt criticality is attained. 
 
Pressure exerted on 
reflector outside 
(TPa) 
Time between compression 
onset and max 
(10-6 s) 
max 
(106 s-1) 
kmax kmax 
Case A 0.06 
Case B 0.11 
40.2 
27.6 
19.33 
53.03 
0.26 
0.716 
1.26 
1.716 
Table 9.17. Maximum (t) and kmax or keff,max reached with different pressures exerted on 
the outer surface of the reflector 
These maximum values of max cannot be achieved with reactor-grade plutonium in the 
HNED, as pre-ignition will start very soon after criticality has been attained and the HNED 
will explode earlier. This will be shown in Section 9.12.4. 
9.12.2   Initial power at t = 0 for calculation of explosive yield 
The initial power was determined in Section 9.10.8 to be 
L(0) = 0.247 W 
The relative radial distribution of this total power follows from neutron transport 
calculations. Figure 9.29 shows the relative fission rate, which is proportional to the radial 
power density distribution. It is equivalent to w(r,0) in Eqs. (9.1a) through (9.1c), Section 9.7. 
The relative fission rate or power density in the reflector is roughly one order of magnitude 
lower than in the plutonium sphere. 
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Fig. 9.29.    Radial distribution of the relative fission rate or power as a function of r at t = 0. 
9.12.3     Power Excursion 
The Rossi alpha, (t), of Figs. 9.27 and 9.28 is applied to the two cases of 0.06 TPa and 
0.11 TPa, and Eqs. (9.1) through (9.5) are solved by the iterative calculation procedure 
described in Section 9.7.1 with the materials data and equation of state data taken from 
Section 9.8.5. Ignition of the chain reaction is assumed to occur at prompt criticality, as in 
Mark [19]. Section 9.12.6 below will discuss a sensitivity study with time delays for ignition 
of the chain reaction of 1x10-6 s and 3x10-6 s as suggested in Section 9.11.2. 
9.12.4    How Far Can the Shock Wave Penetrate into the Pu-sphere? 
According to Eqs. (9.1a) through (9.1c), and as a consequence of Rossi alpha, (t), in Fig. 
9.27 and 9.28, power will rise extremely fast. The integral of power over time will be 
responsible for the temperature increase in the plutonium sphere (Eqs. (9.2) and (9.3)) up to 
the boiling point. According to the equation of state (Eq. (9.4) and Section 9.8.5), further 
increases in plutonium temperature will lead to high pressures up to the [TPa] range. This 
means that the shock wave progressing inward more and more must counteract the rising 
pressures in the Pu-sphere and will eventually be stopped. From that time on, the compressed 
volumes cannot be further increased by the shock wave, and Rossi alpha, (t), remains 
constant. In the cases under study, this occurs when the shock wave has penetrated the 
plutonium sphere some 1.3 cm or 1.8 cm from the outside, and the front of the shock wave 
comes to a halt roughly 4 or 4.5 cm from the center of the plutonium sphere. 
This is shown in Fig. 9.30 and Table 9.18. For the 0.06 TPa case, the shock wave 
progressing inward hits the pressure rising in the plutonium sphere at 11.47x10-6 s from 
prompt criticality and at the radius of approximately 4.5 cm. Plutonium boiling will occur 
earlier, at 11x10-6 s. Rossi alpha stays constant from  = 9.26x106 s-1 on. 
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Fig. 9.30. Dependence on time and space of shock wave pressure and internal plasma 
pressure for the 0.06 TPa case. 
For the 0.11 TPa case, the time spans are 9.307x10-6 s from prompt criticality when Rossi 
alpha, (t), has arrived at  = 12.719x106 s-1. The front of the shock wave is stopped at a 
radius of approx. 4.5 cm. 
 
 
case 
Time to 
prompt 
criticality 
[10-6 s] 
Onset of Pu 
boiling from 
criticality 
[10-6 s] 
Time from 
criticality when 
shock wave 
stopped  
[10-6 s] 
Total time from onset 
of compression when 
shock wave stopped 
[10-6 s] 
Constant  
[106 s] 
Radius where 
shock wave 
stopped [cm] 
0.06 TPa 
0.11 TPa 
16.933 
8.442 
11 
8.95 
11.47 
9.307 
28.403 
17.749 
9.26 
12.719 
4.5 
4.0 
Table 9.18. Time spans to prompt criticality and shock wave stopped by higher plasma 
pressure 
It should be noted that this criterion, or explanation of the stopping of the shock wave, is 
not consistent with the criterion applied by Mark [19]. He applied a much cruder criterion: 
reactivity or comp stays constant when the power in the plutonium sphere has risen to  
L(t) = L(0)e45. Then he applies the Serber formula [32]. 
9.12.5 Detailed results of the calculations of explosion yield for the 0.06 TPa and 
0.11 TPa cases 
This section contains a presentation of the detailed results of the calculations for both the 
0.06 TPa and 0.11 TPa cases. Rossi alpha, (t), for both cases is shown in Fig. 9.31 and 9.32 
from the onset of compression of the reflector up to the point of criticality and, finally, to the 
shock wave being stopped with  = constant. 
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Fig. 9.31. Dependence on time of Rossi alpha, (t), after compression or after transition 
through prompt criticality (0.06 TPa case). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.32. Dependence on time of Rossi alpha, (t), after compression or after transition 
through prompt criticality (0.11 TPa case). 
As a consequence of supercriticality and the relatively high Rossi alpha, (t), the power 
rises sharply, as shown in Fig. 9.33, peaking 12.34x10-6 s (0.06 TPa case) or 10.0x10-6 s (0.11 
TPa case) after prompt criticality. In the 0.11 TPa case (Fig. 9.34), the power rises to levels 
roughly six times higher than in the 0.06 TPa case before the rapid increases in internal 
energy and internal pressures within the reactor-grade plutonium sphere initiate the explosion. 
This results in a strong negative feedback. As a consequence, the power drops very sharply. 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
6 8 10 12 14 16
Time of power excursion [10-6s]

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Prompt
critical
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
onset of compression
at t = 0
 = 9.26 x106s-1
time when shock pressure and plasma
pressure at r = 4 cm in Pu sphere become
equal
Reactor Pu-(1)
case 0.06 [TPa]
11.47 x10-6s
28.30 x10-6s
max. energy
at 12.7 x10-6s
max. power 
at 12.3  x10-6s
Pu-boiling
at 11 x 10-6s

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Time of power excursion [10-6s]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
 = 12.72 x106s-1
t = 9.307 x10-6s, time when shock pressure and plasma
pressure at r = 4 cm in Pu sphere become equal
Reactor Pu-(1)
case 0.11 [TPa]
Pu-boiling
at 8.35 x10-6s
Time of compression
max. energy
at 10.7 x10-6s
max. power 
at 10.0 x10-6s
9.307 x10-6s

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
t = 0

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]

(t)
 [1
06
s-
1 ]
    233
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy as an integral over power is shown in Fig. 9.35 and 9.36 for the 0.06 TPa and 
0.11 TPa cases. The total energy released, or the explosion yield, results in 0.119 kt of TNT 
(equivalent) for the 0.06 TPa case. As can be expected, this value is higher for the 0.11 TPa 
case resulting in 0.34 kt of TNT (equivalent). 
The values in kt of TNT equivalent are based on the energy equivalence of  
4.1871012 J 1 kt TNT [50]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.35.  Energy released as a function of 
time after prompt criticality 
(0.06 TPa case). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.36.  Energy released as a function of 
time after prompt criticality 
(0.11 TPa case). 
 
Figure 9.37 and 9.38 shows the plasma pressure at the r = 0 and r = 4.04 cm locations of 
the plutonium sphere as a function of time after prompt criticality. For the 0.06 TPa case, a 
maximum plasma pressure of approx. 102 TPa is attained at 12.34x10-6 s. For the 0.16 TPa 
case, the maximum plasma pressure of approx. 3.4x102 TPa is reached roughly 10x10-6 s after 
prompt criticality. 
Fig. 9.33. Total power as a function of time Fig. 9.34: Total power as a function of 
prompt criticality (0.06 TPa case). time after prompt criticality (0.11 TPa 
 case).
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Fig. 9.37.    Plasma pressure at r = 0 and  
r = 4.04 cm as a function of time after 
prompt criticality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.38.    Plasma pressure at r = 0 and  
r = 4.04 cm as a function of time after 
reaching prompt criticality. 
 
 
To complete the picture, Fig. 9.39 and 9.40 show the plasma pressure as a function of the 
radius and of the time up to maximum plasma pressure (12.39x10-6 s for the 0.06 TPa case 
and 10.031x10-6 s for the 0.11 TPa case). The pressure spikes in the natural uranium reflector 
are caused by the rapidly expanding plutonium sphere and the inertia of the outer parts of the 
reflector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.39. Pressure as a function of radius  
and time after prompt criticality (0.06 TPa 
case). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.40.  Pressure as a function of radius 
and time after prompt criticality (0.11 TPa 
case). 
 
Figures 9.41 and 9.42 show the plasma densities in the reactor-grade plutonium sphere and 
the reflector as a function of space and time for the 0.06 TPa and 0.11 TPa cases. Again, the 
density spikes at the inner part of the reflector are caused by the expanding plutonium sphere. 
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Expansion of the plutonium sphere and natural-uranium reflector system as well as the 
associated density variations give rise to frequent SN-calculations (see Section 9.7.) to 
determine keff(t) or tot(t). These tot(t) values determine the power as a function of time (Fig. 
9.43). These figures (shown only for 0.06 [TPa]) also indicate the variations in the outer 
radius of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere as a function of time. They again show the 
proportionality of R(t) and (t) used in the Serber correlation [32]. 
9.12.6   Sensitivity of calculations of the nuclear explosion yields 
Section 9.12.5 contained the results of explosion yields calculated under the assumption of 
pre-ignition occuring at the earliest possible time when the Rossi alpha, (t), curve intersects 
prompt criticality, i.e., pre-ignition occurs at t = 0, the onset of the power excursion. Section 
9.11, presented the pre-ignition theory, concluding that pre-ignition would occur at an 
average -61t  = 10  s. To get a feeling for the sensitivity of these results, also the explosion 
yield for pre-ignition at 0, 10-6, or 3x10-6 s was calculated. The results are shown in Table 
9.19. 
 
Average time 
of pre-ignition [10-6 s] 
0 1 3 
[kt] TNT (equivalent) 0.119 0.120 0.130 
Table 9.19. Explosion yields for different times of pre-ignition after prompt criticality. 
 
The results in Table 9.19 show that the impact on nuclear explosion yield is rather small 
within an average time, 1t , of pre-ignition between 0 and 3x10
-6 s. The earliest possible time 
of pre-ignition, 1t  = 0 , was assumed also by Mark [19]. The corresponding explosion yield 
was referred to as the minimum fizzle yield. 
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Fig. 9.42.   Plasma density as a function 
of space and time after prompt criticality 
(0.11 TPa case). 
Fig. 9.41.   Plasma density as a function of 
space and time after prompt criticality 
(0.06 TPa case). 
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Fig. 9.43.  Expansion of the outer radius of the Pu-sphere, including internal density changes 
and the corresponding Rossi alpha change, tot(t) = comp + exp,  for the 0.06 TPa case. 
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Another factor studied was the influence of the initial temperature in the reactor-grade 
plutonium sphere and natural-uranium reflector system. The results in Section 9.12.5 
correspond to a constant initial temperature of 300 K over the entire HNED. Other 
calculations were performed under the assumption of the real temperature in the HNED being 
caused by alpha heat power in the plutonium sphere (for details, see Kessler [13]) and the 
temperature increase due to shock wave compression (Section 9.10.4). The results are shown 
in Table 9.20. 
 
Technology Case Initial temperature in the 
HNED 
Yield (kt) of 
TNT 
(equivalent) 
Const.  
(x106 s-1) 
Medium 
technology 
0.06 TPa Real temp. profile 
Room temp. (300 K) 
0.119 
0.119 
 
9.26 
Very high 
technology 
0.11 TPa Real temp. profile 
Room temp. (300 K) 
0.346 
0.346 
 
12.719 
Table 9.20. Nuclear explosion yields for the 0.06 TPa and 0.11 TPa cases and for different 
temperatures in the HNED. 
The results are essentially the same because the difference in temperatures caused by 
alpha heat power and by shock compression is small compared to the temperature increase 
throughout the power excursion. 
9.12.7   Nuclear explosive yield of hollow reactor-grade plutonium HNEDs 
Section 9.10.5 showed the results of radial compression of a hollow spherical HNED as a 
function of time for an assumed pressure of 0.11 TPa acting on the outside of the reflector. 
The radial shock front hits the outer radius of the spherical reactor-grade plutonium shell at 
around 15x10-6 s, arriving at the inner radius of the spherical shell at approx. 20x10-6 s. From 
this point in time on, the plutonium particles would fly toward the center where they would 
be compacted into a highly compressed solid sphere. This would apply to a nuclear explosive 
device without pre-ignition problems. The neutron chain reaction would be ignited in a 
nuclear explosive device when the inner solid sphere would be fully compacted. 
In a spherical hollow HNED with reactor-grade plutonium, the sequence of steps will be 
different. The analysis of a hollow reactor-grade plutonium HNED with a Pu-(1) plutonium 
composition, an inner radius of 5.6 cm, and an outer shell radius of 7.43 cm showed the 
following results. 
When the shock front penetrates into the outer reflector, prompt criticality would be 
attained when roughly 2.5 cm of the 5 cm natural-uranium reflector are compressed. Pre-
ignition will start with a delay of approx. 10-6 s. The rising power will increase pressure in 
the spherical reactor-grade plutonium shell, and the shock front will be stopped after 
penetrating roughly 1.5 cm into the solid region of the hollow spherical plutonium shell. This 
is similar to the results for a solid sphere of reactor-grade plutonium as described in detail in 
Section 9.12. Also the maximum Rossi alpha, max, will be similar to the values described for 
the solid reactor-grade plutonium sphere. 
As the entire sequence of events in the ensuing nuclear explosion will only take 2x10-6 s 
(Section 9.12.5), there will be no time for the plutonium particles to fly toward the center. 
Internal movement of the plutonium particles or plasma during the nuclear excursion would 
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not increase Rossi alpha, (t), as the reactivity importance function for the particles is rather 
flat in the inner hollow spherical part, i.e. the exact position of these particles has only a 
small influence on the criticality. The nuclear explosive yields would be similar to those 
reported in Section 9.12.5 for solid reactor-grade plutonium HNEDs. The advantages of 
hollow spherical implosion in nuclear explosive devices with weapons-grade plutonium 
cannot be confirmed for hollow spherical reactor-grade plutonium HNEDs. 
9.12.8   Discussion of these results compared to those of Mark [19] 
It was demonstrated in Section 9.10.8 that the geometrical arrangement of the HNEDs with a 
keff = 0.98 required a subcriticality multiplication of M = 50 to be taken into account. This 
leads to a spontaneous fission neutron source of 4.8x108 n/s for the Pu-(1) plutonium 
composition considered (see Table 9.14). (The other plutonium compositions, Pu-(0) through 
Pu-(6), would have spontaneous fission neutron sources between 1.5x108 n/s and 6x108 n/s). 
As a consequence of this high spontaneous fission neutron source, pre-ignition would occur 
as early as about 10-6 s after prompt criticality. Mark [19] assumed that pre-ignition would 
occur when prompt criticality was attained during shock compression. No pre-ignition theory 
was applied to that assumption. 
As a result of Monte Carlo calculations, Kessler et al. [12] assumed an average neutron 
life time of eff = 1.35x10
-8 s (see Section 9.10.7.2). Mark [19] assumed a somewhat shorter 
neutron lifetime of 10-8 s. 
Detailed calculations describing shock compression and density variations as a function of 
space and time as well as reactivity as a function of time show that, during power excursion, 
the shock wave can penetrate only as far as some 4.5 cm (0.11 TPa case) or 4 cm (0.06 TPa 
case) from the center of the sphere (Table 9.18). The reason is that the rising internal pressure 
in the plutonium sphere becomes higher during the power excursion than the pressure of the 
shock wave. This stops the shock wave, and the reactivity, comp, introduced stays constant 
until explosion starts. This criterion leads to a nuclear explosion yield of 
 0.119 kt of TNT (equivalent) for low technology (0.06 TPa), 
 0.346 kt of TNT (equivalent) for very high technology (0.11 TPa). 
Mark [19] applies a cruder criterion: Reactivity, or comp, stays constant when the power 
in the plutonium sphere has risen to L(t) = L(0)e45. Application of Serber's formula (Serber 
[32]) leads to an explosion yield of 
0.54 kt of TNT (equivalent). 
This value is higher than the results obtained by Kessler et al. [12]. 
It is pointed out in Mark [19] that a relatively broad probability density function for the 
differential probability of pre-ignition would allow higher fizzle yields of the nuclear 
explosion. As pointed out by Seifritz [73] and shown in Section 9.11.2, the probability 
density function for pre-ignition extends only over a very narrow range of time, and the 
results for the explosion yield of Kessler et al. [12] thus become quasi-deterministic. 
Mark [19] also indicates that higher reactivity ramps would be possible as a consequence 
of higher pressures exerted on the outside surface of the reflector. While this may be possible 
to a certain extent with weapons-grade plutonium for advanced NWSs, considerable doubts 
are raised in case of HNEDs based on reactor-grade plutonium by Kessler et al. [23]. Higher 
shock pressures would require thicker high-explosive lenses of more than 25 cm. Explosive 
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lenses that thick would melt or auto-ignite if reactor-grade plutonium in the HNEDs were 
used. In addition, it was explained in Section 9.10.1.3 that the shock wave and particle 
velocity are limited. 
It should also be kept in mind that the calculated results discussed above are based on 
perfect radial symmetry of the shock wave hitting the outer surface of the reflector. In 
practical reality, however, even quasi-radial symmetry is extremely difficult to achieve. 
9.12.9 Conclusions from the analysis of the explosive yields of HNEDs based on 
reactor-grade plutonium 
The physics models developed for early power excursion and disassembly analysis of metal-
fueled plutonium criticals are extended to the 102 TPa range by additional equation-of-state 
models for high plasma pressures. These models were applied to the so-called "Sandmeier 
case", the only result of a nuclear explosion ever published at least in part [37]. This 
approach confirmed and validated the theoretical models sufficiently well for further 
application to determining the nuclear explosive yield potential of HNEDs with reactor-grade 
plutonium. 
Application of the theories of pre-ignition to ramp-type and the real sigmoidal curves of 
Rossi alpha, (t), demonstrated that pre-ignition occurs roughly at 10-6 s after prompt 
criticality. This early pre-ignition implies that the shock wave can penetrate not more than 1.3 
to 1.8 cm into the sphere of reactor-grade plutonium from the outside. This limits reactivity 
or the maximum Rossi alpha, max, to be achieved by shock compression of reactor-grade 
HNEDs. 
As a consequence, nuclear explosive yields were calculated of 
 0.119 kt of TNT (equivalent) for an outside pressure of 0.06 TPa, 
and 0.354 kt of TNT (equivalent) for an outside pressure of 0.11 TPa. 
The results which are based on perfect radial symmetry of the shock wave, are 
quantitatively lower than the 0.54 kt of TNT (equivalent) published by Mark [19]. They are 
not different qualitatively, as they would still be beyond the explosive yield of any known 
conventional chemical explosive device. 
These are the results of neutronic investigations. However, as shown in Kessler et al. [23], 
they do not describe the full reality. They must be seen together with a thermal analysis and 
with the level of technology available or needed to achieve such nuclear explosive yields. 
When only low technology is used for the geometric dimensions and the type of high 
explosives, such HNEDs would not be feasible technically with reactor-grade plutonium 
from reprocessed spent LWR fuel with a burn-up higher than about 35 GWd/t. Only if 
advanced medium technology can be applied, this limit of technical feasibility must be 
shifted from 35 GWd/t to a level above 58 GWd/t (see Section 10). 
9.13   Categorization of different isotopic compositions of plutonium 
The analysis of C. Mark [19] for the potential nuclear explosive yield of HNEDs with 
reactor-grade plutonium is based mainly on assumptions already described in the Los Alamos 
Primer [32]. This possibly intentionally simplified model does not follow a detailed analysis 
as presented by Kessler et al. [12] and summarized in Sections 9.12.5 to 9.12.7. However, it 
allows to categorize the different plutonium compositions collected in Tables 9.2-9.6.b of 
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Section 9.3 according to their pre-ignition potential and their resulting potential nuclear yield 
without doing many detailed calculations. 
 
C. Mark [19] applies the following formalism: 
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In addition, he assumes that L(t) increases exponentially. With L(t) = L(0)٠e45 the 
plutonium will have vaporized and at a pressure of about 1 Mbar will start the expansion or 
explosion of the device. At this point in time also the maximum possible criticality or max 
will be achieved (Fig. 9.44). 
In a further simplified approach it is assumed – as in Los Alamos Primer [32] – that the 
shock compression leads to a linear increase (instead of a sigmoidal increase (Section 9.11) 
of (t) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.44.     Linear increase of Rossi alpha during shock compression 
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C. Mark [19] assumes that pre-ignition starts already at t = 0 when supercriticality is 
exceeded. This earliest possible pre-ignition results also in the smallest nuclear explosive 
yield, called smallest fizzle yield, YF, with a Rossi alpha, max,F, at tF = t0. 
Finally the Serber relation (Section 9.9) is applied to two different nuclear explosive 
devices A and B. In both cases the shock velocity is 5 km/s and the radius of both plutonium 
spheres is 5 cm. 
Case A is an NED based on weapons-grade plutonium with an explosive yield of 20 kt 
TNT (equivalent) with leff = 10-8 s, keff,max = 2, kmax = keff,max-1 = 1 and max = 108 s-1. 
Case B is a HNED based on reactor-grade plutonium. It is compressed with the same 
shock velocity of 5 km/s. Pre-ignition starts at the earliest point in time when supercriticality 
is exceeded. At tc the power results in L(tF) = L(0)e45 and the maximum possible Rossi alpha 
will be attained and stays constant at max,F. Therefore, Case B can attain only a minimum 
fizzle yield YF. The max,F is determined by the above assumptions. 
The application of the Serber relation (Section 9.9) leads then to C. Mark's [19] estimated 
minimum explosion fizzle yield for case B of 
YF = 0.45 kt TNT (equivalent) 
9.13.1     Integral pre-ignition probability and nuclear explosive yield 
In the Appendix to the paper of C. Mark an analytical relation between the integral 
probability of pre-ignition and the possible nuclear explosive yield Y is derived by van 
Hippel and Lyman [19]. They start from Eq. (9.14) Section 9.11.1 for the integral or 
cumulative probability for pre-ignition. 
 
 (9.17) 
 
with kmax = (keff,max-1) with keff,max-max. supercriticality of the sigmoidal curve 
 t0 = compression time 
 t1 = time after prompt criticality. 
 
As already mentioned in Section 9.11, C. Mark [19] assumes kmax = 1 which corresponds 
to kmax/42 = 1/2. Using this factor 1/2 and the Serber relation they are able to derive an 
analytical relationship between the integral or cumulative probability for pre-ignition P and 
the possible nuclear explosive yield fraction Y/Yo. 
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eff  = effective neutron life time, e.g. 10
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9.13.2 Numerical evaluation of the integral probability for pre-ignition for different 
isotopic compositions of plutonium 
The integral probability for pre-ignition can be evaluated, e.g. for two cases with different 
numerical assumptions. 
Case 1 describes roughly the data used in Section 9.12.5 
-5 -8
max eff,0 0 effΔk  = 0.6      k  = 0.98      t  = 10  s      ν = 2.5        = 1.35 10  s  
Case 2 describes roughly the data used by Mark [19] 
-5 -8
max eff,0 0 effΔk  = 1      k  = 0.90      t  = 10  s      ν = 2.5        = 10  s  
The SM are taken according to the critical masses and to the spontaneous fission neutron 
sources of Tables 9.2-9.6.b for case A. For keff,0 = 0.90 (Case 2) the critical masses and SM 
were corrected accordingly. The plutonium compositions of Tables 9.2 to 9.6.b contain the 
plutonium compositions of Tables 9.12 and 9.14 in part but also some more realistic 
compositions of proliferation-proof plutonium for the application of civil nuclear energy. 
Figures 9.45a and b show the cumulative or integral probabilities of pre-ignition as a 
function of t1/t0 or of the real time scale assuming t0 = 10-5 s. 
The different isotopic compositions of plutonium are given in colors. The denotations A, 
B, C, D, E correspond to the Tables 9.2 through 9.6.b. It can be seen that reactor-grade 
plutonium C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 and proliferation-proof plutonium D-1, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4 
represent a special category for themselves. For these isotopic compositions the cumulative 
or integral probability for pre-ignition attains 1 for t1/t0 "0.1 i.e. pre-ignition occurs within or 
"10-6 s in case 1. In case 2 pre-ignition occurs within about t1/t0 "0.2 or "2x10-6 s. 
Case 2 corresponds to kmax = 1 which would represent a compression ratio of about 4 to 
5 of the original plutonium density. A comparison of Case 1 and Case 2 clearly shows that 
some of the isotopic compositions of the category A and B attain the cumulative or integral 
probability of 1 rather late between 0.6"t1/t0"0.8 or between 6x10-6 s to 8x10-6 s 
These plutonium compositions which correspond to super-grade (A-1), weapons-grade 
(A-2), low burnup CANDU (A-3) and the CANDU (B-2) and FBR blanket (B-3) confirm the 
US-statement of Fig. 9.1. Such type of reactor plutonium would pre-ignite over a broad time 
scale of the spherical shock compaction and therefore attain different unpredictable explosive 
yields over a broader range. This is not the case for reactor-grade and proliferation-proof 
plutonium from spent PWR fuel (categories, C, D and E). They show the quasi-deterministic 
behavior for the corresponding minimum fizzle yields. 
An absolute exemption is the Trinity test case which is discussed by C. Mark [19] and 
shown here only for Case 2. A plutonium composition of 99.2% Pu-239 and 0.8% Pu-240 
was chosen for the TRINITY test which corresponds roughly to the cumulative probability 
data of C. Mark [19]. This is slightly lower than Chebeskov's value of 0.9% Pu-240 [14]. 
This gives an indication that the Trinity test probably had a plutonium composition with a 
Pu-240 content better, i.e. smaller than supergrade weapons plutonium. 
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Fig. 9.45 (a) and (b).     Cumulative probability for Cases 1 and 2 
 
Figs. 9.46a and b show the evaluation of Eq. (9.18) for the Cases 1 and 2 and for the 
different isotopic categories of plutonium of Tables 9.2 to 9.6.b. The left ordinate shows the 
cumulative or integral probability of pre-ignitions as a function of the possible nuclear 
explosive yield fraction Y/Y0. The right ordinate represents 1-P the cumulative or integral 
probability for no pre-ignition which is equivalent to the probability to attain Y/Y0. Fig. 
9.46a shows the results for Case 1 whereas Fig. 9.46b represents Case 2, the highest state of 
implosion technology. Both figures show that reactor-grade plutonium from LWRs and 
especially proliferation-proof plutonium lead to quasi deterministic minimum fizzle yields. 
Only the isotopic plutonium composition from low burnup CANDU or AGR spent fuel or 
FBR blanket plutonium offer the possibility to attain small ratios of Y/Y0 for small 
cumulative or integral probabilities of success. 
Only these plutonium composition (super-grade (A-1), weapons-grade (A-2), very low 
burnup CANDU (A-3), US test (A4, Pellaud [9]) and the AGR (B-1) CANDU (B-2) and 
FBR blanket (B-3) plutonium composition confirm the US-statement of Fig. 9.1. Different 
explosion yields can be attained for different cumulative probabilities of pre-ignition. 
Again the Trinity test device represents the absolute exemption attaining Y/Y0 = 1 with an 
about 80% cumulative probability for success. 
The data for the TRINITY test device (brown curve) are thoroughly discussed by C. Mark 
[19]. 
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Fig. 9.46.a. Cumulative probability P(Y/Y0) for pre-ignition and cumulative probability 
1-P(Y/Y0) to attain Y/Y0 for Case 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.46.b. Cumulative probability P(Y/Y0) for pre-ignition and cumulative probability 
1-P(Y/Y0) to attain Y/Y0 for Case 2. 
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The above results can also be used to present another Fig. 9.47. In this Figure the 
fractional nuclear explosive yield Y/Y0 is shown on the ordinate. The cumulative 
probabilities to attain these Y/Y0 are taken from the curves of Figure 9.46b shown as a 
parameter in Fig. 9.47. All the results in Fig. 9.47 (Case 2) are spread on the abscissa and 
arranged according to their quality of plutonium composition. This quality is expressed by 
the spontaneous fission neutron source which is also shown on the abscissa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.47. Relative nuclear explosive Y/Y0 with cumulative probability for achievement 
for the different plutonium compositions (weapons-grade and reactor-grade). 
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(Kessler et al. [12]) cases C2 through C4 (Table 9.4), case D1 (Table 9.5) and E1 through E4 
(Table 9.6b). 
Also shown on a second abscissa in Fig. 9.47 are the alpha-particle heat powers for each 
nuclear explosive device starting from left with Trinity (12 W), US test of 1962 (Pellaud 
(18 W), AGR and CANDU plutonium (30 W). The right side of this figure shows the reactor 
grade plutonium composition C-1 through C-3 with 112 to 243 W per HNED and 
proliferation-proof plutonium D-1 as well as E-1 through E-4 with 445 to 684 W (Table 9.2 
through 9.6b). It will be shown in the next Section 10 that HNEDs with more than 120 W 
alpha-particle heat power for low technology HNEDs and with more than 240 W for medium 
technology HNEDs are technically unfeasible. 
These data underline convincingly that different categories of plutonium must be 
considered – as suggested in Section 9.3 - for IAEA safeguards and for discussions of the 
proliferation issue. 
9.13.3 The US test of 1962 with reactor-grade plutonium 
The US-DOE [75] states that the reactor-grade plutonium used for the US-underground 
test in 1962 was plutonium from gas cooled reactors of the UK. The four 50 MW(e) gas 
cooled reactors at Calder Hall – the first British nuclear reactors – were connected to the 
electrical grid in 1956. The next four MAGNOX reactors at Chapelcross started operation in 
1959. Therefore, the plutonium for the US-underground test of 1962 must have been from 
these British nuclear reactors. Pellaud [9] estimated that this plutonium from the gas cooled 
graphite moderated reactors of the UK had a Pu-240 content of 12%. According to Chesson 
[76] – who calculated the isotopic content of plutonium from MAGNOX fuel of the Calder 
Hall reactors – a fuel burnup of 3000 MWd/t leads to a Pu-240 content of 12% in the 
plutonium as estimated by Pellaud [9]. 
Even if the Pu-240 content of this plutonium of the US-test in reality was slightly different 
from the estimate of Pellaud [9] with 12% it can be understood from Fig. 9.47 for a Pu-240 
content of less than 12% the related nuclear explosive yield would be found left of case A4 
between A2 and A4. In case the real Pu-240 was higher than 12% the relative nuclear 
explosive yield would be found right of A4 between A4 and B1. The maximum burnup of 
MAGNOX fuel is 5000 to 6000 MWd/t which corresponds to case B1 (Fig. 9.47 and Table 
9.2). 
All these possible results between case A2 and B1 confirm the statement of US-DOE [75] 
– the plutonium of this weapon test was reactor-grade because it had a higher Pu-240 
content than weapons-grade plutonium with more than 5.8% Pu-240 (see Tab. 9.7) 
– the nuclear explosive test was successful and the nuclear explosive yield was less than 20 
kt TNT (see Fig. 9.47). 
However, this reactor-grade plutonium used in the US underground test of 1962 does not 
at all correspond to reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel of LWRs with a burnup of 40-60 
GWd/t. 
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10.     Thermal analysis of HNEDs at different levels of technology 
In this Section the favorable results of neutronic analyses will be shown to not necessarily 
imply that such HNEDs are technically feasible. This point will be proved by thermal 
analysis. The heat produced by HNEDs will be used as the leading parameter. This alpha-
particle heat power is associated with a specific composition of reactor-grade plutonium, in 
which the Pu-238 isotope dominates the heat output. Moreover, various levels of technology 
required to design HNEDs will be defined and discussed in the light of the neutronic and 
thermal analyses. 
10.1 Definition of different levels of technology 
The geometric dimensions of the reactor-grade plutonium sphere and its reflector (Figure 
10.1) are determined by their nuclear characteristics. The radius of the plutonium sphere as 
the central part of HNEDs varies between 5.3 cm and 5.8-cm. The subcritical mass (keff = 
0.98) ranges between 9.2 to 13.2 kg for a solid reactor-grade plutonium sphere when 
reflected by a 5-cm thick natural-uranium reflector (see Tables 9.4 and 9.5 but also 9.6b as 
well as Tables 9.12 and 9.14). Hollow reactor-grade plutonium spheres would have an outer 
diameter of about 7.2 cm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.1. Schematic geometric arrangement of HNEDs and dimensions for thermal 
analyses. 
 
Kessler et al. [1,7,16,32] show the levels of technology of HNEDs to be based not only on 
geometric dimensions but also on the thermodynamic data of the materials used, e.g. the high 
explosive lenses. These thermodynamic data are much more important in reactor-grade 
plutonium HNEDs than in weapons-grade plutonium nuclear explosive devices. 
The heat produced by Pu-238 is negligible (less than 20 W) in a weapons-grade plutonium 
based nuclear explosive device (NED), thus requiring no thermal analysis. For reactor-grade 
plutonium HNEDs with higher Pu-238 content, however, these thermodynamic data are 
decisive, as will be seen below. The most critical parts are the high explosive lenses. 
As the geometric shape of the high explosive lenses is classified, a so-called one-
dimensional conservative approach must be chosen here for the thermal analysis. With this 
approach the real temperature profile in the explosive lenses tends to be underestimated 
which is conservative (Kessler [1]). This will be explained in Section 10.3.1. 
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The history of nuclear weapons development (Rhodes [3], Cochran et al. [4], and Podwig 
[5]) shows that a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) about to design and build HNEDs 
from reactor-grade plutonium would have to proceed from low to medium technology levels. 
Only current Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) would be able to master the very high level of 
technology because of their know-how in research and experiments accumulated over long 
periods of time. 
10.2    Geometric dimensions for different levels of technology 
Accounts of the development of nuclear weapons in Rhodes [3], Cochran et al. [4] and 
Podwig [5] indicate the outside radius of nuclear weapons to have decreased from 75 cm 
(earliest nuclear weapon) to some 22 cm (Fetter et al. [6]). At the same time, the thickness of 
high explosive lenses decreased from 43 cm (Rhodes [3]) to approx. 25 cm and then to some 
10 cm (Fetter et al. [6]). 
For the thermal analysis three classes of technological development (low, medium and 
very high technology) are selected (Fig. 10.2). 
Kessler [1] selected an outer radius of 65 cm for the low technology case. This is 
somewhat smaller than the 75 cm for the earliest nuclear explosive device. Similarly for the 
size of medium technology (HNEDs) the outer radius was estimated to be 42 cm from 
pictures in (Fetter et al. [6], Cochran et al. [4], and Blechman et al. [21]. The high technology 
case is chosen to have an outer radius of 21 cm from pictures in (Podwig et al. [5], Fetter et 
al. [6], and Cochran et al. [4]. These are reasonable guesses only for the following thermal 
analysis of HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium (Fig. 10.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.2.   Assumed geometric dimensions for three classes of technology. 
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Whereas the Pu-sphere, the Unat reflector and the Al-layer are of metallic structure, the 
high explosive hollow sphere consists of a complicated geometric lense structure of at least 2 
different high explosives with different detonation velocities (Rhodes [3,22]), but also 
different thermal conductivities. 
10.3 High explosives for different classes of technology 
10.3.1 Low technology high explosives 
According to Section 9 the first nuclear explosive device had Baratol and Composition B as 
high explosives. Table 10.1 shows the thermal characteristic data of these low technology 
high explosives, together with those of TNT. Their melting point is 79-81 °C representing the 
limiting characteristic of these high explosives. 
These data are collected from Gibbs et al. [18], Mader et al. [19] and Dobratz [24]. 
Onset of pyrolysis [°C] High explosive Density 
[g/cm3] 
Thermal 
conductivity 
[W/m °C] 
Detonation 
velocity 
[km/s] 
Melting point
[°C] 
Temperature for onset of chem. self-
explosion Te [°C] 
180 Baratol 
 
2.61 0.494 4.9 79-80 
300 
200 Composition B 
 
1.74 0.219 7.8-8.0 79 
214 
260 TNT 1.45 0.259 6.9 81 
288 
Table 10.1.     Characteristic materials data for low technology high explosives. 
10.3.2 Medium technology high explosives 
Medium technology high explosives have higher thermal conductivities, higher melting 
points and higher temperatures Te for onset of pyrolysis and onset of chemical self-explosion. 
Table 10.2 shows these thermal characteristic data for DATB, HMX, PBX 9011, PBX 9404, 
PBX 9407 and PBX 9901. These data are collected from Gibbs et al. [18], Mader et al. [19] 
and Dobratz [24]. 
Kessler [1,16] assumed these same temperatures Te for the onset of self-explosion for all 
thermal analyses of the low, medium, and high technology cases because it is a temperature 
determined by experiments for each high explosive (Gibbs et al. [18], Mader et al. [19] and 
Dobratz [24]). Shmelev et al. [51] used a relation for the pyrolysis of 2% of the high 
explosive. 
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Onset of pyrolysis (°C) High 
explosive 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Thermal 
conductivity 
(W/m °C) 
Detonation 
velocity 
(km/s) 
Melting point 
(°C) 
Temperature for onset of 
chem. self-explosion, Te (°C) 
300 DATB 1.83 0.259 7.6 286 
322 
285 HMX 1.84 0.406 9.11 256-286 
259 
260 PBX9011 1.77 0.381 8.5 190 
 
290 PBX 9404 1.84 0.385 8.8 190 
236 
240 PBX 9407 1.65 0.335 8.4 204 
 
275 PBX 9501 1.86 0.452 8.7 190 
235 
 
Table 10.2.   Characteristic materials data for medium technology high explosives. 
10.3.3     Very high technology high explosives 
Very high technology high explosives have the highest melting points and the highest 
temperatures Te for onset of pyrolysis or onset for chemical self-explosion (Table 10.3). 
These data are collected from Gibbs et al. [18], Mader et al. [19] and Dobratz [24]. They are 
only available to advanced NWSs, e.g. the USA. 
As both very high technology high explosives have similar detonation velocities and 
thermal characteristics, they will have to be combined with other high explosives or materials 
in the implosion lenses. For the following calculations of the temperature profiles in the very 
high technology HNEDs, only the temperature curve for the two very high technology 
explosives TATB or PBX-9503 will be shown. 
 
Onset of pyrolysis (°C) High explosive Density 
(g/cm3) 
Thermal 
conductivity 
(W/m °C) 
Detonation 
velocity 
(km/s) 
Melting 
point 
  (°C) Temperature of onset of chem. self-explosion, Te (°C) 
395 PBX 9502 1.89 0.561 7.6 448 
331 
395 TATB 1,89 0.544 7.6 448 
347 
Table 10.3.   Characteristic materials data for very high technology high explosives. 
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10.4   The one-dimensional conservative approach for the thermal analyses 
The spherical lenses in the first NED consisted of two different fast and slow reacting high 
explosives (Baratol and Composition B) and had a complicated explosive lense structure 
[3,22]. As the complicated high explosive lense structure is not known (classified), the 
following one-dimensional conservative approach is applied. 
Imagine radial sections through the high explosive lense structure or small elements which 
consist e.g. of 2 different high explosives 1 (Composition B) and 2 (Baratol). Along such 
sections (Fig. 10.3) interchanging parts of the two different high explosives Composition B 
and Baratol may be found which – apart from different detonation velocity – have different 
thermal conductivity  1 and 2. Not knowing in which radial position the different parts of 
the two high explosives are located and what dimensions they have, it can nevertheless be 
concluded  that the  unknown  radial  temperature  profile in the  unknown  structure can only 
 
Fig. 10.3. Explanation of the conservative one-dimensional approach for an unknown  
3-dimensional high explosive lense structure. 
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vary between two limiting radial temperature profiles of Composition B and Baratol. These 
are determined by two simple cases. Each of these two simple cases would consist of only 
one high explosive 1 (Composition B) or 2 (Baratol) with its thermal conductivity 1 or 2 
(Fig. 10.3). It is assumed that high enough gap heat transfer coefficients exist at the interfaces 
between the two high explosives such that the temperature change across the interface can be 
neglected. 
In the azimuthal direction there will also be interfaces between the two high explosives 
and there will be quasi-oscillations of the azimuthal temperature profile at constant radius. In 
this azimuthal direction the conservative approach of the two limiting temperature profiles 
will also be valid. 
The real temperature profiles will always be located within the limiting temperature 
profiles of Composition B and Baratol. 
In cases where limiting temperatures of the high explosives are exceeded, e.g. melting 
point or temperature Te for initiation of self-explosion, always the lower limiting temperature 
profile is considered which is determined by the high explosive with the higher thermal 
conductivity. This is always conservative, because the explosive with the lower thermal 
conductivity has the higher temperatures in the interior regions. In addition, the real limiting 
temperatures (melting point, temperature Te for initiation of self-explosion) are accounted for 
(see Tables 10.1 through 10.3). 
For very high technology cases the two high explosives are assumed to be the same and 
have the highest thermal conductivities and limiting temperatures which can be found in the 
open scientific literature [Gibbs et al. [18], Mader et al. [19] and Dobratz [24]] (again to be 
conservative). 
If three or more different high explosives would be used in the high explosive lense 
structure the approach would be the same, but the limiting temperature curves would be 
represented by the high explosives with the highest and the lowest thermal conductivity. This 
is e.g. shown in cases for medium technology. 
It is assumed that an HNED would not work properly if its high explosive lenses would be 
either partially molten or if the temperature for start of pyrolysis and/or the temperature Te 
for initiation of self explosion would be exceeded. 
For low technology it is assumed that the HNED would not work if the melting 
temperature of Baratol or Composition B of 79-80 °C would be exceeded (Table 10.1). 
For medium technology it is assumed that both the fast- and the slow-reacting high 
explosives will melt at about 190 to 286 °C, pyrolysis will start at about 260 °C to 300 °C 
and have a temperature Te for initiation of self-explosion around 235 °C to 322 °C. This 
would correspond to high explosives like DATB, HMX, PBX 9011, PBX 9407, PBX 9501. 
Again it is assumed that an HNED would not work properly if its high explosive lenses 
would be partially molten or if the temperatures for start of pyrolysis and chemical self-
explosion would be exceeded (Table 10.2). 
For very high technology PBX 9502 or TATB are assumed. They have a melting point of 
448 °C. The start of pyrolysis will be at 395 °C, but the limiting temperatures will be the 
initiation of self-explosion at Te = 331 °C (PBX 9502) or Te = 347 °C (TATB) (see Table 
10.3). As is stated in Zinn et al. [23]: a high explosive will start self-explosion, if the 
temperature at its surface exceeds Te. 
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10.5   Temperature profile within an HNED 
The alpha-particle heat power generated in the plutonium core must be transferred through 
the different material layers to the outer steel casing by heat conduction and from there to the 
atmosphere by natural convection and radiation. This can be described by: 
 6 7 4 4N R a 12 a wQ  = Q  + Q  =  h A  T -T  + C   A  T -T      
  
 (10.1) 
where 
Q

 = alpha-particle heat power in the Pu-core 
NQ

 = heat power transferred by natural convection 
RQ

 = heat power transferred by radiation 
 h = heat transfer coefficient for natural convection to be determined by the relation of 
  [25], given below 
A = outer steel casing surface area of the HNED 
Ta = outer steel casing temperature of the HNED 
T = ambient gas temperature around the HNED 
Tw = wall temperature of a room or structures surrounding the HNED 
C1,2 = is defined by Equ. 10.1c 
 
According to Yuge [25] the heat transfer coefficient at the surface of a heated sphere can 
be determined from 
Nu = 2 + 0.43 · Ra1/4                                                         (10.1.a) 
for Pr = 1 and 1 " Ra " 105 
where: 
Pr = Prandtl number, Nu = Nusselt number, Ra = Raleigh number and 
3
ag ß (T - T) DRa 	
  
     
  
                                                    (10.1.b) 
with 
 = thermal diffusivity D = diameter of HNED 
 = kinematic viscosity g = gravity constant 
ß = thermal expansion coefficient 
The constant C1,2 for concentric radiating surfaces is: 
1,2
a w w
C
1 A 1 - 1
A
  
    

	
& '
 ( )2 2* +
                                         (10.1.c) 
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where 
 = Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 5.67x10-8 W/m2K4 
A = surface of HNED outer casing, Aw = surface of room or structures surrounding the 
HNED 
w
A   1
A
  
2a = emissivity of the outer steel casing of the HNED 
2w = emissivity of room walls or structures surrounding the HNED 
It can further be assumed 
w w
A 1  - 1  0
A ε
& '
$( )
* +
; 
then                                       6 7
•
4 4
a a wQ =      A T  - T                                                   (10.1.d) 
The emissivities 2a of different materials, collected by Kuchling [9], are given in Table 10.4. 
 
Black body 
 
Gold polished 
at 500 °C 
 
Aluminum 
polished 
1 
 
0.03 
 
 
0.04 
Silver polished 
 
Steel polished 
20 °C 
 
Aluminum 
rolled 
0.035 
 
0.286 
 
 
0.07 
Table 10.4.  Some emissivities of different materials [9]. 
As can be seen from the above equation for radiation transfer, the highest radiation heat 
transfer occurs at 2a = 1 (black body radiation). This also leads to the lowest surface 
temperature of the outer steel casing Ta. 
To be on the conservative side, black body radiation is assumed for the further 
considerations. With an emissivity of e.g. 0.286 for polished steel the surface temperature 
difference (Ta-Tw) of the outer casing would be by 0.286-1/4 or about a factor of ~1.3 higher. 
Equation (10.1) for the total heat transfer from the outer steel casing of the HNED to the 
atmosphere is solved inversely by assuming temperatures for T, Ta and TW and calculating 
Q which allows the outer wall temperature Ta to be determined by interpolation tables. 
10.6.   Outer temperature at the casing of the HNED 
For the different Pu-compositions of Section 9 the temperatures in degrees Celsius for the 
three assumed cases of technology are given in Table 10.5. It clearly shows the trends of 
higher outer casing temperatures for higher alpha-particle heat powers (higher Pu-238 
content) and the increase of outer-casing temperatures as a function of lower outer radius 
going from low $ medium $ high technology. 
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HNED Technology 
-heat power (kW) low medium high 
 Outlet radius of 
HNED 65 (cm) 
Outlet radius of 
HNED 42 (cm) 
Outlet radius of 
HNED 21 (cm) 
 Ta (°C) Ta (°C) Ta (°C) 
0.144 
0.240 
0.614 
0.858 
1.121 
1.244 
1.416 
1.530 
32 
34 
43 
49 
55 
58 
61 
64 
36 
42 
62 
71 
85 
89 
96 
100 
58 
76 
129 
154 
183 
187 
199 
208 
Table 10.5. Outer Steel Casing Temperature Ta of HNEDs for different alpha-particle heat 
power and different technology. 
 
The calculations showed also that the radiation heat transfer is dominant. In many cases 
the radiation heat transfer amounts to 90% and more, whereas the natural convection heat 
transfer is only several percent up to 10%. 
After determination of the temperature Ta of the outer steel casing, the temperature profile 
in the spherical shells without internal heat sources (high explosives, aluminum, Unat-reflector 
etc.) can be adressed. 
10.7 Radial temperature distribution within the HNED for constant thermal 
conductivity 
The radial temperature distribution within the HNED is obtained by the solution of the heat 
conduction equation with internal and external boundary conditions and constant thermal 
conductivities. 
The temperature difference 81 - 8n+1 over n shells with constant thermal conductivities 1 
to n and inner and outer radii rn, rn+1 for n=1....N is given by Eq. (10.2): 
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and the corresponding temperature profile within the k-th 
spherical shell follows Eq. (10.2a):  

1 1
4
& '
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  r r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As will be seen below from Table 10.7 as well as already shown in Tables 10.1 through 
10.3 the high explosives have the lowest thermal conductivities of all spherical shells without 
internal heat sources. It is therefore important to have reliable experimental data for the high 
explosives. 
The heat transfer through a gap, e.g., between the heat producing Pu-sphere and the Unat 
reflector can be described by 
 
•
gap Q  =    A  T                                                      (10.3) 
gap = gap heat transfer coefficient (Kämpf [27,28] 
A = surface of Pu-sphere or Pu-spherical shell 
T = Temperature difference between outer Pu-sphere and inner Unat reflector surface 
 
The temperature difference due to alpha-particle heat power in a solid Pu-sphere is 
described by Eq. (10.4): 
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2
0 1
0 1
Pu
L  • rT   -  T   =  
6 • 
                                                               (10.4) 
where 
L0 heat power rate in the sphere (cal/cm3٠s) 
Pu thermal conductivity of 1-phase plutonium which is 0.0458 (cal/cm·s·°C) (Blank et al. 
[34]). 
 
For cylindrical geometry of the reactor-grade plutonium, Eq. (10.4a) holds 
2
0 1
0 1
Pu
L  • rT   -  T   =  
4 • 
                                                               (10.4a) 
The temperature difference (T0-T1) would be by a factor 1.5 higher. 
 
If the reactor-grade Pu would be arranged in a hollow spherical shell, then Eq. (10.5) 
holds: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
ri - inner radius of the Pu-spherical shell 
ra - outer radius of the Pu-spherical shell 
Ti - inner temperature of the Pu spherical shell 
Ta - outer temperature of the Pu spherical shell 
10.8     Radial temperature distribution in a bare solid Pu-sphere 
As discussed earlier the bare solid sphere or two hemispheres of it must be machined, 
handled etc.. This must be done in glove boxes or hot cells with a gas temperature of about 
room temperature. 
Eq. (10.1) together with Eqs. (10.1a) through (10.1d) describing natural convection and 
radiation must be solved by assuming temperatures for T, Ta and TW and inverse calculation 
of the alpha-particle heat power Q  with interpolation tables. The results are given in Table 
10.6 for the plutonium compositions shown already in Table 9.14. Natural convection only 
contributes by a few percent whereas radiation is predominant. The outer surface 
T1     To 
            r1 
r1    - solid sphere radius 
T0   - center temperature 
T1  - surface temperature 
 
 
2 3
2o a i
i a i
Pu a
L r r3T  -  T  =  -  r  + 
3 2 2 r
 
  
 
                      (10.5) 
ra 
 Ti Ta   ri i
i i
ii
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temperatures increase steadily for increasing Pu-238 compositions and alpha-particle heat 
power. 
 
radius of Pu-sphere 
(cm) 
-heat power 
(kW) 
outer Temperature 
Ta (°C) 
central Temperature 
T0 (°C) 
5.2 
5.3 
5.8 
5.8 
5.8 
5.7 
5.5 
5.4 
0.144 
0.240 
0.614 
0.858 
1.121 
1.244 
1.417 
1.530 
251 
213 
434 
496 
550 
571 
618 
molten 
257 
322 
456 
527 
590 
616 
669 
molten 
Table 10.6. Outer temperature, Ta, and central temperature, T0, of bare plutonium spheres as 
a function of alpha-particle heat power. 
 
The central temperature of the bare plutonium spheres is calculated from Eq. 10.4. The 
thermal conductivity of reactor grade plutonium is taken from Blank et al. [26] to be 19 
W/mK. Fig. 10.4 shows the outer and central temperatures of a bare metallic plutonium 
sphere as a function of the total alpha-particle heat power or of the Pu-238 content [%] of the 
reactor grade plutonium. 
For an alpha heat power of 1416 [W] the surface temperature would be 618 °C. Its central 
temperature would be 669 °C (above the melting point for Pu-metal of 640 °C). The inner 
3.85 cm of the Pu-sphere would be molten, the outer spherical shell of 1.65 cm would be at a 
temperature between 618 °C and 640 °C (melting point). The sphere would collapse (loose 
the geometrical form) under its own gravity. 
Subcritical plutonium spheres (keff = 0.98) with a Pu-238 content of >20% would melt and 
collapse at about 23%. For a hollow spherical shell design the conclusions would be very 
similar, although the outer radius would be somewhat larger (e.g. 7.2 cm instead of 5.8 cm). 
The outside temperatures of Table 10.6 and Fig. 10.4 are conservative as they are valid for 
black body radiation 2a = 1. The real emissivity of polished plutonium metal cannot be found 
in the literature. However, if the plutonium sphere would be plated with gold at the outside 
(see Section 9.5) the emissivity would be 0.03 (Table 10.4). This would increase the 
temperature difference (Ta-T0) by 0.04-1/4 or by a factor of 2.24. 
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Fig. 10.4. Outer and central steady state temperature of a bare metallic Pu-sphere as function 
of Pu-238 content [%] of reactor-grade plutonium and its alpha heat power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.5. A 100 W heat source of about 3 cm diameter containing 250 g of 238-PuO2. The 
oxide glowed at red heat. It was manufactured by Los Alamos Laboratory, USA 
for the thermoelectric generators of the Voyager space mission [30]. 
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10.8.1     Comparison with IAEA definitions 
With the above results the IAEA definitions (INFCIRC 153 Section 8) cannot be understood. 
IAEA requires that only plutonium with more than 80% Pu-238 can be exempt of IAEA 
safeguards or is not to be considered weapons-grade plutonium. Subritical (keff = 0.98) 
plutonium metal spheres operated with 80% Pu-238 content cannot exist (molten already for 
23% or even lower Pu-238 content). 
As an illustration of these facts Fig. 10.5 taken from [30] shows a sphere of plutonium 
dioxide with a diameter of about 3 cm. The heat source which was part of the Voyager space 
missions thermoelectric generators contains 250 g of 238-PuO2. 
A subcritical (keff=0.91) reactor grade plutonium metal sphere with 80% Pu-238 
enrichment would have an outer diameter of about 11 cm, weigh about 11 kg (Table 9.14) 
and contain about 8.2 kg Pu-238. It would produce about 5 kW of alpha-particle heat power. 
Such plutonium quantities can only exist above the melting point of plutonium. 
In the same context also publications as Bathge et al. [31] must be seen. They are based on 
rules of US-DOE defining also the 80% Pu-238 criterion similar to IAEA (INFCIRC 153). 
10.9   Temperature profile in an assembled HNED 
After determination of the outer casing temperatures Ta (see Table 10.5) for the different 
cases of HNEDs, equations (10.2) through (10.5) are applied for calculating the associated 
inner radial temperature profiles. The following constant thermal conductivity data (Table 
10.7) are used. 
 
Pu-metal 0.0458 [cal/cm s·K] 
reflector (U-metal) 
Aluminum 
Beryllium 
Tungsten 
High explosive 
Steel casing 
Gap coefficient Pu-sphere-reflector 
19 [W/m K] [34] 
34 [W/m K] [29] 
146.5 [W/m K] [29] 
117.2 [W/m K] [29] 
117.2 [W/m K] [29] 
see Tables 10.1 through 10.3 
13.6 W/m K [29] 
700 W/m2 K [27,28] 
Table 10.7. Thermal conductivities for the different materials within a HNED. 
There will be a thin gap between the Pu-sphere or hollow spherical shell and the Unat 
reflector. For the gap transfer coefficient a value is assumed as it was determined for fresh 
mixed oxide plutonium/uranium fuel elements (Kämpf [27,28]). For the other spherical shells 
(aluminum, high explosives) gap coefficients were not considered in order to remain 
conservative. Aluminum, Beryllium or Tungsten can also surround the Unat reflector. They 
have similar high thermal conductivity, but different melting points. For each class of 
technology the thermal conductivity values for the corresponding high explosive are applied 
(Table 10.1 through 10.3). 
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For Pu-metal the measured thermal conductivity (Blank et al. [34]) which is valid for 1% 
Gallium-stabilized plutonium-metal up to temperatures of 500 °C. As will be seen later, 
many of the investigated cases will lead to even higher Pu temperatures and melting of the 
reactor Pu. 
10.10 Results of thermal analyses [1,32] 
In this section the inner temperature profile for low, medium, and very high technology 
HNEDs will be discussed for increasing alpha-particle heat power. 
10.10.1 Radial temperature profiles in an HNED with reactor-grade plutonium 
with an alpha-particle of 0.144 kW 
10.10.1.1 Low technology 
As has been explained above, the class "low technology" has the largest overall dimensions 
(Fig. 10.3) and contains the high explosives Baratol and Composition B. In Fig. 10.6 it is 
shown that the radial temperature profile rises from 32 °C at the outside casing to 107 °C in 
Baratol and 201.8 °C in Composition B. According to the one-dimensional conservative 
approach (Section 10.4.) the real radial temperature profile would be varying between the 
two limiting radial temperature profiles which are determined by the thermal conductivities 
of Baratol and Composition B. 
In the low technology case with an alpha-particle heat power of 0.144 kW about one-sixth 
(radius) of the Baratol and one-half (radius) of Composition B would be molten and the 
explosive lenses could not work properly. Any higher alpha-particle heat power than 0.144 
kW would lead to higher temperatures and increase of melt zones. 
It can be shown by calculation that for 0.120 kW the high explosion Baratol would just be 
molten at the inner surface. The high explosive lenses could, therefore, not function any 
more. 
10.10.1.2 Medium Technology 
For medium technology smaller overall dimensions (42 cm outer-casing radius) are assumed. 
For this case: DATB with  = 0.259 W/cm°C, PBX 9011 and PBX 9404 with  = 0.38 
W/cm°C and PBX 9501 with  = 0.452 W/cm°C, different high explosives with better 
thermal conductivities and higher melting points (DATB, HMX, PBX 9011, PBX 9407, PBX 
9501) are assumed. Again the principle of limiting temperature profiles is applied. Obviously 
the high explosives with a higher melting point have also higher thermal conductivities so 
that at no spatial point in the high-explosive lenses would the melting point be attained (Fig. 
10.7). The explosive lenses could function properly. 
For comparison Fig. 10.7 shows also the temperature profiles which would evolve with 
low technology high explosives (Baratol and Composition B) and medium-technology 
dimension, see dashed lines. Again large volumes of Baratol and Composition B would be 
molten. 
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Fig. 10.6. Temperature profiles in a low technology HNED with an alpha-particle heat 
power of 0.144 kW. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.7. Temperature profiles in a medium technology HNED with reactor Pu 
 (0.144 kW alpha-particle heat power). 
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10.10.1.3 Very High Technology 
With a relatively small radius of 21 cm and the outer-casing temperature of 58 °C, the high 
explosives PBX 9502 or TATB with the highest thermal conductivity of 0.561 W/cm °C and 
the highest melting point 448 °C are assumed (Table 10.3) for that option. The maximum 
temperature within the Pu sphere would be 113 °C. The high technology HNED could 
function properly. 
10.10.2 Radial temperature profiles for reactor plutonium from spent fuel with an 
alpha-particle heat power of 0.240 kW 
10.10.2.1 Low Technology 
With a higher alpha-particle heat power, namely 240 W, the temperatures in such an HNED 
would be higher than shown in Fig. 10.6. The explosive lenses would not work. 
10.10.2.2 Medium Technology 
This case is shown by Fig. 10.8. The outer-casing temperature would be 42 °C at an outer 
radius of 42 cm. It can be realized that the melting point would be attained at about 2 to 4 cm 
from the inner edge of the chemical high explosives DATB, PBX 9011, PBX 9404 and 
HMX. Also for the high explosive PBX 9501 the melting plant would be reached in a thin 
zone. 
Therefore, the medium technology high explosive lenses would not function properly for 
this limiting alpha-particle heat power of 0.240 kW. 
For comparison Fig. 10.8 shows also the temperature profiles which would evolve with 
low technology explosives and medium technology dimensions. Again a large volume of the 
high explosive lenses would be molten in such case. 
10.10.2.3 Very High Technology 
Under the assumptions explained above and PBX 9502 or TATB as high explosives with 
the highest thermal conductivity, there will be an outer-casing temperature of 76 °C and a 
maximum temperature in the very high explosive of 151 °C and of 170 °C in the plutonium. 
The very high technology HNED could still function properly. 
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Fig. 10.8. Temperature profiles in a medium-technology HNED with an alpha-particle 
heat power of 0.240 kW. 
10.10.3. Radial temperature profiles for reactor plutonium with an alpha-particle 
heat power between 0.375 and 0.562 kW 
10.10.3.1 Low Technology 
With a higher alpha-particle heat power between 0.375 and 0.562 kW, the temperatures 
would be such high that most of the high explosive lenses would be molten. Such an HNED 
could not work at all. 
10.10.3.2 Medium Technology 
Also in the medium technology case with an alpha-particle heat power between 0.375 and 
0.562 kW the temperatures would be so high that such an HNED could not function at all. 
10.10.3.3 Very High Technology [16] 
The high-technology explosives PBX 9502 and TATB would attain 347 °C at the inner 
radius of the high explosive lenses for an alpha-particle heat power of 0.375 kW (see also 
Section 10.13.9.1). This is above the temperature for initiation of explosion Te = 331 °C 
(PBX 9502) or equal to Te = 347 °C (TATB). Under the assumption that the real tempera-
tures in the high explosive lenses would be higher than determined by the one-dimensional 
conservative approach such a very high-technology HNED would not function properly. At 
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an alpha-particle heat power of 0.562 kW both PBX 9502 and TATB would reach the 
melting point of 448 °C. 
10.10.4 HNEDs with other implosion geometries [1,32] 
10.10.4.1 Very High technology HNED with hollow spherical reactor Pu shell 
The hollow spherical shell has an inner radius ri = 5.6 cm, an outer radius of 7.2 cm. The 
outer dimensions of the HNED were the same as in the solid-sphere. Only the thickness of 
the aluminum spherical shell was reduced from 3 to 1.6 cm. 
The temperatures in the high explosive are the same as in the solid Pu-sphere case. Only 
the temperature difference in the spherical plutonium shell would be somewhat lower. 
The limits for alpha-particle heat power would be the same as in the case for a solid 
plutonium sphere (Section 10.10.3.7). 
10.10.4.2 Very High technology Pu-sphere combined with spherical shell design [1,32] 
In this case an inner solid reactor-grade plutonium sphere of 4 cm radius and a Pu spherical 
shell of 5.8 cm inner and 6.8 cm outer radius were assumed. The resulting temperature profile 
in the explosive lenses remains essentially equal to those of the solid sphere with reactor-
grade plutonium. Only the temperatures in the small Pu sphere become considerably higher. 
Again as in the cases of solid or hollow plutonium spheres such an HNED would have the 
same limits of alpha-particle heat power when the HNED would not function any more. 
10.10.4.3 HNEDs with smaller outer diameter of 15.5 cm 
For the sake of completeness also HNEDs with reactor-grade plutonium and an outer-casing 
diameter down to 15.5 cm were analyzed. Such cases belong only to the very high 
technology class. Applying Eqs. (10.1) through (10.1d) for natural convection and radiation, 
the outer-casing temperatures were determined. 
Table 10.8 shows that the outer-casing temperature for a 15.5 cm HNED design, e.g. for 
Pu with  0.614 kW  alpha-particle  heat power would be 338 °C. This means that most part of 
the high explosives inside would exceed the temperature Te = 331 °C or 347 °C for initiation  
-heat 
(kW) 
155 mm diameter casing 
outer temperature (°C) 
0.144 
0.240 
0.614 
0.858 
1.121 
1.244 
1.416 
1.530 
 168 
 183 
 338 
 392 
 451 
 456 
 479 
 494 
Table 10.8. Outer-Casing Temperature Ta of HNEDs with 15.5 cm outer diameter. 
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of self-explosion of PBX-9502 or TATB, respectively. Such designs would not be possible 
with reactor-grade plutonium at least from an alpha-particle heat power of 0.55 kW upwards. 
10.11     Conclusions for the results of the thermal analyses 
Following the conservative approach described in Section 10.4, always the lower limiting 
temperature profile is taken to define a limit for denatured proliferation-proof plutonium. The 
limiting temperatures are 
1. the melting point of the high explosives 
2. the temperature Te for initiation of self explosion of the high explosive 
3. the melting temperature of the Pu metal 
The reactor-grade plutonium can be considered to be denatured or proliferation-proof if at 
least one of these limits is exceeded, because the high explosive lenses and, therefore, the 
whole HNED would not work. 
10.11.1 Low Technology 
As was shown already in Section 10.10.1.1, and can be seen from Fig. 10.9 the melting point 
of both Baratol and Composition B are exceeded already for 0.120 kW. This corresponds to 
reactor-grade Pu from spent LWR fuel with about 35 GWd/t burnup (Table 9.4). The 
temperature Te for initiation of self-explosion for Composition B would be exceeded for a 
slightly higher alpha-particle heat power. Thus, reactor-grade plutonium from LWR spent 
fuel with 1.8% Pu-238 or about 35 GWd/t burn-up (Table 9.4) if used in low technology 
HNEDs is proliferation-proof. 2 
10.11.2 Medium Technology 
As was shown already in Section 10.10.2.2 and can be seen from Fig. 10.10 the melting 
points are exceeded for an alpha-particle heat power of 0.240 kW for the high explosives 
PBX 9011, PBX 9404, PBX 9501, as well as HMX and DATB. 
Reactor-grade plutonium from LWR spent fuel with about 3.6% Pu-238 or a burnup of 
about 58 GWd/t (Table 9.4) if used in HNEDs of medium technology can be considered as 
proliferation-proof. 
 
                                                 
2 The 1.8% Pu-238 in the reactor grade plutonium and the 0.120 kW are not fully consistent with the 1.6%  
Pu-238 and 0.144 kW of Pu(0) in [1] as the alpha-particle heat for Pu-242 had to the corrected in later 
publications [16,32]. 
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Fig. 10.9. Temperature profiles in an HNED with low technology and different values of 
alpha-particle heat power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.10. Temperature profiles in HNEDs for reactor-grade plutonium for the medium 
technology case. 
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10.11.3     Common assessment of the neutronic and the thermal analysis 
In Section 9.10.1.4 and 9.12.1, two levels of technology and the associated shock pressures 
acting on the outside of the natural uranium reflector had been defined: 
 low technology 0.06 TPa 
 very high technology 0.11 TPa. 
These levels of technology incorporate the art of designing and building the high 
explosive lenses and are directly related to the thickness of the explosive lenses. The 
increase in pressure applied to the outside of the reflector is a function of convergent 
spherical flow and has been shown (Kessler et al. [2]) to be the higher the thicker the high 
explosive lenses are. The higher the thickness of the explosive lenses the higher the 
magnification factor for the shock pressure applied to the outer surface of the reflector, the 
higher are the particle velocities caused by the shock wave, the maximum Rossi alpha 
attained and, finally, also the nuclear explosive yields. 
According to the shock compression results of [2,26], an increase of the thickness of the 
implosion lenses up to 40 cm would allow to increase the concentric shock pressure from 
about 0.11 (TPa) to about 0.18 (TPa) acting on the outer surface of the reflector. This would 
theoretically result in even higher nuclear explosive yields than those reported in Section 
9.12.5. However, such HNEDs would not be technically feasible above a certain alpha-
particle heat power of reactor-grade plutonium. This is born out by the results of the thermal 
analysis of Section 10.10. 
The results of the thermal analysis shown in Figs. 10.6 and 10.7 show that for both 43 cm 
thick (low technology) and 25 cm thick implosion lenses (low technology of high explosives 
and medium technology for thickness of high explosive lenses) (Table 10.9) the implosion 
lenses would be partially molten for an alpha particle heat of 0.144 (kW). One can calculate 
that the corresponding limit would be 0.120 kW where the high explosives begin to melt. 
This corresponds to plutonium in LWR spent fuel with about 1.8% Pu-238 or a burnup of 
about 35 GWd/t. Similarly, this limit would be 0.240 kW or a burnup of 58 GWd/t for 
medium technology with 25 cm thick lenses as shown by Fig. 10.8. 
 
Level of 
technology 
Thickness of 
implosion lenses 
(cm) 
Thermal conduc-
tivity (W/m °C) 
Melting tempe-
rature (°C) 
Temperature start of 
self explosion (°C) 
Low 
technology 
43 0.219-0.494 79-80 180-288 
Medium 
technology 
25 0.259-0.452 190-286 260-322 
Very high 
technology 
10 0.561 448 331-347 
 
Table 10.9. Geometric dimensions and thermodynamic data of implosion lenses for 
different levels of technology. 
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10.11.4 Limits of alpha-particle heat power for proliferation-proof plutonium 
All reactor-grade plutonium generating an alpha-particle heat power of more than 0.120 kW 
or reactor-grade plutonium from LWR-UOX or LWR-MOX fuel with a burnup of more than 
35 GWd/t or more than 1.8% Pu-238 in the reactor plutonium (see Table 9.6) will render a 
low technology HNED technically unfeasible (Fig. 10.9). This means that the explosive 
yields of 0.12 or 0.35 kt TNT (equivalent) of Section 9.12.5 would not be feasible either. 
For medium technology HNEDs this limit for the alpha-particle heat power is 0.240 kW. 
Temperatures in this case would be so high that medium technology high explosives (see 
Table 10.2) would melt or even reach the temperature limit above which a chemical self-
explosion would be initiated. The thermal limit of 0.240 kW is determined by the high 
explosive PBX-9501 which has the highest thermal conductivity with 0.452 W/cm °C out of 
the medium technology high explosives (Table 10.2). From Fig. 10.8 it can be seen that it 
would just be molten at the inner boundary. This thermal limit of 0.240 kW corresponds to 
reactor-grade plutonium from reprocessed UOX or MOX spent LWR fuel with a burnup 
above 58 GWd/t (roughly 3.6% Pu-238 in the plutonium – see Table 9.6). It would even 
render a medium technology HNED technically unfeasible. This means that the nuclear 
explosive yield of 0.12 or 0.35 kt TNT (equivalent) of Section 9.12.5 would not be feasible 
either. 
These results do not confirm the statement in Fig. 9.1 which reads: 
..........plutonium of the quality produced in current nuclear reactors................can be 
used to make nuclear explosives, using technology comparable to the earliest plutonium 
weapons. 
This statement seems to be based on the neutronic analysis only but disregards any results 
from a thermal analysis (see also Fig. 9.47). 
To bring the above results in direct relationship with practical reality the current burnup of 
LWR spent fuel is close to 60 GWd/t. 
The first nuclear explosive device (Fig. 9.3) had somewhat larger geometric dimensions as 
used in Fig. 10.6, and contained the same chemical explosives as shown in Fig. 10.6 or Table 
10.1. However, it incorporated a weapons-grade plutonium sphere with an alpha-particle heat 
power of less about 12 W (see Fig. 9.47). It did work with weapons-grade plutonium, but it 
would not work with reactor-grade plutonium producing more than 0.120 kW in its fissile 
part. This corresponds to reactor grade plutonium from spent PWR fuel with more than 
35 GWd/tHM or more than 1.8% Pu-238 (Table 9.4). 
The above results could confirm the statement in Fig. 9.1 only for plutonium from LWR 
spent fuel with less about 35 GWd/t burnup (1.8% Pu-238) and low technology (earliest 
plutonium weapons). In reality, the above limits of 0.120 kW and 0.240 kW are even time-
dependent. The Pu-241 of the reactor-grade plutonium decays to Am-241 with a half life of 
14.4 years. Whereas the Pu-241 produces 3.3 W/kg alpha-particle heat power, the Am-241 
produces 110 W/kg. A typical HNED with about 10 kg of aged reactor-grade plutonium 
(Tables 9.4 through 9.6b) and a typical Pu-241 isotopic composition of about 14% would 
produce the following alpha-particle heat power from Am-241 in addition to that of the 
reactor-grade plutonium 
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time after reprocessing (years)  2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
alpha-particle heat power of 
Am-241 
(W) 14 26 38 48 57 66 75 
 
This decreases the above thermal limits of 0.120 kW and 0.240 kW, which are given for 
the alpha-particle heat power of the reactor-grade plutonium. 
A technically still feasible HNED would have to be designed for a lower thermal limit 
than the above 0.120 kW (low technology) and 0.240 kW (medium technology) or the Am-
241 would have to be chemically separated prior to applications. 
In addition impurities, e.g. carbon, boron etc. in the metallic reactor-grade plutonium 
undergo (n,) reactions which also contribute to the alpha-particle heat power [48]. This 
contribution is not accounted for in the above considerations. 
10.11.5     Additional remarks on the low and medium-technology cases 
The above thermal analysis is based on conservative assumptions: 
– Black-body radiation at the outer surface of the HNED casing (Kessler [1]). 
– If the radiation emissivities measured, e.g., for steel or aluminum at the outer casing were 
taken into account, the difference between the temperature of the outer casing and that of 
the ambient air (30 °C) would increase by 2-1/4 (2 being the emissivity of the outer casing). 
For steel as the outer casing, 2 = 0.22 (Paloposki et al. [8] and Kuchling [9]). This leads to a 
temperature difference higher by a factor of 1.46. For aluminum, 2 = 0.07 is reported, and a 
temperature difference higher by a factor of 1.94 is obtained. 
The low technology and medium technology cases represent the highest levels of 
technology to be achieved in a NNWS. Subnational groups would not even be able to manage 
the low technology case (see also Younger [10]). NWSs never used reactor-grade plutonium 
for nuclear weapons [11,12]. 
Grizzle [50] gives the following reasons “Reactor-grade plutonium is significantly more 
radioactive which complicates the design, manufacture and stockpiling of weapons. Use of 
reactor-grade plutonium would require large expenditures for remote manufacturing facilities 
to minimize radiation explosure to workers. Reactor-grade plutonium use in weapons would 
cause concern over radiation exposure to military service personnel.” 
10.12. Outside cooling of the HNEDs 
10.12.1 Coolability of HNEDs 
Statements in the literature asserted that the problem of temperature limits, e.g. melting 
temperatures or temperatures initiating explosion of high explosives, could be overcome by 
means of cooling (strips of conducting materials or external cooling) (Garwin [11], Mark 
[13]). 
10.12.2 Metal strips of high thermal conductivity 
Garwin [11] refers to the use of so called "in-flight insertion devices". Nikitin [14] showed in 
a preliminary analysis that a relatively large number of metal strips arranged symmetrically 
within the explosive lenses would have to be used for cooling. In addition, an insulating layer 
would have to separate the metal strips adjacent to the high explosives. Three-dimensional 
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analysis would have to show the absence of azimuthal temperature increases between strips. 
Finally, the metal strips would have to be replaced by strips of high explosives assuring 
precise three-dimensional internal structures of the high explosive lenses before an HNED 
could be fired (otherwise detonation physics would not work). All of this would have to be 
done in a short span of time because interruption of cooling would raise temperatures in the 
HNED (Kessler [16] and Section 10.14). 
10.12.3     Coolability of very high technology HNEDs 
Another idea for overcoming the temperature problem in the high explosive lenses was 
presented recently by (Shmelev et al. [17]). A very high-technology HNED could be 
surrounded by a hollow spherical shell of aluminum 43 cm thick. The good thermal 
conductivity of aluminum and the larger outer surface would lower the outer temperature. 
This would also lower the whole temperature profile. Thus decreasing the temperatures at the 
high explosive lenses. Subsequent cooling by liquid nitrogen to -200 °C would again lower 
the whole temperature profile for the inner temperature of the high explosive lenses. This 
would be below the temperature at which self explosion (331 or 347 °C) of the TATB or 
PBX-9502 high explosives sets in (Table 10.3). Such HNED could still function. However, it 
would have to be assembled remotely under liquid nitrogen. High technology high explosive 
are only available in advanced NNWs (Gibbs et al. [18] and Mader et al. [19]). A hollow 
sphere with an outer radius of 7.2 cm at keff = 0.98 would have an outside temperature around 
400 °C (at 30 °C outside air temperature). This gives an idea of some of the technical 
difficulties to be overcome (see Kessler [16] and Section 10.13.8). 
Discussions of such hypothetical examples must stick to reality [10,15]. 
10.12.4     Effects of cooling low-technology and medium technology HNEDs 
Cooling a low-technology and medium technology HNED requires submerging them in 
liquid nitrogen or helium. Submerging the HNED in liquid nitrogen or liquid helium has the 
consequence that the lower temperatures of all HNED materials give rise to lower thermal 
heat conductivities raising the above temperatures at the inner surface of the high explosives. 
This is shown by Kessler [16]. Such more detailed analyses will be described in Section 
10.13. 
The thermal analysis for the description of cooling HNEDs down to cryogenic 
temperatures requires the use of temperature dependent thermal heat conductivities and 
specific heats. Three different cooling possibilities were treated consistently with numerical 
methods for comparison by Kessler [12]: 
– cooling the outside casing of the HNEDs by thermal radiation and natural convection of 
air, 
– cooling the outside casing of the HNEDs down to cryogenic temperatures, e.g. to -200 °C 
by liquid nitrogen or to -270 °C by liquid helium. This was first proposed by Shmelev 
[17] as a cooling possibility to overcome the problem of high temperatures in HNEDs 
based on reactor-grade plutonium, 
– cooling by internal metal rods which would transfer the alpha-particle heat power from 
the inner aluminum spherical shell through the high explosive lenses to the outer casing 
of the HNED. This was discussed, e.g. by Mark [13] to overcome the high temperatures 
in HNEDs based on reactor-grade plutonium. 
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Cooling of the HNED by gas or liquids through internal cooling channels or gaps does not 
need to be not considered. This would destroy the high precision spherical symmetry of 
implosion shock physics and cause severe hydrodynamic instabilities during shock 
compression. 
10.13. Solution of the steady state and transient heat conduction problem with 
temperature dependent thermal conductivities and specific heats 
Cooling the outside of the HNEDs by cryogenic liquids and calculation of the resulting 
cryogenic temperatures requires a thermal analysis with the solution of the heat conduction 
equations with temperature dependent thermal conductivities, specific heats and densities. 
The assessment of cooling the HNEDs by internal metal rods (thermal bridges) and 
replacement of these devices prior to the application of the HNED requires a thermal analysis 
with the solution of the transient heat conduction equation. This can only be achieved by 
using numerical methods in combination with the one-dimensional conservative approach 
described in Section 10.4. 
10.13.1     Formulation of the heat conduction problem [16] 
The thermal conduction problem within the HNED can be described by the following 1-D 
diffusion equation in the polar coordinate system, 
2
2
1 ! ! !& '	 ( )! ! !* +
p
Tc T r k q
t r r r
   within each material layer (Fig. 10.1)         (10.6) 
T is the temperature, q  the power density, which is equal to the power divided by the 
active volume,  the material density, cP the thermal heat capacity and k the thermal conduc-
tivity. The material thermal physical properties, , cP and k are functions of temperature. The 
boundary conditions are set as follows: 
The symmetry condition is valid at r = 0, i.e., 
 ,0	
!
! T
r
  at  0	r  (10.6a) 
Inner boundary condition between material layers i and i+1 is the heat flux continuity 
condition, i.e., 
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Between the plutonium sphere and the natural uranium spherical reflector layer there is a 
gap with a gap conductance gap . The temperature jump through this gap can be described 
by 
 24 gap
gapgap R
PT
%
 	  (10.6c) 
P is the power, Tgap the temperature difference over the gap and Rgap the gap radius 
(changes of the gap with are neglected). 
At the outer casing surface of the HNED a temperature boundary condition has to be 
adopted. If the outer surface temperature Ts is known, e.g. the HNED is in a liquid medium, it 
is simply 
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 outTT 	  at Rr 	  (10.6d) 
If the outer surface temperature of the casing is determined by natural convection of air 
and by thermal radiation (Kessler [1]), the following equations have to be taken into account. 
For the natural convection the correlation (10.1a) is used as coefficient with 0.43. This 
coefficient can also be 0.5 as given by Kakac et al. [33]. 
Nu  is the Nusselt number, Gr  the Grashof, and Pr  the Prandl number. 
They are defined as 
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	 ,     
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TDgGr 2
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
 
	 ,     
k
cp	Pr  (10.6e) 
aconv is the heat transfer coefficient due to the natural convection, D = 2 R is the sphere 
diameter, ß the volumetric thermal expansion coefficient, g the acceleration due to gravity, 
  the kinematic viscosity and T is the temperature difference between the surface 
temperature and the air. 
The thermal radiation is described by (see Eq. 10.1d) 
 4 4 rads env 2
P(T T )
4 R
2  	
%
 (10.7) 
Ts is the temperature at the surface of the HNED, Tenv is the temperature of the 
environment, Prad is the power transferred by radiation, 2 the emissivity (Table 10.5) and 2 = 
5.67 x 10-8 W/(m2K4) the Stefan-Boltzmann radiation constant. An equivalent heat transfer 
coefficient rad can be derived for the thermal radiation process as 
 rad s env(T ,T ) 	
2 2
s env s env(T T )(T T )2    
so that (10.7) becomes 
 radrad s env 2
P(T ,T ) T
4 R
  	
%
 with s envT T T 	   
Thus, with Eqs. 10.1 as well as 10.1a and 10.1b the outer casing surface temperature is 
obtained by 
 eff s 2
P( T,T ) T
4 R
   	
%
 (10.8) 
 eff s conv rad( T,T )  	    (10.9) 
10.13.2    Numerical solution for the transient temperature distribution 
The code system Mathematica is applied to solve the steady state and time dependent 
problem. Mathematica has a good solver for ordinary differential equation (ODE) systems. If 
a finite difference approximation in space is applied to Eq. (10.6), an ODE system in time is 
obtained. Thus, within layer n, where nr  is uniform, Eq. (10.6) can be discretized at irr 	  
as 
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i n
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4
  (10.10) 
with rn = rn – rn-1. 
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At the inner boundary between layers n and n+1, the diffusion equation is discretized as 
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At the gap ( grr 	  or gii 	 ), the diffusion equation is discretized as 
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where r is the gap width. 
On the outer casing surface ( Rr 	  or Rii 	 ), the temperature boundary condition is 
assumed as, 
 	 	i s outT T T    or   1i envT T 	  (10.13) 
This condition means that the outer casing surface temperature is either given as the 
cooling temperature as Eq. (10.6d) or calculated by Eq. (10.8) where natural convection and 
thermal radiation are considered. 
10.13.2.1     Numerical solution for the steady state temperature distribution 
In case of the steady state problem the time derivative dTi/dt on the left side becomes zero. 
The Eqs. (10.10) through (10.13) become a system of linear equations which is solved by 
Mathematica. 
10.13.3    Thermal conductivity and specific heat at cryogenic temperatures 
According to cryogenic temperature physics both the thermal conductivity and the specific 
heat decrease for metals and polymers to smaller and smaller values, when the temperature 
approaches low Kelvin values. 
10.13.3.1   Thermal conductivity for plutonium metal 
Plutonium metal exists in 5 allotropic phases and has a melting temperature of 640 °C. Its 
thermal conductivity was measured down to very low temperatures. The thermal conductivity 
data for plutonium are taken from the Reactor Handbook [29] and supplemented by measured 
data of Blank et al. [34] (Fig. 10.11). 
10.13.3.2   Thermal conductivity of uranium metal 
Similar data can be found for uranium metal. It has 3 allotropic phases and a melting point of 
1132 °C. Its thermal conductivity was also measured down to very low temperatures. For the 
calculation the thermal conductivity data are taken from Gebhardt et al. [35]. 
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10.13.3.3    Thermal conductivities for aluminum, beryllium and stainless steel 
Thermal conductivity data for aluminum, beryllium and stainless steel down to cryogenic 
temperatures can be found in Marquardt et al. [36]. They are displayed in Fig. 10.11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.11. Thermal conductivity of aluminum, beryllium and stainless steel SS 304 down 
to cryogenic temperatures. 
10.13.3.4   Thermal conductivity for chemical high explosives 
For chemical high explosives no measured data can be found in the open literature for the 
temperature range down to cryogenic temperatures. Only thermal conductivity data for 20 °C 
are given by Dobratz [18], Gibbs et al. [19] and Mader et al. [24]. 
For the temperature range down to cryogenic temperatures, therefore, a theoretical 
analogy was applied which was reported by Shchetinin [37]. This theoretical analogy was 
combined with data for temperature dependent thermal conductivities of Hartwig [38], 
Barron et al. [39] and Marquardt et al. [36] for different polymers. In addition, they were 
adapted to the measured data at 20 °C of Gibbs et al. [18] and Mader et al. [19]. This is 
shown for chemical high explosives in Fig. 10.12. 
Al
304SS
Be
Temperature [K]
Th
er
m
.C
o
nd
uu
ct
ivi
ty
[W
/(m
K)
]
Th
er
m
. C
on
du
ct
iv
ity
[W
/(m
·K
)]
0
50
100
150
0 100 200 300 400
Th
er
m
. C
on
du
ct
iv
ity
[W
/(m
·K
)]
  280
0 200 400 600 800
Temperature [K]
0
500
1000
1500
2000
H
e
a
t C
a
p
a
c
ity
 [J
/(k
g
 K
)]
Pu Unat
Steel
Al
Be
PBX9502
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.12. Thermal conductivities of chemical high explosives down to cryogenic 
temperatures. 
10.13.4 Specific heat data at cryogenic temperatures 
10.13.4.1 Specific heat for the metals applied 
The data for the specific heat of plutonium metal, uranium metal, beryllium, aluminum and 
steel are shown by Fig. 10.13 for a temperature range down to cryogenic temperatures. They 
are based on Shmelev [40], Lashley et al. [41] and Marquardt et al. [36]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.13.    Heat capacities of metals down to cryogenic temperatures. 
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10.13.4.2   Specific heat for high explosives 
The specific heat data for high explosive materials are taken from Hartwig [38], Barron et al. 
[39], Marquard et al. [36], Gibbs et al. [18] and Mader et al. [19]. Again the theoretical 
analogy by Shchetinin [37] and Shmelev [40] is applied. The data are displayed in Fig. 10.14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.14.    Heat capacity of chemical high explosives down to cryogenic temperatures. 
 
10.13.5 Cooling of low technology HNEDs by liquid nitrogen or liquid helium  
Fig. 10.15 shows the temperature profile for the high explosive Baratol and an alpha-particle 
heat power of 0.24 kW (for a constant thermal conductivity k). If the temperature-dependent 
thermal conductivities k(T) of Figs. 10.11 and 10.12 are applied, the temperature profile is 
raised as shown by the upper curve of Fig. 10.15. This accounts for the smaller thermal 
conductivities at lower temperatures. 
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Fig. 10.15. Temperature distribution in a low technology HNED with reactor-grade 
plutonium of 0.240 kW alpha-particle heat power (cooling by liquid nitrogen). 
 
More results for low technology HNEDs with higher alpha-particle heat power are given 
in Table 10.10. As can be understood from Table 10.10 the maximum temperatures at the 
inner border of the high explosive lense systems and Baratol (temperature-dependent thermal 
conductivity) would be -32 °C for an alpha-particle heat power of 0.24 kW and cooling the 
outer casing by liquid nitrogen. It would be -50 °C for cooling by liquid helium (Table 
10.10). 
For Composition B due to the significantly smaller heat conductivity compared to Baratol 
these temperatures would be 128 and 111 °C, respectively. The melting point of 79 °C for 
Composition B (Table 10.2) would be already exceeded for this alpha-particle heat power of 
0.24 kW. 
 
Alpha-particle 
heat power (kW) 
With Baratol 
in -200 °C 
nitrogen (°C) 
With Baratol 
in -270 °C 
helium (°C) 
Composition B 
in -200 °C 
nitrogen (°C) 
Composition B 
in -270 °C 
helium (°C) 
0.240 kW -32 -50 128 111 
0.350 kW 26 10 258 242 
0.460 kW 97 79   
 
Table 10.10. Temperature at the inner border of the implosion lenses as a function of the 
alpha-particle heat power and cooling of the outside by liquid nitrogen or 
liquid helium. 
 
Due to the high thermal conductivity of Baratol the melting point of 79 °C is reached only 
for an alpha-particle heat power of about 0.460 kW. Already for an alpha-particle heat power 
of 0.35 MW a considerable part of the volume of the high explosive Composition B would be 
molten and have exceeded the limiting temperature for start of chemical self explosion at 
214 °C (Table 10.10). 
Therefore, a range between 0.24 kW (melting of Composition B) and 0.35 kW alpha-
particle heat power was determined for which a low technology HNED will be technically 
questionable or very probably technically unfeasible. The alpha-particle heat of 0.46 kW 
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(melting of Baratol) would certainly be a conservative upper limit for low technology 
HNEDs [16]. 
There are only relatively small differences in temperature for cooling by liquid nitrogen or 
by liquid helium. This is due to the temperature-dependence of the thermal conductivities of 
the high explosives at cryogenic temperatures. 
10.13.6   Numerical results for medium technology HNEDs [16] 
10.13.6.1   Cooling of medium technology HNEDs by liquid nitrogen or liquid helium 
The limiting temperatures for the medium technology high explosives DATB and PBX-9011 
(representative for PBX-9011, PBX-9404, 9501 and HMX) were shown in Table 10.2. 
 
alpha particle 
heat power 
[kW] 
cooling by liquid nitrogen cooling by liquid helium 
 DATB [°C] PBX 9011 [°C] DATB [°C] PBX 9011 [°C] 
 0.4 321 169 305 153 
 0.415 333 175 323 165 
 0.44 369 202 353 185 
 0.50 441 250 425 234 
Table 10.11. Temperature at the inner border of the implosion lenses as a function of alpha-
particle heat power and cooling of the outer casing by liquid nitrogen or liquid 
helium. 
 
The alpha-particle power limits at which the temperature limits, e.g. melting points or 
temperatures for start of self-explosion at the inner radial boundary of the high explosive 
lenses, will just be attained, can be found by varying the alpha particle heat power in the 
range between 0.4-0.5 kW. Table 10.11 gives the temperatures at the inner border of the 
implosion lenses as a function of the alpha-particle heat power for both high explosives 
DATB and PBX9011 and for both cases of cooling the outer cooling of the HNED either by 
liquid nitrogen or liquid helium. 
According to Zinn et al. [23] and Mader et al. [19] chemical self-explosion of the high 
explosives starts when a critical temperature Te is exceeded. For DATB this critical Te 
temperature is 322 °C. The melting point of DATB would be exceeded already at 286 °C. For 
PBX9011 the melting point is 190 °C and the critical temperature for start of self explosion is 
somewhat above 260 °C. 
Therefore, a medium technology HNED would become questionable and very probably 
technically unfeasible for an alpha-particle heat power range of 0.39 to 0.46 kW for cooling 
by liquid helium. 
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10.13.7   Conclusions for low and medium technology HNEDs 
The results of Sections 10.11 and 10.12 show that 
– any low technology HNED based on reactor-grade plutonium producing more than 0.12 
kW of alpha-particle heat power (if cooled by natural convection of air and thermal 
radiation) and more than 0.46 kW, respectively, (if cooled at the outside by liquid 
nitrogen or helium) and 
– any medium technology HNED with reactor-grade plutonium producing more than 
0.24 kW of alpha-particle heat power (if cooled by natural convection of air and thermal 
radiation) and more than 0.46 kW alpha-particle heat power, respectively, (if cooled by 
liquid nitrogen or helium 
will be technically unfeasible (Figs. 10.16 and 10.17). The high explosives would either 
melt in considerable parts of the implosion lenses or exceed the temperatures for start of 
chemical self-explosion. Outside casing temperatures lower than -270 °C (liquid helium) are 
technically impossible. Any increase of the outside casing temperature would increase these 
temperatures in the high explosives again. 
Figs. 10.16 and 10.17 also show the results for high technology HNEDs. This analysis will 
be presented below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.16. Limits for alpha-particle heat power above which HNEDs with reactor-grade 
plutonium become technically unfeasible for different levels of technology 
when cooled by air and radiation (Kessler et al. [16]). 
Low                         Medium                      Very high 
technology              technology                  technology 
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Fig. 10.17. Limits for alpha-particle heat power above which HNEDs with reactor grade 
plutonium become technically unfeasible for different levels of technology 
and cooling at the outside by liquid helium (Kessler [16]). 
 
As explained already in Section 10.11.4 the above limits are time-dependent and will 
decrease with ageing because of the buildup and -decay of Am-241 which is a consequence 
of the beta-decay of Pu-241. 
10.13.8   Technical difficulties for cooling by liquid nitrogen or liquid helium 
Cooling of the HNEDs by submerging them into liquid nitrogen or helium would require 
heavy transport vehicles or ships for transportation of the cryogenic cooling devices. These 
transport possibilities are discussed by Hecker [42]. The following technical difficulties 
would have to be overcome for cooling the HNEDs by liquid nitrogen or helium. 
A bare sphere of reactor-grade plutonium with an alpha-particle heat power of e.g. 
0.35 kW would have an outside temperature in air of about 350 °C (black body radiation 
assumed). For an alpha-particle heat power of e.g. 0.42 kW the bare sphere would have an 
outside temperature of about 380 °C. According to Chebeskov [43], or Campbell et al. [44] 
such bare reactor-grade plutonium spheres would cause a radiation exposure (-radiation and 
neutrons) at 1 m distance of >5 Sv/hr. The whole HNED would have to be assembled by 
remote technology under liquid nitrogen or liquid helium. High precision machining of the 
solid or hollow reactor-grade plutonium metal sphere at temperatures of about 350-380 °C 
and radiation levels of several Sv/h would be a very high technology challenge. Experimental 
programs for the determination of the exact thermal conductivity down to cryogenic 
temperatures and of the thermal expansion coefficients of the high explosives would be 
needed. Measurements of the temperature field in the implosion lenses would have to assure 
that the melting points or the critical temperature for chemical self explosion would not be 
exceeded. 
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Plutonium metal has 5 allotropic phases in solid state with different densities over certain 
temperature ranges. Long term cooling to -200 °C or -270 °C of the outer casing of the 
HNED would bring the metallic plutonium through temperature ranges from about 350-
370 °C down to the range of about 0°C. 
Metallic plutonium applied in nuclear explosive devices is usually stabilized by about 1% 
gallium to extend the 1-phase (Mark [13]). One reason is – among others – the almost zero 
thermal expansion coefficient of the 1-phase plutonium. Moreover, the 1-phase leads to 
favorable ductile properties of the metallic plutonium (Morss et al. [45]). According to 
Timofeeva [46] this 1-phase can change into the -phase below about 100 °C. This -phase 
metallic plutonium has a higher density. Long term changes of the density, e.g. from 
15.8 [g/cm3] (1-plutonium) to 18.9 [g/cm3] (-plutonium), might, therefore, have to be 
considered. This would lead to an increase of about 0.1 in keff (criticality factor). 
The difficulties would become even higher as a consequence of impurities and buildup of 
americium in the metallic plutonium. They would change the allotropic phase diagrams 
(Cleveland [47]). In addition impurities like boron or beryllium lead to (n,)-reactions and 
higher alpha-particle heat powers (Shmelev et al. [48]). 
At least two different high explosives must be used in the explosive lenses (Rhodes [3]). 
They have different thermal expansion coefficients (Gibbs et al. [38]). Together with the 
temperature difference of about 300 °C across the radius of the explosive lenses this would 
create tremendous difficulties for the very high precision needed in assembling the high 
explosive lense system. 
These are only some of the expected technical difficulties which would have to be 
overcome. It is hardly conceivable that a Non-Nuclear Weapon State would make such 
extreme high-technology efforts. Even if a Non-Nuclear Weapon State would be able to 
overcome all these technical difficulties the results could only be a fizzle explosive yield 
under the most favorable conditions (Kessler et al. [32] and Section 9). 
This holds only for HNEDs with an alpha-particle heat power of less than 0.24 kW for low 
technology and for less than 0.39 kW for medium technology. For the alpha-particle heat 
powers above these alpha-particle power levels for HNEDs based on reactor grade plutonium 
either the melting points or the critical temperatures for self explosion of the high explosives 
would be exceeded (Figs. 10.16 and 10.17). 
10.13.9 Numerical results for high technology HNEDs 
10.13.9.1 Cooling of high technology HNEDs by air and radiation 
Despite the above results and arguments there is some theoretical interest in analyzing also 
so-called very high technology cases. However, one should remind that such high technology 
cases could – if at all – only be mastered by present advanced Nuclear-Weapon-States having 
performed many years of research, experiments and development (Kessler et al. [32]). 
Garwin [11], deVolpi [12] and Grizzle [50] stated that no Nulcear Weapon State has 
ever used reactor-grade plutonium for its weapons arsenal. 
Nevertheless, this section contains a thermal analysis of a high-technology case which was 
presented in Kessler [1] and Kessler et al. [32]. The same geometric dimensions and 
materials were used by a US-Russian group (Fetter et al. [6]). This HNED has an outer 
diameter of 22 cm and a thickness of the spherical high explosive lenses of 10 cm. The 
reactor-grade plutonium (density 15.8 g/cm3) is arranged as a hollow spherical shell of 
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7.2 cm outer diameter and 5.6 cm inner diameter. Its mass is around 13 kg (keff = 0.98). The 
HNED is cooled by natural convection air and thermal radiation (black body radiation 
assumed). 
The high technology high explosives TATB or PBX 9502 (see Table 10.3) have the 
highest thermal conductivities, the highest melting point, and the highest temperature for 
initiating chemical self-explosion to be found in the open scientific literature (Dobratz [24], 
Gibbs et al. [18], and Mader et al. [19]). 
The thermal analysis of Kessler [16] shows that the melting point of the high explosives 
PBX 9502 or TATB of 448 °C would be exceeded for 0.562 kW. Similarly the limiting 
temperature for start of self-explosion of the chemical explosives (347 °C) would be already 
exceeded for 0.375 kW. Again it must be emphasized that these calculated temperatures are 
conservative as the one-dimensional conservative approach (Kessler [1]) and black-body 
radiation at the outer casing were assumed. In addition, these thermal limits are time-
dependent and decrease because of the buildup of americium (Section 10.11.4). 
10.13.9.2    Cooling of high technology HNEDs by liquid nitrogen or liquid helium 
Analysis [16] shows that the alpha-particle heat power of reactor-grade plutonium must be 
increased to 0.93 kW to obtain a temperature of 347 °C at the inner boundary of the high 
explosives PBX9502 or TATB. In this case chemical self-explosion would be initiated. 
The high technology HNED would then become technically unfeasible even for the case 
of cooling its outside boundary by liquid helium. 
10.13.9.3     Improved coolability of high technology HNEDs 
An interesting idea for improving the coolability of high technology HNEDs has been 
presented by Shmelev [17]. The high-technology HNED could be surrounded by a hollow 
spherical shell of aluminum of 23 cm thickness. The good thermal conductivity of aluminum 
and the larger outer surface would decrease the outer temperature from 144 °C to some 46 °C 
(cooling by free convection of air and thermal radiation). This would also lower the whole 
temperature profile. 
Subsequent cooling by liquid helium to -270 °C would lower the whole temperature 
profile further. The alpha-particle heat power would have to be raised to 0.96 kW (cooling 
the outside by liquid helium). In this case the temperature would be 347 °C at the inner 
border of the high explosives PBX9502 or TATB and chemical self-explosion would start. 
The melting point of 448 °C at the inner border of the high explosive lenses would be 
attained for an alpha-particle heat power of 1.146 kW. 
This high technology HNED would have to be assembled remotely – as discussed in the 
previous section – under liquid nitrogen or liquid helium. A hollow sphere with an outer 
radius of 7.2 cm (keff = 0.98) would have an outside temperature around 440 °C. This 
illustrates some importand technical difficulties to be overcome. 
The results of these sections on high technology HNEDs are shown in Figs. 10.18 and 
10.19. Again it should be emphasized that only advanced Nuclear Weapon States could 
perhaps master these technological difficulties if at all. 
  288
10.14. Steady state and transient temperature distributions for cooling of the HNED 
by internal rods of high thermal conductivity 
There are assertions (Mark [13]) or speculations that the problem of limiting temperatures, 
e.g. melting temperatures or the temperatures for the start of self-explosion of the high 
explosives could also be overcome by other cooling possibilities (strips of conducting 
materials as thermal bridges). 
In a preliminary analysis Nikitin [14] showed that a relatively high number of 
symmetrically arranged 1 cm thick aluminum rods would have to be used for internal cooling 
(Fig. 10.18). However, an insulation layer would have to separate the aluminum rods, 
wherever they border the chemical high explosives. A three-dimensional thermal analysis 
would have to show which azimuthal temperature oscillations would occur between the rods 
within the high explosive lenses. Finally, prior to the use of the HNED as a nuclear explosive 
the aluminum rods would have to be removed and replaced by rods of high explosive 
material. This explosive material consisting of rods would have to fit exactly into the three-
dimensional structure of the high explosive lenses. Only the exact internal structure can 
assure the symmetrical shock implosion needed for technical feasibility (Rhodes [3]). 
Otherwise the detonation physics would not work. This replacement would have to be done 
in a short time period, since a stop of the cooling (by removing the aluminum rods with high 
thermal conductivity) would again increase the temperatures fairly rapidly within the high 
explosive lenses of the HNED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.18. Schematic cross-section through a spherical HNED with thermal bridges. 
 
In Nikitin [14] it was shown that for a low technology HNED with an alpha-particle heat 
power of 0.144 kW 20 aluminum rods of 1 cm diameter would be needed to keep the 
temperature at the inner boundary of the high explosive lenses 11 °C below the melting 
temperature of 79°C. 
An approximate method for the determination of the steady state temperature distribution 
in an HNED with aluminum rods was described by Kessler [16]. 
10.14.1 Outline of the approximate method for determining the steady state tempe-
rature distribution in an HNED with cooling by aluminum rods 
Two heat conducting materials are put together for the approximate method. They form a 
parallel heat conducting channel. If k1 and k2 are the thermal conductivities for the two 
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materials and A1 and A2 are their conducting areas, the heat conducting process can be 
described by 
xd
TdAk
xd
TdAk
xd
TdAkQ 		 222111 ,  with  21 AAA 	                       (10.14) 
If it holds approximately 
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an effective thermal conductivity k  can be expressed as 
 k k A A k A A k a k a	  	 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2   with  a a 	1 2 1 (10.15) 
This linear volumetric weighting is known as Vegard’s law in the literature. 
In the case of aluminum cylindrical rods inserted in the spherical high explosive (HE) 
material the effective thermal conductivity can be written as 
 / 0Al Al HE Alk (T ,r ) k (T ) ( r ) k (T ) ( r ) 	  1  (10.16) 
where 
 6 7
rodAl rod
a ( r ) N r r	 2 24  (10.17) 
rodN  the number of aluminum rods and rodr  the radius of the aluminum rod. 
This approximate model of Vegard underestimates the effective thermal conductivity and 
its temperature reduction effect. It overestimates the temperature distribution in the high 
explosives [20]. This weakness can be partially made up again by calibrating the results of 
the approximate model to the accurate results of Nikitin [14]. 
10.14.2  Calculated results for low technology HNEDs (steady state temperature profile) 
Fig. 10.19 shows temperature profiles of a low technology HNED (with Baratol and 
Composition B as high explosives) with an outer casing radius of 0.65 m and an alpha-
particle heat power of 0.144 kW (Kessler [1] without aluminum rods). Also presented are the 
calculated results for 20 aluminum rods inserted in the high explosive lenses (Nikitin [14]). 
As mentioned before, the approximate homogeneous model would overestimate the 
temperature in the high explosive lenses significantly. However, the same temperature as in 
Nikitin [14] is roughly obtained if the aluminum rod diameter is increased from 1 cm 
(Nikitin) to 1.73 cm (calibration). The maximum temperature at the inner border of the 
chemical high explosive (Baratol) is about 11°C below its melting point of 79°C. Only 
Baratol is considered as high explosive, because it has a higher thermal conductivity than 
Composition B (low technology case). The temperature profile of Baratol is therefore the 
lowest possible one. For Composition B the number of aluminum rods would have to be 
increased if the same low temperature distribution as for Baratol should be achieved. 
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Fig. 10.19. The radial temperature distribution of the cases of 0 and 20 aluminum rods of 
1 cm and 1.73 cm diameter inserted. Alpha-particle heat power P = 0.144 kW 
(low technology case). 
10.14.3 Transient temperature distribution if the aluminum rods will be replaced by 
high explosive material 
It is hypothesized that the aluminum-rods have to be removed from the HNED and the 
remaining cylindrical holes will be refilled with the high explosive material before the HNED 
could become active. The question is how much time remains for this action before the high 
explosive material would be melting at its inner border. The HNED would then become 
technically unfeasible. The transient temperature calculation is performed by solving the 
equations of Section 10.13 with the temperature distribution of Fig. 10.21 as initial condition. 
The result is that the transient temperature development for Baratol at the inner border of 
the high explosive lenses needs about 5.8 hours and for Composition B about 6.5 hours to 
reach the melting point of 79°C. 
These calculations were repeated for an alpha-particle heat power 0.480 kW. Of course 
more aluminum rods are needed for the heat removal in the steady state case. A similar 
temperature distribution (11 °C below its melting point) is obtained for 170 aluminum rods 
with a diameter of D = 1.73 cm. A transient temperature calculation is also performed 
starting from these steady state conditions. The time period for the temperature at the inner 
border of the high explosive lenses to reach the melting point of 79°C would be 0.8 hours for 
Baratol and 0.85 hours for Composition B. Exceeding the melting point of Baratol and 
Composition B will render this HNED technically unfeasible. 
It can be concluded that 20 aluminum rods can probably be replaced within 5.8 h. 
However, replacing 170 aluminum rods within a time period of about 1 h under the existing 
nuclear radiation and temperatures with the high precission needed within the three-
dimensional internal structures of the implosion lenses could be an almost impossible 
undertaking. Therefore, the limiting case for the alpha-particle heat power can be estimated 
to be below 0.4 kW for a number of aluminum rods between 20 and about 170. 
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For this alpha-particle heat power a low technology HNED would become technically 
unfeasible even if cooled internally by aluminum rods. 
Again it must be emphasized that also this thermal limit is time-dependent and decreases 
because of the buildup of americium (Section 10.11.4). 
10.14.4 Technical difficulties 
A bare sphere of metallic reactor-grade plutonium with an alpha-particle heat power of 0.4 
kW would have a surface temperature of about 370°C and cause a radiation exposure of more 
than 5 Sv/hr (Campbell et al. [44] and Chebeskov [43]). High precision machining of the 
plutonium sphere could only be done by remote technology. Assembling of the HNED 
together with the explosive lenses and all aluminum-rods would probably have to occur in 
radial sections. The radial plutonium metal sphere sections would have to be placed at last. 
All radial sections would then have to be clamped together with high precision. 
When the heat conducting aluminum rods would be replaced by high explosive materials, 
the latter cylindrical parts would have to be machined with very high precision. They must 
exactly fit into the 3-dimensional structure of the explosive lenses (in radial and azimuthal 
direction). Any inaccuracies at interfaces of different high explosive materials in the high 
explosive lenses would lead to hydrodynamic instabilities during the implosion process and 
disturbances of the symmetry of the shock waves and deteriorate to the nuclear explosive 
yield (Rhodes [3]). Such inaccuracies would, e.g. be caused by the radial temperature 
differences and by the different linear expansion coefficients (Gibbs et al. [18]) of the 
different high explosive materials in the high explosive lenses. 
These are only some of the technical difficulties which would have to be overcome. It is 
hardly conceivable that a Non Nuclear Weapon State would make such high technology 
efforts. As a result it could at best only produce HNEDs based on reactor-grade plutonium, 
which would lead to a quasi-deterministic fizzle explosive yield (Kessler et al. [2,32]). 
10.14.5 Installing the reactor grade plutonium sphere prior to detonation 
Kang et al. [49] emphasized that the reactor-grade plutonium sphere could be installed into 
the high explosive lense system in a short time before detonation. However, the statement is 
based on the assembling of the first NED (Fat Man) which lasted more than one day (Rhodes 
[3]). 
Calculations show that the installation of a reactor-grade plutonium sphere with an alpha-
particle heat of 0.48 kW and a surface temperature of 400 °C would bring the temperature of 
the high explosive lenses at the inner border above the melting point within 10 min. 
This reactor-grade plutonium sphere could also be cooled in liquid nitrogen to -200 °C. If 
this reactor grade plutonium sphere would be suddenly removed from the liquid nitrogen it 
would take 27 min to heat up to an outer surface temperature of 68 °C. If it could be installed 
with this temperature under the existing neutron and gamma radiation of 5 Sv/h into the 
HNED with its high explosive lense system, than it would take another 0.8 h for the high 
explosive to attain the melting temperature of 79 °C (see previous Section 10.13.4). If the 
inner border of the high explosive lenses would be thermally shielded by a layer of very low 
thermal conductivity (0.035 W/cmK) then the reactor-grade plutonium sphere would start to 
melt about 7 h after removel from the liquid nitrogen (Kessler [16]). 
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10.15. Conclusions 
Although details of the arrangements of high explosive materials in the high explosive lenses 
are classified, the applied conservative approach (Kessler [1]) leads to scientifically reliable 
data with respect to the tolerable alpha-particle heat power and the associated temperature 
distributions in HNEDs. 
Three different technologies: low, medium and very high technology for the multishell 
spherical systems (HNEDs) were defined. They differ in geometrical dimensions and 
different chemical high explosives. For the case of cooling the outside casing by natural 
convection of air and thermal radiation, the analysis shows that above an alpha-particle heat 
power of 0.12 kW for low technology, 0.24 kW for medium technology and 0.37 kW for very 
high technology the HNEDs would become technically unfeasible. These thermal limits are 
time-dependent and decrease as a consequence of the buildup of Am-241. 
For the case of cooling the outside casing by submerging the HNED into liquid nitrogen or 
liquid helium the analysis becomes more sophisticated. The thermal conductivities of all 
materials become temperature dependent going to zero at zero Kelvin. In case of cooling the 
outside casing by liquid helium the limits above which the HNED become technically 
unfeasible raise to the limiting alpha-particle heat power of 0.46 kW for low technology, the 
range of 0.46 kW for medium technology and to 0.95 kW for very high technology. If the 
very high technology HNEDs would be surrounded by a spherical aluminum shell of 23 cm 
thickness, the alpha-particle heat power would be raised to 0.96 kW. Cooling by liquid 
helium leads only to small differences if compared to cooling by liquid nitrogen. All these 
thermal limits are time-dependent and decrease because of the buildup of Am-241. 
For the case of cooling the HNED by thermal conduction through cylindrical aluminum 
rods reaching from the inside aluminum shell to the outside casing, different analyses are 
required. Depending on the number of aluminum rods this leads to a steady state temperature 
distribution that is below the melting point of the high explosives. However, the thermally 
conducting aluminum rods must be replaced by rods of chemical high explosives fitting 
exactly into the three dimensional structure of the high explosive lenses. When cooling by the 
thermally conducting rods is stopped, a transient thermal analysis must show within which 
time period the melting temperature at the inner border of the high explosive lenses would be 
attained or exceeded. 
For low technology HNEDs the results allow the conclusion that the limit, above which 
the HNED could become technically unfeasible, is below an alpha-particle heat power of 
about 0.4 kW, i.e. below the range which was determined for the case of cooling the outside 
casing by liquid helium to -270°C. 
In both cases of cooling either the outside casing by liquid helium or by cooling the high 
explosive lenses by aluminum rods, tremendous technical difficulties would have to be 
overcome. Doubts are raised whether a Non Nuclear Weapon State would ever undertake 
such technical efforts. Any attempts to improve the cooling of the reactor grade-plutonium 
based HNEDs are colliding with the extreme requirements for high geometrical precision of 
all parts within the HNEDs. If all these technical difficulties could be overcome the results 
would still be a low quasi-deterministic fizzle explosive yield (Kessler et al. [2,32]). 
High technology cases could only be mastered by advanced Nuclear Weapon States. But 
these have never used reactor-grade plutonium for their weapons arsenal (Garwin [11], 
deVolpi [12], Grizzle [50]). 
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11. Proliferation Resistance of Americium Originating from Spent 
Irradiated Reactor Fuel 
11.1 Introduction 
The three most important americium isotopes Am-241, Am-242m and Am-243 originate 
from neutron irradiation during nuclear fuel burn-up in nuclear reactors, e.g. LWR fuel, FR 
fuel or fuel of accelerator driven systems (ADSs). The isotope Am-241 alone can originate 
from the beta decay of the isotope Pu-241 of stored spent fuel elements or of chemically 
separated plutonium. Separated americium together with separated neptunium has been of 
concern in proliferation and safeguards discussions, see Albright et al. [1]. The total amounts 
of americium in spent fuel elements and high level waste was estimated by IAEA [50] to be 
160 tonnes in 2010 (Section 1). 
11.2 Some nuclear physics data of the three americium isotopes Am-241, Am-242m 
and Am-243 
The americium isotopes Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 arise from nuclear reactions 
[2,3,4] as shown in Fig. 11.1. Only the main production paths for the isotopes are shown. 
Their abundance in irradiated fuel depends on the cross sections and the neutron energy 
spectra in the different reactors, e.g. LWRs, FRs or ADSs. Due to its short half-life (16 h), 
Am-242 is not relevant here for the further considerations. 
 
Fig. 11.1. Production paths for the three americium isotopes Am-241, Am-242m, and 
Am-243. 
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Some nuclear properties, e.g. alpha decay or gamma decay, half lives, related energies and 
branching ratios are given in Table 11.1 (Cesana et al. [2]). The alpha decay is responsible 
for the considerable alpha particle heat rate, which is also listed in Table 11.1 for all three 
americium isotopes. Because of the branching ratio of only 0.459% for alpha-decay, Am-
242m causes only a relatively low alpha particle heat rate (Holden et al. [3] and Kocharov et 
al. [4]). The high gamma activity of all three americium isotopes is often cited as a 
proliferation barrier (Ronen et al. [5,6]. Also, Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 are 
spontaneous fission neutron emitters [7-12]. Their half lives for spontaneous neutron 
emission and their spontaneous fission neutron emission rates [n/(g·s)] [3,4] are indicated in 
Table 11.2. 
Nuclide Half-life 
(y) 
Decay 
Products 
Energy 
(keV) 
Bran- 
ching 
(%) 
alpha particle 
heat power 
(W/kg) 
Am-241 
 
432 
 
Alpha 
 
 
Gamma 
5486 
5443 
5388 
  59.5 
85.2 
13 
1.4 
35.9 
110 
 
Am-242m 141 Alpha 
Gamma 
5207 
984 
1028.5 
0.459 
0.128 
0.093 
1.5 
Am-243 7370 Alpha 
 
 
Gamma 
5275 
5233 
5181 
    74.7 
87.4 
11 
1.1 
68.2 
6.4 
Tablle 11.1. Alpha and gamma decay for Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 [2]. 
 
Table 11.2. Spontaneous fission neutron rates for Am-241, Am-242, Am-242m and Am-243 
[7-12]. 
 
The critical mass of Am-241 metal reflected by 20 cm of steel was reported to be between 
33.6 and 43.6 kg depending on the codes and nuclear cross-section sets applied. With the 
same codes and nuclear cross-section sets a critical mass of 3.7 to 5.2 kg was calculated for 
metallic Am-242m. For Am-243 metal a critical mass between 111 to 193 kg was 
determined. In all cases 20 cm of steel was used as a reflector (Diaz et al. [13]). 
11.3. Isotopic ratio of americium isotopes generated in spent fuel of different fuel cycle 
options of Pressurized Water Reactors and Fast Reactors 
Fig. 11.2 shows the isotopic ratios of Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 for a variety of 
different fuel cycle options in the spent-fuel elements of a modern PWR for a cooling time of 
10 y after discharge [14-20]. Options A and B represent low-enriched-uranium (LEU) fuel 
Isotope Half life spontaneous 
fission (y) 
 spontaneous 
fission 
Spontaneous fission 
neutron emission 
(n/(g·s)) 
Am-241 1.2·1014 2.85 1.3 
Am-242m 3·1012 2.45 44.6 
Am-243 2·1014 2.57 0.7 
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after a burnup between 33 and 50 GWd/t. The ratios of 39.7% Am-241, 0.3% Am-242m and 
60% Am-243 (option A) or 23.2% Am-241, 0.3% Am-242m and 76.5% Am-243 (option B) 
would exist at discharge of the spent fuel after a burnup of 33 or 50 GWd/t. During a 
subsequent cooling time of 10 y, Pu-241 (half life for beta decay of 14.4 y) would decay into 
Am-241 and change the isotopic ratio to 85.6% Am-241, 0.08% Am-242m and 14.32% Am-
243 (option A) or 81% Am-241, 0.1% Am-242m and 18.9% Am-243 (option B). These 
isotopic ratios of Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 after 10 y decay time would be 
representative for americium which could be misused for a nuclear explosive device (NED). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A - Low enriched uranium oxide fuel (LEU-UOX) with 33 GWd/t burn-up and 10 years cooling time 
B - Low enriched uranium oxide fuel (LEU-UOX) with 50 GWd/t burn-up and 10 years cooling time 
C - Reenriched reprocessed uranium (RRU) oxide fuel with 60 GWd/t and 10 years cooling time 
D - Natural uranium plutonium oxide fuel (MOX) with 50 GWd/t and 10 years cooling time 
E - Reenriched reprocessed uranium mixed with denatured plutonium RRU-MOX with 60 GWd/t 
and 10 years cooling time 
F - Reenriched reprocessed uranium mixed with plutonium and minor actinides (RRU-Pu-MA-
MOX) with 60 GWd/t and 10 years cooling time 
G - Thorium and reenriched reprocessed uranium (RRU) mixed with plutonium and minor actinides 
(RRU-Th-Pu-MA-MOX) with 60 GWd/t and 10 years cooling time 
 
Fig. 11.2. Isotopic compositions of americium separated from spent fuel (10 years after 
discharge) for different fuel cycle options of PWRs. 
 
In the options C, D, E either reenriched reprocessed uranium (RRU) (option C) or natural 
uranium or RRU both together with plutonium (option D and E) are used. The isotopic ratios 
of Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 vary from 21.2% Am-241, 0.3% Am-242m and 78.5% 
Am-243 up to 40.7% Am-241, 0.3% Am-242m and 59% Am-243 at discharge after a burnup 
of 60 GWd/t. After a cooling time of 10 y, these ratios are modified to range from 73.6% 
Am-241, 0.4% Am-242m and 26% Am243 to 77.4% Am-241, 0.1% Am-242m and 22.5% 
Am-243 (only option E has 0.4% Am-242m). 
14.32
0.08
85.60
14.32
0.1
81.0
18.9
0.1
77.4
22.5
0.1
73.9
26.0
0.4
73.6
26.0
0.3
73.7
26.0
0.5
73.5
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In options F and G, RRU or thorium are mixed with plutonium and MAs in order to 
incinerate both plutonium and MAs in PWRs. In these cases the isotopic ratio of Am-241, 
Am-242m, and Am-243 changes from 46% Am-241, 0.7% Am-242m and 53.3% Am-243 up 
to 51% Am-241, 1.1% Am-242m and 47.9% Am-243 at discharge after a burnup of 
60 GWd/t. After a cooling time of 10 y this ratio is modified to range from 73.7% Am-241, 
0.3% Am-242m and 26% Am-243 up to 73.5% Am-241, 0.5% Am-242m and 26% Am-243. 
In sodium cooled FRs (Fig. 11.3) the ratio of the americium isotopes Am-241, Am-242m, 
and Am-243 is 51.5% Am-241, 3.6% Am-242m and 44.9% Am-243 with metallic fuel after a 
burnup of 140 GWd/t (option H) and a cooling time of 2 y. In the spent fuel of mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel FRs (option I), americium can be found with 55% Am-241, 1.5% Am-242m and 
43.5% Am-243 for a cooling time of 7 y after discharge of the fuel having a burnup of 
185 GWd/t. Plutonium and MA incinerating ADSs with metallic fuel (option J) contain 
americium with 45% Am-241, 3.5% Am-242m and 51.5% Am-243 in the spent fuel after a 
burnup of 250 GWd/t and 2 y cooling time. ADSs which incinerate both plutonium and MAs 
in nitride fuel (case H) will have americium with 49% Am-241, 4.5% Am-242m and 46.5% 
Am-243 after a cooling time of 2 y after discharge of the spent fuel having a burn-up of 
150 GWd/t (Hill [21], Messaoudi [22]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H - Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeders (LMFBR) with metallic fuel after l40 GWd/t burn-up and 2 
years cooling time 
I - Liquid Metal cooled Fast Reactor (FR) with MOX fuel after 185 GWd/t burnup and 7 years 
cooling time 
J - ADS (accelerator driven system) with metallic fuel with Pu and MAs having a burn-up of 250 
GWd/t and 2 years cooling time 
K - ADS (accelerator driven system) with nitride fuel containing Pu and MAs having a burn-up of 
150 GWd/t and 2 years cooling time. 
Fig. 11.3. Isotopic compositions of americium separated from spent fuel (2 years or 7 years 
after discharge) for different fuel cycle options of FRs. 
44.9
3.6
51.5
43.5
1.5
55.0
51.5 46.5
3.5
45.0
4.5
49.0
  301
11.3.1    Am-241 from the decay of Pu-241 
Chemically separated reactor plutonium, which has been intermediately stored for several 
years, will contain Am-241 from the beta decay of Pu-241 (Fig. 11.1). This pure Am-241 
isotope (in the later analyses called option L) can be chemically separated from the 
plutonium. This is for example presently being done before MOX refabrication in order to 
avoid the high gamma radiation of 59.5 keV (Table 11.1) during hands-on refabrication of 
the presently applied glove-box technique. As shown in Tables 11.1. and 11.2., this pure Am-
241 has a relatively low spontaneous fission rate but a relatively high alpha-particle heat 
production. 
11.3.2   Am-242m production 
As reported above, the Am-242m generation is <1% for PWR fuel cycles but several percent 
in FR and ADS fuel cycles. It has a small spherical critical mass of 3.7 to 5.2 kg metal 
(Section 11.2) if reflected by steel and, therefore, has become of importance for special 
purpose applications, e.g. space applications [2,5,6,23,24]. In the latter case, it would have to 
be especially produced by applying special neutron filters in high flux thermal reactors 
(Cesana et al. [2]) or in FR blankets (Ronen [6]). Further isotopic enrichment from the 
accompanying isotopes Am-241 and Am-243 would become necessary to achieve Am-242m 
enrichments up to 70% but would be particularly difficult and costly (Cesana et al. [2], 
Ronen et al. [6]). 
For the following analysis a case with 92.37% Am-241, 7.13% Am-242m and 0.5% Am-
243 from (Ronen [6]) is added (option M) for the further analysis. This isotopic composition 
corresponds to 18 y of Am-241 irradiation in outer core and blanket fuel elements of Fast 
spectrum Reactors (FRs). 
11.4 Considerations on pre-ignition, alpha-particle heat power and critical mass of 
americium 
The motivation and incentive of the following analysis is to find out whether or not metallic 
reactor americium with the composition of isotopes as they originate in spent reactor fuel e.g. 
from PWRs, FRs, or ADSs would be suitable for a nuclear explosive device (NED). Reactor 
americium with the composition of isotopes as they appear in spent reactor fuel of, e.g. 
PWRs, FRs or ADSs would have a high spontaneous fission neutron source rate such that 
early pre-ignition could occur during the compaction of the fissile material. It will be shown 
in Section 11.7 that the use of the gun system method [25-29] would lead to extremely low 
explosion yields (fizzle yields) that are of no interest for HNEDs. The pre-ignition results 
would be much better if the implosion method [25-29] would be used. But, because of the 
compact geometrical (spherical) arrangement that must be used for the implosion method, the 
subcriticality multiplication of the spontaneous fission neutron source must be accounted for. 
This will also lead to relatively early pre-ignition during the compaction process. 
In addition, it will be shown, that the high alpha-particle heat power of Am-241 (Table 
11.1), together with the relatively high critical mass of metallic reactor americium originating 
from reactor spent fuel of PWRs, FRs, or ADSs, will lead to very high temperatures in the 
high explosive lenses necessarily surrounding the fissile americium metal in an implosive-
type device. As a consequence, the melting point or temperature for initiation of self-
explosion of the high explosive material will be exceeded. 
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11.5. Critical mass of reactor americium metal based Hypothetical Nuclear Explosive 
Devices 
The gun type system (Fig. 11.4) and the spherical implosion type system (Figs. 9.3 and 11.5) 
are considered for the subsequent calculations of the critical mass for an HNED based on 
reactor americium. From the critical mass data, the spontaneous fission neutron source and 
the alpha-particle heat power can be determined. 
For the gun type system and for the implosion type system, the following assumptions are 
taken for the further analysis: 
11.5.1    Gun type HNED with metallic americium 
For the gun type system, a cylindrical arrangement of reactor-americium metal is assumed. A 
cylinder with a diameter of 16 cm is selected surrounded by a cylindrical and axial reflector 
of metallic Unat with 5-cm thickness leading to an inner barrel diameter of 26 cm. This is in 
accordance with data given in [25,26,27] where gun barrel diameters of ~16 cm up to 28 cm 
are reported for U-235 highly enriched uranium. The critical masses or critical lengths of this 
reflected fissile material arrangement will be determined for keff = 1 in Section 11.6.1. 
However, this critical length Lcrit for keff = 1 determined in Section 11.6.1 does not represent 
the length of the critical assembly that will be responsible for determining the time period t0 
between reaching prompt criticality and the final maximum keff,max or for the determination of 
the total spontaneous fission neutron source (Section 11.7). The critical mass or critical 
length for keff = 1 underestimates the mass needed for gun type device by a factor of ~2. The 
gun type systems described in [25-27] have typically about two or somewhat more critical 
masses or a keff,max »1. 
 
Americium "target"                                          Americium "bullet"
 
 
Fig. 11.4.     Gun type HNED based on reactor-americium [47,48] (adapted). 
 
Cooling of the cylindrical fissile parts with their high alpha-particle heat production rate of 
reactor americium is not further discussed because the gun type system will lead to extremely 
low explosion yields. This will be of no further interest for HNEDs (Section 11.7). 
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11.5.2     Spherical implosion type HNED with metallic americium 
For the spherical implosion type system, the geometric arrangement is shown in Figs. 9.3 and 
11.5. A reactor-americium metal sphere with a Unat reflector/tamper is surrounded by high 
explosive lenses and an outer casing. Such an HNED would have to be subcritical prior to the 
start of the implosion process. Similarly as in Kessler [31], a keff 0.98 is selected for the 
neutronic calculations. 
Internal cooling of the solid reactor-americium sphere with its considerable alpha-particle 
heat power (Section 11.8.1) is not considered. Either cooling channels or heat-conducting 
metallic sheets with proper heat insulation would be required (see Section 10.14). The 
concerns are that such cooling measures would lead to reflections and perturbations of the 
shock waves on their way through the high explosives and would cause deterioration of 
symmetry and increase of hydrodynamic instabilities. The shock waves within the HE lenses 
would be deformed [22,23,29] and the resulting nuclear explosive yield would be strongly 
reduced. In addition, it will be shown in Sections 11.10 and 11.11 that the temperatures in 
americium based implosion type HNEDs would be so high that cooling by heat conducting 
sheets would become impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.5. Geometric arrangement and dimensions for scoping studies of critical masses for 
reactor americium 
 
The high explosive lenses must have a specific geometry with at least two explosives with 
different detonation velocities. They must be very accurately machined to produce a precisely 
spherical shock wave [25,26,32,33]. The so-called one-dimensional conservative approach 
described in Section 10.4 will be applied later in Sections 11.8 and 11.8.3 for the thermal 
analysis of the HNEDs. 
11.6 Critical masses for gun type HNEDs and spherical implosion type HNEDS 
11.6.1 Critical masses for gun type systems 
The TWODANT neutron transport code with S16 order and P3 scattering matrices, 100 
neutron energy groups, and ENDF/B-VII cross sections are applied to calculate the critical 
length of the cylindrical metallic americium arrangement reflected by 5-cm thick metallic 
Unat, which was described above. 
fissile core
reflector-tamper
high explosive, 10 cm
aluminum casing, 1 cm
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Table 11.3 shows the results for all different reactor-americium options A through K for 
PWRs and FRs or ADSs fuel cycle options which were described in Section 11.3. In addition, 
option L for 100% Am-241 and one case for dedicated Am-242m production (option M) 
(Section 11.3.2) are listed. 
11.6.2 Critical masses for spherical implosion type systems 
The ONEDANT neutron transport code with S16 order and P3 scattering matrices, 100 
neutron energy groups, and ENDF/B-VII cross sections was applied to calculate the critical 
radius of the solid metallic americium sphere reflected by 5-cm thick metallic Unat. 
This calculation route had been validated before by benchmark calculations for one-
dimensional models of GODIVA and JEZEBEL where agreement to reference values was 
observed within ~0.1% k. Although even better agreement might be achieved by higher SN- 
or PN-order, this scheme was considered to be sufficiently accurate for the current purpose. 
Of course, one has to be aware that the uncertainty that has to be attributed to the nuclear data 
of the americium isotopes is considerably larger than that of the nuclear data of the fissile 
isotopes U-235 and Pu-239, relevant for GODIVA and JEZEBEL. 
The data listed in Table 11.4 are valid for keff 0.98 as described above. Table 11.4 shows 
the results for all different reactor-americium options A through K from PWR and FR or 
ADS spent fuel described in Section 11.3. In addition the option L for 100% Am-241 and 
option M for dedicated Am-242m production, described in Section 11.3.2 are listed. 
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11.7 Pre-ignition for reactor-americium based gun type and spherical implosion type 
HNEDs 
A discussion of the proliferation resistance of reactor-americium requires analyzing the 
importance of pre-ignition – caused by the high number of spontaneous fission neutrons – on 
the potential nuclear explosive yield of the HNED. In addition, also a thermal analysis is 
needed because of the high alpha-particle heat power of the reactor-americium. In this section 
the pre-ignition problem of metallic reactor-americium will be investigated for both the gun 
and the spherical implosion system. 
The theory of pre-ignition based on ramp-type reactivity increases during compaction of 
the fissile material arrangement [34-37] was applied by Kessler [30]. The main calculational 
parameters needed for the pre-ignition problem are the total spontaneous fission neutron 
source S (n/s) of the HNED, the neutron life time leff (s), the ramp rate and the associated 
time period t0 (s) from reaching prompt criticality up to the end of compaction of the fissile 
material. 
11.7.1 Pre-ignition of metallic americium based gun type systems 
Table 11.5 shows that the total spontaneous fission neutron source for gun systems and for 
keff = 1 ranges from 0.72105 n/s for 100% Am-241 (option L) to ~1.68·105 n/s for case K 
(Table 11.4). For spherical implosion systems and keff  0.98, they range from ~0.6·105 n/s 
for 100% Am-241 (option L) to 1.48·105 n/s for option J. 
For the case with Am-242m breeding in a liquid-metal fast breeder reactor (Ronen [6]) 
(LMFBR) (option M), the spontaneous fission neutron source is 1.64·105 n/s for gun type 
systems and for keff = 1 and 1.43·105 n/s for spherical implosion systems. 
Gun type systems – as reported in [25-27] – had a fissile material mass of about two or 
more critical masses. Therefore, values of a factor of 2 higher for the spontaneous neutron 
source should be accounted for gun type HNEDs in the discussion following. Table 11.5 
shows values for the spontaneous fission source S that represent values based on the critical 
mass (keff = 1) multiplied by the factors 1.35 (conservative) and 2. 
In Kessler [30] a parametric approach with S = 105 n/s and S = 1.5·105 n/s was chosen. For 
the neutron life time, leff = 10-8 s, was selected as it was used also by Mark [37] for reactor 
plutonium metal. For the time period, t0, two parametric values are investigated: t = 5·10-4 s 
and t0 = 10-3 s. They are based on Mark [37], on data from [25-29], and critical length data of 
Table 11.3. 
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gun type system 
keff = 1 (mass) 
gun type HNED* 
factor 1.35 to 2.0 
Isotopic composi-
tion of reactor 
americium (option) 
spherical implosion 
type HNEDs 
keff  0.98 
0.765·105 105             to  1.53·105 A 0.622·105 
0.788·105 1.06·105 to 1.57·105 B 0.624·105 
0.801·105 1.08·105 to 1.60·105 C 0.637105 
0.816·105 1.10·105 to 1.63·105 D 0.641·105 
0.876·105 1.18·105 to 1.75·105 E 0.706105 
0.858·105 1.16·105 to 1.72·105 F 0.678·105 
0.898·105 1.21·105 to 1.8·105 G 0.715·105 
1.522·105 2.02·105 to 3·105 H 1.276·105 
1.20·105 1.62·105 to 2.4·105 I 0.937·105 
1.60·105 2.16·105 to 3.2·105 J 1.482·105 
1.68105 2.27·105 to 3.36·105 K 1.404105 
0.720·105 0.98·105 to 1.43·105 L 0.60·105 
1.64·105 2.21·105 to 3.28·105 M 1.43·105 
*gun type HNED with a total of 1.35 to 2 time the mass calculated for keff = 1. 
 
Table 11.5. Spontaneous fission neutron source (n/s) (fissile core and reflector) for different 
reactor americium mixtures as well as for gun type and spherical implosion type 
HNEDs 
11.7.2   Results of pre-ignition analysis for gun type systems 
For these chosen parametric values of the gun HNEDs the cumulative probabilities for pre-
ignition were calculated by Kessler [30]. Pre-ignition occurs stochastically already early 
during the compaction phase between t1/t0= 0 and t1/t0 at ~0.3 for a spontaneous neutron 
source of 105 n/s or 1.5·105 n/s and a total compaction time of t0 = 10-3 s (t1 = time when pre-
ignition occurs). For a compaction time of t0 = 5·10-4 s the values are only slightly larger. 
The cumulative probabilities for pre-ignition as a function of the ratio x of the attainable 
explosive yield, Y, relative to the maximum nominal yield, Y0, were also determined by 
Kessler [30]. 
The minimum relative explosive fizzle yield would be 
6 7
6 7
0
-5 -3
F,min 0 0F,min
-5 -4
F,min 0F,min
x  = Y/Y  = 2.7  10  for the time period of compaction of t =10 (s)
and
x  = Y/Y = 7.6  10  for the time period of compaction of  t  = 5 10  (s)

 
 
(for Y0 typically a value of 20 kt TNT can be considered [36,37]). 
It is also understood that each value x = Y/Y0 belongs to a certain cumulative probability 
for pre-ignition (integral of the differential probability) [30]. 
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It can be concluded that for the gun type systems the attainable nuclear explosive yield, Y, 
would be extremely low. On the basis of Y0 = 20 kt TNT, the minimum fizzle yields would 
be 0.54 t TNT for t0 = 10-3 s and 1.5 t TNT for t0 = 5·10-4 s and therefore be of no interest. 
This conclusion is also valid for an HNED with 100% Am-241 (option L in Table 11.3), 
having a spontaneous fission neutron source of ~105 to 1.4·105 n/s. 
The same conclusion also holds for the isotopic composition of option M (Am-242m 
generated by breeding in outer core and blanket assemblies of an LMFBR [6]) as the 
spontaneous fission neutron source would be between 2.2·105 n/s and 3.2·105 n/s. 
11.7.3 Results of pre-ignition analysis for spherical implosion HNEDs 
For the subcritical spherical fissile assembly (Fig. 11.5) with keff  0.98 the subcriticality 
multiplication (Keepin [10], deVolpi [26], Weinberg [38] 
eff
1M  
1-k
  
must be accounted for which is M  50 for keff  0.98. This was also confirmed, e.g., for 
option A by inhomogeneous ONEDANT calculations with the corresponding internal 
spontaneous fission source [30]. 
This means that all values for the spontaneous fission neutron source S of Table 11.5 for 
the spherical implosion system will have to be multiplied by 50. This leads to spontaneous 
fission neutron sources that can be represented by the parameters 3·106 n/s and 7·106 n/s. 
For the spherical implosion system much shorter time periods of t0 = 2·10-5 s down to t0 = 
10-5 s can be achieved [25,26,37,46]. 
The relative minimum fizzle yields, xF,min are now 
6 7 -3 -5F,min 0 0F,minx  = Y/Y  = 9.5 10  for  the time period for compaction of  t =2 10  s   
and 
-5
F,min 0
0 F,min
Yx  =  = 0.027 for the time period of compaction of t  = 10  s
Y
& '
( )
* +
 
These are by a factor of ~102 and 103 higher than for the gun type HNED and would lead 
to 0.54 kt TNT for t0 = 10-5 s or 0.19 kt TNT for t0 = 2·10-5 s. These results for the attainable 
minimum fizzle yield are the same for t0 = 10-5 s as given for reactor-grade plutonium by 
Mark [37]. There is, however, also the relatively high alpha-heat rate of the isotope Am-241 
(Table 10.1) to be considered. This needs, in addition, a thermal analysis of the implosion 
type HNED. 
11.8. Geometric dimensions, alpha particle heat power and material characteristics 
for the thermal analysis of spherical americium based implosion type HNEDs 
11.8.1 Geometric dimensions of a reactor-americium based spherical implosion type 
HNED for the thermal analyses 
Based on the analysis of Kessler [31] for reactor-grade plutonium the following geometric 
dimensions, material for the reflector/tamper [47], and material characteristics of the high 
explosives are assumed. The geometric dimensions of the metallic americium sphere with 5-
cm thick metallic Unat reflector/tamper are given in Table 10.6 and Fig. 11.4 for fuel cycle 
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options A through M. The thickness of the high explosives spherical lense system is assumed 
to be 10 cm. The outer casing shall be of 1-cm thick aluminum (Fig. 11.4). The material 
characteristics of the high explosives will be defined in Section 11.8.2. All assumptions for 
HNEDs are merely intended to represent a range for which the thermal analysis can be 
performed [45]. 
 
Case Radius of 
americium sphere 
(cm) 
Outer radius of 
reflector/tamper 
(cm) 
outer radius 
high explosives
(cm) 
Outer radius 
aluminum 
casing (cm) 
Alpha particle 
heat power 
(W) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
9,45 
9,54 
9.62 
9.69 
9.64 
9.66 
9.62 
14.45 
14.54 
14.62 
14.69 
14.64 
14.66 
14.62 
24.45 
24.54 
24.62 
24.69 
24.64 
24.66 
24.62 
25.45 
25.54 
25.62 
25.69 
25.64 
25.66 
25.62 
4575 
4497 
4415 
4330 
4296 
4269 
4208 
H 
I 
J 
K 
9.46 
9.81 
9.61 
9.34 
14.46 
14.81 
14.61 
14.34 
24.46 
24.81 
24.61 
24.34 
25.46 
25.81 
25.61 
25.34 
2889 
3431 
3027 
2443 
L 
M 
9.18 
8.26 
14.18 
13.26 
24.18 
23.26 
25.18 
24.26 
4884 
3286 
Table 11.6. Geometric dimensions and alpha-particle heat power of HNEDs for reactor-
americium from fuel cycle options A through M 
11.8.2   Material properties for high explosives 
The high explosives represent the limiting thermal material characteristics for HNEDs with 
reactor-grade americium in their central region. High explosives have the lowest thermal 
conductivities of all material layers in the considered HNED designs. In addition, they melt at 
relatively low temperatures or undergo transition to pyrolysis, to self-ignition or self-
explosion if certain limiting temperatures are exceeded. The real design of high explosives 
lenses is classified. They have a sophisticated geometry and consist of at least two different 
high explosives with different detonation velocities (Rhodes [25,26]). In Table 11.7 a 
selection of materials data for high explosives is shown. The very high-technology high 
explosives have the highest thermal conductivity values, the highest melting points, and the 
highest temperatures for start of pyrolysis or start of self-ignition and self-explosion that can 
be found in the literature [39-42]. Just for demonstration, data for two very high technology 
and one medium technology high explosive material are given as defined in Kessler [30]. 
As the complicated three-dimensional geometric structure for the high explosive lenses is 
unknown, the so-called one-dimensional conservative approach – as explained in detail in 
Section 10.4 – is applied. This leads to limiting temperature curves. To generate final results 
of the thermal analysis, always the lower of these limiting temperature curves with the 
highest thermal conductivity for the high explosives will be considered. This is always on the 
conservative side. 
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Start pyrolysis Level of 
technology 
 
High Explosive Density 
(g/cm3) 
Thermal 
conductivity 
(W/cm  K) 
Melting 
point 
    (°C) self explosion 
Te 
275 °C medium 
technology 
PBX 9501 
 
1.86 0.452·10-2 190 
235 °C 
395 °C very high 
technology 
PBX 9502 
 
1.89 0.561·10-2 448 
331 °C 
395 °C  TATB 
 
1,89 0.544·10-2 448 
347 °C 
 
Table 11.7.  Material Data of High Technology High Explosives [39-42]. 
11.9   Outside temperature of the reactor americium based HNED 
The alpha-particle heat produced in the solid americium metallic sphere must be transferred 
through the different spherical material layers by thermal conduction to the outside casing, 
where it is transferred to the ambient atmosphere by natural convection and radiation. 
The highest radiation heat transfer and therefore the lowest surface temperature can be 
found for black body radiation. Black body radiation is assumed although, e.g., for rolled 
aluminum with an emissivity of 0.07 [43], the temperature difference between the outer 
casing and the environment would be about a factor of ~1.94 higher. For polished aluminum 
with this factor would be 2.24. 
11.9.1 Temperatures of a metallic reactor americium bare sphere and gamma 
radiation problems 
The temperatures in a bare metallic americium sphere are of interest for the manufacturing 
process. For different outside radii of the bare metallic reactor americium sphere (options A 
through M) and black body radiation the following outside surface temperatures are 
calculated as shown in Table 11.8. Also the central temperatures are given on the basis of a 
thermal conductivity of 0.1 (W/cmK) for metallic reactor americium [44]. 
These temperatures are very high and would make manufacturing and assembling of  a 
reactor americium based bare sphere extremely difficult. 
In addition to the high temperatures, there is the high gamma radiation to be considered. 
Table 11.1 lists the gamma-ray energies of the three americium isotopes. Together with the 
relatively high critical masses of such HNEDs (see Table 11.4) of ~32 to 58 kg reactor 
americium, the associated gamma activities with 
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 59.5 keV for Am-241 
 984 keV 
 1028.5 keV 
 74.7 keV for Am-243 
 
would represent extreme impediments for manufacturing and handling of such devices. This 
high gamma activity is therefore often cited as a proliferation barrier [28,30]. 
 
Case Radius of americium 
bare sphere 
(cm) 
Outside temperature 
of americium bare 
sphere, Ta (°C) 
Central temperature 
of americium bare 
sphere, T0 (°C) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
9.45 
9.54 
9.62 
9.69 
9.64 
9.66 
9.22 
645 
636 
628 
628 
621 
619 
619 
838 
824 
811 
806 
798 
795 
793 
H 
I 
J 
K 
9.46 
9.81 
9.61 
9.34 
544 
565 
548 
515 
666 
704 
673 
619 
L 
M 
9.18 
8.26 
677 
629 
889 
787 
 
Table 11.8. Outside temperature and central temperature of a bare sphere of reactor 
americium for fuel cycle options A through M. 
11.9.2   Outside casing temperature of americium based HNEDs 
For an HNED consisting of the metallic reactor-americium sphere surrounded by a 5-cm 
thick reflector/tamper of metallic Unat a 10-cm thick HE and a 1-cm-thick aluminum casing 
(Fig. 11.4, Table 11.6) the outside surface temperature of the casing would be lower than for 
the bare sphere (Table 11.9) because the heat power is rejected from a larger surface. These 
outside casing temperatures are again given for black body radiation. 
11.9.3    Inside temperature profile in the americium based HNED 
Having determined the outer temperature Ta of the aluminum casing (Table 11.9), one can 
now evaluate the temperature profile in the hollow spherical shells without internal heat 
sources (aluminum casing, high explosives, Unat reflector/tamper). 
  for Am-242m 
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Case Outer radius of aluminum casing 
(cm) 
Outside casing temperature 
(°C) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
25.45 
25.54 
25.62 
25.69 
25.64 
25.66 
25.62 
288 
285 
281 
279 
278 
277 
274 
H 
I 
J 
K 
25.46 
25.81 
25.61 
25.34 
232 
249 
236 
214 
L 
M 
25.18 
24.26 
299 
258 
 
Table 11.9. Outside casing temperature of reactor americium based HNEDs (fuel cycle 
options A through M) 
11.9.4 Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium sphere HNED (option G, 
PWR) 
Fig. 11.6 shows the radial temperature profile within the HNED described as option G. 
Option G has the lowest alpha-heat power of PWR fuel cycle options A through G (Table 
11.6). As the casing outer radius does not vary much (Table 11.6), it would therefore have the 
lowest temperature profile. The temperature of the outer aluminum casing at 25.62 cm would 
be 274 °C. (For the real emissivity of rolled aluminum, it would be considerably higher). 
Because of the relatively low thermal conductivity of  = 0.561·10-2 W/cm °C for TATB 
or PBX 9502, the radial temperature would rise in these high explosives from 274,6 °C at 
their outer radial boundary to 1933 °C at their inner radial boundary at 14.62 cm. For 
comparison also the radial temperature profile for another high explosive (PBX 9501 with a 
lower thermal conductivity of  = 0.452·10-2 W/cm °C) is shown (see Table 11.7) as dotted 
line in Fig. 11.6, for which the temperature in the high explosives would rise even up to 
2332 °C. The melting temperature of 448 °C and the temperature for initiation of pyrolysis 
(395 °C) or self-explosion (331 °C or 347 °C) of the high explosives would be exceeded in 
>90% of the volume of the high explosives, which would melt or self-explode. The HNED 
described as option G could not function technically. The inside temperature of the 5-cm 
thick spherical shell of Unat metal would be 1968 °C or 2367 °C. For all other PWR fuel cycle 
options A through F, the temperatures would be somewhat higher (Table 11.10 in Section 
11.10). The Unat metal would also be molten since its melting temperature of 1132 °C is 
exceeded. Finally, the temperatures in the metallic reactor-americium sphere would also be 
so high that it would be fully molten (melting temperature 1176 °C). The HNED defined as 
option G would not be feasible technically. 
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Fig. 11.6. Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium based HNED (option G PWR) 
11.9.5 Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium HNED (Option H 
LMFBR) 
Fig.11.7 shows the radial temperature profile within the HNED described as option H. Option 
H represents the metallic LMFBR fuel cycle (Fig. 11.3) and has the lowest alpha-particle heat 
rate of the two considered FR fuel cycle option options H and I. As the outer-casing radius of 
these two options is almost equal (Table 11.7), it would have the lowest temperatures among 
the HNEDs (see Table 11.12). Assuming black body radiation, the temperature of the outer 
aluminum casing at 25.46 cm would be 232 °C. (For an emissivity of 0.07 for rolled 
aluminum it would be considerably higher). Because of the relatively low thermal 
conductivity of  = 0.561·10-2 W/cm °C for the high explosive PBX 9502, the radial 
temperature would rise in these high explosives from 232.5 °C at their outer radial boundary 
to 1391 °C at their inner radial boundary at 14.46 cm. For comparison also the radial 
temperature profile for another high explosive (PBX 9501 with a lower thermal conductivity 
of  = 0.452·10-2 W/cm °C) is shown as dotted line, for which the temperature in the high 
explosives would rise to 1671 °C. The melting temperature of 448 °C and the temperature for 
initiation of pyrolysis (395 °C) or self-explosion (331 °C or 347 °C) of the high explosives 
would be exceeded in >80% of the volume of the high explosives, which would melt or self-
explode. The HNED described as option H could not function technically. The inside 
temperature of the 5-cm-thick spherical shell of Unat metal would be 1416 °C or 1695 °C. For 
LMFBR  fuel  cycle  option I, the  temperatures  would  be  somewhat  higher. The Unat metal  
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would also be molten, and the temperatures in the metallic reactor-americium sphere would 
also be so high (Fig. 11.7) that it would be fully molten. The HNED defined as option G 
would not be feasible technically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.11.7. Radial temperature profile for a reactor americium based HNED (option H 
LMFBR) 
11.9.6      Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium HNED (option K, ADS) 
Fig. 11.8 shows the radial temperature profile within the HNED described as option K. 
Option K represents the ADS-nitride fuel cycle (Fig. 11.3) and has the lowest alpha-particle 
heat rate of the two considered ADS fuel cycle options J and K. As the outer-casing radius of 
these two options is almost equal (see Table 11.7), it would therefore have the lowest 
temperatures among the HNED (see Table 11.11). Assuming black body radiation, the 
temperature of the outer aluminum casing at 25.34 cm would be 214 °C. (For an emissivity 
of 0.07 for rolled aluminum, it would be considerably higher). Because of the relatively low 
thermal conductivity of  = 0.561·10-2 W/cm °C for the high explosive PBX 9502, the radial 
temperature would rise in these high explosives from 214.2 °C at their outer radial boundary 
up to 1207 °C at their inner radial boundary at 14.34 cm. For comparison the radial 
temperature profile for another high explosives (PBX 9501 with a lower thermal conductivity 
of  = 0.452·10-2 W/cm °C) is shown (see Table 11.8) as dotted line, for which the 
temperature in the HE would rise even up to 1446 °C. The melting temperature of 448 °C and 
the temperature for initiation of pyrolysis (395 °C) or self-explosion (331 °C or 347 °C) of 
the high explosives would be exceeded in >60% of the volume of the high explosives, which 
would melt or self-explode. The HNED described as option K could not function technically. 
The inside temperature of the 5-cm-thick spherical shell of Unat metal would be 1228 °C or 
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1467 °C. For the other ADS fuel cycle option J, the temperatures would be somewhat higher. 
The Unat metal would also be molten, and the temperatures in the metallic reactor-americium 
sphere would also be so high (Fig. 11.8) that it would be fully molten. The HNED defined as 
option K would not be feasible technically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.8. Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium HNED (option K ADS) 
11.9.7 Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium HNED (option L, 100% 
Am-241) 
Fig. 11.9 shows the radial temperature profile within the HNED described as option L. This 
option represents 100% Am-241 from the decay of Pu-241 (section 11.3.1). Assuming black 
body radiation, the temperature of the outer aluminum casing at 25.18 cm would be 299 °C. 
(For an emissivity of 0.07 for rolled aluminum it would be considerably higher). Because the 
thermal conductivity of  = 0.561·10-2 W/cm °C for the high explosive PBX 9502, the radial 
temperature would rise in these high explosives from 299.4 °C at their outer radial boundary 
to 2320 °C at their inner radial boundary at 14.68 cm. For comparison also the radial 
temperature profile for another high explosive (PBX 9501 with a lower thermal conductivity 
of  = 0.452·10-2 W/cm °C) is shown (see Table 11.7) as dotted line, for which the 
temperature in the high explosives would rise even up to 2807 °C. The melting temperature 
of 448 °C and the temperature for initiation of pyrolysis (395 °C) or self-explosion (331 °C 
or 347 °C) of the high explosives would be exceeded in >90% of the volume of the high 
explosives, which would melt or self-explode. The HNED described as option L could not 
function technically. The inside temperature of the 5-cm-thick spherical shell of Unat metal 
would be 2364 °C or 2851 °C. Option L would have the highest temperatures in the HNED.  
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The Unat metal would also be molten, and the temperatures in the metallic reactor americium 
sphere would also be so high (Fig. 11.9) that it would be fully molten. The HNED defined as 
option L would not be feasible technically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.9. Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium based HNED 
(option L 100% Am-241) 
11.9.8 Radial temperature profile for a reactor-americium HNED (option M  
Am-242m breeding) 
The radial temperature profile within the HNED described as option M represents the fuel 
cycle option Am-242m breeding in an FR (Section 11.3.2). Assuming black body radiation, 
the temperature of the outer aluminum casing at 25.26 cm would be 258 °C. The melting 
temperature of 448 °C and the temperature for initiation of pyrolysis (395 °C) or self-
explosion (331 °C or 347 °C) of the high explosive PBX 9502 would be exceeded in >85% of 
the volume of the HE, which would melt or self-explode. The HNED described as option M 
could not function technically (Kessler [30]). 
11.10.   Discussion of the results of the thermal analyses and uncertainties 
Table 11.10 collects the data for the temperature profile in the HNEDs for options A through 
M. It can be seen that the main temperature rise is always occuring within the high explosives 
lenses, the material with the lowest thermal conductivity. Most parts of the high explosives 
lenses would be molten and would exceed the critical temperatures for start of pyrolysis and 
initiation of explosion. The americium metal and the metallic Unat would also be molten. 
Options A through G show very similar temperature profiles among the HNEDs. As can be 
expected, among them option A with the highest alpha-heat power – due to the highest 
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percentage of Am-241 (Fig. 11.2) – has the highest temperatures, whereas option G, shown in 
Fig. 11.6, with an Am-241 content of 73.5% (Table 11.4) has the lowest temperatures. 
LMFBR options H and I show somewhat lower temperatures due to the lower percentages 
of Am-241, but still the critical temperatures in the high explosives lenses would by far be 
exceeded, and the americium metal and the metallic Unat would be molten (Fig. 11.6 for 
option H). Similar results are valid for the two ADS options J and K (Fig. 11.7 for option K). 
 
option Central/outer 
temperature 
americium 
°C 
Inner temperature 
Unat 
°C 
Inner/outer 
temperature 
high explosives 
°C 
Outer temperature 
Al-casing 
°C 
A 2415/2223 2164 2125/288,4 288 
B 2355/2167 2111 2073/285,4 285 
C 2295/2112 2058 2021/281,4 281 
D 2239/2060 2008 1973/279,4 279 
E 2233/2056 2003 1968/278,4 278 
F 2215/2038 1988 1952/277,4 277 
G 2193/2019 1968 1933/274,4 274 
H 1574/1452 1416 1391/232,4 232 
I 1781/1642 1601 1574/249,3 249 
J 1618/1493 1456 1430/236,3 236 
K 1364/1260 1228 1207/214,2 214 
L 2641/2430 2364 2320/299,4 299 
M 2018/1859 1805 1770/258,3 258 
Table 11.10. Temperatures within HNEDs for fuel cycle options A through M 
Option L, which represents the case of 100% Am-241 originating from the decay of Pu-
241 has, as expected, the highest temperatures of all cases investigated in an HNED (Fig. 
11.8). 
Option M, representing americium with a high content of Am-242m, has similar high 
temperatures as the PWR, LMFBR, and ADS fuel cycle options A through K. 
11.11    Characteristics of material data 
If the reflector Unat were replaced by beryllium and tungsten, the temperature difference 
within the reflector tamper would be decreased by a factor of only ~3.5 according to the 
different thermal conductivities of Unat on the one side and beryllium and tungsten on the 
other side (see Table 10.7). 
In addition, one should clearly keep in mind hat a conservative approach was applied with 
the assumption of the blackbody radiation. 
If a hollow americium sphere for the application of the implosion process would have to 
be investigated instead of the solid americium sphere, the above results would not be very 
different since the main temperature rise again would be caused by the HE lenses with their 
low thermal conductivity. 
11.12.   Coolability of the reactor americium HNED 
The possibility of external cooling of the HNED, e.g., by forced convection or by liquid 
nitrogen or liquid helium, was analyzed with the following results. Cooling the outside casing 
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down to the lowest temperature of -270 °C lowers the whole temperature profile (Fig. 11.6 
through 11.9 and Table 11.11) accordingly. If, as an example, the temperature profile of 
option K with an outside-casing temperature of 214 °C, which is the lowest of options A 
through M would be lowered to -270 °C, then the temperature at the inner radius of the high 
explosives would be lowered from 1207 °C to 723 °C. This is still by 275 °C higher than the 
melting temperature, 328 °C higher than the starting temperature for pyrolysis, and 376 °C 
higher than the limiting temperature for start of explosion of, e.g. the high explosive TATB. 
All other options listed in Table 11.11 would have even higher temperatures. 
11.13     Conclusions 
Reactor-americium originates during irradiation of the fuel in nuclear reactors to presently 
applied burnup values of 50 to 60 GWd/t as a mixture of the isotopes Am-241, Am-242m, 
and Am-243. In PWR spent fuel – depending on the fuel cycle strategies considered in this 
paper – this isotopic mixture varies between 73.5% Am-241, 0.5% Am-242m and 26% Am-
243 up to 81% Am-241, 0.1% Am-242m and 18.9% Am-243 after a burnup of 50 to 
60 GWd/t and a cooling time of 10 y (Fig. 11.2). In the spent fuel of FRs after 2 or 7 y 
cooling time, the composition varies between ~51.5% Am-241, 3.6% Am-242m and 44.9% 
Am-243 up to 55% Am-241, 1.5% Am-242m and 43.5% Am-243 for the considered options 
(Fig. 11.3). For longer cooling times of the spent fuel, the content of Am-241 increases 
because of the decay of Pu-241. Pure Am-241 can be chemically separated from plutonium 
being stored over longer times. 
The spontaneous fission neutron rates of Am-241, Am-242m, and Am-243 require a 
detailed pre-ignition analysis for the gun type system and the implosion method. After 
determination of the critical masses for all fuel cycle options (options A through G for PWRs, 
options H and I for FRs, and options J and K for ADSs as well as for pure Am-241 and a 
dedicated Am-242m breeding case) and calculation of the spontaneous fission sources, a 
detailed pre-ignition analysis was performed (Kessler [30]). It was shown that for all cases 
considered, the gun type system would lead to very early pre-ignition during the compaction 
process and to extremely low explosion yields, which are of no further interest. A thermal 
analysis was therefore not performed. 
The implosion method, however, would lead – despite of early pre-ignition – to minimum 
fizzle yields which are in the same range as they were determined in Section 9 for reactor-
grade plutonium. A subsequent thermal analysis for implosion-type HNEDs shows, however, 
that the high alpha-particle heat production of Am-241 and the relatively high near-critical 
mass between 46.6 and 58.3 kg of reactor americium lead to an alpha-particle heat power 
between 2.4 and 4.5 kW (for pure Am-241 and dedicated Am-242m breeding, it would be 
4.9 kW (option L) and 3.3 kW (option M)). 
For the detailed thermal analyses, the same calculational procedures and the same one-
dimensional conservative approach, were applied as described in Section 10. The results of 
the thermal analyses are that in all cases the limiting temperatures for melting and the start of 
self-explosion of the high explosives are exceeded in 60% or 90% of the volume of the high 
explosive lenses. Also the melting temperature of the metallic reactor americium would be 
exceeded. 
If external cooling even down to cryogenic temperatures of –270 °C would be applied, the 
limiting temperatures for the high explosives would still be exceeded for all options A 
through M considered in this paper. 
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It is therefore concluded that HNEDs based on the gun system or on the implosion 
system using reactor americium as fissile material would be technically unfeasible.  
Reactor americium can be considered proliferation-proof. 
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12. Fuel cycle options for the production of denatured, proliferation-proof 
plutonium 
12.1     Introduction 
In Section 10 it is demonstrated that reactor plutonium with an increased isotopic content of 
Pu-238, e.g. more than 1.8% Pu-238 corresponding to more than 0.12 kW in a low 
technology HNED or more than 3.5 Pu-238 leading to more than 0.24 kW in an HNED of 
medium technology can be regarded as proliferation-proof. The utilization of such so-called 
denatured proliferation-proof plutonium would be unsuitable for a nuclear explosive device 
(NED), because the chemical high explosive lenses surrounding the plutonium would 
partially melt, or their elevated temperature would lead to self-ignition and chemical 
explosion. 
The utilization of such proliferation-proof plutonium will require the generation of Pu-238 
in sufficient percentages in the reactor-grade, proliferation-proof plutonium isotopic 
composition in an adapted fuel cycle. The incineration of this proliferation-proof plutonium 
requires modern reprocessing and, e.g., mixed-oxide (MOX) refabrication technologies 
which are already under development [1 through 6]. The evolution of proliferation-proof, 
reactor-grade plutonium during irradiation will be discussed in Sections 13 and 14. 
12.2   Review of earlier research 
During and just after the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program [7] research 
results were published [8-11] indicating that reactor plutonium with isotopic contents of up to 
8-10% Pu-238 or more can be generated. They were aiming at a reactor-grade plutonium 
composition with 5% Pu-238 and more in as proposed by Heising-Goodman [8]. However, 
this lower limit had not been derived from detailed criticality calculations for the hypothetical 
nuclear explosive device (HNED) and also differed considerably in thermal conductivity data 
for the high explosive lenses as applied by Kessler [1]. 
More recent results for Pu-238 production were obtained, e.g., in the context of studies on 
plutonium and actinide transmutation and incineration analyses using plutonium and minor 
actinides, Unat and thorium in pressurized water reactors. This resulted in a Pu-238 isotopic 
content of 8 to 10% (Shwageraus et al. [12]). Extensive studies with neptunium- and 
americium-doped enriched uranium fuel in PWRs yielded Pu-238 contents in the reactor-
grade plutonium of 30% and more [13 through 15]. Doping of the blanket fuel elements of 
the fast reactor (FR) JOYO with neptunium lead to Pu-238 isotopic contents of higher than 
10% [16]. 
However, as will be shown in Section 13, neptunium must be avoided in a future 
proliferation-proof civil nuclear fuel cycle. 
In all these studies the Pu-238 production was enhanced, e.g., by 
– recycling of the U-235/U-236 from reprocessed spent fuel; also re-enriched U-235/U-236 
from reprocessed uranium can be utilized. 
– recycling of recovered MAs: neptunium, americium, and curium from reprocessed spent 
fuel 
– reduction of the U-238 content in the fuel by substitution of thorium. 
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Pu-238 is produced in nuclear reactors principally through several routes: from U-235/U-
236 neutron capture, to a smaller extent from U-238 (n,2n) reactions, more directly from 
Np-237 (if separated chemically from the MAs), and from the decay of Cm-242, which will 
be of importance if plutonium recycling is utilized. Fig. 12.1 displays different possible 
routes for an increased Pu-238 production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12.1.    Different production routes for Pu-238. 
12.3 Analysis of fuel cycle options for the production of proliferation-proof plutonium 
Broeders and Kessler [17] demonstrated that proliferation-proof, denatured reactor plutonium 
can be directly generated by loading re-enriched reprocessed uranium into PWR cores. In 
addition they presented three different options how the presently already existing plutonium 
in spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel, after reprocessing, can be converted into 
proliferation-proof, denatured reactor plutonium. This can be done by mixing the presently 
236m
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existing reactor plutonium with reenriched reprocessed uranium, refabricating it to, e.g., 
MOX fuel, and subsequently irradiating this fuel in a PWR over a burnup cycle of 60 GWd/t. 
Similarly existing reactor plutonium can be mixed with reenriched reprocessed uranium and 
TRU. Partial replacement of uranium by thorium leads to similar results for proliferation-
proof, denatured reactor plutonium, but additional U-233 denatured in U-238 is generated. 
12.4 Fuel cycle options for the production of denatured, proliferation-proof 
plutonium 
Based on the results of earlier investigations [8,9,10,18,23] Broeders and Kessler [17] 
selected different fuel types for the production of plutonium with a Pu-238 fraction of 6% or 
somewhat more, as shown in Table 12.1. 
 
U (wt%) Plutonium (wt %)  
Fuel 
type 
 
P/D 
Ratio 
 
M/F 
Ratio 
 
Fuel composition
 
Th 
(wt%) Total Fissile
Fraction 
Total Fissile 
Fraction 
MA 
(wt%) 
A 1.4427 2.2039 Re-enriched 
recycled U 
0 100 5.52 0 0 0 
B 1.3389 1.7132 Re-enriched 
recycled U + Pu 
(Table 12.2) 
0 93.9 5.00 6.1 64.5 0 
C 1.3389 1.7132 Re-enriched 
recycled U + Pu 
(Table 12.3) 
0 94.9 5.00 5.1 54.3 0 
D 1.4068 2.0302 Re-enriched 
recycled U + 
Pu/MA 
(Table 12.4) 
0 92.5 5.00 6.5 64.5 1.0 
E 1.5926 2.9780 Enriched U + 
Th + Pu/MA     
(Table 12.4) 
52.6 35.1 6.00 10.7 64.5 1.6 
Table 12.1. Fresh fuel compositions for fuel cycle calculations leading to denatured, 
proliferation-proof plutonium. 
 
Fuel type A is re-enriched uranium from reprocessed UO2 fuel (see Sec. 12.5.1). The re-
enriched recycled uranium will generate plutonium with a sufficiently high Pu-238 content 
(denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium) after a burnup of ~60 GWd/t. Fuel type A is close 
to the presently used standard LEU fuel with a pitch/diameter (P/D) ratio of 1.4427, which 
corresponds to a moderator-to-fuel (M/F) ratio of 2.2039 [19,20]. 
For the subsequently chosen MOX fuel types B through E, fully MOX fuel-loaded cores 
are assumed, as they lead to simpler fuel assembly design [21,22,23]. In addition, the M/F 
ratio is varied from 1.7132 to 2.9780 in order to obtain adequate safety characteristics. The 
technical and economic implications of such higher M/F ratios are discussed in Section 12.8. 
In the case of fuel type B, recycling of presently existing plutonium (Table 12.2) together 
with re-enriched reprocessed uranium in a PWR is considered. Fuel type C contains already 
recycled denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium (Table 12.3) together with re-enriched 
reprocessed uranium. In both cases, MAs would have to be separated from the spent nuclear 
fuel (SNF) and stored for later incineration [24]. 
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Isotope wt % 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
3.2 
56.4 
26.6 
8.0 
5.8 
Table 12.2. Plutonium composition from SNF with 50 GWd/t, 10 years after unloading. 
(This plutonium composition differs somewhat from the plutonium of Table 7.5 
due to different cross sections used). 
Isotope wt % 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
7.7 
44.0 
31.0 
10.3 
7.0 
 
Table 12.3. Plutonium composition of recycled, proliferation-proof PWR MOX fuel with 
50 GWd/t, 10 years after unloading. 
 
Fuel types D and E initially contain plutonium and MAs of isotopic composition in the 
proportion in which they arise from present spent fuel with a burnup of 50 GWd/t after 8 y 
cooling time in intermediate storage and 2 y reprocessing time (Tables 12.2 and 12.4). In the 
fuel type E the use of thorium, together with plutonium and enriched uranium, is introduced, 
similarly to [12]. 
 
Isotope wt % 
Np-237 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
Am-241 
Am-242m 
Am-243 
Cm-243 
Cm-244 
Cm-245 
Cm-246 
6.65 
2.75 
48.73 
23.02 
6.94 
5.04 
4.64 
0.19 
1.48 
0.00 
0.50 
0.06 
0.00 
 
Table 12.4. Plutonium and MA composition from SNF with 50 GWd/t, 10 years after 
unloading. 
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All fuel types are assumed to be dioxides with 96% of their theoretical density. The 
assumed theoretical density of thorium is 9.6 g/cm3, of plutonium and MAs is 11.0 g/cm3, 
and of uranium is 10.5 g/cm3. Table 12.2 shows the isotopic composition of the plutonium as 
it arises from present PWR spent nuclear fuel after 50 GWd/t burnup and a cooling and 
reprocessing time of 10 y. Table 12.3 shows the isotopic composition of denatured plutonium 
as it arises after several times recycling of the plutonium. In Table 12.4 the isotopic 
composition of the plutonium and the MAs are given as they arise from present PWR SNF 
after 50 GWd/t burnup and a cooling and reprocessing time of 10 y. 
12.5. Results of physics calculations for the selected fuel types 
The following results were obtained with the KAPROS modular program system [25] for pin/ 
cell calculations and the related cross-section sets based on ENDF/B6.5. Pin/cell calculations 
are adequate for such investigation as long as the recommendations of Driscoll [26] are 
followed. 
12.5.1 Results for fuel type A; UO2 from reenriched recycled uranium 
In the case of fuel type A, denatured plutonium is produced with UO2 fuel from re-enriched 
recycled uranium coming from PWR spent fuel (50 GWd/t burnup). Reprocessed uranium 
contains ~0.8-0.9% U-235 and 0.6 to 0.7% U-236 depending on the irradiation history of the 
spent reprocessed fuel. This reprocessed uranium can be reenriched, e.g., by centrifuge 
enrichment technology. According to the different atomic masses of U-235 and U-236, the 
ratio of enrichments of both uranium isotopes would be about 4:3 [27,28]. The re-enriched 
reprocessed uranium considered in these investigations is based on the results of Broeders 
[20]. Using the factor 4/3 mentioned above leads to a uranium vector of 5.52% U-235, 3.0% 
U-236, 91.48% U-238 (U-234 is neglected) [17]. 
A satisfactory burnup behaviour could be obtained with a PWR lattice with P/D=1.4427. 
Figs. 12.2 and 12.3 show the buildup of the isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-242 for fuel type A. 
(For a simple presentation only these two plutonium isotopes are shown.) It can be seen that 
after a burnup of 60 GWd/t already 12% Pu-238 and 7% Pu-242 are attained. This means that 
a lower U-236 content in the fresh fuel would already lead to about 6% Pu-238 isotopic 
content in the spent fuel after 60 GWd/t burnup. 
12.5.2. Results for fuel type B 
In the case of fuel type B, a lattice with a P/D = 1.3389 could be applied for the production of 
denatured proliferation-proof plutonium with MOX fuel from the re-enriched recycled 
uranium of fuel type A (UO2 from PWR spent fuel with 50 GWd/t burnup), mixed with 
plutonium from spent LWR UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 GWd/t (Table 12.2). 
The buildup of the isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-242 is shown in Figs. 12.2 and 12.3. It can be 
seen that 6% Pu-238 and 9% Pu-242 in the denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium are 
attained after a burnup of 60 GWd/t. 
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Fig. 12.2.   Buildup of Pu-238 in wt% for different fuel types. 
12.5.3. Results for fuel type C 
In the case of fuel type C, a lattice with a P/D = 1.3389 can be applied for the production of 
denatured plutonium with MOX fuel from the re-enriched recycled uranium of fuel type A 
(UO2 from PWR spent fuel with 50 GWd/t burnup), mixed with dedicated denatured 
plutonium from spent LWR fuel with a burnup of 50 GWd/t (Table 12.3). The main results 
for the burnup-dependent isotopic compositions for Pu-238 with 9% and Pu-242 with 10.3% 
after a burnup of 60 GWd/t can be seen from Figs. 12.2 and 12.3. 
12.5.4. Results for fuel type D 
In the case of fuel composition D, a lattice with a P/D = 1.4068 can be applied for the 
production of denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium with MOX fuel from the re-enriched 
recycled uranium of fuel type A (UO2 from PWR spent fuel with 50 GWd/t burnup), mixed 
with TRU from spent LWR UO2 fuel with a burnup of 50 GWd/t (Table 12.4). The MAs are 
in the proportion in which they appear, together with the plutonium, after a burnup of 50 
GWd/t in UO2 PWR fuel (Table 12.4), as determined with the KAPROS system [25]. The 
main results for the burnup-dependent fraction of the plutonium isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-242 
are shown in Figs. 12.2 and 12.3. After a burnup of 60 GWd/t 11% Pu-238 and 9% Pu-242 
are attained for the isotopic composition vector of denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium 
are attained. 
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Fig. 12.3.   Buildup of Pu-242 in wt% for different fuel types. 
 
12.5.5. Results for fuel type E; MOX fuel with thorium, uranium, plutonium and 
minor actinides 
In the case of fuel type E, denatured plutonium is produced in a PWR lattice with P/D = 
1.5926 with MOX fuel from enriched natural uranium, plutonium, and MAs in the proportion 
in which they appear after a burnup of 50 GWd/t in UO2 PWR fuel, and additional thorium. 
The main results for the burnup-dependent isotopic compositions for Pu-238 and Pu-242 are 
again given in Figs. 12.2 and 12.3. Pu-238 attains 11% and Pu-242 about 10.8% in the 
isotopic composition vector of denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium after a burnup of 60 
GWd/t. 
Fig. 12.4 shows the buildup of the mainly interesting heavy metal isotopes (U-233, U-235, 
Pu-238, Pu-242) for fuel type E with thorium. Because of the presence of thorium, fissile U-
233 is built up. The consequences are a concentration of ~3% U-233 together with ~3.5% 
remaining U-235 in U-238 (remaining below the limits set by IAEA (Section 8)) after a 
burnup of 60 GWd/t. At this burnup of 60 GWd/t, the Pu-238 and Pu-242 isotopic contents 
would rise to somewhat more than 10% each. 
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Fig. 12.4. Changes of Pu-238, Pu-242, U-233 and U-235 fractions of optimized MOX fuel 
from enriched uranium, plutonium, MAs, and thorium (fuel type E). 
 
The above results show that reactor plutonium from spent fuel of 50 GWd/t, as described 
by Table 12.2, can be modified to denatured plutonium in one single burnup cycle of 
~60 GWd/t for fuel types A, B, D, and E. This denatured plutonium would be, according to 
Section 10 and Kessler [1,38] unsuitable as fissile material for an HNED. The results of fuel 
type C show that reactor-grade plutonium which is already proliferation-proof at the 
beginning of the burnup cycle remains proliferatioin-proof over the full burnup cycle of 60 
GWd/t. It is obvious that a proper Pu-238 content around 6% can be tailored by adequate 
selection of the U-236 content or of the content of neptunium and americium in the fresh fuel 
of options A, B, D and E. 
12.6. Moderator density and Doppler reactivity coefficients for the fuel type  
A, B, C, D, E 
Broeders and Kessler [17] also presented an analysis of the safety-related reactivity 
coefficients MDC (moderator density coefficient), MTC (moderator temperature coefficient) 
and Doppler Coefficient (DC). In Table 12.5 a summary of the results is presented. The MDC 
is calculated from a 10% density decrease at the nominal coolant density. The MTC is based 
on the water coolant properties at pressure 15.6 MPa and temperature 583 K, leading to a 
multiplication factor of –3.22x10-3 to the MDC. For the DC investigations the lattice 
reactivity was calculated at three temperatures: 300, 900 and 2100 K. In all cases a good fit 
of these values could be obtained, utilizing the following formula for the DC: 
dk / dT =  AD/TX, 
where AD = Doppler constant, and T =  mean fuel temperature in kelvin. It was found that the 
value, X = 1.0, leads to a good fitting to the calculated temperature-dependent data, although 
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X = 1/2 should be expected for theoretical reasons for PWR cores (with fairly thermal 
neutron spectra (Section 4.10.2.1). 
The data of Table 12.5 show satisfactory results for the voiding effects and coolant 
temperature changes. The required boron concentrations for natural boron are in most cases 
too high for practical application. Therefore, more refined solutions are required, e.g. B10 
enrichment and the use of burnable poisons like gadolinium or erbium. 
 
Fuel Type Reactivity 
coefficients A B C D E 
BOL 0.1257 0.1542 0.1692 0.1616 0.1744 Moderator Density 
Coefficient (MDC) EOL 0.1336 0.1706 0.1840 0.1721 0.1677 
BOL -4.048x10-4 -5.449x10-4 -4.965x10-4 -5.204x10-4 -5.617x10-4 Moderator Temperature 
Coefficient (MTC) EOL -4.302x10-4 -5.923x10-4 -5.494x10-4 -5.541x10-4 -5.400x10-4 
BOL -2.113x0-2 -2.212x10-2 -2.203x10-2 -1.911x10-2 -1.330x10-2 Doppler Constant 
(AD) EOL -1.172x10-2 -2.012x10-2 -2.001x10-2 -1.796x10-2 -1.269x10-2 
BOC boron in ppm 4600 6100 4800 4000 2100 
BOL -5.73 -1.80 -1.64 -1.85 -2.60 Boron efficiency 
(pcm/ppm)  EOL -5.20 -1.81 -1.64 -1.92 -2.67 
MDC: Moderator Density Coefficient calculated from 10% reduction at nominal density 
MTC: Moderator Temperature Coefficient, being –3.22x10-3 x MDC at nominal coolant conditions 
DC: Doppler Coefficient calculated from fit of dk/dT = AD  / T for T=300, 900 and 2100K 
Boron at BOL: The boron concentration to obtain k∞  ≈ 1.03 at BOL 
BOL: Begin of cycle; EOL: End of cycle 
 
Table 12.5. Summary of reactivity coefficients for LWR lattices with dedicated fuels. 
 
The absolute values for the MTC and Doppler constant in Table 12.5 are only slightly 
different from those for present PWRs (Tommasi et al. [22] and Kloosterman [19]). 
12.7. Long term behavior of denatured, proliferation-proof fuel in PWRs and FRs 
Once denatured reactor plutonium would be introduced into the denatured plutonium fuel 
cycle, it could be incinerated by further recycling in PWRs or in either integral fast reactors 
[29,30] (IFRs) or FRs of type Consommation Améliorée du Plutonium dans les Réacteurs 
Avancés (CAPRA) [31-34]. The time periods for storage of denatured, proliferation-proof 
reactor plutonium should be smaller than several decades, because Pu-238 has an -decay 
half-time of 87.7 y. The question then arises: how the Pu-isotopic composition would change 
during irradiation up to a certain burnup in these reactors with different neutron energy 
spectra (PWRs or FRs). 
This question and the following analyses or considerations – will be also discussed in 
Sections 13 and 14. They shall be valid here for NWSs, because neptunium – posing a 
serious proliferation problem – is produced together with plutonium and other actinides. 
Therefore it is proposed in Section 14 to do further recycling (two or more recycles) of 
proliferation-proof plutonium during a transition period only in NWSs or future multilateral 
fuel cycle centers. 
12.7.1. Long term behavior of denatured plutonium in LWRs 
If MOX fuel with denatured proliferation-proof reactor plutonium and reenriched reprocessed 
uranium is loaded in a PWR core with the pin-cell parameters as reported above (Table 12.1), 
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the results are as follows. Fig. 12.5 shows the time evolution of the Pu-isotopic composition 
over ~100 GWd/t. For fuel type C (already denatured proliferation-proof reactor plutonium) 
the Pu-238 percentage is only slightly increasing in a PWR core from 7.7% to ~9% after 
burnup of 60 GWd/t (see also Fig. 12.2, Section 12.5. For comparison also the Pu-238 time 
evolution for fuel type B (see Fig. 12.2) is shown. 
 
Fig. 12.5. Plutonium-238 fraction in fuel in thermal and fast neutron spectrum as a functiion 
of burnup. 
12.7.2. Long-term irradiation behavior of denatured plutonium in fast reactors 
If MOX fuel with denatured, proliferation-proof reactor plutonium mixed with natural 
uranium would be loaded into a typical FR core, (e.g., German SNR-300 typical lattice, see 
also Table 12.6), the Pu-238 isotope concentration, because of the higher fission/absorption 
ratio in the fast neutron spectrum [29,30], decreases as a function of burnup. However, over a 
typical possible burnup of 150 GWd/t in a typical FR core this is only a ~2% net decrease 
(Fig. 12.5). This means that, if the Pu-238 content is raised to ~11% at the beginning of the 
burnup cycle, it decreases to ~9% at the end of the burnup cycle; i.e., the reactor plutonium 
remains proliferation-proof during the full burnup cycle until unloading of the fuel. The 
decrease of the Pu-238 content is a well-known characteristic of the FR neutron spectrum 
[29,30]. Fast reactors can incinerate plutonium more efficiently than LWRs. 
Fig. 12.5 also shows for comparison the Pu-238 concentration decrease in the same FR 
neutron spectrum for plutonium coming from a PWR after 50 GWd/t burnup as it would be 
the case for Pu-recycle scenarios discussed in Section 7.7 (Table 12.2). 
FR lattice with high Pu-238 fraction of 11.7% 
FR lattice with Pu from UO2 in PWR with 50 GWd/tHM 
PWR lattice with fuel type B (Tables 12.1 and 12.2) 
PWR lattice with fuel type C (Tables 12.2 and 12.3)
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fuel pin diameter [mm] 
outer fuel pin diameter [mm] 
cladding thickness [mm] 
pin diameter/pitch (P/D) 
fuel average temperature [K] 
average power rating [W/cm] 
5.24 
6.08 
0.38 
1.32 
1183 
300 
Table 12.6.   Data for a fast reactor SNR-300 fuel pin-cell geometry. 
However, FRs, due to their more efficient destruction of Pu-238, will permanently need a 
certain feed of this plutonium isotope from LWRs or – as described in Section 13 – by 
admixing of certain percentage of americium to the fresh fuel. LWRs and FRs can operate in 
symbiosis. 
12.7.3. Destruction of denatured fuel type C in a PWR 
Figure 12.6 shows the denatured reactor plutonium inventory changes during burnup in kg/t 
for the considered fuel types, loaded as MOX fuel in a PWR core. At a burnup of 60 GWd/t, 
the net inventory decreases (destruction) for the fuel types B, C, and D by ~9.5 to 10 kg 
plutonium/t. Higher destruction rates above 30 kg plutonium/t may be obtained with thorium-
based fuel type E. The production rate for denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium with fuel 
type A amounts to ~13 kg plutonium/t. 
Fig. 12.7 displays the concentration (in %) for the 5 plutonium isotopes of fuel type C as a 
function of burnup up to 100 GWd/t. It can be seen that the Pu-238 concentration, which is 
responsible for the denaturing of reactor plutonium, is even slightly increasing over the 
burnup. Only the Pu-239 content is decreasing from 44% to 35.6%. The denatured reactor 
plutonium remains denatured during burnup. 
12.8. Peculiarities of the fuel cycle and of the PWR design for production and 
recycling of denatured proliferation-proof plutonium 
The separated plutonium and minor actinides (neptunium, americium, curium) together with 
uranium and thorium would have to be fabricated as fuel type B through E in a future 
refabrication plant and loaded into a full MOX PWR core. As americium and curium-doped 
fuel becomes too difficult for standard refabrication, both americium and curium have to be 
separated and the curium stored [22]. 
The PWR core design would need small changes and adaptations in the control rod 
systems, e.g. more control rods, poison rods with high-enriched boron or fuel doped with 
gadolinium or erbium [20,21]. The moderator to fuel ratio can be increased from 2 to 2.5 or 3 
[19,23] by either 
─ reducing the fuel pin diameter 
─ increasing the P/D ratio 
─ replacing a certain number of fuel rods by water rods. 
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Fig. 12.6. Denatured reactor plutonium inventory changes in 1 tonne fuel when loaded into 
PWR core as a function of burnup of fuel types considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12.7. Fraction development of plutonium isotopes of denatured plutonium when loaded 
into PWR core with fuel type C. 
 
The latter design possibility was suggested for full MOX cores by Barbrault [23]. If a 
larger P/D ratio or water rods are used, either a smaller electrical power output is obtained or 
the diameter of the pressure vessel must be increased. 
After a burnup of 60 GWd/t the plutonium will be converted to proliferation-proof 
denatured reactor plutonium, as shown in Figs. 12.2 and 12.3 as well as 12.4 for fuel type A 
through E. 
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Fuel types D and E containing MAs still need further development in fuel refabrication 
technologies. While there is some fabrication and irradiation experience available for 
neptunium-doped fuel [24,29,37], there is still research and development necessary for fuel 
containing americium and curium [22,24,36,37] (if curium is not separated and stored for 
decay) [22,36]. The heat conductivity and irradiation behavior of such fuel up to high 
burnups will have to be investigated. The safe design and operation of fuel assemblies 
accounting for thermal hydraulic and hot-spot effects must be assured [11]. 
Because of the higher Pu-238 content in the converted denatured, proliferation-proof 
reactor plutonium with its resulting high heat production and spontaneous neutron radiation 
and -radiation, the present aqueous reprocessing technology would have to be slightly 
modified and the present MOX refabrication technology would not be feasible any more. 
Present glove-box type MOX refabrication technology is limited to a Pu-238 isotopic content 
of ~4% and present aqueous reprocessing technology to ~5% [11]. Advanced aqueous and 
pyrochemical reprocessing [4-6,24,36,39] and related refabrication technology for metallic 
fuel [4], applying remote handling, would become necessary. These advanced technologies 
are currently being developed in the United States, Russia, Japan, and Europe in the context 
of actinide transmutation research and would have to be applied [4-6, 36]. 
There will certainly be some penalties in fuel cycle costs compared to present MOX fuel 
according to the degree of severity given by the difficult reprocessing and refabrication 
technology going from fuel types A, B and C to fuel types D, and E. 
Also, if a larger P/D ratio of the fuel rods becomes necessary for reasons of assuring an 
adequate negative reactivity coefficient, this will increase the electricity generating costs, 
since either a smaller power output from the same core volume or the higher capital cost for 
an increased diameter of the pressure vessel must be accounted for (if the same presently 
chosen fuel rod diameter should be kept). More burnable poison rods and high enriched 
boron for control rods and boron acid in the coolant will also increase the electricity 
generating cost, somewhat. 
12.9.   Conclusions 
Denatured, proliferation-proof reactor plutonium can be generated in a number of different 
fuel cycle options. First, denatured reactor plutonium can be obtained if instead of low-
enriched U-235 PWR fuel, re-enriched U-235/U-236 from reprocessed uranium is used (fuel 
type A). Also the envisaged existing 2500 tonnes of reactor plutonium (being generated 
worldwide up to the year 2010 (Section 1)), mostly stored in intermediate fuel storage 
facilities at present, could be converted during a transition phase into denatured proliferation-
proof reactor plutonium by the options fuel type B and D. Denatured, proliferation-proof 
reactor plutonium could have the same safeguards standard as present low-enriched (<20% 
U-235) LWR fuel. It could be incinerated by recycling once or twice in PWRs and 
subsequently by multirecycling in FRs, e.g. of CAPRA-type or IFRs. Once denatured or 
proliferation-proof, the reactor plutonium would remain denatured and proliferation-proof 
during multiple recycling. In a PWR, e.g., denatured reactor plutonium could be destroyed at 
a rate of ~250 kg/GW(e)·y. While the denatured, proliferation-proof reactor plutonium could 
be recycled and incinerated, the generated neptunium would still have to be monitored by the 
IAEA for all cases in which considerable amounts of neptunium are produced. 
Therefore it is proposed in Section 14 to perform the conversion into proliferation-proof 
plutonium preferably first in NWS where most of the PWRs and reprocessing/refabrication 
facilities operate. Also the neptunium could be incinerated there after co-separation of 
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plutonium/neptunium and utilizing the neptunium for the production/conversion to 
proliferation-proof plutonium. This proliferation-proof plutonium can then be used and 
incinerated in NNWSs. 
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13. Neptunium as a proliferation problem and fuel cycle options for 
avoiding neptunium production 
13.1 Neptunium as a proliferation problem 
Neptunium is considered useable in nuclear explosive devices (Loaiza et al. [1,2] and 
Albright et al. [3]). It has a bare critical mass of 574 kg (Sanchez et al. [4]). A reflector, e.g., 
beryllium can reduce this bare critical mass to approx. 45 kg. It produces virtually no alpha-
particle heat and has a very low spontaneous fission neutron rate of 0.11 n/kg·s, which is 
lower than for U-235 (0.29 n/kg s) (Holden et al. [5]). The IAEA has begun to adopt 
measures to monitor neptunium (Albright et al. [3], Ottmar et al. [6], Morgenstern et al. [7]). 
The amount of neptunium available in civil nuclear energy programs is estimated by IAEA to 
be around 90 tonnes (Fukuda et al. [8]). Neptunium, therefore, should be incinerated as early 
as possible by the NWSs and its production should be avoided as far as possible in future 
denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium fuel cycles. 
13.2 Neptunium-free nuclear fuel cycle 
Broeders and Kessler [9] showed that reactor-grade plutonium can be converted so as to 
become denatured and proliferation-proof. Such reactor-grade plutonium can also be 
incinerated (almost completely, except the unavoidable losses of about 1% during recycling) 
[9,10]. This also holds for the incineration potential of neptunium and americium. Minor 
actinide incineration is being discussed also with the aim of minimizing the radioactive 
inventory of nuclear waste disposal sites (Kessler [10], Wigeland et al. [11]). 
Neptunium, however, poses a problem because of its usability in nuclear explosive 
devices. Therefore, neptunium should be avoided in a future civil denatured, proliferation-
proof nuclear fuel cycle, in which denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium and reactor-grade 
americium are incinerated. 
13.2.1 Model of a neptunium-free nuclear fuel cycle 
Neptunium cannot be denatured with other neptunium isotopes. Therefore, it should be 
avoided in a future denatured, proliferation-proof civil nuclear fuel cycle. 
Galperin et al. [12] and Sagara [13] offered some indications that this is possible in PWR 
cores by combining denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium with depleted U-238 (only 
0.2% U-235) and thorium. In this way, neptunium can be avoided as only protactinium 
isotopes and uranium isotopes up to U-234 (Fig. 13.1) or plutonium isotopes as well as 
americium and curium (Fig. 13.2), but no significant amounts of U-236 or neptunium are 
produced. The U-238 is necessary to keep the originating U-233 denatured "12% U-233 in 
U-238 (Section 8.1). Neptunium can only be produced in tiny amounts via neutron capture in 
U-236 or -decay of Am-241 (Section 13.4.1). 
Americium can be used together with U-238 and reactor-grade plutonium in FR cores. 
This produces some Pu-238. This occurs by alpha decay of Cm-242 (Fig. 11.1 in Section 
11.2). Irradiation experiments in a fast reactor core have shown that Pu-238 can be produced 
by converting americium into Cm-242 (Walker et al. [14] and Sagara et al. [15]). The use of 
thorium and U-238 allows producing new U-233 denatured in U-238. 
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Fig. 13.1. Buildup of isotopes in the thorium fuel cycle. 
13.2.2     Future proliferation-proof, neptunium-free fuel cycles 
Starting from the earlier results of Galperin et al. [12] and Sagara [13] a scientific concept for 
a future proliferation-proof fuel cycle was proposed by Kessler [16] and Rineiski et al. [17]. 
The initial amount of proliferation-resistant plutonium would have to be produced by using 
existing PWR reactors, as well as reprocessing and refabrication facilities of the NWSs or 
multilateral reprocessing and refabrication centres (MLRCs) as suggested by IAEA [18]. 
After the initial amount of denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium is available, it can be 
utilized together with small amounts of proliferation-proof americium in nuclear reactors 
outside of NWSs, provided that the neptunium production is drastically minimized by proper 
fuel cycle options. 
This can be accomplished, e.g. by minimizing the U-235 content and avoiding U-236 in 
the fresh fuel through the use of depleted uranium (hereafter it is assumed that depleted 
uranium contains 99.8% of U-238 and 0.2% of U-235). This uranium can be (1) mixed with 
U-233, thorium, denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium and americium and be used in 
PWRs or (2) mixed with denatured, proliferation-proof plutonium and americium and used in 
fast reactors (FRs) or accelerator driven systems (ADSs). The ADSs are not considered in 
detail here, but would also be characterized by a fast neutron spectrum. 
13.3 Initial fuel composition for proliferation-proof plutonium and neptunium-free 
fuel cycles 
Several constraints must be taken into account if proliferation-proof plutonium shall be 
recycled and incinerated in PWRs without generation of neptunium. Proliferation-proof 
plutonium would lead to positive coolant temperature coefficients in PWR cores. This was 
demonstrated by Broeders [19] who showed that a plutonium composition above 5.5% Pu-
238 (corresponding to D1 in Table 9.5) leads to positive coolant temperature coefficients in 
PWR cores. 
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Rineiski and Kessler [17] also found strong positive coolant temperature coefficients for a 
plutonium composition with 7.7% Pu-238 shown in Table 13.1. Such PWR cores can not be 
licensed by regulatory authorities. 
Pu isotope at.% 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
 7.7 
 44.0 
 31.0 
 10.3 
 7.0 
Table 13.1. Plutonium composition in recycled denatured PWR MOX fuel with burnup of 
50 GWd/t, after 10 years cooling. 
 
As U-235 cannot be admixed to the plutonium – it would lead to neptunium production 
via U-236. The only solution is the admixture of several percent of U-233 in U-238 and 
thorium to the proliferation-proof MOX fuel. An increase of the moderator to fuel ratio by 
wider spacing of the fuel rods in the fuel element will also ameliorate the coolant temperature 
coefficient. 
13.4 Selection of fuel composition for neptunium-free proliferation-proof fuel cycles 
The following four cases of fuel compositions and moderator to fuel ratios M/F were 
analyzed by Rineiski and Kessler [17] (Table 13.2). 
The uranium (about one third of the fuel content) consists of depleted uranium mixed with 
U-233 to keep the uranium denatured. Depending upon the case, a different amount of U-233 
was mixed with depleted U in order to obtain proper criticality values. The assumed isotopic 
composition of the proliferation-proof plutonium is given in Table 13.1. The isotopic 
composition of americium is Am-241 to Am-243 in the ratio 3:1. 
The four cases with different percentages of americium: 0% (case 1), 0.5% (cases 2 and 3) 
and 1.5% (case 4) of americium in the fresh fuel shall show the effect of americium on the 
build-up of Pu-238 (via Cm-242 decay, see Fig. 11.1, Section 11). 
 
case P/D 
ratio 
M/F 
ratio 
Thorium 
wt% 
Uranium, 
including 
U-233 
wt% 
U-233 
wt% 
Denatured 
Plutonium 
wt/% 
Americium
wt% 
1 1.40 2.0 54.67 34.52 1.69 10.81 0 
2 1.40 2.0 54.67 34.02 2.03 10.81 0.50 
3 1.686 3.50 54.66 34.03 1.25 10.81 0.50 
4 1.686 3.50 54.66 33.02 3.17 10.81 1.51 
Table 13.2.  Fuel compositions and M/F ratios for four investigated cases. 
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For the analysis it was assumed that fresh fuel contains no curium. It is a strong 
spontaneous neutron emitter (mainly due to Cm-244 with half life of about 18.1 years, Cm-
242 decays relatively fast). Its presence would make fuel fabrication very difficult. To avoid 
handling curium during PWR fuel fabrication, the minor actinides, americium and curium, 
must be separated from each other during spent fuel reprocessing [20]. Curium could be 
stored in special storage facilities (where Cm-244 would decay to Pu-240) (Section 7.9.7). 
The four cases of Table 13.2 assure sufficiently a strong negative coolant temperature 
coefficient, and allow a burnup of 60 GWd/t (Section 13.5). 
13.4.1      Isotopic compositions of the fuel during burnup [17] 
In Fig. 13.2 the variations of the plutonium isotopic compositions during burnup for cases 1 
and 2 (0% and 0.5% americium, M/F ratio of 2.0) are shown. The corresponding results for 
cases 3 and 4 (0.5% and 1.5% americium, M/F ratio of 3.5) are presented in Fig. 13.3. In both 
cases, the lines with markers show the cases with the higher americium content. The 
percentage of Pu-239 is strongly decreasing, whereas the percentages of Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-
241 and Pu-242 are increasing. 
One may conclude that the initial americium content affects appreciably the Pu-238 build-
up, whereas the relative variations vs. time for the content of the other plutonium isotopes 
can be considered as less dependent on the americium content. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.2. Plutonium isotopic fraction variations during burnup, cases 1 and 2 [17]. 
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Fig. 13.3. Plutonium isotopic fraction variations during burnup, cases 3 and 4 [17]. 
 
Table 13.3 shows the isotopic compositions of the denatured plutonium for the begin of 
the burnup cycle (BOL) and the end of the burnup cycle (EOL) at about 60 GWd/t for all 4 
cases of different americium content and different M/F ratios. It can be seen that the 
admixture of americium increases the Pu-238 percentage during burnup. However, the Pu-
238 percentage increases also slightly during burnup even if no americium is added to the 
fresh fuel in accordance with pronounced decrease of the Pu-239 content. 
 
wt% at EOL 
     Pu isotope 
wt% at BOL  Case 1  Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Pu-238  7.7  8.2 9.8 10.5 13.2 
Pu-239 44.0  27.4 28.2 20.3 22.4 
Pu-240 31.0 34.0 33.1 37.2 33.9 
Pu-241 10.3 18.2 17.3 16.8 15.6 
Pu-242 7.0 12.1 11.6 15.3 13.8 
 
Table 13.3. Plutonium isotopic fraction at BOL and EOL (at about 60 GWd/t) for different 
americium content in the fresh fuel. 
 
If no americium is put into the fresh fuel, an appreciable amount of it is produced up to 
EOL (Fig. 13.4). A net production can be avoided if about 0.5% of americium is added to the 
fuel at BOL. For the higher initial americium content (1.5%), the incineration of americium is 
about 6 kg/t of fuel after a burnup of 60 GWd/t (see Fig. 13.4). 
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Fig. 13.4.     Americium content in the fuel during burnup [17]. 
 
The higher is the americium content, the higher is the curium production and the lower is 
the plutonium incineration, see Figs 13.5 and 13.6. At EOL, the fraction of Am-241 in 
americium is between 33% and 45%, but after cooling for a few years it approaches or 
exceeds 70% due to decay of Pu-241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.5.     Curium content in the fuel during burnup [17]. 
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Fig. 13.6 shows the plutonium incineration for all four cases. For case 3 (0.5% of 
americium, M/F=3.5) the plutonium incineration rate is the highest (about 40 kg/t of spent 
fuel) over a burnup period of 60 GWd/t. The pronounced difference between the curves of 
case 3 and case 4 in Fig. 13.6 is due to the fact that a higher content of U-233 is present in the 
fresh fuel of case 4 which is fissioned during burnup, thus reducing the contribution of 
plutonium isotopes to energy production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.6.     Plutonium content in the fuel during burnup [17]. 
 
The U-233 content in the fresh fuel at BOL depends upon the amount of americium and 
M/F ratio (see Table 13.2). The fraction of U-233 in uranium is higher for higher americium 
content (provided that the M/F ratio is the same). This is shown in Fig. 13.7. It is necessary to 
compensate the strong negative influence of americium on criticality in the PWR. The 
fraction is lower for a larger M/F ratio (provided that the Am content is similar); this is 
possible due to higher contribution of U-233 to the neutron balance in a better moderated 
environment. 
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Fig. 13.7.     Uranium isotopic fraction variations during burnup [17]. 
 
During burnup, the U-233 fraction (denatured in U-238) does not vary appreciably (due to 
the large thorium content in the fuel) except for case 4 (see Fig. 13.7). The uranium content 
in the fuel decreases only slightly, by ca. 1-2% (e.g. from ca. 34% to ca. 32%) for the 
considered burnup of ca. 60 GWd/t. The U-233 inventory (including Pa-233) increases by ca. 
3% in case 3 and by ca. 0.5% in case 1, but decreases by ca. 11% in case 2 and by ca. 21% in 
case 4. Fig. 13.7 also shows the fractions of the isotopes U-234 in uranium for cases 1 to 4. 
The U-235 inventory slightly increases, but remains quite small. 
The results of calculations [17] show a negligible amount of neptunium in the spent fuel 
after a burnup of 63 GWd/t and 10 years cooling time (Table 13.4). This is a consequence of 
the use of depleted uranium that almost excludes the production of U-236, that is converted 
into Np-237 in a nuclear reactor. 
The neptunium appears mainly due to the alpha decay of Am-241, the latter being a decay 
product of Pu-241 (see Fig. 11.1 in Section 11). 
 
case 1 2 3 4 
Np content % 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.018 
 
Table 13.4. Neptunium content in spent fuel after a burnup of 63 GWd/t and 10 years 
cooling time. 
13.5 Reactivity coefficients relevant to PWR safety 
The reactivity coefficients required for the safety analysis of a PWR are shown in Table 13.5 
for cases 1-4. The moderator density and temperature coefficients (MDC and MTC) are 
obtained by pin-cell calculations. The MDC is the reactivity effect due to 10% density 
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decrease of the nominal coolant density (including boron). The MTC is obtained by 
multiplying MDC by -3.22x10-3 that is based on the water coolant properties at pressure of 
15.6 MPa and temperatue of 583 K. 
For computing the Doppler contant, the lattice reactivity values were calculated at three 
fuel temperatures: 300, 773, and 2100 K. A good fit of the results could be obtained, by 
DAd  .
dT T

	  
with    – Doppler reactivity 
 T   – fuel temperature 
 AD – Doppler constant. 
 
The Doppler constant is given in Table 13.5 separately for the temperature ranges 300-773 
and 773-2100 K. The absolute values of the MTC and Doppler constant are only slightly 
lower than those for present PWRs (Tommasi et al. [21]; Kloosterman et al. [22]). 
The required boron concentrations at BOL are in all cases too high for application of 
conventional soluble boron acid. More refined solutions applying solid burnable poisons, e.g. 
gadolinium or erbium are required. 
From the above results it can be concluded that the objective of a neptunium-free PWR 
fuel cycle with proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium can be fulfilled, in particular by 
case 1. If, in addition, americium shall be incinerated, cases 2 to 4 could be applied. 
  Case 1, 0% americium 
Case 2, 0.5% 
americium 
Case 3, 0.5% 
americium 
Case 4, 1.5% 
americium 
Moderator density 
coefficient [MDC] 
BOL 
EOL 
0.100 
0.154 
0.004 
0.142 
0.091 
0.121 
0.089 
0.116 
Moderator Temperature 
Coefficient [MTC] 
[pcm/K] 
BOL 
EOL 
-32.2 
-49.7 
-32.6 
-45.7 
-29.2 
-38.5 
-28.8 
-37.2 
Doppler constant (AD) 
between 300-773 [K] 
BOL 
EOL 
-2.33x10-3 
-2.84x10-3 
-2.71x10-3 
-2.81x10-3 
-1.65x10-3 
-2.11x10-3 
-2.71x10-3 
-2.10x10-3 
Doppler constant AD 
between 773–2100 [K] 
BOL 
EOL 
-2.18x10-3 
-2.67x10-3 
-2.16x10-3 
-2.62x10-3 
-1.57x10-3 
-2.00x10-3 
-1.61x10-3 
-1.97x10-3 
Boron efficiency 
[pcm/ppm] 
BOL 
EOL 
-1.26 
-1.74 
-1.13 
-1.62 
-2.49 
-4.29 
-2.13 
-3.13 
Boron concentration to 
bring k; to 1.03 [ppm] 
BOL 10930 13360 8050 10670 
MDC: Moderator Density Coefficient calculated from 10% reduction at nominal density 
MTC: Moderator Temperature Coefficient, being –3.22.10-3 x MDC at nominal coolant conditions 
DC: Doppler Coefficient calculated from fit of results for T=300, 773 and 2100K 
Boron at BOL: The boron concentration to obtain k∞  ≈ 1.03 at BOL 
 
Table 13.5.   Reactivity coefficients relative to safety of PWR [17]. 
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13.6 Peculiarities and technical modifications required for the PWR design 
In comparison to present PWR core designs with low enriched uranium fuel the above PWRs 
– incinerating proliferation-proof plutonium and americium – would need several design 
modifications. They may need adaptations of the control and shim rod system, as well as a 
different number of solid burnable poison rods at begin of the burnup cycle. The relatively 
high (as compared to conventional values near 2.0) M/F ratio of 3.5 can be attained in the 
fuel assembly design by reducing the number of fuel rods per assembly, e.g. through 
replacement of a part of them by water rods (Barbrault [23]). If a larger M/F (or P/D) ratio is 
chosen, either a smaller electrical power output is obtained or the diameter of the pressure 
vessel must be increased (if the active core height remains the same). If the fresh fuel is 
doped with americium, more research will be needed for fuel fabrication and more 
experimental experience regarding fuel behavior is required. 
Because of the higher Pu-238 content in the proliferation-resistant reactor plutonium with 
its resulting high heat production and spontaneous neutron radiation and -radiation, the 
present aqueous reprocessing technology would have to be modified and the present MOX 
refabrication technology would not be feasible any more. Present glove-box-type MOX 
refabrication technology is limited to a Pu-238 isotopic content of 4% and present aqueous 
reprocessing technology to 5% (Broeders and Kessler [9]). Advanced aqueous or pyro-
chemical reprocessing for plutonium/thorium/uranium fuel and related fuel refabrication 
technology applying remote handling will become necessary. These advanced technologies 
are currently being developed in the Europe, Japan, Russia, and the United States in the 
context of actinide transmutation research and would have to be applied. 
As was shown in Fig. 13.3 the Pu-239 isotopic content in the plutonium/thorium/uranium/ 
americium fuel will decrease from 44% to about 20% over a burnup of 60 GWd/t. For further 
recycling steps this fuel can be mixed always with fresh proliferation-resistant plutonium 
with about 40% Pu-239 coming from the NWSs. After several steps this proliferation-proof 
plutonium may have to be loaded into fast reactors (due to variations in the isotopic 
composition that will make fuel fabrication difficult and may worsen PWR safety 
coefficients). 
There will certainly be small penalties in fuel cycle costs compared to present MOX fuel 
according to the degree of complexity given by the fuel reprocessing and refabrication 
technology. 
13.7     Conclusion for incineration of proliferation-proof plutonium in PWR cores [17] 
Due to the isotopic content of >5-6% Pu-238 in proliferation-proof plutonium the mixed 
oxide plutonium-uranium fuel would lead to positive coolant temperature coefficients. Such 
PWR cores cannot be operated for safety and licensing reasons. 
However, a mixture of proliferation-proof plutonium with depleted uranium, thorium and 
low enriched with U-233 is feasible. This leads to acceptable safety coefficients for the PWR 
cores and minimizes to production of neptunium to less than 0.02% in the spent fuel after a 
burnup of about 60 GWd/t. Incineration rates of 30-40 kg proliferation-proof plutonium per 
tonne of fuel are possible. 
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13.8 Fast reactor fuel cycle for utilizing americium as well as denatured proliferation-
proof plutonium but avoiding neptunium production [17] 
Fast spectrum reactors (FRs) or fast breeder reactors (FBRs) can incinerate some of the 
plutonium isotopes and of the minor actinides much better than LWRs with their thermal 
neutron spectrum. In a PWR-MOX core most of the neutron fission reactions occur in the 0.1 
eV (average) range of neutron kinetic energy. In a FR core fission occurs in the 0.2 MeV 
range of neutron kinetic energy. 
The ratio of fission to absorption in a PWR core and an SFR core is given by Fig. 13.8. It 
can be understood that in an SFR core the isotopes Np-237, Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242, Am-
241, Am-243 and Cm-244 are fissioned at a much higher rate than in thermal spectrum 
reactors, e.g. PWRs. The net result is that more excess neutrons are available and less higher 
actinides are generated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.8. Impact of energy spectrum on incineration and transmutation performance [26]. 
 
Rineiski and Kessler [17] used the BN-600-core as an example for their analyses of a 
plutonium proliferation-proof and neptunium-free fuel cycle for fast spectrum reactors. 
Fig. 13.9 shows a cross section of a BN-600 type MOX-fuelled core with lower fertile 
blanket, an internal fertile blanket (a 5 cm layer at axial mid-plane in the inner core), a radial 
steel reflector and a sodium plenum (a region with a large sodium volume fraction) above the 
core [17,24]. The core fuel contains depleted uranium mixed with denatured proliferation-
proof plutonium (Table 13.1) and americium (4% wt. of total heavy metal content). The 
isotopic composition of americium in Am-241 to Am-243 shall be in the ratio 3:2. 
The core is subdivided into a low enrichment inner zone (LEZ), a middle enrichment zone 
(MEZ), and a high enrichment outer zone (HEZ). The control and shim rods (SCR/SHR) are 
radially interspersed in the LEZ region. 
The core zones contain 24.6 wt% fuel and americium, 52.7 wt% steel and 22.7wt% 
sodium. They have the following plutonium enrichments and fractions (wt%) of uranium, 
plutonium and americium given in Table 13.6. The isotopic composition of the plutonium is 
given by Table 13.1. 
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Fraction LEZ MEZ HEZ 
uranium wt% 76.8 74.0 71.0 
plutonium wt.% 19.2 22.0 25.0 
americium wt% 4.0 4.0 4.0 
 
Table 13.6.     Composition (fractions) of the different core zones LEZ, MEZ, HEZ. 
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Fig. 13.9.  R-Z model for the BN-600 type reactor [17,24]. 
 
Two options are considered: (1) axial lower and radial steel reflectors (SSA) and (2) a core 
surrounded by axial lower and radial fertile blankets containing depleted uranium mixed with 
4.2% of americium (isotopic ratio Am-241:Am-243 equal to 3:1) and 1.08% proliferation-
proof plutonium (Table 13.1) (at BOL). 
Case 1 is chosen for plutonium incineration. Case 2 represents an option for breeding 
proliferation-proof, denatured plutonium. The americium is added to the core or core and 
blankets (case 2) to generate Pu-238. This assures that the plutonium fuel in the core remains 
denatured or proliferation-proof. Plutonium produced in the blankets becomes also denatured 
or proliferation-proof (although Pu-239 is generated in the core and the blankets through 
neutron capture in U-238). Only proliferation-proof plutonium is present in the reactor core 
during operation. In the breeding blankets proliferation-proof plutonium develops via decay 
of Cm-242 (see Section 13.8.3). Neptunium production is minimized by the use of depleted 
uranium with only 0.2% U-235. 
Similar to the PWR cases investigated in Section 13.4 americium consists of Am-241 and 
Am-243 in the ratio of about 3 to 1. No curium is assumed in the fresh fuel. For both options 
(burner and breeder) core operation at a thermal power of 1470 MWth and 1450 full power 
days at end of burnup (EOL end of life) are assumed. This leads to an average burnup of 
about 185 or 113 MWd/t, for the burner or breeder case. The total actinide mass in the burner 
is about 115 t, while in the breeder case it is about 189 t (the difference amounting to the 
mass in the blankets). The control rod positions are kept constant during burnup. This 
modeling is certainly an approximation allowing to see the trends in core reactivity, void 
effect and isotopic composition during core operation. 
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13.8.1    Results of the FR core calculations 
The keff values as well as core void effects at the BOL and EOL and the conversion (for 
burner or incinerator) and breeding (for breeder) ratios are shown in Table 13.7. The effective 
delayed neutron fraction is about 340 pcm, the Doppler constant is -485 pcm (in the range 
from 1500 to 2100 K) in case of burner at BOL. 
 
 keff, BOL keff, EOL Void effect 
BOL, pcm 
Void effect 
EOL, pcm 
Conversion or 
breeding ratio 
Burner 1.0190 0.8689 1777 2691 0.78 
Breeder 1.0068 0.9044 1716 2731 1.07 
Table 13.7. Criticality, void effect and breeding ratio for the BN-600 type reactor operating 
with denatured proliferation-proof plutonium [17]. 
 
The conversion or breeding ratios (CR and BR) are defined in Section 4.7.3. The void 
effect given in Table 13.7 is only due to the core voiding. If both the core and the region 
(including sodium plenum) above the core were voided, the void effect would be lower by 
530 pcm, e.g. for the burner case. 
13.8.1.1   Isotopic composition of plutonium in case of fast reactor burner (incinerator) 
Variations of the plutonium isotopic composition (averaged in space over the core in case of 
burner and over the core and blanket in case of breeder) during burnup (followed by 5 years 
of cooling after unloading) are shown in Figs. 13.10 and 13.11. The sudden variations in 
concentrations of Pu isotopes at the end of burnup are due to decay of unstable isotopes after 
cooling, that increases, in particular, the fraction of Pu-238, thus decreasing (relatively) other 
fractions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.10.    Plutonium isotopic composition in the core of the FR operating as burner [17]. 
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It can be seen that the plutonium remains proliferation-proof in average in both cases 
(burner or breeder) as long as the fuel of the core and the blankets are mixed after unloading 
in case of the FR breeder. 
However, the blanket plutonium isotopic composition differs considerably from the one in 
the breeder core. This needs a detailed discussion and design modifications in view of future 
proliferation-proof blanket fuel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.11. Average plutonium isotopic composition in the FR breeder (core and breeder 
fuel mixed after unloading) [17]. 
 
13.8.1.2 Proliferation-proof blanket fuel for FR-breeders 
The fresh fuel elements of axial and radial blankets of FR-breeder prototype reactors contain 
either natural uranium or depleted uranium (0.2% U-235) as UO2 fuel. It is commonly 
assumed that both core and blanket fuel after unloading and cooling are mixed together in the 
head end (fuel element chopping and dissolver tank) of the reprocessing plant. This can be 
controlled and verified by IAEA inspectors (Section 8.4). 
However, if the blanket elements, especially those of the radial blanket, would be 
unloaded separately and chemically reprocessed (violation of the NPT and IAEA safeguards) 
the resulting plutonium is weapon-grade. This is demonstrated by Fig. 13.12 which shows the 
Pu-239 content of the plutonium produced in the axial and radial blankets of the Indian 
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) [27,28]. For this PFBR the axial blankets remain in 
the core for about 540 full power days, whereas the radial blanket elements remain 1440 full 
power days, before they are unloaded. All plutonium which is produced in the axial blankets 
and in the radial blankets remains weapon-grade over the entire operation time of 540 or 
1440 full power days which is demonstrated by comparison with the classification of US-
DOE and US-NRC [29] (Tab. 9.2). 
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Pu-Isotope Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Supergrade 
weapon-Pu 
0% Pu-238 97% Pu-239 3% Pu-240 0% Pu-241 0%-242 
Weapon-grade 
plutonium 
0.01%  93.8%  5.8% 0.35% 0.022% 
Table 13.7. Isotopic composition of supergrade weapon plutonium and weapon-grade 
plutonium [29]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13.12. Plutonium-239 fraction of the plutonium produced in the Indian Prototype Fast 
Breeder Reactor (PFBR) as a function of irradiation time in the axial or radial 
blanket fuel elements [27]. 
 
The quality of the plutonium in the axial blankets even remains supergrade. 
This can be modified by admixing to the UO2 blanket fuel about 4.2% reactor-grade 
americium and about 1.08% proliferation proof plutonium. The results of such calculations 
[30] are shown in Fig. 13.13 which shows the development of the fractions of americium, 
plutonium and Cm-242 as a function of full power days in the radial blanket fuel elements. 
Fig. 13.14 shows the isotopic fractions of the different plutonium isotopes Pu-238, Pu-
239, Pu-240, Pu-241 and Pu-242 in the radial blanket fuel elements for the case of 
proliferation-proof plutonium with initially 11.4% Pu-238. 
During the initial time period of about 200 to 300 days the initial proliferation proof 
plutonium will be diluted by the fresh plutonium with more than 98% Pu-239 (the Pu-238 as 
decay product of Cm-242 appears later). Therefore, the initial 1.08% proliferation proof 
plutonium must have a Pu-238 content of about 11.4% (see the plutonium composition E1 in 
Table 9.6b). In this case the blanket plutonium will always remain above 7.8% Pu-238 (Fig. 
13.14), i.e. proliferation-proof (non-proliferation level II being defined in Section 14). 
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Fig. 13.13. Fraction (%) of americium, curium and plutonium in radial blanket fuel 
elements of BN-600 type FBR (Initial fractions 4.2% reactor americium, 1.08% 
proliferation-proof plutonium with 11.4% Pu-238) [30]. 
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Fig. 13.14. Fractions (%) of the different plutonium isotopes as a function of time in the 
radial blanket fuel elements. The initial plutonium composition with 11.4% Pu-
238 remains always above 8% Pu-238 (proliferation-proof) over the full 
irradiation time period in the FBR [30]. 
 
For proliferation-proof plutonium of non-proliferation level Ia or Ib (Section 14) the 
excess percentage in the initial proliferation-proof plutonium and the fraction of reactor-
grade americium of the fresh blanket fuel can be lower. 
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13.8.2 Plutonium incineration and breeding [17] 
The incineration of the denatured plutonium (reduction of its content in the fuel) is shown in 
Fig. 13.15. In case of operating the FR as burner, the denatured plutonium is incinerated, the 
reduction being about 33 kg/t of fuel over a burnup of 160 GWd/t. In case of operating the 
FR as breeder, some additional amount of proliferation-proof plutonium is generated, just 
about 3 kg/t of fuel over the burnup period of 113 GWd/t. 
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Fig. 13.15. Plutonium content per tHM fuel in the FR burner and in the FR breeder (reactor 
average) during reactor operation [17]. 
13.8.3   Americium incineration and production of curium 
The results for the incineration of americium and the production of curium are shown in Fig. 
13.16. and 13.17. At EOL, the fraction of Am-241 in americium is about 70%, this fraction 
does not vary appreciably after cooling over 2 years. 
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Fig. 13.16.   Americium and curium content in the burner during reactor operation [17]. 
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Fig. 13.17.    Am and Cm content in the  breeder during reactor operation [17]. 
 
As indicated earlier, the results of Fig. 13.16 and 13.17. also show the effect of the decay 
of short-lived actinides, e.g. Pu-241 and Cm-242 for a cooling period of 5 years after 
unloading of the fuel. 
The neptunium content at EOL and after 5 years cooling time is minor. It is only about 
0.06 kg/t for the FR burner and for the FR breeder. 
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Similar to the PWR options, this example of a BN-600-type design loaded with 
proliferation-proof plutonium and americium fuel is considered conceptually and technically 
feasible. 
13.9 Conclusion for FRs operating with proliferation-proof plutonium and americium, 
but avoiding neptunium 
The above results show that FRs can be operated with proliferation-proof plutonium and 
americium. The fresh FR fuel contains no curium. It is assumed that the chemical separation 
of americium and curium can be developed to technical scale [20,25]. 
It was shown that FR-Burners can incinerate the proliferation-proof plutonium at a 
relatively high incineration rate of 33 kg/t of fuel over a burnup of 160 GWd/t. Also breeding 
is possible with axial and radial blankets. The new plutonium generated by the breeding 
process becomes also proliferation-proof either already during reactor operation or during the 
necessary cooling process of the spent blanket fuel elements. The conceivable objection that 
there exists a short period of time where the blanket plutonium would not be proliferation-
proof can be resolved by adding a small amount of proliferation-proof plutonium and a small 
fraction of reactor-grade americium to the fresh depleted uranium blanket fuel – if considered 
necessary. 
The essential result is that only proliferation-proof plutonium exists in such an FR fuel 
cycle, i.e. in the reprocessing plant, refabrication plant and in the reactor. This opens the 
possibility of future civil proliferation-proof nuclear applications having MOX-PWRs 
operating in the neptunium-free fuel cycle and FRs operating with proliferation-proof 
plutonium and proliferation-proof americium creating their own proliferation-proof 
plutonium and proliferation-proof americium. In such a way depleted uranium can be utilized 
over thousands of years. 
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14. Future civil proliferation-proof fuel cycles 
14.1 Introduction 
This Section describes a potential long term strategy for producing and utilizing denatured, 
proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium during a transition period in existing PWRs. This 
proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium can then be incinerated by recycling it once or 
twice in PWRs and subsequently loading it into FR cores for further multirecycling. 
It is proposed that future civil proliferation-proof plutonium-uranium or plutonium-
uranium-thorium fuel cycles shall only utilize proliferation-proof fissile materials, i.e. 
– proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium (Sections 9, 10 and 12) 
– proliferation-proof reactor-grade americium (Section 11) 
– neither produce nor utilize neptunium (only negligible amounts shall be present). The reason 
is: neptunium cannot be denatured, but could be used for nuclear explosive devices 
(Section 13). 
The nuclear reactors envisaged for this proposal of a long term non-proliferation strategy 
shall be PWRs and FRs (BWRs can certainly also be used, but all detailed results applied 
here were obtained in Sections 9 through 14 for PWRs only). FRs will probably be 
introduced on a large scale at a later time (Section 2.7, Fig. 2.4). This is compatible with this 
proposal. PWRs are well suited for the conversion of currently existing plutonium into 
proliferation-safe plutonium during an initial transition phase. 
CANDU reactors are not considered here (low burnup fuel see Section 9 with Table 9.3 
and Fig. 9.47). Similarly, high temperature gas cooled reactors are not considered for this 
proposal, since their coated particle fuel is up to now not well suited for reprocessing and 
recycling. 
14.2 Plutonium incineration by a multi-recycling strategy 
Because of their high contribution to the long term radiotoxicity of spent fuel in the high 
level waste repository and for non-proliferation reasons (long term accumulation in the 
repository and problems of human intrusion) the reactor-grade plutonium and the minor 
actinides, neptunium and americium shall be destroyed with first priority and as soon as 
possible in existing PWRs and in FRs later. It was shown (Section 7) that multi-recycling of 
reactor-grade plutonium and minor actinides (neptunium and americium) is feasible with 
currently available technology. 
Recycling of reactor-grade plutonium in PWRs leads to a higher production of minor 
actinides. Therefore, recycling of reactor-grade plutonium in PWRs will probably be done 
only once or twice [1,2,3,4]. Subsequent multi-recycling of reactor-grade plutonium in FR 
burners (CAPRA type) [3,5,7] or in IFRs [6] leads to more efficient destruction of reactor-
grade plutonium, neptunium and americium. Only the inevitable losses during reprocessing 
and refabrication go into the high level waste (HLW) together with the fission products. The 
HLW is finally disposed to a deep geological repository. 
Cm-243 and Cm-244 are decaying with a half-life of about 24 y and 18 y respectively. 
Cm-242 decays quickly practically already completely during the usual fuel cooling period. 
Curium should be chemically separated and stored for further decay of Cm-243 into Pu-239 
and Cm-244 into Pu-240, respectively [3,7]. The remaining tiny parts of the Curium isotope 
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(Cm-245), half-life 8500 y would have to be disposed to a deep geological repository or be 
recycled together with plutonium. 
(Multi-recycling of curium together with neptunium and americium appears to be only 
possible in an FR, e.g. in combination with pyroprocessing. Multi-recycling of curium in 
thermal spectrum reactors, e.g. PWRs can eventually lead to Cf-252 production, thus 
requiring longer intermediate storage and making refabrication of actinide doped fuel 
extremely difficult [7]). 
14.3 Needed capacity of reprocessing and Pu/U refabrication plants 
The incineration of reactor-grade plutonium and minor actinides by multi-recycling needs 
sufficient reprocessing and refabrication plant capacity and suitable reactors (MOX-PWRs 
and CAPRA type FRs or IFRs) to be built up. The optimum strategy is to convert the present 
reactor-grade plutonium in PWR cores to denatured, proliferation-proof reactor-grade 
plutonium first (Sections 12 and 13) and then incinerate the denatured reactor-grade 
plutonium and the minor actinides mainly in FR burners. This would be similar to the present 
strategy followed by France [3] and proposed by the USA [6]. 
Incineration of reactor-grade plutonium as well as neptunium and americium and 
separation of those fission products (cesium an strontium) causing the highest heat loads 
would alleviate considerably the needed volume capacities for future deep geological 
repositories [8]. 
The build up of the needed reprocessing and refabrication capacity would certainly take 
time. If the 2500 t of plutonium in spent fuel elements in the world in 2010 [9] after 
reprocessing would be used for PWR MOX fuel elements with, e.g. for fuel type D of 
Section 12, this would be sufficient for about 38500 t of MOX fuel elements with 6.5% 
plutonium correponding to the first core loading of about 300 PWRs of 1.3 GW(e) [10]. 
14.4 Fuel cycle plant capacity in the world in 2010 
Out of the 439 nuclear reactors operating in the world in 2008, there were 265 PWRs and 54 
BWRs. Additional PWRs and BWRs were under construction in 2010 (Section 2.1). 
The civil reprocessing plant capacity for UO2 fuel in the world was about 4200 (tHM/y) in 
2008, mainly located in NWSs. It consisted of the large scale reprocessing plant at LaHague 
(France) with 1700 (tHM/y), Sellafield in the UK with 1200 (tHM/y), Majak in Russia with 500 
(tHM/y) and of the smaller reprocessing facilities in India and China (Table 7.2 in Section 7). 
Japan with its reprocessing plant in Rokkasho-mura with 800 (tHM/y) is up to now the only 
NNWS operating a large scale civil reprocessing plant. Its safeguards concept was developed 
in close cooperation with IAEA already during the design and construction phase (Section 
8.4 through 8.6). The accompanying critique and discussion was assessed in Sections 8.7 and 
8.8. 
The USA has no civil reprocessing capacity available anymore. It decided in 1982 
(Nuclear Waste Policy Act) to refrain from chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and 
from plutonium recycling. As a consequence, only the direct spent fuel disposal concept was 
pursued. However, this direct high-level waste disposal concept is being reconsidered after 
the US-DOE withdraw the license application for the Yucca Mountain high level waste 
repository in 2010 [11]. This was a consequence of the temperature design limits required by 
USEPA for the vicinity of the waste packages within the deep geological repository 
(Section 7). 
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For economical reasons civil spent fuel reprocessing plants have a plant capacity of 1200 
(tHM/y) (Sellafield) or 1700 (tHM/y) (LaHague) in Europe. Such a reprocessing plant can serve 
about 50 or 70 GW(e) of PWRs (on the basis of 24 tHM unloaded spent fuel per GW(e)y). 
Such a plant capacity exceeds the own needs for reprocessing of spent fuel of countries like 
France and the UK. Therefore, these reprocessing plants also offer reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel to other countries, e.g. European countries or Japan. 
The IAEA proposed (INFCIRC/640) the multilateral approach for the nuclear fuel cycle in 
2005 [12]. This would open the possibility that several countries in certain regions of the 
world build common large scale fuel cycle facilities together in multi-partner and multi-
ownership under IAEA control. Also the US government announced the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) in 2006 [13] and Russia proposed to create a Global Nuclear 
Power Infrastructure in 2007 (Section 1) [14]. 
The capacity of MOX fuel fabrication plants in the world was about 500 (tHM/y) in 2008 
(Table 7.3, Section 7.6). These MOX fuel refabrication plants were mainly located in NWSs, 
e.g. MELOX (195 tHM/y) at Marcoule (France), Sellafield (120 tHM/y) in the UK, 
Zheleznogorsk 60 (tHM/y) in Russia. Japan with its MOX refabrication plant at Rokkasho-
mura (130 tHM/y) is the only NNWS operating such a MOX refabrication plant. The 
accompanying critique and discussion was assessed in Sections 8.7 and 8.8. 
The above mentioned reprocessing capacity of 4200 (tHM/y) in the world could reprocess 
the spent  fuel of about 175 GW(e) of PWRs (based on 24 tHM of spent nuclear fuel being 
unloaded per GW(e)y. The corresponding MOX refabrication capacity needed would be 
about 500 tHM/y based on 0.6% or 0.8% plutonium in the UOX spent fuel and 5 to 7% 
plutonium enrichment of the MOX fuel to be loaded in LWRs. 
Also, the capacity of uranium enrichment plants is almost entirely located in NWS, e.g. in 
USA (14.3 million kg SWU/y), in Russia (20 million kg SWU/y), in France (10.8 million kg 
SWU/y) and in China (0.2 million kg SWU/y) (Section 3). Japan as a NNWS has an 
enrichment capacity of 0.3 million kg SWU/y. 
Urenco, a multinational enrichment company (UK, Netherlands and Germany) can be 
considered already as a multilateral enrichment company (MLEC) along the proposal of 
IAEA for Multilateral (multinational) enrichment companies. Also, the new LASER 
enrichment facility owned by Hitachi (Japan) and General Electric (USA) or the Russian 
offer for a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure [14] belong to this category of multilateral or 
multinational fuel cycle companies. 
Multilateral uranium enrichment centers (MLECs treatment) and multilateral reprocessing 
centers (MLRCs) in collocation with MOX fuel refabrication plants – so called MLRCs – as 
well as waste treatment plants must be large fuel cycle facilities for economical reason. 
Therefore, they are well suited to be multilateral, multinational fuel cycle centers as proposed 
by IAEA (INFCIRC/640) [12]. 
14.5   Transition phase for the production of proliferation-proof plutonium. 
Already Massey et al. [16] had pointed out in 1982 that the existing reactor-grade plutonium 
from LWRs could be converted into proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium within 
several decades. Indeed the results of Section 12 show that proliferation-proof plutonium can 
be obtained using fresh fuel of types A, B, D or E after one full burnup period of 60 GWd/tHM 
or 5 to 6 years PWR operation. The large scale conversion of reactor-grade plutonium into 
proliferation-proof plutonium, therefore, becomes only a question of reprocessing plant and 
MOX fuel refabrication plant capacities. These capacities determine how fast the present 
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reactor-grade plutonium in spent fuel elements can be converted into proliferation-proof 
reactor-grade plutonium. This conversion of present plutonium into proliferation-proof 
plutonium shall only be done in NWS as neptunium cannot be avoided in this transition 
phase. 
Fig. 14.1 shows a scheme of the transition phase for PWRs. The UOX-PWRs of NWS 
receive their LEU fuel from multilateral enrichment centers (MLECs) in NWS. After one 
burnup period of 60 GWd/tHM their spent nuclear fuel – after intermediate storage – is 
transported to a multilateral reprocessing center and MOX-Pu/U refabrication center (MLRC) 
in NWS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14.1. Transition phase for the production of proliferation-proof plutonium in NWS 
(Reprocessing and Refabrication are in reality collocated but shown separately 
here). 
 
Such reprocessing centers are located presently in NWS (except the Rokkasho-mura 
reprocessing plant in Japan (see Sections 8.7 and 8.8)). It is proposed that these reprocessing 
centers in NWS apply coprocessing of plutonium and neptunium. This can be done by slight 
modification of the PUREX reprocessing flow sheet (PUREX/COEX) and is already 
Pu-238
denatured plutonium
proliferation-proof
NWS
U5, U6, U8
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considered for the LaHague reprocessing plant in France [17]. The refabricated MOX fuel 
shall contain plutonium, neptunium and reenriched uranium (similarly to fuel types A, B, D 
in Section 12 but without curium). 
This MOX Pu/U fuel will be converted in the NWS into proliferation-proof reactor-grade 
plutonium after a burnup period of 60 GWd/tHM in MOX PWRs. A simpler and faster way to 
produce directly proliferation-safe plutonium in the NWS is the use of re-enriched 
reprocessed uranium (RRU) as fresh PWR fuel. This leads directly to proliferation-proof 
reactor-grade plutonium after a burnup period of 60 GWd/tHM [10]. RRU-fuel was already 
used in PWRs in France [18]. 
The amount of civil reprocessed uranium in the world was about 120,000 tHM in 2008 [9]. 
A factor of two more of such uranium was still stored in spent nuclear fuel and would 
become available after further reprocessing. 
The re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium is already performed in centrifuge enrichment 
plants in Russia and Europe. The presently operating large scale reprocessing plants in the 
NWS are able (with slight modifications) to reprocess the fuel type A, B, D for generating 
proliferation-safe reactor-grade plutonium. Their capacities would be sufficient to serve the 
initial cores about 170 GW(e) MOX PWRs (Section 14.4) which is close to one half of the 
PWRs which were operating in the world in 2008. 
At a later stage and along with the present development efforts for the separation of 
americium and curium, for the transmutation and incineration of americium and storage of 
curium for decay, the present large scale reprocessing plants could be supplemented by 
additional separation stages. These additional separation stages would apply e.g. the SANEX-
GANEX or EXAm processes in France to separate americium and curium [17]. Americium 
could then be used later in the FR fuel cycle to keep the Pu-238 percentage in the plutonium 
isotopic composition at the required level for proliferation-proof plutonium (Section 13.8). 
14.6    Different levels for non-proliferation criteria of reactor-grade plutonium 
In Section 12 it was shown that several options, e.g. fuel type A, B, D or E can be used to 
produce plutonium with Pu-238 isotopic contents up to about 6-12% in one burnup period of 
60 GWd/tHM in a PWR core [10]. Similar results had been obtained by Campbell et al. [19] 
already in 1978. 
In Section 9 and 10 it was demonstrated by nuclear explosion yield calculations and by 
thermal analyses, that HNEDs become technically unfeasible for reactor-grade plutonium 
with Pu-238 isotopic contents above certain thermal limits. These thermal limits are listed in 
Table 14.1 together with the corresponding alpha-particle heat power of HNEDs and the Pu-
238 contents of the reactor-grade plutonium of PWR spent fuel. Different possibilities of 
cooling the HNEDs were also investigated in Section 10. They are also listed as category I 
and category II in Table 14.1. 
As detailed in Section 10, very high technology HNEDs in terms of the size of the 
HNEDs, applied chemical explosives, art of implosion technology etc. could only be 
mastered by advanced NWSs. They do possess already NEDs on the basis of weapon-grade 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. According to Garwin [20], deVolpi [21] and Grizzle 
[22] NWS have never applied reactor-grade for plutonium nuclear weapons (Section 10). 
Therefore, very high technology cases are not included in the present proposal for levels of 
non-proliferation (Table 14.1). (These thermal limits are time-dependent and they decrease 
somewhat as a function of time. This must be taken into account for the design of HNEDs or 
the americium must be separated chemically (Section 10). 
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Thermal analysis Technology 
assumption 
Alpha-particle 
heat power (kW) 
of HNED 
Pu-238 isotopic 
content (%) 
Proposed safe 
level for non-
proliferation 
Outside cooling 
of HNED by radi-
ation and natural 
convection by air 
 
low 
medium 
0.120 
0.240 
1.8 
3.6 
Ia 
Ib 
Cooling of HNED 
by liquid helium 
low 
medium 
0.24 – 0.46 
0.39 – 0.46 
3.5 – 7.0 
6.0 – 7.0 
Cooling by inter-
nal rods of high 
conductivity 
 
low 
 
0.4 
 
6.2 
 
 
     II 
 
Tab. 14.1. Proposed levels for non-proliferation of reactor-grade plutonium for different 
limits for alpha-particle heat power and corresponding Pu-isotopic composition. 
14.6.1   Scientific proposal for level I criterion for non-proliferation 
The level I criterion for non-proliferation shall be split into level Ia (low technology HNEDs) 
and level Ib (medium technology HNEDs) for PWR spent fuel in Table 14.1. The level Ia 
non-proliferation criterion (Table 14.1) shall be valid for reactor-grade plutonium with a Pu-
238 content above 1.8% which corresponds to an alpha-particle heat power of the low 
technology HNED above 0.12 kW. Such reactor-grade plutonium of more than 1.8% Pu-238 
is proliferation-proof for all HNEDs of low technology cooled at the outside by radiation and 
natural convection by air. 
Similarly, the safety level Ib criterion for non-proliferation shall be valid for reactor-grade 
plutonium from PWR spent fuel with a Pu-238 content above 3.6% which corresponds to an 
alpha-particle heat power of the medium technology HNED with an alpha-particle heat above 
0.24 kW. Such reactor-grade plutonium with more than 3.6% Pu-238 is proliferation-proof 
for all HNEDs, of medium technology cooled at the outside by radiation and natural 
convection by air. 
The buildup of Am-241 as a function of time shall be neglected in the discussed proposal 
for the level Ia and Ib non-proliferation criteria in order to remain conservative. 
14.6.2    Scientific proposal for level II criterion for non-proliferation 
The level II criterion for non-proliferation (Table 14.1) shall cover cooling of the low and 
medium technology HNEDs by liquid helium to -270 °C as well as the possibility of cooling 
of low technology HNEDs by internal rods of high conductivity. 
From Table 14.1 it can be understood that a level II criterion of non-proliferation of 
0.46 kW alpha-particle heat power of the HNED (thermal limit) covers cooling of the low 
and medium technology HNEDs down to -270 °C as well as cooling by rods of high 
conductivity for low technology HNEDs. This thermal limit corresponds to 7% Pu-238 in the 
reactor plutonium (Table 9.6b). Such reactor-grade plutonium with more than 7% Pu-238 is 
considered proliferation-proof. 
The buildup of Am-241 as a function of time is neglected in this proposal for the level II 
non-proliferation criterion in order to remain conservative. 
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(This safety level II would even cover the very high technology case with the limit of 
0.37 kW for cooling the outside of HNEDs by radiation and natural convection by air 
(Section 10)). 
Proliferation-proof reactor grade plutonium satisfying level II with about 7% Pu-238 
would require slight adaptions of the chemical reprocessing methods and MOX refabrication 
methods. Present chemical reprocessing plants allow Pu-238 contents of the reactor grade 
plutonium up to about 6% [17]. For the MOX fuel fabrication  also more advanced methods 
like vibro-compaction or Solgel processes could be applied (Section 7). 
14.6.3 Alpha-particle decay of Pu-238 in proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium 
Pu-238 decays with a half-life of 87.7 years. This must be accounted for in the management 
as well as safeguards survey and control of IAEA of a future civil fuel cycle with 
proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium. The fuel cycle turn-around time of the PWR 
MOX recycle case is 10 years. For future FR recycle times only two years are projected. For 
these time periods the decay of Pu-238 will be rather small, but should be accounted for. 
However, proliferation-proof plutonium should not be stored over many decades because the 
Pu-238 could decay to such percentage that the reactor-grade plutonium would no longer be 
proliferation-proof any more. Therefore, the proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium must 
be utilized without long delays in the fuel cycle. This must be controlled and verified by 
IAEA inspectors (Section 8). 
14.7 Can proliferation-proof plutonium be converted to weapon grade plutonium 
In this subsection the question is discussed whether such proliferation-proof, reactor grade 
plutonium, as , e.g., given in Table 13.3 with 7.7% Pu-238, 44% Pu-239, 31% Pu-240, 10.3% 
Pu-241, and 7% Pu-242, could be modified by enrichment techniques, to weapon-grade 
plutonium. This is discussed below for the possibilities of applying either centrifuge or 
LASER enrichment technology. 
14.7.1     Centrifuge enrichment technology 
For the utilization of centrifuge enrichment technology, the reactor-grade plutonium must be 
converted into plutonium hexafluoride PuF6, the only gaseous component of plutonium with 
a sublimation temperature of 51 °C [26]. 
14.7.2 Decomposition of PuF6 by alpha-particle radiation 
Gaseous PuF6 is formed by reaction between plutonium tetrafluoride PuF4 with fluorine gas 
at elevated temperature (750 °C). Plutonium hexafluoride is a very powerful fluorinating 
agent. Its rate of thermal dissociation is fairly small, but PuF6 decomposes as a consequence 
of the high specific alpha radiation activity of its different isotopes. The decomposition 
product is solid plutonium tetrafluoride PuF4. 
4 2PuF   PuF  + F$6  
which plates out on the surrounding surfaces. According to Weinstock et al. [26] an average 
energy of 31 eV is necessary for the decomposition of one PuF6 molecule. When the PuF6 is 
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kept as a solid material at temperatures lower than 51 °C a destruction rate of the PuF6 of 
1.5% per day was measured. On the other side, if the PuF6 is stored as a gas in small 
cylinders the destruction rate was only 0.1% [26]. In this case, dependent on the geometry of 
the container and the pressure of the gas a large fraction of the alpha particles from the decay 
of plutonium isotopes is absorbed by the walls of the container. This difference between the 
destruction losses of the solid plutonium hexafluoride and the gaseous plutonium 
hexafluoride of a factor of 15 will be applied in the considerations below. 
Somewhat smaller destruction rates as in the PuF6 gas were reported for uranium 
hexafluoride [27]. UF6 has a decomposition energy of about 100 eV per 0.9 molecule. 
Kryuchkov et al. [27] proposed to use this effect for non-proliferation purposes by admixing, 
e.g. 1% of U-232 hexafluoride to the U-235/U-238 uranium hexafluoride mixture. U-232 is 
one of the strongest alpha-particle emitters with a half-life of about 70 years and an average 
energy of the alpha particles of 5.3 MeV. Kryuchkov et al. [27] showed that the admixture of 
1% U-232 would destroy about 48% of all UF6 molecules within a time period of 1.2 months. 
If these calculational procedures of Kryuchkov et al. [27] are applied to different 
proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium isotopic mixtures of plutonium-hexafluoride the 
following data must be considered. Table 14.2 shows the half-lives, the decay constants, the 
alpha-decay activities and the energies of the alpha-particles emitted from the different 
plutonium isotopes. Pu-241 decays via beta decay into Am-241 with a half life of 14.4 years. 
Am-241 itself is an alpha-emitter. However, Am-241 is not considered for the further 
considerations. 
From the activities of the different alpha-particle emitting plutonium isotopes the number 
of emitted alpha-particles can be determined e.g. for a time period of one year. Each alpha-
particle with an energy, e.g. for Pu-239 with 5.5 MeV, can destroy 1.77x105 molecules of 
PuF6, as the average energy to destroy one PuF6 molecule into PuF4 is 31 eV [26]. The 
measured data of [26] for the case of PuF6 gas in a container resulted in loss of PuF6 
molecules by destruction which was by  a factor of 15 smaller than in solid PuF6 material. 
Applying this factor 15 allows calculating the decomposition losses over a time period of one 
month for the three different plutonium isotopic compositions of Table 14.3. The isotopic 
compositions correspond to the levels Ia, Ib and II for non-proliferation which were defined 
in the previous  Section 14.6. 
 
Pu-isotope Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Half-life for 
-decay (y) 
87.7 2.41x104 6563 -decay 3.75x105 
Decay constant 
 [s-1] 
2.5x10-10 0.91x10-10 3.3x10-12 ---* 0.58x10-13 
Activity of -decay 
(sg)-1 
6.3x1011 0.23x1010 0.88x1010 ---* 0.15x109 
Energy of alpha 
particles (MeV) 
5.5 5.2 5.2 ---* 4.9 
*Pu-241 decays to Am-241 with a half-life of 14.4 years. 
 
Table 14.2.  Data for alpha decay of plutonium isotopes. 
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Pu-isotope Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 
Type Ia composition [%] 1.8 55.2 23.8 12.8 5.4 
Type Ib composition [%] 3.6 52.0 23.1 14.1 7.2 
Type II composition [%] 7.0 39.6 25.8 18.0 9.6 
 
Table 14.3.  Different proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium compositions. 
 
A plutonium hexafluoride mixture of non-proliferation level Ia (Table 14.3) would loose 
within one month about 18% of its PuF6 molecules by alpha-particle decomposition. A 
plutonium hexafluoride mixture of non-proliferation level Ib (Table 14.3) would loose within 
one month about 32% of its PuF6 molecules by alpha-particle induced decomposition. A 
plutonium hexafluoride mixture of non-proliferation level II (Table 14.3) would loose within 
one month about 58% of its PuF6 molecules by alpha-particle induced decomposition. 
The results for Pu-238 (highest enrichment factor of all plutonium isotopes and the above 
high decomposition rates for PuF<) show that all enrichment methods (centrifuges etc.) using 
plutoniumhexafluoride, PuF6, lead to technically almost insurmountable problems. 
14.7.3      Atomic vapor Laser isotope enrichment 
For the LASER isotope separation based on plutonium vapor (AVLIS process) insufficient 
scientific information is available in the open literature to answer this question directly. But it 
is known that the different isotopes can be selectively excited by LASER beams and be 
separated. However, if the argumentation of [28] is applied to proliferation-proof reactor 
grade plutonium containing Am-241 from the decay of Pu-241, it can be concluded that 
LASER enrichment with the AVLIS process would become very difficult, if technically 
possible at all. All earlier efforts of enriching uranium by atomic vapor LASER technology 
were not pursued to technical scale up to now. 
14.8. Future civil Pu/U fuel with proliferation-proof, reactor-grade plutonium 
At the end of the transition phase (Fig. 14.1) proliferation-safe, reactor-grade plutonium 
would be available for MOX Pu/U fuel refabrication. This proliferation-proof reactor-grade 
plutonium cannot be misused any more for nuclear explosive devices. It can be incinerated in 
PWRs or FRs. 
This must occur under the prerequisites of the reactor-grade plutonium remaining 
proliferation-proof over the burnup phase of about 60 GWd/t. 
Neptunium-237 is a proliferation problem as it can be misused for building nuclear 
explosive devices (Section 13). Therefore, it must be made sure that only extremely small 
amounts of neptunium are produced. (A very small amount will be produced by alpha-decay 
of Pu-241 and neutron capture process in U-235 and U-236 of the 0.2% U-235 of depleted 
uranium (Section 13)). 
14.8.1 Incineration of proliferation-proof, reactor-grade plutonium in PWRs 
In Section 13 it was shown that proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium with 7.7% Pu-
238 (being slightly above the level II criterion for non-proliferation) can be incinerated by 
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MOX-PWRs (Fig. 14.2). Only tiny amounts of neptuniun would be generated. The fresh 
MOX fuel would contain proliferation-proof, reactor-grade plutonium and either 0% or 0.5% 
proliferation-proof americium. In addition the MOX fuel must contain 54.67% thorium and 
either 1.69% or 2.17% U-233 to assure acceptable safety-related reactivity coefficients. This 
design option would allow the incineration of about 40 kg/tHM of proliferation-proof 
plutonium over a burnup phase of 60 GWd/tHM. The Pu-238 content would even slightly 
increase during burnup, whereas the Pu-239 content would decrease from 44% to 20% during 
this burnup phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14.2. Incineration of proliferation-proof plutonium in PWRs in a future civil 
international proliferation-proof fuel cycle. (Reprocessing and Refabrication 
step are in reality collocated in one MLRC but shown separately.) 
 
Nevertheless another recycling of this proliferation-safe plutonium would still be possible. 
For this case the proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium after a first recycle containing 
only about 20% Pu-239 would have to be mixed with the reactor-grade plutonium coming 
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from the transition phase which contains 44% Pu-239. This would enable recycling over a 
number of decades. This method is similar to the SGR Pu-recycling, described in Section 7. 
The PWR core design would have to be modified slightly and a mixed thorium/plutonium/ 
uranium reprocessing scheme would have to be deployed. 
For proliferation-proof, reactor-grade MOX fuel corresponding to level Ia or Ib for non-
proliferation with only more than 1.8% or 3.6% Pu-238 isotopic content the above described 
constraints regarding safety related reactivity coefficients would be easier to cope with. 
14.8.2 Incineration of proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium in FRs 
The proliferation-proof plutonium could also be loaded into FR cores, either directly after a 
transition phase (Section 14.5) or after a recycling phase of a number of decades in PWRs 
(Section 14.8.1). This is shown in Fig. 14.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14.3. Incineration of proliferation-proof plutonium in FRs. Future civil international 
proliferation-proof fuel cycle. 
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In this case about 4% proliferation-proof americium must be admixed to the proliferation-
proof plutonium in the fresh fuel, in order to keep the Pu-238 sustainable (Section 13.8) over 
the whole burnup cycle of about 130-150 GWd/t. Only depleted uranium (e.g. containing 
about 99.8% of U-238 and about 0.2% of U-235) may be used to keep the neptunium 
production minimal (buildup of neptunium by neutron capture in U-235 and subsequently in 
U-236). 
Also the blanket fuel of FRs would have to consist of depleted uranium with about 4% 
proliferation-proof americium and about 1% proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium if 
the level II non-proliferation criterion could have to be fulfilled. The 1% proliferation-proof 
plutonium should have a Pu-238 content which is about to 4% higher than the proposed level 
for non-proliferation, e.g. it should be (7+4)% Pu-238 for non-proliferation level II in order 
to assure proliferation-proof plutonium from the very beginning of irradiation in the blanket 
fuel (see Fig. 13.15 in Section 13.8.1.2). The Pu-239 from neutron capture in U-238 would be 
born in the proliferation-proof plutonium admixed to the fresh fuel. In addition Pu-238 would 
be generated from the decay of Cm-242 (half life 180 days). 
A sodium-cooled BN-600-type fast reactor core was analyzed in Section 13. The results 
show that for the two considered options the system can operate either as a burner of 
proliferation-proof plutonium or as a breeder. In case of a FR burner without blankets a 
conversion ratio of CR = 0.78 and an incineration rate for proliferation-resistant plutonium of 
33 kg/t during the burnup phase of 150 GWd/tHM were obtained. If the FR would be operated 
as a breeder with blankets a breeding ratio of BR = 1.07 would be possible for the BN-600-
type FR (Section 13). 
However, FR burners would have to operate first for many decades in order to incinerate 
all plutonium (2500 t in 2010) which was generated by UOX fuelled thermal spectrum 
reactors and by MOX-PWRs operating during the transition phase. Only when natural 
uranium will become scarce, FR breeding will have to take over. However, then a breeding 
ratio of about BR = 1.07 will be sufficient. 
FR reactors operating in the thorium/plutonium/uranium fuel cycle with proliferation-
proof plutonium would be feasible as well using fuel with U-233 from option E (Section 12). 
The important result is that after a transition phase, in which proliferation-proof plutonium 
is produced by PWRs, a civil proliferation-proof fuel cycle becomes possible. 
The transition phase could be started already with present fuel cycle centers of the NWSs, 
e.g. LaHague in France, Sellafield in the UK, or Mayak in Russia. These fuel cycle centers 
could later be complemented by more international MLRCs following the proposal of [23] 
and IAEA [12]. 
14.8.2.1 Availability of americium for sustainability of proliferation-proof plutonium 
in FR burners or breeders 
As shown in Section 14.8.1 and Section 14.8.2 above, americium would be required to keep 
the proliferation-proof plutonium sustainable in both future FR-burners and FR breeders. The 
question then comes up whether there will be sufficient americium available to operate a 
proliferation-proof civil nuclear fuel cycle. 
Fig. 1.3 in Section 1 shows the projections of the IAEA for the generation of americium 
by nuclear reactors in the world up to 2030. About 450 tons of americium would be available 
worldwide until 2030. 
A fast reactor, e.g. BN-800 with 800 MW(e) power has a mass of 16 tons of PuO2/UO2 
and 25 tons of UO2 in the blankets. Assuming 4% of americium in the core and blanket fuel – 
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as assumed above and in Section 13.8 – about 2 to 2.5 tons of americium would be needed 
for loading such a future FR (somewhat less for FR burners without blankets somewhat more 
for FR breeders with blankets). On the basis of 2.5 tons of americium per GWe and an 
availability of 450 tons americium by 2030 this would be sufficient to start about 180 GW(e) 
FRs. The americium will be incinerated (20 kg/ton, see Section 13.8.3) and provide the Pu-
238 to keep plutonium proliferation-proof. 
A large scale introduction of FR burners will probably not start before 2040-2050 (Section 
2). Even then LWRs and FRs must continue to operate together in symbiosis and MOX-
PWRs produce more americium than UOX-PWR (Section 7). 
14.8.3 Future international proliferation-proof nuclear fuel cycles 
The proliferation-proof plutonium and proliferation-proof americium together with thorium 
and depleted uranium can then be utilized in a later proliferation-proof international civil 
nuclear fuel cycle which is open for all countries (Fig. 14.4). Advanced aqueous or 
pyrochemical reprocessing for plutonium/thorium/uranium fuel and related fuel refabrication 
technology applying remote handling may become necessary. IAEA safeguards would still be 
required. 
An increase of the present reprocessing and MOX refabrication plant capacity by a factor 
of three would be sufficient for 525 GWe PWRs which is about a factor of two more than the 
265 GWe PWRs operating in 2008. This additional needed reprocessing and MOX 
refabrication plant capacity should be located where the PWRs are operated (Fig. 14.4). 
The NWSs should open their MLRCs for multi-partnership with other countries according 
to the initiatives of the USA and Russia [13,14]. 
Fig. 14.4. Future multilateral reprocessing and refabrication centers (MLRCs) in the world 
(adapted from IAEA). 
439 Power Reactors in 30 countries
~ 372 GWe in 2008
in future multilateral reprocessing
and re-fabrication centers (MLRCs),
as proposed by IAEA 2005
Presently existing:
La Hague (F) 1700 t/y
Sellafield (UK) 1200 t/y
Rokkasho (J)   800 t/y
MAJAK     (C)  500 t/y
4000 t/y potential future
MLRCs
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14.9 Effect on Safeguards and Non-proliferation Issues in Future Civil Uses of 
Nuclear Power of the Proposed Concept of Upper Limits for Non-proliferation 
Sections 8.3 and 8.4 above had shown the main reason for the existing mistrust of any kind of 
chemical reprocessing and plutonium recycling in LWRs and FRs to be the ultra-conservative 
requirements of INFCE/153 [15]. The requirements in INFCE/153 and internal U.S. 
safeguards conditions and classifications, respectively, are practically identical. 
The rule in INFCE/153 [15] that all reactor-grade plutonium, other than plutonium with a 
Pu-238 isotopic content of 80%, must be treated like weapon-grade plutonium cannot be 
made consistent with the results of the thermal analysis discussed in Section 10, where it was 
shown that critical spheres without reflectors and without chemical implosion lenses (keff = 1) 
of reactor-grade plutonium metal are completely molten already above a Pu-238 isotopic 
content of about 23%. If these spheres of reactor-grade plutonium metal are surrounded by a 
reflector or tamper of reactor-grade plutonium metal, as required for a nuclear explosive 
device, and with the necessary explosive lenses for implosion, this thermal limit drops as 
follows for reactor-grade plutonium of spent PWR fuel: 
 
 1.8% Pu-238 (low-technology HNEDs with 0.12 kW) cooling by 
 3.6% Pu-238 (medium-technology HNEDs with 0.24 kW) radiation and natural 
  convection by air 
 7% Pu-238 (low and medium-technology HNEDs cooling by liquid 
 with 0.46 kW) helium to –270 °C 
 6.2% Pu-238 (low-technology HNEDs with 0.4 kW) cooling by internal 
 rods of high thermal 
conductivity 
Above these limits the chemical explosives of the explosive lenses either melt or self-
explode. Reactor-grade plutonium whose Pu-238 isotopic composition is above these 
thermal limits may be considered proliferation-proof. 
As such proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium cannot be misused for building 
nuclear explosive devices, it must not be equated with weapon-grade plutonium as required 
in INFCE/153 [15]. 
Reprocessing plants and Pu/U refabrication plants processing such proliferation-proof 
reactor grade plutonium no longer fall under the risk described in Sections 8.3 and 8.4 which 
is caused by the measurement error of 1% of the safeguards instrumentation in large 
reprocessing plants. Hence, there is no reason either to fear abrupt or protracted 
diversion. 
Opting out of the NPT and subsequently making use of the proliferation-proof reactor-
grade plutonium to build nuclear weapons would make no sense. The proliferation-proof 
reactor-grade plutonium then in possession of the government could not be used to make 
nuclear weapons. 
A specific attempt to produce weapon-grade plutonium by shutting the nuclear reactor 
down and unloading parts of the fuel elements or the total core at an early point in time (after 
some weeks) and reprocessing the low-irradiated LEU UOX fuel elements or special U-238 
fuel elements must be detected by IAEA safeguards, e.g., anti-neutrino detectors combined 
with electronic data transmission to the IAEA headquarters (Section 8.3). If, however, the 
reactor is fueled with MOX fuel from proliferation-proof reactor-grade plutonium, this too 
cannot be used any more for nuclear weapons at any point in time. 
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If an NNWS does not accede to the NPT and builds and runs on its own all nuclear plants 
required for making weapon-grade plutonium, it can be prevented from doing so only by 
diplomatic measures or other deterrents. 
14.9.1 Not Included In This Proposal 
It should be emphasized again at this point that the following reactor lines cannot be included 
in the above proposal of an international proliferation-proof civil fuel cycle: 
– Gas cooled graphite reactors, e.g. of MAGNOX type and  
– CANDU reactors, which attain a maximum fuel burnup of only 7 GWd/t. This is also 
valid for more recent version (CANDU-ATR), with fuel burnup up to 20 GWd/tHM. 
– Research reactors, which attain a maximum fuel burnup of only 7 GWd/t. 
– Breeding blanket elements with depleted uranium or natural uranium fuel of today’s 
prototype fast breeder reactors. 
The latter are required, in the future to contain about 4% of americium for the production 
of Pu-238 and about 1% proliferation-proof plutonium with an initial Pu-238 composition 
of about 11% (non-proliferation level II), in the fresh blanket elements. In this way, the 
plutonium of the blanket elements will always remain proliferation-proof (Section 13). 
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